

SCHOOL SHOOTER RESOURCE KIT


Presented by: Ohio Homeland Security's
Strategic Analysis & Information Center



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Click image below to view an active shooter survival video provided by the City of Houston Mayor's Office of Public Safety and Homeland Security



20 December 2012

Bulletin 2012-095

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(U) The information contained in this guide is for educators and first responders. The Ohio Homeland Security—Strategic Analysis and Information Center (OHS/SAIC) strives to provide our reader with relevant, pertinent, and timely information.

(U) Please review the compilation of documents using the navigation bookmarks located on the left hand side of the document. If you have any questions regarding the content contained within or to report suspicious activity, please contact the OHS/SAIC at SAIC@dps.state.oh.us or (877) OHS-INTEL.



(U) Law enforcement response to Chardon High School shooting. Photo from Mirror News.

(U) Newtown CT School Shooting

(U) On 14 December 2012, an active shooter entered Sandy Hook Elementary school in Newtown, CT killing 20 students and 6 staff members.


(U) As the nation responds to this incident, the Ohio Homeland Security—Strategic Analysis and Information Center is dedicated to assisting educators and first responders in preventing, detecting, and deterring similar incidents in our communities.



(U) Children evacuating Sandy Hook. Photo from LA Times.

(U) Did you know?

- (U) According to 2011 FBI Statistics, there were **344** firearm related deaths in Ohio.
- (U) According to the Washington Post, in the five years prior to the school shooting in Newtown, Connecticut, there have been 13 major active shooter incidents in the United States, resulting in over 145 deaths and 130 injuries.
- (U) On 14 March 2012, a man armed with three knives stabbed four people at the Miami Jacobs Career College in Columbus, Ohio. The suspected perpetrator was wounded by Columbus Division of Police during the arrest.
- (U) On 27 February 2012, a former student of Chardon High School shot 6 students, killing 3, with a .22 caliber handgun. The suspected perpetrator was taken into custody shortly after the incident.
- (U) According to the New York City Police Department (NYPD), 46% of active shooter incidents are ended by the application of force by police or security, 40% end in the shooter's suicide, 14% of the time the shooter surrenders or, in less than 1% of cases, the violence ends with the attacker fleeing.
- (U) According to research by the NYPD, 29% of active shooter events occurred at schools and 36% of active shooter incidents involved multiple weapons.



Cover articles can be found at:

Las Vegas courthouse shooting highlights rising threat:
<http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2010/0104/Las-Vegas-courthouse-shooting-highlights-rising-threat>

St. Louis News: ABB Shooting Leaves 3 Dead, 8 Injured:
<http://personalmoneystore.com/moneyblog/2010/01/07/st-louis-news-abb-shooting>

Gunman kills 8, himself at busy Nebraska mall:
<http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/news/nationworld/stories/120607dnnatmallshooting.6e6aa175.html>

Two die, four hurt in Atlanta shootings:
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/01/12/national/main6088432.shtml>

Based on

How to Survive An Active Shooter, Fort A.P. Hill, U.S. Army
U.S. Department of Homeland Security. *Active Shooter: How to Respond*. December 2008

STOP WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

ACTIVE SHOOTER

HOW TO RESPOND

GUIDANCE ON HOW TO RESPOND TO AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION AND REACT WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONDS

CRIME SCENE DO NOT

Las Vegas courthouse shooting highlights rising threat

Two die, four hurt in Atlanta shootings

St. Louis News: ABB Shooting Leaves 3 dead, 8 Injured

Gunman kills 8, himself at busy Nebraska mall



PROFILE OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An active shooter is an individual engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases, active shooters use firearms and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims. Because active shooter situations often are over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

Quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. Remember that customers and clients are likely to follow the lead of employees and managers during an active shooter situation.

1. Evacuate

If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
- Leave your belongings behind
- Help others escape, if possible
- Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may be
- Keep your hands visible
- Follow the instructions of any police officers
- Do not attempt to move wounded people
- Call 911 when you are safe

2. Hide out

If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter is less likely to find you. Your hiding place should:

- Be out of the active shooter's view
- Provide protection if shots are fired in your direction (e.g., an office with a closed and locked door)
- Turn off lights
- Not trap you or restrict your options for movement

GOOD PRACTICES FOR COPING WITH AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Be aware of your environment and all possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- If you are in a hallway, get into a room and secure the door
- As a last resort, you may choose to attempt to take the active shooter down – when the shooter is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is much greater if you try to incapacitate him/her

CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO!

To prevent an active shooter from entering your hiding place:

- Blockade the door with heavy furniture

If the active shooter is nearby:

- Silence your cell phone and/or pager
- Turn off any source of noise (e.g., radios, televisions)
- Hide behind large items (e.g., cabinets, desks)
- Remain quiet

If evacuation or hiding out are not possible:

- Remain calm
- Dial 911, if possible, to alert police to the active shooter's location
- If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen

3. Take action against the active shooter

As a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, you may choose to attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by:

- Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
- Throwing items and improvising weapons
- Yelling
- Committing to your actions and follow through

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

Law enforcement's goal is to locate, contain and stop the active shooter as soon as possible. Officers will proceed directly to the area in which the last shots were heard.

- Officers usually arrive in teams of four
- Officers may wear regular patrol uniforms or external bulletproof vests, helmets and other tactical equipment
- Officers may be armed with rifles, shotguns and handguns
- Officers may use pepper spray or tear gas to control the situation
- Officers may shout commands and push individuals to the ground for their safety

How to react when law enforcement arrives:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (e.g., bags, jackets)
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers, such as attempting to hold on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling
- Do not ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises
- Information to provide to law enforcement or 911 operator:
 - Location of the active shooter
 - Number of shooters, if more than one
 - Physical description of shooter(s)
 - Number and type of weapons held by the shooter(s)
 - Number of potential victims at the location

The first officers to arrive to the scene will not stop to help injured persons. Expect rescue teams comprised of additional officers and emergency medical personnel to follow. These rescue teams will treat and remove any injured persons. They also may call upon able-bodied individuals to assist in removing the wounded from the premises. When you have reached a safe location or an assembly point, you likely will be held in that area by law enforcement until the situation is under control and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Do not leave the safe location or assembly point until law enforcement authorities have instructed you to do so.

RECOGNIZING POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

An active shooter in your workplace may be a current or former employee, or an acquaintance of a current or former employee. Intuitive managers and co-workers may notice characteristics of potentially violent behavior in an employee. Employees should inform their supervisor or security/facility manager of the potential for workplace violence due to direct knowledge, reasonable suspicion, observable warning signs or direct threat.

INDICATORS OF POTENTIAL VIOLENCE BY AN EMPLOYEE

Employees typically do not just snap but display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. If these behaviors are recognized, they often can be managed and treated. Historically, many attackers have had no prior violent criminal record.

Potentially violent behaviors may include one or more of the following (this list of behaviors is not comprehensive nor is it intended as a mechanism for diagnosing violent tendencies):

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints
- Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene
- Depression/withdrawal
- Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures
- Repeated violations of company policies
- Increased severe mood swings
- Noticeably unstable, emotional responses
- Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation
- Suicidal; comments about "putting things in order"
- Behavior that is suspect of paranoia ("everybody is against me")
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems
- Talk of previous incidents of violence
- Empathy with individuals committing violence
- Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crimes

WHEN HELP ARRIVES

Once Security Forces arrives:

- Remain calm and follow instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling
- Do not stop to ask response forces for help or direction when evacuating

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENT

The incident will be a dynamic situation that evolves rapidly and demands immediate response from law enforcement to terminate the life-threatening situation. The immediate response of the first patrolmen on scene is to take aggressive action to find and stop the shooter(s). Rescue efforts will be delayed until the danger can be either mitigated or eliminated.

IMPORTANT NUMBERS

If an emergency, ALWAYS dial

911

Other numbers to know

Base Security Forces:

Base AFOSI:

Base AT Officer:

Eagle Eyes Report:



HQ AETC

SHOOTING INCIDENT THREAT AID

SHOOTING INCIDENT

IMMEDIATE DANGER

RISK of DANGER

ESCAPE or HIDE OUT

CALL 911

- Caller's Location
- Number of Shooters
- Types of Weapons
- Shooter Location & Direction of Travel
- Shooter Description

SECURE self & location


SHELTER in place

MITIGATE: lock doors, turn off lights, limit movement

ACCOUNT for personnel & report

WAIT for response forces & instructions

IMMEDIATE DANGER



If you find yourself in immediate danger during a shooting incident within your work center **Escape** from the scene or **Hide Out**.

During **ESCAPE** plan your route, leave your stuff behind and exit with your hands visible. Security Forces personnel may mistake you for the shooter.



If you **HIDE OUT** contact 911 as soon as possible.

As a **LAST RESORT...TAKE ACTION**

If you find yourself in **IMMINENT DANGER** take action. Attempt to incapacitate or act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter.



RISK of DANGER

If you find yourself in risk of danger but are not being immediately threatened...



Secure Yourself and your Location

Once secured, position yourself in a place clear of direct fire. You should be able to observe the ingress and egress routes. This will include the process of Sheltering in place and Mitigating the vulnerabilities to the room. Mitigation will start with locking the doors and windows and barricading the access. Turn off the lights and make your location appear unoccupied. Monitor communications i.e. phone, computer, radio.

Account for Personnel and Report

By whatever means you have available contact your Unit Control Center (UCC) or Chain of Command (CoC) and inform them of your location, status and the personnel present.

Stay Put

Until the authorities instruct you to move or you have been released **DO NOT MOVE**. Persons milling about increase confusion and the likelihood of injury.

WARNING SIGNS


Someone may need help if:

- Their behavior is unusually aggressive, odd or scary
- They make threats of violence or retribution (serious or joking)
- They are distraught or show signs of suicide
- They're overheard making comments of planned/intended violence
- There is a gang/cult ideation
- They fight or perform acts of violence on the installation
- There is a presence of weapons (guns, knives, suspicious objects)

INFORMATION

Provide to Security Forces:

- ☐ Your Location
- ☐ Number of shooters
- ☐ Shooter's Location
- ☐ Description of the Shooter
- ☐ Type of weapons involved
- ☐ Shooters direction of movement



COMMAND

Co-locate with Law Enforcement, EMS, and FIRE to form Unified Command

Command Objectives:

1. Threat neutralization or containment
2. Mark potential hazards
3. Establish and mark evacuation corridor(s)
4. Establish evacuation teams with force protection
5. Rapid evacuation of the injured

LAW ENFORCEMENT

First Arriving

- Scene size-up, initial intel
- Determine entry team/officer(s)
- Designate team leader (if not single responder)
- Enter scene/engage to prevent further life loss

Arriving Supervisor:

- Establish contact with team leader
- Understand/assess situation
- Assume command
- Designate command post – maintain contact with team leader
- Separate Command and Operations as soon as practical
- Assign resources:
 - Threat neutralization
 - Victim search
- Determine perimeters (inner and outer)

EMS

First Arriving

- Scene size-up report to dispatch
- Communicate evacuation corridors
- Do NOT co-locate operations and command staff

Arriving Supervisor

- Establish contact with the initial EMS/Fire commander
- Understand/assess situation
- Assume command
- Update to scene size up. Request additional resources as appropriate
- Fire Commander assigns:
 - Operations Division Chief
 - Exterior - apparatus shielding
 - Interior - evacuation team
 - Staging
 - Communications - monitor TAC channels

FIRE

EXPLOSIVE EVACUATION GUIDELINES

Threat	Explosive Mass †	Building Evacuation ††	Outdoor Evacuation †††
Pipe bomb (metal or PVC)	5 lbs	70 ft	850 ft
Suicide belt	10 lbs	90 ft	1,080 ft
Suicide vest	20 lbs	110 ft	1,360 ft
Briefcase or backpack	50 lbs	150 ft	1,850 ft
Compact car (in trunk)	500 lbs	320 ft	1,500 ft
Full size car (in trunk)	1000 lbs	400 ft	1,750 ft
Passenger or cargo van	4,000 lbs	640 ft	2,750 ft
Small box van or truck	10,000 lbs	860 ft	3,750 ft
Large box van or water/fuel truck	30,000 lbs	1,240 ft	6,500 ft
Semi-trailer	60,000 lbs	1,570 ft	7,000 ft

† Based on the amount of material (TNT equivalent) that could reasonably fit - variations are possible.


†† Governed by the ability of an unreinforced building to withstand severe damage or collapse.

††† Governed by the greater fragment throw distance or glass breakage and falling glass hazard distance.

3E Job Aid

Sponsored by:

- Metropolitan Emergency Services Board
- Minneapolis – Saint Paul Metropolitan Medical Response System




POST BLAST ACTIVE SHOOTER 3E JOB AID

ENTER

EVALUATE

EVACUATE

COMMAND



ENTER

Caution

- Windshield survey (360 degree 3D) for threats prior to and after arriving (duffel bags/backpacks, vehicles, dumpsters, out of place persons etc.)
- Assess for radiological agent post blast
- While exiting vehicle visually clear a 15 foot safe zone all directions
- After exit from vehicle extend visual sweep 75 feet in all directions - 'z sweep'
- Check staging areas, corridors and victim areas in a similar manner - mark hazards as appropriate
- Notify dispatch/supervisor if a hazard is identified and take appropriate action
- Maintain situational awareness for secondary threats
- Incident specific PPE:
 - Post Blast: dust mask, eye and skin protection
 - Active Shooter - body protection per instructions from incident commander

Communicate

- Establish communication with command and advise location of staging
- Report type of event, provide size up: number and severity of injured, hazards, resource needs
- Assure interoperable communication (common talkgroups), request talkgroups and assign as required

Create

- Unified command separate from operations
- Formal command post at a safe distance away from scene (initial liaison of agencies may occur close to event)
- Perimeters per law enforcement
- **Patient Loading Area** - patients into ambulances
- Create **Non - Injured and Walking Wounded Assembly Area**
- **Ambulance Staging**
- Safe cover: angle vehicles in relation to building to protect from a potential secondary device blast wave



EVALUATE

Caution

- Perpetrator or accomplice may be among victims
- Hazards: Secondary devices, gas, hazmat, electrical, structural, CBRN, fire, or inhaled dusts
- Make visual and physical body sweep of all the victims for weapons and other secondary threats

Care

FIRST PRIORITY IS TO REMOVE PATIENTS FROM THE HAZARD AREA

- Triage in immediate area only vs. entire scene.
- Triage victims as alive or dead, do not touch or move dead victims (no CPR)
- Unconscious with amputations or open head injury should be triaged last
- Penetrating injuries can be small - examine trunk carefully when in a safer area
- If awaiting **Evacuation Corridor** control hemorrhage with tourniquets or dressings



EVACUATE

- Move along most secure entry/exit route
- Mark **Evacuation Corridors** (police tape, spray paint, light sticks)
- Clear scene of non-injured and walking wounded along **Evacuation Corridors** to the **Non - Injured and Walking Wounded Assembly Area**
- Make visual and physical body sweep of all the victims for weapons and other secondary threats
- Request necessary drag/carry equipment for non-ambulatory
- Extricate the living rapidly
- Move patients along **Evacuation Corridors** to **Patient Loading Area**
- For delays in transport - establish intermediary **Triage Point** for critical interventions (including tourniquets and dressings for active bleeding) - load and go as rapidly as possible
- Request law enforcement to assist with body sweeps and impound personal property before transport



ENTER Active Shooter

Concealment and Cover

- Stay in safe areas out of any lines of potential fire
- Advance from staging as directed by staging supervisor/incident commander
- Consider using large vehicles (i.e. fire trucks) as cover

Corridor

- With law enforcement establish location of wounded and determine **Evacuation Corridors**
- Once corridor is secured evacuation team(s) may enter towards wounded with law enforcement cover
- Take in tourniquets and bandages, minimize treatment




ENTER Post Blast

Cordon

- Law enforcement defines secure rescue grid and work zone

Corridor

- All movement in and out of scene must follow established **Evacuation Corridors**
- Enter safest/most accessible area first - establish geographic divisions within operations section based on event scope
- Direct non - injured and walking wounded to exit along **Evacuation Corridors** to **Non - Injured and Walking Wounded Assembly Area**
- Follow in the footsteps of others in case of buried hazards





ACTIVE SHOOTER

HOW TO RESPOND



National Retail Federation®
The Voice of Retail Worldwide



RETAIL INDUSTRY LEADERS ASSOCIATION
Retail's Future...Educate, Innovate, Advocate

October 2008

Emergency Numbers

EMERGENCY SERVICES: 9 -1 -1

LOCAL EMERGENCY INFORMATION LINE: _____

LOCAL POLICE DEPARTMENT: _____

LOCAL FIRE DEPARTMENT: _____

LOCAL HOSPITAL: _____

LOCAL FBI FIELD OFFICE: _____

FACILITY SECURITY: _____

FACILITY ADDRESS: _____

FLOOR: _____ SUITE/ROOM: _____

OFFICE #: _____ EXT. _____

PROFILE OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An Active Shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area; in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.

Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate harm to victims.

Because active shooter situations are often over within 10 to 15 minutes, before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter situation.

Good practices for coping with an active shooter situation

- Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- If you are in a hallway, get into a room and secure the door
- As a last resort, attempt to take the active shooter down. When the shooter is at close range and you cannot flee, your chance of survival is much greater if you try to incapacitate him/her.

**CALL 911
WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO!**

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

Quickly determine the most reasonable way to protect your own life. Remember that customers and clients are likely to follow the lead of employees and managers during an active shooter situation.

1. Evacuate

If there is an accessible escape path, attempt to evacuate the premises. Be sure to:

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Evacuate regardless of whether others agree to follow
- Leave your belongings behind
- Help others escape, if possible
- Prevent individuals from entering an area where the active shooter may be
- Keep your hands visible
- Follow the instructions of any police officers
- Do not attempt to move wounded people
- Call 911 when you are safe

2. Hide out

If evacuation is not possible, find a place to hide where the active shooter is less likely to find you.

Your hiding place should:

- Be out of the active shooter's view
- Provide protection if shots are fired in your direction (i.e., an office with a closed and locked door)
- Not trap you or restrict your options for movement

To prevent an active shooter from entering your hiding place:

- Lock the door
- Blockade the door with heavy furniture

If the active shooter is nearby:

- Lock the door
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager
- Turn off any source of noise (i.e., radios, televisions)
- Hide behind large items (i.e., cabinets, desks)
- Remain quiet


If evacuation and hiding out are not possible:

- Remain calm
- Dial 911, if possible, to alert police to the active shooter's location
- If you cannot speak, leave the line open and allow the dispatcher to listen

3. Take action against the active shooter

As a last resort, and only when your life is in imminent danger, attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by:

- Acting as aggressively as possible against him/her
- Throwing items and improvising weapons
- Yelling
- Committing to your actions



HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

Law enforcement's purpose is to stop the active shooter as soon as possible. Officers will proceed directly to the area in which the last shots were heard.

- Officers usually arrive in teams of four (4)
- Officers may wear regular patrol uniforms or external bulletproof vests, Kevlar helmets, and other tactical equipment
- Officers may be armed with rifles, shotguns, handguns
- Officers may use pepper spray or tear gas to control the situation
- Officers may shout commands, and may push individuals to the ground for their safety

How to react when law enforcement arrives:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

Information to provide to law enforcement or 911 operator:

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter/s
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
- Number of potential victims at the location

The first officers to arrive to the scene will not stop to help injured persons. Expect rescue teams comprised of additional officers and emergency medical personnel to follow the initial officers. These rescue teams will treat and remove any injured persons. They may also call upon able-bodied individuals to assist in removing the wounded from the premises.

Once you have reached a safe location or an assembly point, you will likely be held in that area by law enforcement until the situation is under control, and all witnesses have been identified and questioned. Do not leave until law enforcement authorities have instructed you to do so.

TRAINING YOUR STAFF FOR AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

To best prepare your staff for an active shooter situation, create an Emergency Action Plan (EAP), and conduct training exercises. Together, the EAP and training exercises will prepare your staff to effectively respond and help minimize loss of life.

Components of an Emergency Action Plan (EAP)

Create the EAP with input from several stakeholders including your human resources department, your training department (if one exists), facility owners / operators, your property manager, and local law enforcement and/or emergency responders. An effective EAP includes:

- A preferred method for reporting fires and other emergencies
- An evacuation policy and procedure
- Emergency escape procedures and route assignments (i.e., floor plans, safe areas)
- Contact information for, and responsibilities of individuals to be contacted under the EAP
- Information concerning local area hospitals (i.e., name, telephone number, and distance from your location)
- An emergency notification system to alert various parties of an emergency including:
 - Individuals at remote locations within premises
 - Local law enforcement
 - Local area hospitals

Components of Training Exercises

The most effective way to train your staff to respond to an active shooter situation is to conduct mock active shooter training exercises. Local law enforcement is an excellent resource in designing training exercises.

- Recognizing the sound of gunshots
- Reacting quickly when gunshots are heard and/or when a shooting is witnessed:
 - Evacuating the area
 - Hiding out
 - Acting against the shooter as a last resort
- Calling 911
- Reacting when law enforcement arrives
- Adopting the survival mind set during times of crisis

Additional Ways to Prepare For and Prevent an Active Shooter Situation

- Preparedness
 - Ensure that your facility has at least two evacuation routes
 - Post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout your facility
 - Include local law enforcement and first responders during training exercises
 - Encourage law enforcement, emergency responders, SWAT teams, K-9 teams, and bomb squads to train for an active shooter scenario at your location
- Prevention
 - Foster a respectful workplace
 - Be aware of indications of workplace violence and take remedial actions accordingly

For more information on creating an EAP contact the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, www.osha.gov.



PREPARING FOR AND MANAGING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

Your human resources department and facility managers should engage in planning for emergency situations, including an active shooter scenario. Planning for emergency situations will help to mitigate the likelihood of an incident by establishing the mechanisms described below.

Human Resources' Responsibilities

- Conduct effective employee screening and background checks
- Create a system for reporting signs of potentially violent behavior
- Make counseling services available to employees
- Develop an EAP which includes policies and procedures for dealing with an active shooter situation, as well as after action planning

Facility Manager Responsibilities

- Institute access controls (i.e., keys, security system pass codes)
- Distribute critical items to appropriate managers / employees, including:
 - Floor plans
 - Keys
 - Facility personnel lists and telephone numbers
- Coordinate with the facility's security department to ensure the physical security of the location
- Assemble crisis kits containing:
 - radios
 - floor plans
 - staff roster, and staff emergency contact numbers
 - first aid kits
 - flashlights
- Place removable floor plans near entrances and exits for emergency responders
- Activate the emergency notification system when an emergency situation occurs

Reactions of Managers During an Active Shooter Situation

Employees and customers are likely to follow the lead of managers during an emergency situation. During an emergency, managers should be familiar with their EAP, and be prepared to:

- Take immediate action
- Remain calm
- Lock and barricade doors
- Evacuate staff and customers via a preplanned evacuation route to a safe area

Assisting Individuals with Special Needs and/or Disabilities

- Ensure that EAPs, evacuation instructions and any other relevant information address to individuals with special needs and/or disabilities
- Your building should be handicap-accessible, in compliance with ADA requirements.



RECOGNIZING POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

An active shooter in your workplace may be a current or former employee, or an acquaintance of a current or former employee. Intuitive managers and coworkers may notice characteristics of potentially violent behavior in an employee. Alert your Human Resources Department if you believe an employee or coworker exhibits potentially violent behavior.

Indicators of Potential Violence by an Employee

Employees typically do not just “snap,” but display indicators of potentially violent behavior over time. If these behaviors are recognized, they can often be managed and treated. Potentially violent behaviors by an employee may include one or more of the following (this list of behaviors is not comprehensive, nor is it intended as a mechanism for diagnosing violent tendencies):

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints
- Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene
- Depression / withdrawal
- Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures
- Repeated violations of company policies
- Increased severe mood swings
- Noticeably unstable, emotional responses
- Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation
- Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order”
- Behavior which is suspect of paranoia, (“everybody is against me”)
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems
- Talk of previous incidents of violence
- Empathy with individuals committing violence
- Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crimes

MANAGING THE CONSEQUENCES OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

After the active shooter has been incapacitated and is no longer a threat, human resources and/or management should engage in post-event assessments and activities, including:

- An accounting of all individuals at a designated assembly point to determine who, if anyone, is missing and potentially injured
- Determining a method for notifying families of individuals affected by the active shooter, including notification of any casualties
- Assessing the psychological state of individuals at the scene, and referring them to health care specialists accordingly
- Identifying and filling any critical personnel or operational gaps left in the organization as a result of the active shooter

LESSONS LEARNED

To facilitate effective planning for future emergencies, it is important to analyze the recent active shooter situation and create an after action report. The analysis and reporting contained in this report is useful for:

- Serving as documentation for response activities
- Identifying successes and failures that occurred during the event
- Providing an analysis of the effectiveness of the existing EAP
- Describing and defining a plan for making improvements to the EAP

References

Safety Guidelines for Armed Subjects, Active Shooter Situations, Indiana University Police Department, April 2007.

Safety Tips & Guidelines Regarding Potential “Active Shooter” Incidents Occurring on Campus, University of California Police.

Shots Fired, When Lightning Strikes (DVD), Center for Personal Protection and Safety, 2007.

Workplace Violence Desk Reference, Security Management Group International, www.SMGICorp.com

How to Plan for Workplace Emergencies and Evacuations, U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational Health and Safety Administration, OSHA 3088, 2001.



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HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

QUICKLY DETERMINE THE MOST REASONABLE WAY TO PROTECT YOUR OWN LIFE. CUSTOMERS AND CLIENTS ARE LIKELY TO FOLLOW THE LEAD OF EMPLOYEES AND MANAGERS DURING AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION.

1. EVACUATE

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. HIDE OUT

- Hide in an area out of the active shooter's view.
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors

3. TAKE ACTION

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger.
- Attempt to incapacitate the active shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

**CALL 911 WHEN IT IS
SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES ON THE SCENE

1. HOW YOU SHOULD REACT WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES:

- Remain calm, and follow officers' instructions
- Immediately raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid making quick movements toward officers such as attempting to hold on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming and/or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating, just proceed in the direction from which officers are entering the premises

2. INFORMATION YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR:

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters, if more than one
- Physical description of shooter/s
- Number and type of weapons held by the shooter/s
- Number of potential victims at the location

RECOGNIZING SIGNS OF POTENTIAL WORKPLACE VIOLENCE

AN ACTIVE SHOOTER MAY BE A CURRENT OR FORMER EMPLOYEE. ALERT YOUR HUMAN RESOURCES DEPARTMENT IF YOU BELIEVE AN EMPLOYEE EXHIBITS POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR. INDICATORS OF POTENTIALLY VIOLENT BEHAVIOR MAY INCLUDE ONE OR MORE OF THE FOLLOWING:

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism, and/or vague physical complaints
- Depression/Withdrawal
- Increased severe mood swings, and noticeably unstable or emotional responses
- Increasingly talks of problems at home
- Increase in unsolicited comments about violence, firearms, and other dangerous weapons and violent crimes



Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.

COPING

WITH AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Be aware of your environment and any possible dangers
- Take note of the two nearest exits in any facility you visit
- If you are in an office, stay there and secure the door
- Attempt to take the active shooter down as a last resort

Contact your building management or human resources department for more information and training on active shooter response in your workplace.

PROFILE

OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER

An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area, typically through the use of firearms.

CHARACTERISTICS

OF AN ACTIVE SHOOTER SITUATION

- Victims are selected at random
- The event is unpredictable and evolves quickly
- Law enforcement is usually required to end an active shooter situation



**CALL 911 WHEN IT
IS SAFE TO DO SO**

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN AN ACTIVE SHOOTER IS IN YOUR VICINITY

1. EVACUATE

- Have an escape route and plan in mind
- Leave your belongings behind
- Keep your hands visible

2. HIDE OUT

- Hide in an area out of the shooter's view
- Block entry to your hiding place and lock the doors
- Silence your cell phone and/or pager

3. TAKE ACTION

- As a last resort and only when your life is in imminent danger
- Attempt to incapacitate the shooter
- Act with physical aggression and throw items at the active shooter

CALL 911 WHEN IT IS SAFE TO DO SO

HOW TO RESPOND

WHEN LAW ENFORCEMENT ARRIVES

- Remain calm and follow instructions
- Put down any items in your hands (i.e., bags, jackets)
- Raise hands and spread fingers
- Keep hands visible at all times
- Avoid quick movements toward officers such as holding on to them for safety
- Avoid pointing, screaming or yelling
- Do not stop to ask officers for help or direction when evacuating

INFORMATION

YOU SHOULD PROVIDE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT OR 911 OPERATOR

- Location of the active shooter
- Number of shooters
- Physical description of shooters
- Number and type of weapons held by shooters
- Number of potential victims at the location



The School Shooter: A Quick Reference Guide

BAU-1 (703) 632-4333



REMEMBER

- There is not a “profile” of a school shooter-instead the students who carried out the attacks differed from one another in numerous ways.
- School shootings are rarely impulsive acts.
- They are typically thought out and planned in advance.
- Prior to most school shootings other students knew the shooting was going to occur but failed to notify an adult.
- Very few of the attackers ever directed threats to their targets before the attack.
- The most common goal was retribution. The justifications and excuses offered indicated this stemmed not from an absence of values but from a well-developed value system in which violence was acceptable.
- In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.
- Many offenders experienced a significant personal loss in the months leading up to the attack, such as a death, breakup, or divorce in the family.
- Many offenders engaged in repetitive viewing of violent media and were often fascinated with previous school shootings. Repeated viewing of movies depicting school shootings, such as “Zero Day” and “Elephant,” may indicate a fascination with campus attacks.
- Be aware of the subject’s online videos, blogs, and social networking activities.

Assessing Threatening Communications - Five Dimensions (Mohandie, 2000)

- Organized vs. disorganized thought processes
- Fixed vs. variable themes
- Focused vs. general target identification
- Violent action imperative vs. alternative coping means
- Short time imperative vs. lack of urgency

Threat assessment - 11 Key Questions (U.S. Secret Service, 2002)

- What are the student’s motive(s) and goals?
- Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?
- Has the student shown inappropriate interest in school attacks, weapons, and/or mass violence?
- Has the student engaged in any attack-related behaviors?
- Does the student have the capacity to carry out an act of targeted violence?
- Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation and/or despair?
- Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?
- Does the student see violence as an acceptable/desirable way to solve problems?
- Is the student’s version of events consistent with his/her actions?
- Are other people concerned about the student’s potential for violence?
- What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?

Motives

- 24% motivated by desire for attention or recognition.
- 27% motivated by suicide or desperation.
- 34% motivated by attempt to solve a problem.
- 54% had multiple motives.
- 61% motivated by desire for revenge.
- 75% felt bullied/persecuted/threatened by others.

Statistics

- 27% of attackers exhibited interest in violent movies.
- 37% of attackers exhibited interest in violence in their own writings, poems, essays, and journal entries.
- 59% of attacks occurred during the school day.
- 63% of attackers had a known history of weapons use.
- 68% acquired the weapon used from their own home or that of a relative.
- 93% of attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the attack that caused others to be concerned.
- 93% of attackers planned out the attack in advance.
- 95% of attackers were current students.
- Odds are one in 1 million that a student will die at school as a result of a violent act.

Warning Signs

- Investigators should probe to discover if the subject has engaged in research, planning, or preparation (e.g., researched weapons or made attempts to obtain a weapon). Movement from thought to action represents a severe escalation of the risk of violence.
- In around 80% of school shootings at least one person had information that the attacker was thinking about or planning the school attack. In nearly 2/3, more than one person had information about the attack before it occurred. In nearly all of these cases, the person who knew was a peer, a friend, schoolmate, or sibling.
- Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.
- Be conscious of the “Werther Effect,” defined as a duplication or copycat of another suicidal act. School shootings are typically well-publicized, sensationalized events that can trigger an increase in similar acts for roughly days or weeks after the attack.

Resources

- www.fbi.gov
- www.safetyzone.org (DOE and DOJ)
- www.ncjrs.org/school_safety
- www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS
- www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm
- www.keepschoolsafe.org

Information compiled from the *Safe School Initiative Report*, United States Secret Service and Department of Education, (2002); *School Violence Threat Management*, Dr. Kris Mohandie, (2000); *The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective*, CIRG/NCAVC, (1999).

Active Shooter Safety Considerations for Educators



By Deputy John Williams
Los Angeles County Sheriff's Department

“It’ll be like the LA Riots, the Oklahoma Bombing, WWII, Vietnam, Duke and Doom all mixed together...I want to leave a lasting impression on the world...if by some weird as shit luck me and V survive...then we will hijack a hell of a lot of bombs and crash a plane into NYC.”

Excerpts from Eric Harris Diary
Columbine High School Gunman

This presentation deals with how school staff can work with law enforcement to better prevent, prepare, and respond to a active shooter incident.

Lessons learned, key terms, and important definitions will be discussed as well as the crisis response box, lockdown, and evacuation procedures.

Definitions

Active Shooter: A suspect who's activity is immediately causing death and serious bodily injury. The activity is not contained and there is immediate risk of death and serious injury to potential victims.

Barricaded Suspect: A suspect who's in a position of advantage, usually barricaded in a room or a building and is armed and has displayed violence. May or may not be holding hostages and there is no indication that the subject's activity is immediately causing death or serious bodily injury.

Traditional Deployment: A tactical concept where Officers maintain a secure perimeter around a life threatening armed suspect situation and wait until specially trained units (S.E.B., S.W.A.T., etc.) arrive at the scene to finally intervene.

Rapid Deployment: The swift and immediate deployment of law enforcement personnel to **on-going**, life threatening situations where delayed deployment could otherwise result in death or great bodily injury to innocent persons.

Dynamic Situation: The situation is evolving very rapidly along with the suspect's action. **Example: The shooter is moving and shooting.**

Static Situation: The situation is not evolving or in motion. The suspect appears to be contained. **Example: The suspect is barricaded in a room.**



The ACTIVE SHOOTER

Commonalities & Lessons Learned

- Active shooter incidents are often spontaneous
- Suspects behavior was unpredictable
- Pre-incident signs existed in school incidents
- Incidents occur in a target rich environment
- A tactical intervention was too late
- Multi-jurisdictional response issues were present
- Incidents occurred in a “target rich” environment
- Suspects usually do not have a escape plan
- 9 out of 10 active shooters are suicidal
- Average age for a school shooter is 14.5 years old
- Suspects are mentally deranged or acting in a diminished mental capacity
- Mass murder is most often the goal rather than other criminal conduct, such as robbery
- Most active shooter incidents are over within 10 minutes or less
- Multiple weapons and ammunition are often involved
- First responders often are outgunned and ill-equipped
- Police officers often did not have proper training
- Expect carnage and complete chaos, noise, confusion, alarms with frightened people running and hiding and unwilling to respond to your directions
- A “traditional” police contain and negotiate tactic does not work...tactical intervention is needed



The Post Shooting Event

Incident Management (NIMS)

The National Incident Management System (NIMS) is a nationally recognized emergency operations plan that is adapted for large critical incidents where multi-agency response is required. NIMS facilitates priority-setting, interagency cooperation and the efficient flow of resources and information. NIMS allows law enforcement and school staff to respond to any critical incident with better communication and coordination with other responding agencies and organizations.

Incident Command Post:

Needs to be located in a secure area out of sight & hearing of the incident with staging areas located nearby.

Staging Areas:

- Tactical Staging Area: Police/SWAT Coordination
- Landing Zone: Police/Fire/Medical Helicopters
- Fire Department Staging Area
- Triage / Medical Staging Area
- News Media Staging Area
- Interview Area – Witness Identification & Interview area.
- Evacuation Site / Relocation Site: Acts as parent and student reunification and release area.
- Psychological services should be offered at this area if available along with any school resources, announcements, and student/victim information.



Victim Advice

Things to consider if you are a victim of a Active Shooter Incident

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE

- Active shooters generally have a singular focus - cause as much carnage as possible.
- Shooters range in profile from misguided teenagers to members of highly trained terrorist groups.
- They often seek to block exits to increase the number of casualties and impede law enforcement's response.
- For personal protection, make a habit of identifying multiple exits upon entering a building, arena, stadium or other structure. Think about exits that may not be seen by the general public.
- During an active shooter situation, be alert that any exit may have been booby trapped by the shooter.
- Quick, accurate assessment of conditions is critical to surviving. In an active shooter situation your choices are fight, flight or freeze.
- First try and assess sounds and their source. Freezing is not a realistic option; you become an easy target. Before deciding to fight, first consider fleeing. A tactical escape beats a tactical encounter every time.
- Remember the three E's – Evacuate, Evade or Engage. Only consider engaging the threat if imminent danger exists. If you decide to engage, fight like your life depends on it because it does!

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE - FLEEING

- Take Cover. Cover has ballistic stopping capabilities (brick walls, engine blocks, library books stacked back to back).
- If left without cover, move to concealment (hedges, clothes rack, and drywall). While concealment can't stop a bullet it can hide you from view.
- Exit the kill zone immediately. Move, don't huddle. Huddling makes you a bigger target and the shooter won't have to move the gun muzzle very far to target his next victim.
- Look to leap frog away from the shooter using cover as you retreat. If the shooter has blocked the traditional exits, consider alternate escape routes.
- State fire codes and deliver requirements often require malls to have secondary exits; they're often in the back of a store. These exits generally lead outside or to a fire escape corridor.
- If exit doors are locked intentionally by the perpetrator or for another reason, consider loading dock doors or lower level windows as an escape route (lower may mean the second floor).

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE - FLEEING

- If pinned down try to wait for a lull in the firefight, possibly when the shooter reloads or gets distracted.
- Call 911 and get help on the way. Give police as much detail as possible.
- From the initial onslaught you will be on your own, as the police will not be in a position to respond immediately. Don't rely solely on facility security, rarely are they trained to deal with threats of this level.
- After the initial shock and awe shooters often move to the clearing stages, hunting for additional victims.
- If you are unfamiliar with the layout of the location look for information such as directory maps or evacuation maps to identify exits.
- If you have a video camera it can be used to help your situation, the zoom feature can act like a set of binoculars; the low light setting can serve as night vision; the view finder and lens can work like a periscope to look around corners.

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE - BARRICADING

- If inside of an office building, school, library or similar facility consider barricading in an office as you take cover.
- Use filing cabinets, desks, or bookshelves to barricade an office door if it opens inward. Once filing cabinets are in place consider filling them with large books such as manuals.
- This will increase the ballistic stopping capabilities and a heavy filing cabinet will be problematic for a perpetrator to move.
- Placing a door stop backwards underneath the door provides additional security.
- If there isn't a door stop, consider folding a magazine or newspaper and placing it underneath the door.
- If the perpetrator breaches the door consider scissors to stab or vases, or wall plaques as impact weapons.
- Try to stay on the hinge side of the door as the perpetrator tries to breach the door. This will force him to lead with a body part or weapon which can be attacked, and potentially hide you from view.

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE - CHOOSING TO FIGHT

- Don't go looking for an active shooter. Try to find cover and look to set an ambush. Stay quiet and be attuned to environmental sounds.
- You must be prepared to attack the perpetrator. This is a deadly force situation so be prepared to cause severe injury and possibly death to the shooter.
- Attack the shooter's vitals (eyes, nose, throat, head, or groin).
- Assuming you are not armed with a firearm, consider utilizing improvised weapons. For example, a coat wrapped around your arm can serve as a shield to defend against an edged weapon attack.
- A backpack, briefcase or suitcase stuffed with phone books can serve as a small arms impromptu bullet proof vest.
- Most retailers or offices have scissors and box cutters which can be used in your defense. The center pole from a clothes rack, stiletto or wedge heel, and leg from a desk or chair can serve as an impact weapon.
- A belt can serve as a flexible weapon to strike (belt buckle) or to strangle.

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE - CHOOSING TO FIGHT

- If trapped with multiple people, work together to improve chances for surviving.
- Your goal is to get the shooter on the ground and neutralized. If the shooter breaches the door you will only have seconds to mount countermeasures.
- Typically, when a person breaches a door he will look straight ahead first. Those who are in direct line or across from the shooter should move away from the members who are positioned next to the door, to distract the shooter.
- Members who are positioned on the side of the doors or at an ambush area should attack the shooter. One person forces the perpetrator's weapon down and to the side. Another person attacks the shooter's lower body, typically behind the knee taking him to the ground.
- Do whatever necessary to neutralize the attacker. Other members should secure something to bound and gag the shooter while awaiting law enforcement.
- The most well trained person should secure the weapon and be prepared to help defend others. Move others into a position of cover away from the initial line of fire and prepare to defend.
- Do not leave a secure barricade with a firearm; you don't want law enforcement to confuse a victim with the active shooters.

ACTIVE SHOOTER VICTIM RESPONSE - CHANGING PARADIGM

- Today's world of increased terrorism and active shooter incidents have required law enforcement to move to a more aggressive response, in which officers are now trained to immediately pursue, establish contact with and seek to neutralize the shooter.
- It is now recognized that the sooner the shooter is contained, captured or neutralized, the fewer the casualties.
- Moving toward the sound of gunfire is a strategy only for highly trained individuals, not the average citizen.
- The first response team is typically a small unit of officers. Do not run toward the officers, but listen for their commands.
- Keep your hands in plain view and expect to be treated like a suspect until the officers assess the situation.
- Don't expect first responders to render first aid; their initial concern is neutralizing the threat.
- By following many of these steps, your chances of surviving a active shooter incident will increase exponentially. Stay Safe.

School Procedures

A School and Sheriff Partnership

- ✱ Schools and Law Enforcement need to work together and develop realistic school safety plans in response to various threats.
- ✱ They need to conduct joint training sessions and test procedures in a realistic environment.
- ✱ These exercises should be conducted in a realistic environment with maximum sensory overload.
- ✱ A Memorandum of Understanding between local law enforcement and the Schools should be in place to establish procedures to be followed when an incident involving an act of violence takes place so the School Administration will know the plans and tactics the law enforcement will use to resolve the situation.

Should a School evacuate or lockdown in a Active Shooter Incident?

- ✱ Absent exigent circumstances such as a fire in the immediate area, Schools should call 911 and lockdown. This ultimately will result in less targets for the shooter(s), reduce confusion for arriving officers, help contain the situation, and minimize the chance of an accidental shooting by responding officers.

Recommended School Lockdown Procedure:

- ✱ Have a Signal/Code.
- ✱ Lock Doors.
- ✱ Establish Safe Area.
- ✱ Account for Students.
- ✱ Do Not Open Door Until Deputies Arrive.
- ✱ Communicate.



Classroom Safety Tips:

Once the School is lock down, minus exigent circumstances, no one should leave there position of safety. Classrooms should be locked and students should be instructed to stay quiet, get down low, and sit out of view of the windows. A door or window placard system can be used to help identify your location as being either occupied by non-hostiles (**Green** Color) or in need of medical treatment (**Red** Color). No color indicated would result in law enforcement treating the location as a potential suspect location.

Rule of thumb for School Staff:

- ✳ Call 911 and stay on the phone.
- ✳ Meet law enforcement if possible.
- ✳ Isolate and evacuate as soon as possible.
- ✳ Collect as much information as possible.
- ✳ **Don't try to be a hero.**
- ✳ Allow police first responders to make contact.



"During a crisis you cannot be guaranteed of communications between a classroom and emergency personnel. Port Huron schools came up with a novel idea to alert SWAT Team members of an injured person in a classroom when communications have been cut off: In every teacher's closet, there are two sets of three posters, each of a different color. In a life-threatening emergency, all school personnel and students know that they are to tape the red card in the window to alert people on the outside that they need help immediately. A yellow card informs paramedics that there are injuries in the room, but not life threatening. A blue card notifies them that there are no injuries. These cards are also placed under the classroom door into the hallway to notify the SWAT team of the same information."

Captain James Carmody
Port Huron City Police
Port Huron, Michigan

School Safety Tips:

Crisis Response Box

The purpose of the Crisis Response Box is to quickly locate and provide relevant information to the right people so they may begin responding.

The Crisis Response Box has one simple goal: school administrators will immediately have the information essential for effective management of a major critical incident. A crisis is not the time to collect information – it is the time to act upon information. Precious minutes need not be lost gathering life-saving intelligence. Knowing what information to collect ahead of time, how to organize it and how to use it during a crisis are all addressed through assembling the contents of the box.



Crisis Response Box



“We found that organizing a box . . . that contains crucial information we would need to respond to a critical incident was a great way for both the schools and the police to think through how they would work together in an actual crisis. The principal, local police and local fire department have the same kit. Every summer we meet and review the contents and update them.”

Captain Terry Rammell
La Habra Police Department
La Habra, California

Crisis Response Box

The Crisis Response Box contains more than directions to use in the event of an emergency. The following components make possible a thorough school and community response to a crisis:

Aerial Photos of Campus

An aerial perspective of the campus and the surrounding area is very helpful to all agencies involved in a critical incident, including police, fire and paramedic personnel.

Map

Crisis response planners need to review the traffic patterns and intersections that will be affected in a major crisis. Through this process, you can identify locations where parents or guardians can retrieve their children after an incident and determine traffic safety issues your school and law enforcement will have to consider when directing youth to safe areas. Keep as many as 20 copies of the map available, preferably laminated, for emergency personnel. Establish an emergency traffic plan capable of protecting emergency response routes and accommodating traffic and parking needs for parents, students and the media. The map should illustrate these planned routes as well as: The streets surrounding the school, Intersections near the school, Vacant lots near the school, and Location of major utilities.

Campus Layout

It is important to maintain current, accurate blueprints, classroom layouts and floor plans of the building and grounds, including information about main leads for water, gas, electricity, cable, telephone, alarm and sprinkler systems, hazardous materials location, elevators and entrances. This information is extremely helpful, especially during a “shelter-in-place” situation when students are safely locked in a classroom. Information should be available on the layout of the building, including room numbers and whether or not there is a phone, cable television, e-mail, computers or cell phones in the classroom. On the campus layout diagram, it is also helpful to highlight areas that could pose a possible threat, e.g., the chemistry lab, biology lab or any welding and wood shop areas that could also become a haven for weapons. It is also helpful to show the location of the fire alarm turn-off, sprinkler system turn-off, utility shut-off valves, cable television shut-off and first aid supply boxes. These items can be color-coded on the campus layout.

Crisis Response Box

Blueprint of School Buildings

Architectural blueprints of the school building(s) are important to a SWAT team, and provide additional – and more detailed information – than the simple classroom layout diagram. This information may be critical, especially in the event of a bomb threat. The plant manager for the school site should be the custodian for the blueprints. Grounds and maintenance staff of the school should be familiar with these blueprints and their location.

Teacher/Employee Roster

A teacher/employee roster should go into the Crisis Response Box. If you can enter teachers' names on the classroom layout diagram all the better. If not, be sure to match up each teacher's name with his or her classroom – and identify whether or not each teacher has a cell or land phone. This roster should identify any teacher/employee with special medical needs (e.g., diabetes) who will require medications during a prolonged period and those with a disability who may require assistance in an evacuation. In a critical incident, someone in the front office should pick up the visitor/volunteer/substitute teacher list.

Keys

The Crisis Response Box should also contain a master key and an extra set of keys for those rooms for which a master key cannot be used. The keys must be clearly tagged. Consider placing the keys in a locked container within the box to assure added security in case the box should end up in the wrong hands. Some schools have found it advantageous to keep the master key in a Knox box outside of the school. This is a secured metal box that can easily be accessed by a code or a key without having to enter the building. This can prove especially helpful when it is not safe to enter the school. Further information on a Knox box can be obtained from your local fire department.



Crisis Response Box

Fire Alarm Turn-off Procedures

One of the lessons learned from Columbine was to make it easier to turn off the alarm. The loud alarm made it very difficult for responders to hear directions. It took considerable time before someone who knew how to turn it off was able to do so. School officials learned that you can't assume that the person who knows how to turn off the alarm will be logistically able to do so. If that person is inside the building he or she might not be able to get to the shut-off valve; if that person is outside, it is possible that he or she might not be able to safely re-enter the school. As a result, a number of people need to know how to shut off the alarm. Providing such information on where shut-off valves are located in the building and the procedures for shut-off in the box could prove vital. In addition, though somewhat costly, some schools have installed a secure alarm shut-off system outside the school that can control the fire alarm and sprinklers.

Sprinkler System Turn-off Procedures

Sprinkler systems may go on during an emergency. During the incident at Columbine, no one was readily available who knew how to immediately turn off the sprinkler system. As a result, hallways quickly filled with water, making it difficult to escape. In some places, the water reached dangerous levels in proximity to the electrical outlets – water reaching such outlets could have caused many more injuries and possibly additional deaths. At least two people need to be trained and assigned responsibility for turning off the sprinkler system. As backup, the Crisis Response Box needs to provide information on where shut-off valves are located in the building and the necessary procedures for shut-off.

Utility Shut-off Valves

Shut-off and access points of all utilities – gas, electric and water – need to be clearly identified and their locations listed so they can be quickly shut off in a crisis. If there is not a fire, the water should be shut off immediately to prevent flooding from the sprinkler system. Unless open electric or gas lines pose an immediate threat to life, the decision on whether to shut off these lines should be made by the Incident Command Officer.

“Open-ended communication with school administrators and law enforcement officials must take place while planning. Each must know what his or her individual responsibility is and be comfortable with it. A tragedy is not the place to start debating assignments or responsibilities or whose turf it is”.

Bill Slade, Chief of Police
Pearl Police Department
Pearl, Mississippi

Crisis Response Box

Gas Line and Utility Line Layout

Include a diagram that shows where gas and other utility lines are located throughout the campus.

Cable Television Satellite Feed Shut-off

If your school has a satellite feed for a cable television system, you should also provide directions on how to shut down that feed. Several of the police officers involved in nationally televised shootings recommend that the cable television feed be shut off so that perpetrators on the inside will not be able to view the whereabouts of the SWAT team by tuning into live coverage of the scene on the outside. On the other hand, in a natural disaster, the television system can be helpful (if working) to provide those who are sheltered in- place with up-to-date information.

Student Photos

Photos can help in the essential task of identifying students injured, missing or killed. In addition, in those instances where the perpetrators' identities are known while the crisis is still in progress, photos can be of great assistance to law enforcement and SWAT teams who must enter the building and make split-second decisions amidst a sea of student faces. If you do not have access to copies of student photo IDs, the most recent school yearbook will suffice. Be sure to include photos of teachers and staff, as well. You might want to consider asking vendors who take pictures for your school to digitalize them and make them available on a CD, which you can then include in the box.

Incident Command System (ICS) Key Responders' Phone Numbers

Names and phone numbers for all team participants involved in coordinating with your local emergency response system should be in the box. These people would include the coordinators for the Incident Command System (ICS), Public Information, First Aid, Traffic Safety, Student Assembly and Release and Grounds and Maintenance. Also, include the names and phone numbers of other key staff members, such as the Food, Water and Supplies Coordinator; the bi-lingual translator (if appropriate for your school); and any additional numbers for potential additional positions you have identified. Be sure to place these phone numbers on several cards so that more than one person can begin calling them.

Crisis Response Box

Designated Command Post and Staging Areas

Police chiefs involved in several of the recent school shootings recommend that schools and law enforcement plan for three distinct staging areas, in addition to the Command Post for the Incident Command Officer. Among other things, separate staging areas will prevent the press from converging upon parents or parents from converging upon police. The areas should be:

- A Staging Area for law enforcement and emergency personnel
- A Media Staging Area away from the school, that can accommodate a large number of vehicles
- A Parent Center, located away from the Command Post, where parents can retrieve their children

Maps of all command posts, listing each corresponding main phone number, should be included in the Crisis Response Box. Be aware that these command posts may change based upon the circumstances. It is also recommended that the command posts have telecommunications capability wherever possible.

Student Attendance Roster

One of the most difficult challenges you'll face in such a crisis is accounting for all of your students. Teachers should have readily accessible, when on duty, a listing of all pupils in their charge. Teachers should also be instructed to take their classroom attendance list with them during an evacuation. A system should be developed to retrieve these lists from teachers when it is safe and feasible. Someone should be assigned to place that day's attendance roster into the box each morning. This information is shared with the Search and Rescue Coordinator who, in turn, coordinates with the Student Assembly, Shelter and Release Coordinator and the School Incident Command Coordinator.

“One of the major problems we faced at Columbine was the gridlock. With the crisis being covered live on CNN and local television, parents, relatives and news crews rushed to the scene. The roads couldn't handle the traffic. Even the ambulances had a hard time getting through.”

Officer Joe Schallmoser
Director of Security Services
Jefferson County Public Schools
Littleton, Colorado

Crisis Response Box

Emergency Resource List

A list of individuals and organizations who assist in an emergency should be prepared on a separate sheet of paper and placed in the box so that the person assigned can immediately begin to make phone calls to those on the list. Your local emergency management agency can recommend agencies you should call during an emergency. Please note that any volunteers you enlist for a critical incident response should be pre-screened and that the volunteers on your list must receive training prior to becoming a responsible member of your emergency response team. Some agency phone numbers to have on hand include:

- American Red Cross
- Clergy, including Law Enforcement Chaplaincy • Counselors (A cadre of trained crisis intervention counselors should be identified to provide mental health “first aid” during and following the crisis.)
- County District Attorney’s Victim/Witness Assistance Center
- Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) (local office)
- Local emergency radio channels
- National Organization for Victim Assistance (NOVA)
- Parent representative(s) (The parent representatives should be trained to help fellow parents receive information, answer questions and maintain calm at the Parent Center. Fellow parents can be an excellent source of support.)

“Something most schools would never think of is to call the local Federal Aviation Authority. Yet, as soon as the news media learn of a disaster they send their helicopters and it’s the last thing you’ll need to gain control of the situation. The noise factor alone makes it difficult for people to hear on the ground. Only the FAA can restrict the airspace. A call should be made immediately.

Captain James Carmody
Port Huron City Police
Port Huron, Michigan

Crisis Response Box

Evacuation Sites

Maps with evacuation and alternate evacuation routes should be stored in the Crisis Response Box and should also be posted on classroom doors. It is where students will likely be headed (following the route) in order to identify them, or, if they are missing, to determine where along the route they might be found. Be aware, however, that during a shooting spree the best-laid plans for evacuation are also under siege. All classrooms at Columbine, for example, had evacuation plans – but with two students shooting throughout the entire school, evacuating the building was itself a dangerous venture. In the Jonesboro, Arkansas incident, two boys opened fire after students evacuated the building during a false fire alarm. Other factors may affect an Incident Command Officer to alter the usual evacuation route. In a chemical spill, for instance, how the winds are blowing will determine where to evacuate. Thus, it is important to have at least two predetermined evacuation sites identified.

Student Disposition Forms and Emergency Data Cards

Imagine hundreds of parents descending upon your school to retrieve their children while you are trying to account for each student's whereabouts. You will need forms to keep track of who has been released and to whom – parents, relatives, emergency personnel or the hospital. It is suggested that a set of release forms (enough to cover the entire school census) be stored in the Crisis Response Box and be given to the student Assembly, Shelter and Release Coordinator of your ICS team. Additionally, if possible, it is helpful to have a set of your student emergency data cards placed in the box. Having all the data stored on a disk is the most convenient way of containing the information. Optimally, the cards and disks should be updated every three months to remain current as possible. Emergency information can also be stored, updated and retrieved electronically either from the school office or a remote site, such as the office.

“Though cellular phones are an excellent tool, during the shootings at Columbine so many cell phones were being used in the area that the cell site became overloaded and shut down. During that crisis, some students resorted to computers to send e-mail messages. Many schools are equipping themselves with phones that do not require satellite transmission and several nationwide phone companies are offering free phones to schools.

Officer Scott Wells

Critical Incident Management Unit
Jefferson County Police Department
Littleton, Colorado

Crisis Response Box

Inventory of Staff Resources

Survey your certificated and classified staff to build an inventory of special skills and training they possess. Document your findings and place the list in the box under the ICS heading. For instance, experience can include prior medical and triage experience, bilingual capabilities, grief counseling background, search and rescue training, hostage negotiations, first aid/CPR certification and volunteer firefighter or reserve police officer/deputy. These skills could prove to be very helpful in a critical incident.

List of Students With Special Needs

A list should also be included in the box that identifies those students who need special assistance (e.g., blind and deaf students and those who need wheelchairs, crutches and braces) and/or with special medical needs (e.g., diabetes) that will require medications during a prolonged period and those with a disability that will require assistance in an evacuation.

First Aid Supplies Location

Sets of first aid supplies should be located throughout the campus. Storage locations should be included in the box. Include the locations on one of the building layout maps in the box.

Emergency First Aid Supplies

Though the following list of supplies are not contained in the box, the FBI Academy recommends that schools be aware of information from the Lessons Learned Summit regarding first aid supplies. In the Jonesboro, Arkansas shooting, large bins of first aid supplies were readily accessible on the school grounds and are credited with saving two children's lives and preventing others from going into shock. These supplies were situated in and out of the school building in anticipation of an earthquake because the school property is located on a fault line. The accessibility of these supplies proved to be lifesaving. It will not do anyone any good if these supplies are locked away deep within the confines of the school. Some schools have stationed first aid boxes in every classroom with basic emergency aid instructions to treat various injuries. Although not designed for first aid purposes, duct tape is very useful and versatile and should be available in every classroom. Whichever methods you deem will work best for your school, it is advisable to make sure that ample supplies are readily accessible throughout your complex and that all teachers are aware of their location.

“The Port Huron School District in Michigan employs a system whereby teachers secure the classroom and immediately take the attendance of all who are in the classroom. They have found that, though daily attendance records are helpful, a roster of student locations at the time of a critical incident is much more accurate and useful, as students could be out of their assigned classroom on a hall pass, visiting a classroom or – in the event of a shooting or other disaster – seeking cover in a classroom to which they were not previously assigned.”

Captain James Carmody
Port Huron City Police
Port Huron, Michigan

Tips for Parents

Parents can help create safe schools.



Here are some ideas that parents can do:

- Discuss the school's discipline policy with your child. Show your support for the rules, and help your child understand the reasons for them.
- Involve your child in setting rules for appropriate behavior at home.
- Talk with your child about the violence he or she sees on television, in video games, and possibly in the neighborhood. Help your child understand the consequences of violence.
- Teach your child how to solve problems. Praise your child when he or she follows through.
- Help your child find ways to show anger that do not involve verbally or physically hurting others.
- When you get angry, use it as an opportunity to model these appropriate responses for your child and talk about it.
- Help your child understand the value of accepting individual differences.
- Note any disturbing behaviors in your child. For example, frequent angry outbursts, excessive fighting and bullying of other children, cruelty to animals, fire setting, frequent behavior problems at school and in the neighborhood, lack of friends, and alcohol or drug use can be signs of serious problems. Get help for your child. Talk with a trusted professional in your child's school or in the community.
- Keep lines of communication open with your child even when it is tough. Encourage your child always to let you know where and with whom he or she will be. Get to know your child's friends.
- Listen to your child if he or she shares concerns about friends who may be exhibiting troubling behaviors. Share this information with a trusted professional, such as the school psychologist, principal, or teacher.
- Be involved in your child's school life by supporting and reviewing homework, talking with his or her teacher(s), and attending school functions such as parent conferences, open houses, and PTA meetings.
- Encourage your school to offer before- and after-school programs.
- Volunteer to work with school-based groups concerning violence prevention.
- Talk with the parents of your child's friends. Discuss how you can team up to ensure your children's safety.

If you have any questions or comments, please contact
Deputy John Williams at (213) 893-5171 or by email at
jdwillia@lasd.org, thank you



Situational Awareness

Mass Shootings Analysis – Commonalities and Trends

28 November 2012

(U//FOUO) NJ ROIC Intelligence & Analysis Unit / Threat Program ~ # IAU201208-1430

Key Findings

- (U//FOUO) An analysis of 29 mass shooting incidents in the United States since 1999 indicates that nearly half were workplace shootings.
- (U//FOUO) All of the shooters but one were males between the ages of 17 and 48. All but one of the 29 incidents were conducted by single shooters.
- (U//FOUO) Most of the active shooters took their own lives or were shot by responding police officers.
- (U//FOUO) Only four of the shooters were current or former members of the military.
- (U//FOUO) Semiautomatic handguns were the most commonly used type of weapon in the mass shootings.

Introduction

(U//FOUO) The mass killing incidents this year at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin and a movie theater in Colorado garnered international attention and focused the efforts of public and private sector security officials on the prevention of and response to mass shootings in the United States. This report examines the 29 deadliest mass shootings in the past 13 years, starting with the shootings at Columbine High School in Colorado in 1999, to identify commonalities and trends. These 29 incidents include shooting incidents in which at least five people were killed.

(U//FOUO) DHS defines an “active shooter” as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. In most cases, active shooters use firearms, and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims. Active shooter situations are unpredictable and evolve quickly. Typically, the immediate deployment of law enforcement is required to stop the shooting and mitigate further harm to victims. Typically, active shooter situations are over within 10 to 15 minutes.¹

Recent U.S. Mass Shooting Events

(U) Three shooting incidents resulting in the deaths of at least five people have occurred during 2012:

- Sikh Temple Shooting - Oak Creek, WI
 - On August 5, 2012 Wade Michael Page killed six people and critically wounded three more at a Sikh temple just south of Milwaukee. Four of the deceased victims were found inside the Sikh Temple of Wisconsin, while the remaining two were found outside the building. The three wounded victims included two civilians and

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a local police officer. The gunman fatally shot himself outside the temple after being shot during a firefight with police.²

- Page was a 40-year-old who served in the U.S. Army and received a less-than-honorable discharge in October 1998. He was also a former leader of a white supremacist metal band, End Apathy. A 9-mm semiautomatic handgun recovered at the scene.³
- Movie Theater Shooting – Aurora, CO
 - On July 20, 2012, James Eagan Holmes shot and killed 12 people and wounded approximately 38 more after opening fire in a crowded movie theater in Aurora, CO, during a showing of the new Batman movie. Holmes allegedly entered the movie theater through an exit door about a half-hour into the movie. Holmes was arrested in a parking lot behind the theater near his car without further incident. He was wearing black body armor, much like the SWAT team of police that responded. However, police officers noticed that his gear differed from theirs and detained him.⁴
 - Holmes did not have a previous criminal history other than a traffic ticket. He had moved to Aurora from his hometown of Riverside, California, in 2011 to begin a doctoral program in neuroscience at the University of Colorado, Denver, but was in the process of withdrawing from the school.⁵

(U) A similar mass shooting may have been averted in November 2012 when a 20-year-old Missouri man admitted to police that he planned to shoot people in a movie theater during a showing of a Twilight film. The suspect had bought weapons and ammunition and had purchased a ticket for a showing of the movie. The investigation began when his mother contacted local police, saying that her son had recently bought weapons – including two assault rifles and hundreds of rounds of ammunition – that were similar to those used by the gunman who opened fire inside the theater in Aurora, Colorado.⁶

- Christian College Shooting – Oakland, CA
 - On April 2, 2012, seven people were killed and three others wounded when a nursing student opened fire at Oikos University, a small Christian college in Oakland, California. Six of the dead were students at the school, and one was a secretary. The gunman, identified as One L. Goh, a 43-year-old former student at the school. After fleeing the scene and commandeering a vehicle belonging to one of his victims, the suspect later surrendered to police at a grocery store about three miles from the school.
 - The motive for the shooting remains under investigation, but the Oakland Police Chief said that the suspect was upset about being expelled from the school and being teased by other students about his poor English-language skills. News reports have identified Oikos University as a religious-affiliated college with fewer than 100 hundred students, serving primarily the Korean immigrant community.⁷

(U//FOUO) The following chart provides detailed information on five mass shootings that occurred in 2011 and 2012.

	Oak Creek, Wisconsin August 2012	Aurora, Colorado July 2012	Oakland, California April 2012	Seal Beach, California October 2011	Tucson, Arizona January 2011
Weapon	Small arms: Springfield 9-mm semiautomatic handgun	Tear gas, small arms: a semiautomatic variation of the military's M-16 rifle, a pump-action 12- gauge shotgun, and at least one .40- caliber semiautomatic handgun	Small arms: semiautomatic handgun – make and model unknown	Small arms: semiautomatic handguns – 9-mm Springfield, a Heckler & Koch .45, and a Smith & Wesson .44 magnum	Small arms: semiautomatic handgun – Glock 9-mm
Disguise	None	Tactical clothing	None	None	None
Procedure	Opened fire outside, then went inside	Entered though emergency exit door	Opened fire in middle of classroom	Opened fire in hair salon where ex-wife worked	Opened fire at close range
Number of Assailants	1	1	1	1	1
Target Location	Sikh temple	Movie theater	University	Hair salon	Public gathering
People Killed/Wounded	6 killed/3 injured	12 killed/58 injured	7 killed/1 injured	8 killed/1 injured	6 killed/11 injured
Affiliation with Target	None	None	Former student	Ex-wife worked at salon	None
Motive/Target	Unknown	Unknown	Issue with school administration	Domestic	Political figure
History of Mental Illness	Unknown	Yes	Unknown	Unknown	Unknown
Prior Criminal History	No	No	No	No	Minor offenses
Warning Signs/Indicators	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Prior Military	Yes	No	No	No	No

Analysis of Mass Shootings Since 1999

(U//FOUO) The 29 mass shootings incidents since 1999 – listed in Appendix 1 – were analyzed to identify commonalities and trends. These include the following:

- Males between the ages of 17 and 48 conducted all of the attacks but one.
- The largest number of mass shootings – 13 of the 29 – occurred at the workplace and were conducted by either a former employee or relative of an employee.
- All of the active shooters were single attackers, with the exception of two students who conducted the shootings at Columbine High School.
- In most of the incidents – 20 of the 29 – the active shooters took their own lives or law enforcement was forced to shoot and kill them, thus leaving their true motives uncertain.
- In only four of the 29 incidents were the shooters active or former members of the U.S. military.
- Semiautomatic handguns are the weapon of choice for mass shootings.

Active Shooters: How to Respond

(U//FOUO) Following the tragedy that occurred at Virginia Tech in 2007, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security released a document with recommendations on what to do in the event of an active shooter situation. The most critical recommendation is for both law enforcement and the private sector to have training and conduct drills in order to be prepared for an active shooter incident.

(U//FOUO) In many of the case studies discussed, there were indicators of potential violence. The following is a list of warning signs that an employee may exhibit in the workplace⁸:

- Increased use of alcohol and/or illegal drugs.
- Unexplained increase in absenteeism; vague physical complaints.
- Noticeable decrease in attention to appearance and hygiene.
- Depression/withdrawal.
- Resistance and overreaction to changes in policy and procedures.
- Repeated violations of company policies.
- Increased severe mood swings.
- Noticeably unstable, emotional responses.
- Explosive outbursts of anger or rage without provocation.
- Suicidal; comments about “putting things in order.”
- Paranoid behavior or utterances (“Everybody is against me”).
- Increasingly talks of problems at home.
- Escalation of domestic problems into the workplace; talk of severe financial problems.
- Talk of previous incidents of violence.
- Empathy with individuals committing violence.
- Increase in unsolicited comments about firearms, other dangerous weapons and violent crimes.

Suspicious Activity Reporting

(U//FOUO) Any suspicious activity with a possible nexus to terrorism in New Jersey should be reported immediately following existing protocols specific to respective counties. Activity can

also be reported to CT Watch located at the ROIC by dialing 2-1-1 or (866) 4SAFENJ (866-472-3365) or Tips@NJHomelandSecurity.gov.

Contact Information

(U//FOUO) Any agency with information or comments/questions about this document should contact the NJ ROIC Intelligence & Analysis Unit at (609) 963-6900, ext. 6212, or njroicanalysis@gw.njsp.org.

Appendix: A Sample of Significant Mass Shootings Since 1999

(U//FOUO) The following is a list of mass shooting/active shooter incidents since 1999:

August 2012: Wade Michael Page fatally shoots six people and injures three at a Sikh temple in Oak Creek, Wisconsin, before taking his own life after being shot by a police officer. Page was a member of several neo-Nazi music bands.⁹

July 2012: James Eagan Holmes shoots and kills twelve people and wounds approximately 38 more after opening fire in a crowded movie theater in Aurora, Colorado, during a showing of the Batman movie. Holmes allegedly enters the Century 16 movie theater through an exit door about a half-hour into the premiere.¹⁰

May 2012: Ian Stawicki walks into Café Racer in Seattle, Washington, and opens fire with two handguns, killing four patrons and wounding one. Shortly thereafter he kills another woman in a parking lot while carjacking her SUV. Later that afternoon, he commits suicide.¹¹

April 2012: One L. Goh, a former student at Oikos University, a small Christian college in California, opens fire in the middle of a classroom, leaving seven people dead and three wounded.¹²

October 2011: Scott Dekraai, apparently enraged over a custody dispute, walks into a crowded Seal Beach, California, hair salon where his former wife works and opens fire. Eight people are killed, including a man sitting in a truck outside the salon. Another person is critically wounded.¹³

January 2011: Jared Lee Loughner shoots Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords in the head during a meet-and-greet with constituents at a Tucson supermarket. Six people are killed and 11 others wounded.¹⁴

August 2010: Omar S. Thornton, a driver for Hartford Distributors in Manchester, Connecticut, emerges from a disciplinary hearing and begins shooting, killing eight people and injuring two at the family-owned distributorship and then shooting himself.¹⁵

November 2009: Major Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, shoots and kills 13 people and injures 32 others in a rampage at Fort Hood, Texas, where he is based. Authorities allege that

Hasan was exchanging e-mails with Muslim extremists, including American-born radical Anwar al-Awlaki.¹⁶

April 2009: Jiverly Wong shoots and kills 13 people and seriously wounds four others before committing suicide at the American Civic Association, an immigration services center, in Binghamton, New York.¹⁷

March 2009: Robert Stewart opens fire on a nursing home in Carthage, North Carolina, where his wife worked, killing seven elderly residents and a nurse, and wounding four others. Stewart's wife was not in the facility at the time.¹⁸

June 2008: Wesley Neil Higdon opens fire at his workplace in Henderson, Kentucky, killing five co-workers and wounding another. Higdon was reprimanded by a supervisor for having an argument with a co-worker before the attack.¹⁹

February 2008: Steven Kazmierczak steps on stage in a lecture hall at Northern Illinois University and opens fire on a geology class, killing five students and wounding 16 others before killing himself on the lecture hall stage.²⁰

February 2008: Charles Lee Thornton opens fire on a City Hall meeting in Kirkwood, Missouri, killing five people and wounding two others. Thornton had a history of disputes with the city government and had been arrested twice at council meetings.²¹

December 2007: Robert Hawkins enters a shopping mall in Omaha, Nebraska, and opens fire. He kills eight people and wounds four others before taking his own life.²²

April 2007: Seung-hui Cho, a Virginia Tech senior, opens fire on campus, killing 32 people in a dormitory and an academic building in attacks more than two hours apart. Cho takes his life after the second incident.²³

February 2007: Sulejman Talovic opens fire in a Salt Lake City, Utah, shopping mall, killing five people and wounding four others. An off-duty police officer exchanges gunfire with the Bosnian refugee before other officers arrive and fatally wound Talovic.²⁴

October 2006: Charles Carl Roberts IV, a milk-truck driver armed with a small arsenal, bursts into a one-room schoolhouse in Nickel Mines, Pennsylvania, killing five Amish girls and injuring another five. He kills himself as police storm the building.²⁵

January 2006: Jennifer San Marco shoots her neighbor, then drives to the mail processing plant in Goleta, California, where she was previously employed, and kills six employees of the plant with a pistol before taking her own life.²⁶

March 2005: Jeff Weise opens fire at a high school on an Indian reservation in Red Lake, Minnesota, killing seven fellow students and wounding seven others, then committing suicide. Prior to the attack, Weise killed his grandparents.²⁷

July 2004: Elijah Brown opens fire at a food manufacturing plant in Kansas City, Kansas, killing five people and injuring two others before committing suicide.²⁸

August 2003: Salvador Tapia shoots six former co-workers at an auto parts warehouse in Chicago, Illinois, before being shot to death by members of the Chicago Police Department's Hostage Barricade and Terrorist (HBT) team.²⁹

July 2003: Doug Williams, a production assemblyman for 19 years at Lockheed Martin Aero-nautics Co. in Meridian, Mississippi, goes on a rampage at the defense plant, fatally shooting five and wounding nine before taking his own life with a shotgun.³⁰

September 2001: Joseph Ferguson opens fire at his workplace in Sacramento, California, killing five people, including his girlfriend, and wounding two others. The attack occurs one week after he was suspended from his job as a security guard. The incident lasts 24 hours and concludes when Ferguson commits suicide during a standoff with law enforcement.³¹

December 2000: Michael McDermott, a software tester, shoots and kills seven co-workers at the Internet consulting firm where he is employed in Wakefield, Massachusetts. McDermott, who is arrested, was enraged because his salary was about to be garnished to satisfy tax claims by the Internal Revenue Service.³²

March 2000: Robert Wayne Harris opens fire at his former workplace, a carwash in Irving, Texas, killing five employees and injuring another. Harris was fired three days prior to the attack. He was tried and found guilty in September 2000. Texas executed Harris in 2012.³³

December 1999: Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva opens fire at the Radisson Hotel in Tampa, Florida, where he is employed, killing four co-workers and wounding three others. He then kills a fifth person during an attempted carjacking. He was sentenced in 2002 to life in prison without the possibility of parole.³⁴

September 1999: Larry Gene Ashbrook opens fire inside the crowded chapel of the Wedgwood Baptist Church in Fort Worth, Texas. Seven people are killed before Ashbrook takes his own life.³⁵

July 1999: Mark Orrin Barton, a chemist-turned-day trader, walks into two investment offices in Atlanta, Georgia, and opens fire on fellow investors and office workers. The shootings at All-Tech Investment and Momentum Securities Inc., across the street from each other, leave nine people dead and 12 wounded. After a six-hour manhunt, Barton kills himself.³⁶

April 1999: Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold, students at Columbine High School in Colorado, open fire at the school, killing a dozen students and a teacher and causing injury to two dozen others before taking their own lives.³⁷

¹ (U) DHS, *Active Shooter: How to Respond*, October 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf

² (U) *New York Times*, "Gunman Kills 6 at Sikh Temple Before Dying in Shootout," August 5, 2012, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/us/shooting-reported-at-temple-in-wisconsin.html?pagewanted=all>

³ Ibid.

⁴ (U) *New York Times*, Profile of James Holmes, September 20, 2012, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/h/james_holmes/index.html

⁵ (U) CNN, "Background of Colorado Shooting Suspect Full of Contrasts," July 22, 2012, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/20/us/colorado-theater-suspect-profile/index.html>

⁶ (U) Associated Press, "Police: Mo. man accused of plotting 'Twilight' shooting wanted to kill store worker in 2009," November 20, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/police-mo-man-accused-of-plotting-twilight-shooting-wanted-to-kill-store-worker-in-2009/2012/11/20/072f858a-3366-11e2-92f0-496af208bf23_story.html

⁷ (U) *Washington Times*, "California Attack Suspect Upset About Expulsion, Teasing," April 3, 2012, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/3/students-ran-hid-gunman-opened-fire-calif-campus/?page=all>

⁸ (U) DHS, *Active Shooter: How to Respond*, October 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf

⁹ (U) NBC.com, "Experts: Alleged Temple Gunman Wade Michael Page Led Neo-Nazi Band, Had Deep Extremist Ties," August 6, 2012, http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2012/08/06/13147115-experts-alleged-temple-gunman-wade-michael-page-led-neo-nazi-band-had-deep-extremist-ties?lite

¹⁰ (U) *Washington Post*, "James Holmes Charged With 24 Counts Of Murder In Colorado Theater Massacre," July 30, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/james-holmes-expected-to-be-charged-monday-in-colorado-massacre/2012/07/30/gIQAFCRQKX_story.html

¹¹ (U) SeattlePI.com, "Police: Seattle Shootings Were Like An Execution," June 2, 2012, <http://www.seattlepi.com/local/article/Police-Seattle-shootings-were-like-an-execution-3599900.php>

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¹⁴ (U) ABCNews.com, "Accused Tucson Shooter Jared Loughner Smirks in Court, Smiles for Mug Shot," January 10, 2011, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/jared-loughner-alleged-tucson-shooting-gunman-appears-court/story?id=12580344#.UKZjM-S5Nqw>

¹⁵ (U) CBSNews.com, "Omar Thornton: 'I Killed the Five Racists'," August 3, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20012557-504083.html

¹⁶ (U) CNN.com, "Accused Fort Hood Shooter To Face 32 Counts Of Attempted Murder," December 2, 2009, http://articles.cnn.com/2009-12-02/justice/fort.hood.shooting_1_nidal-malik-hasan-accused-fort-hood-additional-charges?_s=PM:CRIME

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Situational Awareness Report

Unclassified//For Official Use Only

School Shooting Commonalities

15 November 2012

(U//FOUO) NJ ROIC Intelligence & Analysis Unit / Threat Program ~ IAU201209-1807

Scope Note

(U//FOUO) This report attempts to analyze the indicators and commonalities of recent school shootings in an effort to inform public safety officials and assist in the detection and prevention of potential school shooter plots or attacks. All incidents included in this assessment occurred in the United States while classes were in session. Domestic violence shootings and gang violence were not included in an effort to differentiate between “active shooter” incidents and other acts of violence. DHS defines an “active shooter” as an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.¹

Overview

(U//FOUO) Recently several school shooting plots and attacks have occurred throughout the United States, which has resulted in the deaths and injuries of their victims. These incidents included:

- January 2011 (Utah) – Law enforcement officers arrested two teenagers after discovering that they planned to bomb their high school. The two suspects had blueprints of the school and planned to escape after their attack by stealing a plane at a nearby airport.²
- February 2011 (Ohio) – A student killed three classmates and injured two others at a high school when he opened fire in the cafeteria.³
- April 2012 (California) – A school shooting left seven people dead and three others wounded when a nursing student opened fire at a small Christian college.⁴
- October 2012 (Maryland) – A 15-year old high school student shot and critically injured a classmate on the first day of school.⁵

(U//FOUO) One or more plots or shootings have occurred in each of the last 10 years in the United States, resulting in the deaths of students and school administrators. These attacks have occurred at all types of schools, including elementary, high school, college, and other educational institutions. In

¹ (U) DHS, *Active Shooter: How to Respond*, October 2008, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf

² (U) *Associated Press*, “Student Charged in Utah School Bomb Plot, January 2012,” <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/01/27/utah-girl-credited-with-outrage-school-bombing-plot/>

³ (U) CBS News, “Death Toll in Ohio School Rises to 3, February 28, 2012,” http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-201_162-57386781/death-toll-in-ohio-school-shooting-rises-to-3/

⁴ (U) *Washington Post*, “Students Ran, Hid as Gunman Opened Fire on Calif. Campus,” April 3, 2012, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/apr/3/students-ran-hid-gunman-opened-fire-calif-campus/>

⁵ (U) *ABCNews.com*, “Robert Gladden Charged in Perry Hall High School Shooting,” August 28, 2012 http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/crime_checker/baltimore_county_crime/robert-gladden-charged-in-perry-hall-high-school-shooting

every instance of a school shooting attack in the United States during this period, the attacker has used small arms or homemade explosives.

New Jersey Plots

(U//FOUO) On Thursday, November 29, 2012, a high school student in Trenton, New Jersey was prevented from targeting his classmates in a school shooting. After several classmates attacked the student in his cafeteria, the student fled his school and took a taxi home to obtain a firearm. When he returned to the taxi, he instructed the driver to go back to the high school. During the return trip, the driver heard the student's threats and attempted to calm the student and delay the trip back. Prior to arriving at the school, the student exited the vehicle allowing the driver to contact law enforcement resulting in the student's arrest.^{6 7}

(U//FOUO) In 2009, New Jersey law enforcement arrested two students for planning to attack the Bridgewater-Raritan High School (Somerset County) after another student informed faculty members about the threat. The investigation later found that one student was constructing explosives at his home⁸

Use of Social Media

(U//FOUO) In the past several years, the majority of students who have conducted plots or attacks against their schools have publicized their anger or intentions through the use of social media. Not every instance of expression of anger will necessarily result in violence, but when school shootings have occurred, the perpetrators have often previously expressed a fixation with death or inflicting pain on others.

(U//FOUO) While students have used social media to express their anger and intentions to attack their schools, this type of action is neither new nor limited to online activity. Even without the use of online media, students have expressed their frustration and intentions through other outlets by using handwritten journals, notes, and drawings. These documents can indicate pre-operational planning, as illustrated in the 1999 Columbine shooting. Diary entries of the Columbine shooters, released in 2006, not only contained their anger but also reminders to fill ammunition clips and acquire bomb-making materials, including nails, propane, and fuses.⁹

(U//FOUO) Recent examples of students publicizing their intentions to plot or attack their schools include the following:

- January 2011 (Nebraska) – A high school student who shot one administrator and killed another posted ominous messages on his Facebook page that read., "You're gonna hear about the evil [expletive] I did but that [expletive] school drove me to this. I want you guys to remember me for who I was before this. I greatly affected the lives of the families ruined but

⁶ (U) *Star Ledger*, Trenton High School Arrested Before Returning to School to Shoot Fellow Classmates, November 2012, http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2012/11/trenton_high_school_student_ar.html#incart_river

⁷ (U) *Star Ledger*, Cab Driver Who Foiled Trenton School Shooting Quits Job, Fearing Retaliation, November 2012, http://www.nj.com/mercer/index.ssf/2012/11/cabbie_who_foiled_trenton_scho.html

⁸ (U) NJ.com, "Uneasy Students Return after Bridgewater-Raritan High School Bomb Threat," December 14, 2009, http://www.nj.com/news/local/index.ssf/2009/12/uneasy_students_return_after_b.html

⁹ (U) Associated Press, "1,000 Pages of hate-filled, threatening documents made public," August 7, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12370508/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/columbine-killers-diaries-offer-chilling-insight/#.UEoJmS1rK18

I'm sorry. Goodbye." ¹⁰ These attacks occurred despite the existence of these postings because friends or family were unaware of these writings until law enforcement investigated the shootings and searched the students' computers.

- February 2012 (Ohio) – Authorities discovered several Facebook postings by a high school student attending Chardon High School after he killed three classmates. One of his Facebook postings read, "He longed for only one thing, the world to bow at his feet," and ended ominously, "Die, all of you."¹¹
- In 2012 law enforcement officers arrested several students after they posted threatening language online. In one instance, in January 2012, two students were arrested for planning to bomb their school after one of them shared their plans with another student, who then informed school officials. When questioned by law enforcement, one of the students stated that not only was the 1999 Columbine High School shooting their inspiration, but also that they hoped to surpass its death toll¹² This instance and several others in which a concerned student or parent informed the local police department, preventing the attack, demonstrate the importance of reporting suspicious activities.

(U//FOUO) While social media has provided students with a venue to post their anger and intent, the Internet can also provide them with access to violent web sites. Violent online material has the potential to influence an already emotionally troubled student producing sometimes negative and deadly consequences. In 2005 a 16-year old, who posed messages on a neo-Nazi website calling himself the Angel of Death, killed nine people and wounded seven before committing suicide.¹³ Some online material can also provide instructions on weapons use and bomb construction.

Weapons Acquisition

(U//FOUO) When examining school shootings, a distinction emerges when determining how students obtain their weapons to attack their victims. The main variable is the student's age and the type of school the student attends. K-12 grade students, unlike higher education students, are underage and must resort to stealing weapons, normally from a family member or neighbors. College students, on the other hand, have legal access to gun stores and shows. In the Virginia Tech School shooting, Cho Seung-Hui purchased his weapons legally in Virginia at two gun stores and bought two gun magazines online on eBay.^{14 15}

¹⁰ (U) CBS News, "Omaha School Shooting: Millard South High School Shooter Left Disturbing Facebook Post," January 6, 2011,

http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20027545-504083.html

¹¹ (U) ABC News, "Chardon High School Shooting: Second Student Dies as Alleged Gunman Is Identified," February 28, 2012, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/chardon-high-school-shooting-gunman-identified-tj-lane/story?id=15799815#.UFDHma4rK18>

¹² (U) Associated Press, "Student Charged in Utah School Bomb Plot," January 29, 2012, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-01-27/utah-school-bomb-plot/52820328/1>

¹³ (U) FoxNews, "Shooter Obsessed With Violence," March 23, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,151214,00.html>

¹⁴ (U) CBSNews, "Guns Used In Rampage Traced To Virginia Shops," February 11, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-500690_162-2695059.html

¹⁵ (U) MSNBC, "Cho Bought Ammo Clips on Ebay," April 21, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18246522/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/va-tech-shooter-bought-ammo-clips-ebay/#.UFdIi64rK18

Who are the shooters?

(U//FOUO) In the last 10 years, male students have been responsible for the majority of school shootings nationwide. Students who perpetrated attacks were also more likely to know their intended targets rather than to attack their victims randomly. When students targeted an administrator, they believed that either the school failed to protect them from bullies, or the student felt school officials unfairly reprimanded them.

(U//FOUO) The remaining attackers were outsiders with no relationship to the school or school employees who attacked their supervisors because of employment disputes. One instance of a school employee attacking a school occurred in March 2012, when hours after a teacher was fired, he returned to school and shot dead a school administrator prior to committing suicide. Outsider shooters with no relation to the school, on the other hand, are more likely to attack their victims randomly because these attackers had no discernible association with the school and had no grievances with any potential victims.

(U//FOUO) In 2006, two separate outsider attackers shared similar tactics, one at Platte Canyon High School in Colorado in September, and another at an Amish school at Nickel Mines, PA, in October.^{16/17} In both incidents, the gunmen attacked the schools, took several female students hostage, and killed one or more students, before taking their own lives moments before law enforcement officers broke into the classrooms. The threat from outside attackers is not, however, limited to a gunman entering a school. Shooters have also targeted students by waiting outside the school or near the perimeter during recess or at dismissal.

Implications for New Jersey

(U//FOUO) While online displays of violence can be detrimental to any student, no school shooting has been a terrorist attack but instead has been criminal in nature. History has shown that school shootings can occur at all types of educational institutions, no matter the size of the campus, nor student enrollment. School shootings have occurred all across the country, and an incident could potentially occur in New Jersey with little or no warning. Therefore, the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and Preparedness has assessed that there is a moderate threat of attack to New Jersey schools.

(U//FOUO) Schools remain targets from not only outside attackers, but also students who are emotionally and mentally ill, as well as those who experience withdrawal, bullying, or social rejection. These threats demonstrate the importance of encouraging students, teachers, school resource officers, and school administrators to report suspicious activity.

(U//FOUO) For additional information, please see attached *The Department of Homeland Security Protective Security Measures Report for Elementary and Secondary Schools and Higher Education Institutions*.

¹⁶ (U) Associated Press, "Hostage Wounded In Colorado School Standoff Dies," September 28, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15032063/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/hostage-wounded-colo-school-standoff-dies/#.UD0CA6ArK18

¹⁷ (U) Associated Press, "5th Girl Dies After Amish Schoolhouse Shooting," October 3, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/15105305/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/t/th-girl-dies-after-amish-schoolhouse-shooting/#.UD0MUKArK18

Suspicious Activity in New Jersey

(U//FOUO) In 2012, the most frequently reported type of incident in New Jersey Suspicious Activity Report System (NJSARS) for K-12 schools was unsubstantiated bomb threats, followed by suspicious persons. For colleges, it was suspicious persons on campus.¹⁸

(U//FOUO) Any suspicious activity with a possible nexus to terrorism in New Jersey should be reported immediately following existing protocols specific to respective counties. Activity can also be reported to CT Watch located at the ROIC by dialing 2-1-1 or (866) 4SAFENJ (866-472-3365), or by e-mailing Tips@NJHomelandSecurity.gov.

Contact Information

(U//FOUO) Any agency with information or comments/questions about this document should contact the NJ ROIC Intelligence & Analysis Unit at (609) 963-6900, ext. 6212, or njroicanalysis@gw.njsp.org.

¹⁸ (U//FOUO) New Jersey Suspicious Activity Reporting System



THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS:

A GUIDE TO MANAGING
THREATENING SITUATIONS
AND TO CREATING
SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 2004



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Disclaimer

The findings, conclusions, and opinions expressed in this document are those of the authors, and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Education or the U.S. Department of the Treasury.

Joint message from the Secretary, U.S. Department of Education, and from the Director, U.S. Secret Service

Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret Service have been working as a team to try to better understand—and ultimately help prevent—school shootings in America. When we began this collaboration nearly three years ago, we did not know what information we might uncover in the course of our joint study on targeted violence in schools, known as the *Safe School Initiative*. However, throughout our collaboration, our two agencies have focused on one common goal: to develop accurate and useful information about prior school attacks that could help prevent some future ones from occurring.

We believe the results of this effort have given schools and communities real cause for hope. Through the *Safe School Initiative*, staff from the U.S. Department of Education’s Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program and the U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center have found that some school attacks may be preventable. The companion report to this document, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*, details findings from the *Safe School Initiative* and includes several key findings relevant to prevention efforts. In particular, the *Safe School Initiative* findings indicate that incidents of targeted violence in school were rarely impulsive; that the students who perpetrated these attacks usually planned out the attack in advance—with planning behavior that was oftentimes observable; and that, prior to most attacks, other children knew that the attack was to occur. Taken together, these findings suggest that it may be possible to prevent some future school attacks from occurring—and that efforts to identify, assess, and manage students who may have the intent and capacity to launch an attack may be a promising strategy for prevention.

This document, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*, takes these findings one step further by setting forth a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of targeted violence in schools. This process—known as threat assessment—was first pioneered by the U.S. Secret Service as a mechanism for investigating threats against the president of the United States and other protected officials. The Secret Service threat assessment approach was developed based upon findings from an earlier Secret Service study on assassinations and attacks of public officials and public figures.

This *Guide* represents a modification of the Secret Service threat assessment process, based upon findings from the *Safe School Initiative*. It is intended for use by school personnel, law enforcement officials, and others with protective responsibilities in our nation’s schools. This *Guide* includes suggestions for developing a threat assessment team within a school or school district, steps to take when a threat or

other information of concern comes to light, consideration about when to involve law enforcement personnel, issues of information sharing, and ideas for creating safe school climates.

We applaud all of you working to keep children safe in school. We hope that the information in this *Guide*, and the companion *Final Report*, assist you in your continued efforts to do so.



Rod Paige
Secretary
U.S. Department of Education
May 2002



W. Ralph Basham
Director
United States Secret Service

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THREAT ASSESSMENT AND THE PREVENTION OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE



The vast majority of the nation's students will complete their schooling without ever being touched by peer violence. Nevertheless, recent school attacks carried out by students have shaken the image of schools as reliably safe and secure environments in which the qualifications of teachers and the efficacy of the educational curricula are the most pressing concerns of educators and parents. Televised images of frightened and injured students fleeing school grounds have imprinted themselves on the American consciousness. "Columbine," the Littleton, Colo. high school that on April 20, 1999, was the scene of the most violent of the school attacks recorded to date in the United States, has entered contemporary vocabulary as a national symbol of the violence that claimed the lives of 14 students and a teacher on that day.

Incidents of targeted school violence¹ occurred in 37 communities across the country between December 1974 and May 2000. Compared to the other types of violence and crime children face both in and outside of school, school-based attacks are rare. While the Department of Education reports that 60 million children attend the nation's 119,000 schools, available statistics indicate that few of these students will fall prey to serious violence in school settings.²

However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty about the safety and security of this country's schools and generated fear that an attack might occur in any school, in any community. Increased national attention to the problem of school violence has prompted educators, law enforcement officials, mental health professionals, and parents to press for answers to two central questions: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so, "What could we have done to prevent these attacks from occurring?"

For example, what should happen when a student comes to attention for saying something or behaving in a manner that causes concern, as in the following instances?

- "The kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen."
- Marty, who has appeared withdrawn and irritable the past few weeks, handed in a story about a student putting a bomb in an empty school.
- Sandy brought bullets to school to show friends.
- Rafael, who got pushed around again after gym class, stormed out in tears, shouting "You're all going to pay!"

¹ "Targeted violence" is defined as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack. See Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B. & Holden, G. "Threat Assessment: An Approach to Prevent Targeted Violence." *Research in Action*. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C. (September, 1995), at 1-7. NCJ 155000

² U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2000). *Digest of Education Statistics 2000*. Washington, D.C.: Authors

- Casey, who was suspended last year for bringing a knife to school, left a "hit list" on his desk.
- Terry submitted an essay in which an assassin blew up the school, attacked the governor, and then killed himself.

Given the enormous concern about targeted school violence, these reported statements and behaviors cannot be ignored. But how should school officials and other responsible adults respond?

This publication, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*, is the product of an ongoing collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Department of Education to begin to answer these questions. Its focus is on the use of the threat assessment process pioneered by the Secret Service as one component of the Department of Education's efforts to help schools across the nation reduce school violence and create safe climates. As developed by the Secret Service, threat assessment involves efforts to identify, assess, and manage individuals and groups who may pose threats of targeted violence.

Development of the School Threat Assessment Process

This *Guide* is an outgrowth of the joint Secret Service/Department of Education *Safe School Initiative*. This initiative, begun in June 1999, was undertaken to explore the potential for adapting the threat assessment investigative process developed by the Secret Service to the problem of targeted school violence.

The *Safe School Initiative*, implemented through the Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program, combined the Department of Education's expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff, and the Secret Service's experience in studying and preventing targeted violence.

The *Safe School Initiative* began with a study of the thinking, planning, and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by students who carried out school shootings.³ That study examined 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000 when researchers concluded their data collection.

³ Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., Reddy, M., Borum, R., & Modzeleski, W. *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*. U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education: Washington, D. C. (May 2002), at 15. [hereinafter *The Safe School Initiative Final Report*]. For a fuller discussion of the Safe School Initiative, its methodology, and findings, please refer to this report.

The *Safe School Initiative* was patterned after the Exceptional Case Study Project (ECSP), the Secret Service's earlier five-year study of the thinking and behavior of individuals who carried out or attempted lethal attacks on public officials or prominent individuals in the United States since 1949.⁴ The purpose of the ECSP was to generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn, would inform Secret Service agents' investigations of threats against the president and other Secret Service protectees, and the development of strategies to prevent harm to these public officials.

In July 1998, the Secret Service and the Justice Department's National Institute of Justice released the publication, *Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials*, in an effort to make the Service's threat assessment protocols available to a wider law enforcement audience. That publication offers state and local police officials guidance in carrying out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.⁵

The *Safe School Initiative* study reinforced the findings of the Secret Service's ECSP study concerning the thinking and behavior of attackers. In particular, like the ECSP, the *Safe School Initiative* concluded that most attackers did not threaten their targets directly, but did engage in pre-attack behaviors that would have indicated an inclination toward or the potential for targeted violence had they been identified. Findings about the pre-attack behaviors of perpetrators of targeted violence validated the "fact-based" approach of the threat assessment process. This process relies primarily on an appraisal of *behaviors*, rather than on *stated threats* or *traits*, as the basis for determining whether there is cause for concern. These findings argue favorably for pursuing adaptation of this threat assessment process for use by school administrators and law enforcement officials in responding to the problem of targeted school violence.

The *Guide* is intended to provide school administrators and law enforcement officials guidance in incorporating the threat assessment process for investigating, evaluating, and managing targeted violence into strategies to prevent school violence. The purpose of the *Guide* is to contribute to achieving the broader goal of creating safe and secure school environments by helping school and law enforcement officials respond responsibly, prudently, and effectively to threats and other behaviors that raise concern about potential violence.

Effective threat assessment can only occur in a larger context of school safety. Cultures and climates of safety, respect, and emotional support can help diminish the

⁴ Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. "Assassination in the United States: An Operational Study of Recent Assassins, Attackers, and Near-Lethal Approachers." *Journal of Forensic Sciences*, 44 (1999), at 321-333.

⁵ Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. *Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials*. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D. C. (July 1998).

possibility of targeted violence in schools. Environments in which students, teachers and administrators pay attention to students' social and emotional needs—as well as their academic needs—will have fewer situations that require formal threat assessments.

In an educational setting where there is a climate of safety, adults and students respect each other. This climate is defined and fostered by students having a positive connection to at least one adult in authority. In such a climate, students develop the capacity to talk and openly share their concerns without fear of shame and reprisal. They try to help friends and fellow students who are in distress, bringing serious concerns to the attention of adults.

A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing two students, and wounding several others, told us from his prison cell: "I was really hurting. I didn't have anybody to talk to. They just didn't care."

Ideally when this climate of safety is created, students experience a sense of emotional "fit" and of respect. Problems are raised and addressed before they become serious. As a result, the potential for school violence diminishes. When a member of the school community shows personal pain that might lead them to harm themselves or others, someone is available. Young people can find an adult to trust with this information, so that it does not remain "secret" until it is too late.

A young man who brought a rifle into school, killing two students, and wounding several others, told us from his prison cell: "I was really hurting. I didn't have anybody to talk to. They just didn't care."

Organization of the *Guide*

The remainder of this *Guide* is organized into seven chapters. Chapter II of the *Guide* discusses characteristics of safe school climates. Chapter III presents the key findings of the *Safe School Initiative* and discusses the implications of these findings for the prevention of targeted school violence. Chapter IV describes the principles underlying the threat assessment approach to preventing targeted violence, and outlines the central elements of a threat assessment process.

Chapters V and VI will be of particular interest to school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others who wish to pursue the development of a threat assessment process as a component of a broader school violence prevention strategy. Chapter V outlines the approach to identifying students whose behavior may suggest the potential for targeted school violence, and discusses the steps in carrying out a

threat assessment inquiry or investigation.⁶ Chapter VI addresses the issue of managing threatening situations.

Chapter VII presents an action plan for creating safe school cultures and climates and an action plan to help school leaders implement a threat assessment program. In the final chapter of the *Guide*, Chapter VIII, the authors reassert the importance of the threat assessment process as a component of broader school safety and violence prevention strategies. In addition, the authors offer some concluding observations on the efficacy of the threat assessment process as a tool that can help school administrators, law enforcement officials, and others to make critical decisions about responding to situations involving the threat of targeted school violence.

Readers will find additional resources to inform the development and implementation of school threat assessment processes in the appendix that is included at the end of the *Guide*. The appendix provides an annotated list of publications and other resources on threat assessment and related topics.

⁶ This *Guide* distinguishes between a threat assessment *inquiry* and a threat assessment *investigation*. Threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by school officials (often with input or participation from law enforcement professionals), while threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law enforcement officials. Each school system or community should decide where to place the line between an "inquiry" and an "investigation." For further discussion, please see Chapter V.

CHAPTER II

CREATING CLIMATES
OF SCHOOL SAFETY:

A FOUNDATION FOR
REDUCING SCHOOL
VIOLENCE



"What I hate about this school is that I'm being picked on in the halls and just about everywhere else"—A 14-year-old student

"School has always been hard for me, literally from the first day I started elementary school. People saw me as a ... good target. They just started picking on me for no reason ... they made fun of me [and, now] I'm going through self-esteem issues because of the 11 years I was a target."—An 18-year-old student.

"They want me to open up, express myself. Quite a funny notion, ironic! If someone had helped me do that several years ago, I probably would have turned out okay."—Comment in a diary by a 17-year-old student who attacked others at school, then killed himself.

The threat assessment process described in this *Guide* is presented as an approach to addressing the problem of targeted school violence. Incidents of targeted school violence are extreme and, thankfully, rare events. However, targeted school violence is arguably only the tip of the iceberg of pain, loneliness, desperation, and despair that many students in this nation's schools deal with on a daily basis.

Threat assessment should be looked upon as one component in an overall strategy to reduce school violence. The threat assessment process by itself is unlikely to have a lasting effect on the problem of targeted school violence unless that process is implemented in the larger context of strategies to ensure that schools offer their students safe and secure learning environments. The principal objective of school violence-reduction strategies should be to create cultures and climates of safety, respect, and emotional support within educational institutions.

Fostering a Culture of Respect

In educational settings that support climates of safety, adults and students respect each other. A safe school environment offers positive personal role models in its faculty. It provides a place for open discussion where diversity and differences are respected; communication between adults and students is encouraged and supported; and conflict is managed and mediated constructively.

Cultures and climates of safety support environments in which teachers and administrators pay attention to students' social and emotional needs as well as their academic needs. Such environments emphasize "emotional intelligence" as well as educational or intellectual pursuits.⁷ Students experience a sense of emotional "fit"

⁷ Goleman, D. *Emotional Intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books, (1995).

and of respect within the school body and may be less likely to engage in or be victimized by harmful behavior.⁸

A culture of safety creates "shame-free zones" in which daily teasing and bullying is not accepted as a normal part of the adolescent culture.⁹ School environments characterized by bullying and meanness can lead to student isolation and fear. At best, school environments that turn a blind eye to bullying and teasing inhibit the work of school-learning and growth. At the worst, such environments allow behavior that fosters fear and fury that stunts the healthy development of the victims of that behavior, and may lead to psychological and physical violence.

Creating Connections Between Adults and Students

Connection through human relationships is a central component of a culture of safety and respect. This connection is the critical emotional glue among students, and between students and adults charged with meeting students' educational, social, emotional, and safety needs.¹⁰

In a climate of safety, students have a positive connection to at least one adult in authority. Each student feels that there is an adult to whom he or she can turn for support and advice if things get tough, and with whom that student can share his or her concerns openly and without fear of shame or reprisal. Schools in which students feel able to talk to teachers, deans, secretaries, coaches, custodians, counselors, nurses, school safety officers, bus drivers, principals, and other staff support communication between students and adults about concerns and problems.

Schools that emphasize personal contact and connection between school officials and students will take steps to identify and work with students who have few perceptible connections to the school. For example, during staff meetings in a school in a California School District, the names of students are posted, and school faculty members are asked to put stars next to the names of those students with whom they have the closest relationships. Faculty members then focus on establishing relationships with those students with few stars next to their names.

⁸ See, for example, Resnick, M.D., Bearman, P.S., Blum, R.W. et. al., (1997) "Protecting Adolescents from Harm," JAMA, 278(10) pp. 823-832. See also www.allaboutkids.umn.edu.

⁹ See Pollack, W. *Real Boys: Rescuing Our Sons from the Myths of Boyhood*. New York: Henry Holt, Inc., (1998); Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. *Real Boys' Voices*. New York: Random House, (2000); Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. *Real Boys Workbook*. New York: Villard, (2001).

¹⁰ Pollack, W. *Real Boys*. (1998). See note #9.

Breaking the "Code of Silence"

In many schools there is a pervasive sense among students and some adults that telling grownups that another student is in pain or may pose a threat violates an unwritten, but powerful, "code of silence." A code of silence has the potentially damaging effect of forcing students to handle their pain and problems on their own, without the benefit of adult support. These codes also suggest that a student should not bring any concerns that he or she may have about a peer's behavior to the attention of responsible adults.

The findings of the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that silence is far from golden. In fact, study findings indicate that silence may be downright dangerous. The study found that most school shooters shared their potentially lethal plans with other students, but that students who knew of planned attacks rarely told adults.

In a climate of safety, students are willing to break the code of silence. Students are more likely to turn to trusted adults for help in resolving problems. Moreover, students are more willing to share their concerns about the problem behavior of peers with their teachers and other adults in positions of authority within the school without feeling that they are "snitching" or "ratting" on a buddy or friend.

As a result of responsible bystander behavior, serious problems come to adult attention earlier, before these problems lead to violence. Problems are raised and addressed before they become serious, and the potential for school violence arguably is diminished. In an environment that encourages communication between students and adults, information does not remain "secret" until it is too late. In fact, it is considered good citizenship or even heroic to go to a teacher to share the fact that a fellow student is in trouble and may be contemplating a dangerous act.

Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

The major components and tasks for creating a safe school climate include:

- Assessment of the school's emotional climate;
- Emphasis on the importance of listening in schools;
- Adoption of a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence;
- Prevention of, and intervention in, bullying;
- Involvement of all members of the school community in planning, creating, and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect;
- Development of trusting relationships between each student and at least one adult at school; and
- Creation of mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates.

Discussion of these components and tasks may be found in Chapter VII of this *Guide*.

CHAPTER III

KEY FINDINGS OF THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE'S* STUDY OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE



This chapter summarizes the *Safe School Initiative* and the findings that support a threat assessment process to identify, assess, and manage threatening situations in schools. The *Safe School Initiative* examined incidents of targeted school violence from the time of the incident backward, to identify the attackers' pre-incident behaviors and communications and to explore whether such information might aid in preventing future attacks.

The findings of the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that there are productive actions that educators, law enforcement officials, and others can pursue in response to the problem of targeted school violence. Specifically, *Initiative* findings suggest that these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

- developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack; and
- employing the results of these risk evaluations, or "threat assessments," in developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.

Support for these suggestions is found in the 10 key findings of the *Safe School Initiative*:

- Incidents of targeted violence at school are rarely sudden, impulsive acts.
- Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.
- Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
- There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted school violence.
- Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused concern or indicated a need for help.
- Most attackers were known to have difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.
- Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
- Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
- In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
- Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

An overview of these findings, and their implications for the use of threat assessment protocols to identify, assess, and manage possible targeted school violence, follows.

Implications of Key Findings for the Use of Threat Assessment Protocols

Key Finding 1

Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.

Explanation

Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attacks examined under the *Safe School Initiative* appeared to be the end result of a comprehensible process of thinking and behavior—behavior that typically begins with an idea, progresses to the development of a plan, moves on to securing the means to carry out the plan, and culminates in an attack.

Example: One attacker asked his friends to help him get ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the coat while holding it through one of the cut-out pockets. This same attacker had a well-known fascination with weapons and frequently told his friends that he thought about killing certain students at school.

Implications

The process of thinking and planning that leads up to an attack potentially may be knowable or discernible from the attacker's behaviors and communications. To the extent that information about an attacker's intent and planning is knowable and may be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable. However, the *Safe School Initiative* found that the time span between the attacker's decision to mount an attack and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the form of information about a possible planned attack, school administrators and law enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire about and intervene in that possible plan.

Key Finding 2

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.

Explanation

In most cases, other young persons—friends, schoolmates, and/or siblings—knew about the attacker's idea or plan for a possible attack on the school before that attack occurred. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult.

Example: One attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby of his school prior to the beginning of classes. He told two friends exactly what he had planned and asked three other students to meet him in the mezzanine overlooking the school lobby the morning of the planned attack, ostensibly so that these students would be out of harm's way. On most mornings, few students would congregate in the mezzanine before the school day began. However, on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to happen spread to such an extent that, by the time the attacker opened fire in his school lobby, 24 students had gathered in the mezzanine waiting for the attack to begin. One student who knew about the attacker's plans brought a camera so that he could take pictures of the event.

Implications

First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of targeted school violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair, thoughtful, and effective system to respond to whatever information students do bring forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information that they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information.

In addition, this finding highlights the importance in a threat assessment inquiry of attempts to gather all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with the student. Efforts to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however innocuous they may appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student has contact may help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student's ideas, activities, and plans. In the end, investigators likely will find that different people in the student's life may have different pieces of the puzzle.

Key Finding 3

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

Explanation

The *Safe School Initiative* found that most attackers in fact did not threaten their target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other behaviors and communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a young person is talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators of a possible threat and therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information.

Implications

This finding underscores the importance of *not waiting* for a threat before beginning an inquiry. School administrators, of course, should respond to all students who make threats because the lack of response could be taken by the threatener as permission to proceed with carrying out the threat. In the end, however, it is important to distinguish between someone who *makes* a threat—tells people they intend to harm someone—and someone who *poses* a threat—engages in behaviors that indicate an intent, planning, or preparation for an attack. Those conducting threat assessment inquiries should focus particular attention on any information that indicates that a student poses a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a potential target he or she intends to do them harm.

Key Finding 4

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engage in targeted school violence.

Explanation

The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the attackers varied substantially. Moreover, knowing that an individual shares characteristics, behaviors, features, or traits with prior school shooters does not help in determining whether a particular student is thinking about or planning for a violent act.

Example: In one case, the dean of students had commended a student for improving his grades and behavior a few weeks before that student carried out an attack at his school.

Implications

The use of profiles to determine whether a student is thinking about or planning a violent attack is not an effective approach to identifying students who may pose a risk for targeted violence at school or—once a student has been identified—for assessing the risk that a particular student may pose a risk for targeted school violence. Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two substantial risks: (1) the great majority of students who fit any given profile of a "school shooter" actually will not pose a risk of targeted violence; and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify some students who in fact pose a risk of violence, but share few if any characteristics with prior attackers.

Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student's behaviors and communications to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the student is on a path toward a violent attack, if so how fast the student is moving toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.

Key Finding 5

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

Explanation

Several key findings point to the fact that young people send signals—both direct and indirect—to others regarding their problems. The boys and young men who engaged in the targeted school violence examined by the *Safe School Initiative* were not "invisible" students. In fact, nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors that caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult—and most concerned at least three people.

Implications

This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student's life that may be noticeable to adults and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult. As was true in some of the incidents covered in the *Safe School Initiative's* study, individuals in contact with the attacker each may have observed something of concern about that student's behavior, but not of sufficient concern for them to notify anyone in a position to respond.

Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make appropriate referrals. By inquiring about any information that may have prompted some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student's past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize the student of concern.

Key Finding 6

Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.

Explanation

Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student to appropriate services and resources.

In addition, more than three-quarters of school shooters had a history of suicidal thoughts, threats, gestures, or attempts. Most of these students were known to have been severely depressed or desperate at some point before their attacks.

Example: One school shooter submitted a series of poems describing his thoughts of suicide and homicide to his English teacher. One poem read:

Am I insane
To want to end this pain
To want to end my life
By using a sharp knife
Am I insane
Thinking life is profane
Knowing life is useless
Cause my emotions are a mess
Am I insane
Thinking I've nothing to gain
Considering suicide
Cause love has died
Am I insane
Wanting to spill blood like rain
Sending them all to Hell
From humanity I've fell

The teacher became concerned and recommended that the student receive help. Help, however, was not offered. After failing to kill himself, this student killed two adults at school. He hoped to be convicted of capital murder and executed by the state.

Implications

In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in targeted violence, an inquiry or investigation should include attention to any indication that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and hopelessness. An inquiry or investigation also should anticipate changes in the life of a troubled student, and consider whether these changes might increase—or decrease—the threat that the student poses.

Key Finding 7

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

Explanation

Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal definitions of harassment and/or assault.

Example: In one situation, most of the attacker's schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In witness statements from that incident, schoolmates described how virtually every child in the school had at some point thrown the attacker against a locker; tripped him in the hall; held his head under water in the pool; or thrown things at him. Several schoolmates had noted that the attacker acted differently in the days preceding the attack in that he seemed more annoyed by and less tolerant of the teasing than usual.

Implications

The prevalence of bullying found by the *Safe School Initiative's* examination of targeted school violence and in other recent studies should strongly support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American schools. Educators can play an important role in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not permit bullying, but also empower other students to let adults in the school know if students are being bullied.

Key Finding 8

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Explanation

Almost two-thirds of attackers used a handgun in their attack. Almost half used a rifle. Most attackers acquired weapons from their home or the home of a relative. Approximately two-thirds of attackers had a history of using guns prior to the attack.

Implications

Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea of an attack exists, any effort to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon or ammunition, including bomb-making components, may be a significant move in the attacker's progression from idea to action. Any inquiry should include investigation of and attention to weapons access and use and to communications about weapons.

The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, which generally requires a minimum one-year expulsion of students who bring a gun to school and that all violations be reported to local law enforcement officials.

Key Finding 9

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.

Explanation

The *Safe School Initiative* found that in over half of the incidents, others assisted in the planning or execution of the attack by actively encouraging the attacker to shoot others at school, or even helping to select targets and train the shooter in how to use a weapon.

Example: One attacker's original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let other students see him with it. He wanted to look tough, so that the students who had been harassing him would leave him alone. When the attacker shared this idea with two friends, however, they convinced him that he could not just show up with a gun, but actually had to shoot at people at the school in order to get the other students to leave him alone. It was after this conversation that he decided to mount his school attack.

Implications

This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences any intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack. Any inquiry or investigation of potential targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a student's friends or peers may be playing in that student's thinking about and preparations for an attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may help to move a student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and advancing a plan to carry out the attack.

This finding speaks to the importance of school officials paying attention to the "settings" and climates of their schools. Peers exert enormous influence over their friends and schoolmates. And principals, teachers, counselors, coaches, and other adults at school may make all the difference in preventing violence. An environment in which it is clear that violence doesn't solve problems, but only makes them worse, may help prevent tragedy. A climate in which a young person is seen as a "snitch" or a "rat" for telling an adult about a student in distress differs from one in which young people know that they can call on adults to help students who are in pain.

Key Finding 10

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention and most were brief in duration.

Explanation

Law enforcement authorities responded quickly to almost all calls from schools about attacks. However, most attacks were resolved within minutes, without law enforcement intervention.

Implications

The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of concern.

In summary, the findings of the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that some future school attacks may be preventable. The fact that most attackers engaged in pre-incident planning behavior and shared their intentions and plans with others, suggests that those conducting threat assessment inquiries or investigations could uncover these types of information. The remainder of this *Guide* sets forth how to develop a capacity for and conduct a threat assessment process.

CHAPTER IV

IMPLEMENTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT PROCESS



The primary purpose of a threat assessment is to prevent targeted violence. The threat assessment process is centered upon on analysis of the facts and evidence of behavior in a given situation. The appraisal of risk in a threat assessment focuses on actions, communications, and specific circumstances that might suggest that an individual intends to mount an attack and is engaged in planning or preparing for that event.

In a situation that becomes the focus of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, appropriate authorities gather information, evaluate facts, and make a determination as to whether a given student *poses* a threat of violence to a target. If an inquiry indicates that there is a risk of violence in a specific situation, authorities conducting the threat assessment collaborate with others to develop and implement a plan to manage or reduce the threat posed by the student in that situation.

Six principles form the foundation of the threat assessment process. These principles are:

- Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior.
- Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the individual, the situation, the setting, and the target.
- An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment.
- Effective threat assessment is based upon facts rather than on characteristics or "traits."
- An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment inquiries and investigations.
- The central question in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation is whether a student *poses* a threat, not whether the student has *made* a threat.

In addition, three elements guide the development and operation of an effective school threat assessment program. These elements are:

- authority to conduct an assessment;
- capacity to conduct inquiries and investigations; and,
- systems relationships.

These principles and elements are discussed below.

Principles of the Threat Assessment Process

This *Guide* is about the systematic use of threat assessment as a central component in preventing targeted school violence. The threat assessment process involves

identifying, assessing, and managing individuals who might pose a risk of violence to an identified or identifiable target. Implementation of a threat assessment process is informed by six underlying principles.

Principle 1: Targeted violence is the end result of an understandable, and oftentimes discernible, process of thinking and behavior.

Findings of the *Safe School Initiative* indicate that students and former students who committed targeted attacks at schools almost always thought about their attacks in advance and did not "just snap" suddenly. These findings suggest that students who carry out school attacks may consider possible targets; talk with others about their ideas and intentions; and record their thinking in diaries and journals or on a Web site. They may seek out weapons to use in the attack, and they may practice with these weapons in preparation for the attack. The actions of these attackers may be deliberate and occur over days and weeks, months or years.

Principle 2: Targeted violence stems from an interaction among the person, the situation, the setting, and the target.

Understanding and preventing acts of targeted violence require a focus on these four component parts and their interaction: the person, the situation, the setting, and the target.

- *The potential attacker:* To determine the risk of targeted violence, a threat assessor must gather information about the potential attacker. In a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, a major question is: How has this student dealt with situations that have led him or her to see life as unbearably stressful? Individuals who in times of great stress have considered or acted upon ideas of suicide or violence toward others, or both, should be considered persons of increased concern.
- *The situation:* Investigators should examine circumstances and significant events in the life of the individual, especially recent events that have been overwhelmingly stressful. For students who engaged in school-based attacks, those events included having been bullied and humiliated, especially in public; loss of significant relationships; and perceived failures or loss of status. Almost all school shooters experienced some major situational stress at some point before their attack.¹¹
- *The setting:* The third factor to consider is the specific setting at the time that the student came to authorities' attention as possibly posing a threat of

¹¹ It should be emphasized again that many young people experience losses, failures, humiliations, and other kinds of situational stressors and that few become school shooters.

targeted school violence. Do fellow students, friends, or others say—directly or indirectly—that violence is not a solution to problems? Do these people suggest ways to get help and assistance? In a school, are there respectful connections among students and adults, networks of trusting relationships, that facilitate non-violent problem-solving? Or is the idea of violence proposed, supported, accepted, or ignored by those who know the potential attacker?

In many school shootings, other young persons knew about the shooter's interest in mounting an attack. In some cases, clear warnings were dismissed or ignored. In others, friends and fellow students of the shooter encouraged or helped the attacker in his pursuit of violence. Messages about the acceptability of violence that are communicated directly or subtly to a potential attacker by students and/or adults in his or her environment may facilitate, or alternatively help to prevent, an attack.

- *The target:* When assessing the risk of an attack at school, investigators and others with protective responsibilities also must pay attention to the individual's choice of a potential target. The attacker may target a particular individual or group of individuals over some perceived injury or loss. In some cases, attackers chose a specific target, such as a particular student or teacher. In other instances, the target was more general: the school itself, "jocks," or "kids in the cafeteria."

Principle 3: An investigative, skeptical, inquisitive mindset is critical to successful threat assessment.

An investigative mindset is central to successful application of the threat assessment process. Threat assessment requires thoughtful probing; viewing information with healthy skepticism; and paying attention to key points about pre-attack behaviors. Authorities who carry out threat assessments must strive to be both accurate and fair.

Moreover, threat assessors should question the information in front of them continuously. Ideally, there should be credible verification of all essential "facts." Information about a potential attacker's interests, statements, and actions should be corroborated, wherever possible.

The investigative mindset and perspective also rely on common sense. Threat assessors working to understand a given situation should step back periodically from the individual details of an inquiry or investigation and ask whether information gathered makes sense and supports any hypothesis developed concerning the risk posed by the subject of the threat assessment inquiry.

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Principle 4: Effective threat assessment is based on facts rather than characteristics or "traits."

A major principle of threat assessment is that each investigation stands on its own. Inferences and conclusions about risk should be guided by an analysis of facts and behaviors specific to the person of concern and the given situation. Any student with the motive, intent, and ability potentially is capable of mounting a targeted attack at school. Judgments about a student's risk of violence should be based upon analysis of behaviorally relevant facts, not on "traits" or "characteristics" of a given individual or of a class of individuals.

In the climate of fear that followed recent attacks, students in high schools across the country who appeared angry and wore trench coats were marked as possible school attackers. They were so labeled because of appearance and demeanor. Blanket characterizations, or student "profiles," do not provide a reliable basis for making judgments of the threat posed by a particular student.¹² Even worse, the use of profiles can shift attention away from more reliable facts and evidence about a student's behavior and communications.

Principle 5: An "integrated systems approach" should guide threat assessment investigations.

In a threat assessment, bits of information might be viewed as pieces of a puzzle. Each bit may appear inconsequential or only slightly worrisome by itself. But, when the pieces are put together—as oftentimes has occurred in "after the fact" analyses of school attacks—the behaviors and communications of a student may coalesce into a discernible pattern that indicates a threat of violence. In many school attacks, information existed within the school and community that might have alerted authorities to the risk of attack posed by a particular student.

Relationships with agencies and service systems within the school and the surrounding community are critical to identifying, assessing, and managing students who are on a path toward carrying out a school attack. An integrated systems approach recognizes the necessity of cooperation and partnerships between schools and systems outside of the school. These may include law enforcement, social services and mental health providers, the courts, community agencies, families, worksites, religious organizations, and others.

¹² Please refer to Reddy, et. al. (2001), "Evaluating Risk for Targeted Violence in Schools: Comparing Risk Assessment, Threat Assessment, and Other Approaches," for a discussion of the use and limitations of profiling as a tool for assessing the risk of targeted school violence. The full citation for the article is provided in the **Appendix, Annotated Resources**, of this *Guide*.

Principle 6: The central question of a threat assessment is whether a student *poses* a threat, not whether the student *made* a threat.

Although some individuals who threaten harm may pose a real threat of targeted violence, many do not. The *Safe School Initiative* found that fewer than 20 percent of school shooters communicated a direct or conditional threat to their target before the attack. By contrast, individuals who are found to *pose* threats of violence frequently *do not make* threats to their targets. The study found that in more than 80 percent of the cases, school shooters did not threaten their targets directly, but they did communicate their intent and/or plans to others before the attack.

These findings underscore the importance of making judgments in threat assessment investigations based upon a student's behaviors and communications, rather than upon whether or not that student threatened his or her target. Authorities conducting threat assessment investigations must distinguish between *making* a threat, e.g., telling a potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and *posing* a threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates furthering a plan or building capacity for a violent act.

Nevertheless, threats of violence should not be dismissed out of hand. Students may make threats with a variety of intents and for a wide range of reasons, e.g., to get attention; to express anger or frustration; to frighten or coerce their peers; as a part of joking or "playing around;" or, in some cases, to communicate intent to attack.

Consequently, every threat should receive prompt attention. Although voicing a threat should not be used as the principal determinant in making judgments about the likelihood of a school attack, it likewise would be a mistake to assume that individuals who make threats in every instance are unlikely to follow through on those communications.

Elements of a School Threat Assessment Process

Authorities involved in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should gather and analyze information about the behavior and communications of the student of concern. This information, in turn, will permit these authorities to make reasonable judgments about whether the student of concern is moving along a path toward an attack on an identifiable target. Three elements are essential to the development and operation of an effective school safety threat assessment program.¹³

¹³ See **Chapter VII, Action Plans for School Leaders**, for further guidance in creating school threat assessment programs.

Authorities conducting threat assessment investigations must distinguish between making a threat, e.g., telling a potential target that he or she may or will be harmed, and posing a threat, e.g., engaging in behavior that indicates furthering a plan or building capacity for a violent act.

1. Authority to Conduct an Assessment

A teacher comes to the principal's office to report "the kids are saying that Johnny told his friends not to go to the cafeteria at noon on Tuesday because something big and bad is going to happen." What did Johnny mean by that statement? Is Johnny planning to attack the school? Perhaps Johnny is engaging in idle talk. Perhaps the report of Johnny's statement is inaccurate. Perhaps Johnny is planning an attack on the school or has knowledge about other students' plans.

Clearly, this information cannot be ignored. How, then, should the principal respond to this report? Should the principal call Johnny to the office and ask him about the report? Should other students be queried about the report? What if Johnny denies making the statement that has been reported, while other students assert otherwise?

Schools should have in place clear policies on collecting and reacting to information on potentially threatening situations and determining whether this information merits further attention through a threat assessment inquiry and investigation. Threat assessment inquiry and investigation should be initiated if there is credible information that passes a critical threshold of concern.

In creating these policies, school administrators should be aware of and consult with the school's legal counsel about legal issues related to the conduct of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation. These legal issues include the effects of laws pertaining to: (1) access to and sharing of information, and (2) searches of a student's person or property. Each of these issues should be discussed with the school's legal counsel.

Establishing Authority to Conduct an Inquiry or Investigation

A formal policy authorizing school officials to conduct a threat assessment should cover the following topics:

- the purpose and scope of the policy;
- the role of educators and the threat assessment team in relation to the role of law enforcement;
- the identity of, and delegation of authority to, school officials concerning determination that a threat assessment inquiry or investigation should be pursued;
- the definition of the threshold of concern for initiating a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, i.e., a description of the nature and extent of behavior or communication that would trigger a threat assessment inquiry or investigation;
- the description of the types of information that may be gathered during the assessment;

- the designation of the individuals or group of individuals who would be responsible for gathering and analyzing information; and
- the steps and procedures to be followed from initiation to conclusion of the threat assessment inquiry or investigation.

Information-Sharing in Support of the School Threat Assessment Process

Much emphasis in this *Guide* is placed upon the importance of sharing information about a student who may pose a risk of violence. In most previous school shootings, there was information available prior to the incident that suggested that the student was planning an attack at school.

However, when conducting an inquiry or investigation regarding a potential threat, the inquirer or investigator will find that different people in the student's life may have different—and possibly small—pieces of the puzzle. It is the responsibility of the threat assessment team to gather this information from what may be multiple sources—teachers, parents, friends, guidance counselors, after-school program staff, part-time employers, and others.

Once information is gathered from the various sources contacted during a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team may wish to explore options for storing this information in an accessible format. The team likewise may wish to consider keeping the information in a central location.

Legal Considerations in Developing Information-Sharing Policies and Procedures

Although the need to gather information about a student who may pose a threat of violence is clear, the ability to share this information requires some advance consideration. Laws, rules, regulations, and policies, for example, may place limitations on access to student records and restrict the use of accessible information in conjunction with investigations. In formulating information-sharing policies and procedures, threat assessment teams should consult with their respective school's—or school district's—legal counsel to ensure that team members are well-briefed on existing laws and regulations and their implications for the development of policies and procedures for accessing and disclosing student information. In particular, threat assessment teams should examine provisions of these laws and regulations to identify opportunities for including threatening situations in schools as exceptions to constraints on the disclosure of information contained in education records.

Two principal areas of law—federal statutes and state statutes—may affect access to and sharing of information about a particular student. An overview of the implications of these areas of law for conducting threat assessment investigations is provided in the following.

Federal Statutes

Under existing federal law, a school's authority to release information about a student is governed by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).¹⁴ The intent of FERPA is to protect the privacy of "education records," a term that is defined as any records that contain information directly related to a student and that are maintained by the educational agency or institution or by a person acting for the agency or institution. Under provisions of FERPA, a school may not disclose personally identifiable information about a student from any education records without the prior written consent of the student's parent or, in the case of students who are 18 or older, the consent of the student.

FERPA does allow for various exceptions to privacy protections covering access to student records, specifying situations and conditions under which a school may disclose information from a student's education records without consent. A detailed analysis of these exceptions is beyond the scope of this Guide. However, there are two exceptions that are worth noting because of their specific relevance to accessing and sharing information for threat assessment inquiries:

- **Health and Safety Emergencies:** FERPA provides that schools may disclose information from a student's education records in situations where there is an immediate need to share that information in order to protect the health or safety of the student or others.¹⁵ Under this exception, schools must define the term "health or safety emergency" narrowly and are permitted to disclose information from education records only to those individuals who need the information in order to protect the student and others.
- **Law Enforcement Unit Records:** FERPA regulations draw a distinction between records created by a school law enforcement unit for law enforcement purposes, such as the enforcement of a local, state, or federal law, and records created by a school law enforcement unit for non-law enforcement purposes, such as the enforcement of school policies concerning behavior or disciplinary actions. FERPA also distinguishes between student information that school law enforcement unit officials gathered from education records and student information that unit officials obtained from other sources. With respect to disclosure of student information contained in school law enforcement unit records, FERPA provides that:
 - Personally identifiable information about a student may be disclosed by school officials if that information is held in a school law enforcement unit record that was created to enforce a federal, state, or local law.
 - Information in school law enforcement unit records that was not obtained from a student's education records may also be disclosed without the consent of the student's parents or the student.

¹⁴ 20 U.S.C. 1232g. See "Information Sharing" in the **Appendix, Annotated Resources**, of the *Guide* for referral to additional sources of information on FERPA.

¹⁵ 34 CFR 99.31(a)(10).

It is important to note that FERPA regulations govern the disclosure of student information from education records and any information about the student that is based upon information contained in education records. FERPA regulations do not restrict the authority of school officials to share other information about a student that *is not* contained in education records. For example, information such as a school official's personal observations about or interactions with a student that is not contained in education records may be disclosed.

State Law and Access to Student Records

State laws governing access to and sharing of information about students vary from state to state. Moreover, in the wake of highly publicized school shootings in the 1990s, several states enacted laws that revise restrictions on disclosure of information contained in student records. In some states, these amendments, in effect, make it easier to share this information among schools, law enforcement agencies, and others in furtherance of protecting the safety of students at school.¹⁶

2. Capacity to Conduct Inquiries and Investigations

Proactive planning is a critical element in the implementation of a school threat assessment program. School administrators should consider creating a multidisciplinary threat assessment team that is based in the school or the school district. Schools should not wait until a crisis occurs to establish a threat assessment team. Many schools across the country already have established teams to respond to a wide range of situations, from suicides to meeting special education needs. The expertise and knowledge of any existing teams may be useful in developing a threat assessment team.

The roles and responsibilities of the team as a whole, and of members of that team individually, should be clearly defined. The information gathering and assessment procedures to be used by the team should be formalized. Team members should be trained together in the threat assessment process. Multidisciplinary training sessions provide opportunities for professionals in different systems to build relationships and to consider how to address issues before a crisis arises. Training that uses practical exercises—"what should we do if ..."—can enhance threat assessment and management programs and processes.

The multidisciplinary threat assessment team's principal responsibility is to guide the assessment and management of situations of concern. A senior school administrator should chair the team. Regular members of the team ideally should include: 1) a respected member of the school faculty or administration; 2) an investigator, such as

¹⁶ See "Information Sharing" in the **Appendix, Annotated Resources**, of the *Guide* for references that review some of the more recent changes to state laws that affect access to and disclosure of student information contained in education records.

a school resource officer or other police officer assigned to the school; 3) a mental health professional, such as a forensic psychologist, a clinical psychologist, or a school psychologist; and 4) other professionals, such as guidance counselors, teachers, coaches, and others, who may be able to contribute to the threat assessment process.

In addition, the chair of the threat assessment team may wish to consider including as an ad hoc member of the team someone who knows the student of concern in the threat assessment inquiry. This ad hoc position might be held by an individual from the school community, such as a teacher, counselor, coach, nurse, other school employee, or someone from the community who may know or have knowledge of the student, such as a probation officer, member of the clergy, or a social service worker.

If the student of concern is being provided services under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), a representative from the team that developed or manages that student's Individualized Education Plan (IEP) also should be brought onto the threat assessment team as an ad hoc member for the inquiry regarding this particular student.

Skills and Training

Developing the capacity to conduct school threat assessments involves recruiting, training, and supporting professionals with special skills. The qualifications, skills, knowledge and experience of the members of the threat assessment team should include:

- a questioning, analytical, and skeptical mindset;
- an ability to relate well to parents, colleagues, other professionals, and students;
- familiarity with childhood and adolescent growth and development, the school environment, the need for safe schools, and the community;
- a reputation within the school and the community for fairness and trustworthiness;
- training in the collection and evaluation of information from multiple sources;
- discretion, and an appreciation for the importance of keeping information confidential, and of the possible harm that may result in the inappropriate release of information; and
- cognizance of the difference between harming and helping in an intervention.

3. Integrated Systems Relationships

In order to identify, assess, and manage students who might pose threats of targeted violence, a threat assessment program must build relationships among individuals and organizations both within the school and external to the school. These

relationships can help the team acquire and use information about a given situation, and aid those with protective responsibilities in developing strategies to prevent targeted school violence.

Ideally, community systems concerned with education, safety, and child welfare would have well-established policies and procedures for cooperation and collaboration. In practice, these systems oftentimes are large and overburdened and tend to carry out their functions independently. In a well-functioning threat assessment program, effective systems relationships are most likely to occur between individuals, not institutions.

Individuals who build and maintain these relationships across disciplines and agencies are called "boundary spanners."¹⁷ They serve as a formal link or liaison between various systems and meet regularly with them. Boundary spanners have credibility, respect, and strong interpersonal skills. In addition, they should understand the needs and operation of other systems. This understanding helps in integrating ongoing interagency relationships, in developing written protocols, and in facilitating the resolution of conflicts.

¹⁷ Steadman, H., "Boundary Spanners: A Key Component for the Effective Interactions of the Justice and Mental Health Systems." *Law and Human Behavior*. 16 (February, 1992): 75-87.

CHAPTER V

CONDUCTING A SCHOOL THREAT ASSESSMENT



This chapter focuses specifically on carrying out the threat assessment process. The sections that follow address the issue of identifying threatening situations; describe the information that should be sought in a threat assessment; identify potential sources of information; and set out 11 key questions that may provide members of the threat assessment team guidance in making judgments about whether a student of concern poses a threat.

The approach presented is highly detailed but should not be read as suggesting that most, or even many, threat assessments will require extensive or elaborate gathering and analysis of information. Threat assessments may be brief and limited, or extensive and complex. The facts of a situation, together with information developed about a student of concern, will determine the scope of the threat assessment process. Many situations can be understood and resolved after initial information-gathering and evaluation.

The Threat Assessment Process as a Continuum

In previous chapters of this *Guide*, the terms "threat assessment inquiry" and "threat assessment investigation" generally have been used interchangeably. In this chapter, threat assessment inquiries and threat assessment investigations will be addressed as two complementary parts of a threat assessment continuum. Under this model of the threat assessment process, evaluation of a threatening situation proceeds from a threat assessment *inquiry*, carried out by the school threat assessment team, to a threat assessment *investigation*, carried out by a law enforcement agency, if the initial inquiry determines that there is a valid threat of targeted school violence.

There may be several "right ways" to designate responsibility for conducting a threat assessment. One community or school system may decide to give primary responsibility to specially trained law enforcement professionals. Another may keep responsibility for most threat assessment and management within the school system. Still other communities develop "blended" systems. School, law enforcement, and community leaders should consider the principles of threat assessment, the functions needed for a successful program, and local resources and relationships before deciding what delineation of responsibilities makes the most sense.

The threat assessment process is being presented in this manner as a means of underscoring the proposition that not all situations that become the focus of school threat assessment inquiries will require referral to and follow-up threat assessment investigations by law enforcement officials. For example, some preliminary inquiries by members of the school threat assessment team will find that information about a student was false or unfounded, or that the behavior of the student who is the subject of this inquiry does not present a risk of targeted violence and can be managed by school administrators and other officials on an informal basis. The situations examined in these inquiries do not pose threats to the school, the student body, or

the community, and therefore generally would not be referred to law enforcement agencies. By contrast, threat assessment inquiries that conclude that a valid threat of targeted school violence exists will require referral to law enforcement officials for further investigation.

Central Distinctions Between Threat Assessment Inquiries and Investigations

The primary objective of both a threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to determine whether a particular student poses a threat of targeted school violence.

The central distinctions between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation are defined by the management of these two parts of the threat assessment continuum. The primary objective of both a threat assessment inquiry and an investigation is to determine whether a particular student poses a threat of targeted school violence. Both an inquiry and an investigation ask "Is there information to suggest that this student is on the path to an attack? What is the risk of targeted violence?"

A threat assessment inquiry is initiated and controlled by school authorities (often with law enforcement consultation and participation). Information is gathered at the school and by persons known to the school. If information collected suggests that the student of concern is considering mounting an attack at school, it may be appropriate to refer the situation to law enforcement for an investigation. Also, if information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry suggests that it is likely that a violation of law has occurred, it may be appropriate to refer the situation to law enforcement.

A threat assessment investigation also asks: "Does this student pose a threat of targeted violence?" In addition, investigators may ask: "Has this student violated a law?"

With respect to their management, the threat assessment inquiry and the threat assessment investigation differ as follows:

- threat assessment inquiries are initiated, conducted, and controlled by the school threat assessment team;
- threat assessment investigations are initiated, conducted, and controlled by law enforcement agencies.

The line between a threat assessment inquiry and a threat assessment investigation—the point along the threat assessment continuum at which a school threat assessment team decides that a threatening situation must be referred to a law enforcement agency for investigation—will be determined by the school threat assessment team in consultation with school administrators and law enforcement officials. These determinations, in turn, will be made on a case-by-case basis.

Nevertheless, in developing policies and procedures for carrying out a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment program should establish a general threshold for initiating inquiries and referring threatening situations to law enforcement agencies.

Identifying Students of Concern

As discussion of the threat assessment process in this Guide indicates, that process is not about the wholesale examination of the student body to identify students who may be at risk of committing acts of targeted school violence. Instead, threat assessment is a tool for responding to threatening situations in which there is concern about a particular student who has come to the attention of school administrators or other authorities.

Students who become the focus of threat assessment inquiries and investigations may come to the attention of authorities in a number of ways.

Circumstances That Bring a Student to Official Attention

Some students may bring themselves to the attention of authorities by engaging in communications that cause concern:

- A student submits a story for an English assignment about a character that shoots other students in his school.
- Two students in a video class make a movie about kids who bring bombs to school.
- A dean receives an e-mail stating, "I'm going to kill everyone in this asylum."
- A seventh-grader, who is known to be feared by his classmates, cocks a finger at another boy on the playground and says "you're gonna die."
- The personal Web page of a high-achieving student has links to Web pages with information about cyanide.

In each of the situations described above, a student has behaved in a manner that causes concern to school administrators and other authorities. Each situation requires some kind of follow-up inquiry or investigation. In each case, the identity of the student is known or potentially knowable. In some cases, the student's communication is a direct threat. In other cases, the communication is ambiguous.

Other students of concern come to the attention of authorities through second or third parties:

- A school bus driver tells the principal of a school that a group of students has been overheard whispering about bringing a gun to school.
- A ninth-grader reports that he has been threatened by another student and warned not to tell anybody about the threat.

- A student reports overhearing a lunchroom conversation between two other students in which one of the students says that he "isn't going to take it any more. I'm going to get even for good."
- A neighbor of a student calls the school to report suspicions that the student is experimenting with bomb-making materials.

In still other cases, students come to the attention of authorities through anonymous communications:

- A parent anonymously calls a tip line to report concerns about the behavior of a student.
- The school district superintendent's office receives an anonymous call stating that a bomb will go off in one of the middle schools at 1:45 p.m.
- An anonymous letter signed "Fans of Eric and Dylan Club" arrives at a high school. The letter states "Remember Columbine" and warns that "Judgment Day" is coming.

Information provided anonymously requires careful evaluation by the school threat assessment team. Some information may be accurate. Some information may be partial or incomplete. Some may be false and/or fabricated with malicious intent.

In situations where a student is not easily identifiable from an anonymous communication, more sophisticated identification techniques may be required. These methods and techniques may necessitate involvement of law enforcement organizations, particularly in situations where there are anonymous warnings of imminent danger, such as bomb threats.

Managing Communications about Students of Concern

Policies regarding the handling of communications that raise concerns about students should address the following topics:

- Establishing low barriers for reporting for those who may have information of concern.¹⁸
- Advising students and adults of the kinds of information that should be brought forward: threats; weapon-seeking and weapon-using behavior; homicidal and suicidal behaviors; behaviors suggesting that a young person is contemplating, or planning, an attack.
- Ensuring that a thoughtful process is put in place in the school or school district to assess information that is brought forward about a potential attacker. This process should be perceived as credible by students and adults.

¹⁸ There is a growing body of literature on lowering barriers for persons with concerns and on integrated conflict management systems that may be of interest to school administrators. See for example *Designing Integrated Conflict Management Systems: Guidelines for Practitioners and Decision Makers in Organizations*, Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution, 2001, <http://www.spidr.org/article/icmsD.html>

- Recognizing that what is reported may often be different than what actually was said or occurred.
- Establishing and continually reinforcing a policy that it is everyone's responsibility to help develop and maintain a respectful, safe school environment.
- Reinforcing positive behaviors by teachers, students, and staff in the school.
- Building linkages to individuals, groups, and organizations that can offer support and assistance to students and to the school. Sometimes these persons and groups may provide information that can help prevent targeted violent attacks.

Creating a Central Point of Contact

Individuals who have information about students that is cause for concern should know how to refer this information and to whom. The threat assessment team should designate a member of the team to serve as the initial point of contact for information of possible concern. The availability of this point of contact should be made known community-wide. An anonymous tip line may be of use if there is a process in place to carefully evaluate the information that is received by means of this approach. The threat assessment team member who serves as initial point of contact will screen information and determine whether to initiate a threat assessment inquiry or to consult other members of the team.

Schools should publicize the name of the designated point of contact to faculty, staff, parents, and students as the person to contact with any information of potential concern. Students, faculty, staff, and parents should be instructed and encouraged to bring forward information about any activity that evokes concern about possible targeted violence. Information of interest includes threatening statements and writings; behavior that indicates that an attack is being planned; and attempts to acquire weapons.

Individuals who provide information concerning a student should receive follow-up acknowledgments of their communications from the central point of contact, such as: "We have carefully considered the information you shared with us" or "We appreciate your bringing this situation to our attention." A follow-up acknowledgment can be made without revealing confidential or inappropriate information, and it reinforces the proposition that individuals in the community can play an important role in alerting school officials and other authorities of suspected threatening situations.

The Threat Assessment Inquiry

This section describes the process for conducting a threat assessment inquiry. The information developed during the inquiry will inform the threat assessment team's analysis of a potentially threatening situation and provide the basis for deciding whether that situation should be referred to a law enforcement agency for a threat assessment investigation.

In the event that a threatening situation is referred to a law enforcement agency, the information gathered and analyzed by the threat assessment team during the threat assessment inquiry will be forwarded to the investigative law enforcement agency. That information will provide direction to police officials' more in-depth examination of the behaviors and communications of the student of concern.

When should a threat assessment inquiry be initiated?

Upon receiving information concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat assessment team must first consider: "How much time do we have?" An inquiry should be initiated immediately (within hours of notification) in any situation of concern.

When information about a student's behavior and communications passes an agreed-upon threshold of concern, school officials should initiate a threat assessment inquiry. Upon receiving information concerning a potentially threatening situation, the threat assessment team must first consider: "How much time do we have?" An inquiry should be initiated immediately (within hours of notification) in any situation of concern.

If information concerning a threatening situation suggests that violence is imminent—for example, a student has acquired a weapon and is on his way to the school with the intention of shooting another student—that matter of course should be referred immediately to police.

When information is received concerning a potentially threatening situation, the safety of the school and the community is the priority consideration. The threat assessment team therefore should consider how to handle a student of concern while an inquiry or investigation is being conducted. In making decisions about how to handle a student pending the outcome of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation, care should be exercised to ensure that a student of concern is not treated inappropriately, since any allegations regarding the behavior or perceived dangerousness of the student may be unfounded.

What information should be sought in an inquiry?

Once a decision has been made to conduct an inquiry, the threat assessment team should develop an information plan. A school threat assessment inquiry should seek information in five areas:

1. The facts that drew attention to the student, the situation, and possibly the targets

The first area of inquiry concerns how the student came to the attention of school officials. What behaviors and/or communications were reported, and by whom? What was the situation? Who, if anyone, witnessed the reported behavior of concern? What was the context for the reported behavior, i.e., what else was going on at the time of the reported behavior?

Individuals who report information about possible threatening situations may have multiple motives. Alleged accounts of behaviors may be inaccurate and may be subjective interpretations of events. Careful attention to the facts—with corroboration wherever possible—will help determine whether the situation warrants scrutiny.

2. Information about the student

Three kinds of general information about a student should be gathered: identifiers, background information, and information about the student's current life situation and circumstances.

A. Identifying information:

- name;
- physical description;
- date of birth; and
- identification numbers (e.g., Social Security number, student ID, etc.).

B. Background information:

- residences;
- family/home situation;
- academic performance;
- social networks;
- history of relationships and conflicts;
- history of harassing others or of being harassed by others;
- history of violence toward self and others;
- history of having been a victim of violence or bullying;
- known attitudes toward violence;
- criminal behavior;
- mental health/substance abuse history;
- access to and use of weapons; and
- history of grievances and grudges.

C. Current life information:

- present stability of living and home situations;
- nature and quality of current relationships and personal support;
- recent losses or losses of status (shame, humiliation, recent breakup or loss of significant relationship);
- current grievances or grudges;
- perceptions of being treated unfairly;
- known difficulty coping with a stressful event;
- any "downward" progression in social, academic, behavioral, or psychological functioning;

- recent hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair, including suicidal thoughts, gestures, actions, or attempts; and
- pending crises or change in circumstances.

Of particular note is whether the student has any trusting relationships with adults who are emotionally available to him or her, or whether the student is known to be consistently respectful to any adult. If there is an adult who is "connected" to the student, that adult may have useful information about the student's thinking and behavior. In addition, such an adult may be able to help the student if he or she appears to be on a path toward mounting a targeted school attack.

3. Information about "attack-related" behaviors

Examination of the thinking and behaviors of school shooters suggests that most attacks are preceded by discernible behaviors, as the student plans or prepares for the attack. These behaviors are referred to as "attack-related behaviors."

Behaviors that should raise concern about potential violence include:

- ideas or plans about injuring him/herself or attacking a school or persons at school;
- communications or writings that suggest that the student has an unusual or worrisome interest in school attacks;
- comments that express or imply the student is considering mounting an attack at school;
- recent weapon-seeking behavior, especially if weapon-seeking is linked to ideas about attack or expressions about interest in attack;
- communications or writings suggesting the student condones or is considering violence to redress a grievance or solve a problem; and
- rehearsals of attacks or ambushes.

4. Motives

Motives for actual school attacks have included:

- revenge for a perceived injury or grievance;
- yearning for attention, recognition, or notoriety;
- a wish to solve a problem otherwise seen as unbearable; and
- a desire to die or be killed.

Knowledge of the motives of a student of concern may help the threat assessment team in evaluating the risk of targeted violence. Understanding the circumstances that may have prompted a student to consider attacking others may permit authorities to direct the student away from violence.

For example, a student who feels he has been treated wrongly and unfairly by a teacher or an administrator and who is thinking about "revenge" may be offered or taught non-violent ways to address his concerns and problems. Mediation; personal support; clarification about the disciplinary process; education about how to write a letter of concern to authorities who might intervene in the student's problems; or other dispute resolution efforts might turn that student away from a potentially violent course of action. A student who is suicidal and who wants to get "even" with his bullies before ending his life may be provided mental health services and support. In addition, school administrators should intervene on this student's behalf to stop the bullying.

As stated in previous chapters of this *Guide*, students make threats and engage in other risky behaviors for a range of reasons. Many threatening statements and actions do not reflect the student's actual movement on a path to attack. Adolescents occasionally say and do "outrageous" things, so a single utterance or action should not be seen as determinative in a threat assessment.¹⁹

5. Target selection

Most school shooters identified their targets to friends and fellow students before advancing the attack. Almost half of school shooters had more than one target. Threat assessors should consider whether and how a potential attacker's interest in a target may shift to another target over time. Information about a student's targets may provide clues to the student's motives, planning, and attack-related behaviors. Information about the student's motives also may inform the question of whether there are additional targets.

What are sources of information for the inquiry?

1. School information

A school threat assessment inquiry should begin with what is known about the student from records, teacher interviews, and other information easily accessed at the school and from school officials. In utilizing information from school records in a threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team should follow school policies and relevant laws regarding information-sharing.²⁰

Answers to the following questions may be drawn from information at school:

- Is the student well known to any adult at the school?

¹⁹ Please note that all comments and behaviors should be understood in their context: the words "get him" may have very different meanings at a football game when linemen are chasing the quarterback than in a hallway after a student has been bullied and tormented.

²⁰ See **Chapter IV** of this *Guide* for a more in-depth discussion of the issue of information-sharing.

- Has the student come to attention for any behavior of concern? If so, what? (e-mail, Web site, posters, papers, rule-breaking, violence, harassment, adjustment problems, depression or despair, acting-out behavior, etc.)
- Has the student experienced serious difficulties or been in distress?
- Is there anyone with whom the student shares worries, frustrations, and/or sorrows?
- Is there information that the student has considered ending his or her life?
- Has the student been a victim and/or an initiator of hostile, harassing, or bullying behavior directed toward other students, teachers, or other staff?
- Is the student known to have an interest in weapons? If so, has he or she made efforts to acquire or use weapons? Does the student live in a home in which there are weapons (whether or not the weapons are secured)?

2. Collateral school interviews

Students and adults who know the student who is the subject of the threat assessment inquiry should be asked about communications or other behaviors that may indicate the student of concern's ideas or intent. The focus of these interviews should be factual:

- What was said? To whom?
- What was written? To whom?
- What was done?
- When and where did this occur?
- Who else observed this behavior?
- Did the student say why he or she acted as they did?

Bystanders, observers, and other people who were there when the student engaged in threatening behaviors or made threatening statements should be queried about whether any of these behaviors or statements concerned or worried them. These individuals should be asked about changes in the student's attitudes and behaviors. Likewise, they should be asked if they have become increasingly concerned about the student's behavior or state of mind.

However, individuals interviewed generally should not be asked to characterize the student or interpret meanings of communications that the student may have made. Statements such as "I think he's really dangerous" or "he said it with a smile, so I knew that he must be joking" may not be accurate characterizations of the student's intent, and therefore are unlikely to be useful to the threat assessment team in carrying out a threat assessment inquiry.

3. Parent/guardian interview

The parents or guardians of the student of concern usually should be interviewed.

Parents may be protective of their children. They may be frightened and/or embarrassed about the inquiry and the possibility that their child may be contemplating a violent act. The threat assessment team therefore should make it clear to the student's parents or guardians that the objective of the threat assessment inquiry is not only to help prevent targeted school violence and diminish the chance that the student and possibly others would be harmed, but also to help their child.

The threat assessment team should seek the help of the student's parents in understanding the student's actions and interests, recognizing that parents may or may not know much about their child's thinking and behavior. Questions for parents should focus on the student's behaviors and communications, especially those that might be attack-related. The student's interest in weapons should be explored, as well as his or her access to weapons at home.

It may be useful for a member of the threat assessment team to visit and observe the student of concern's home. The threat assessment team should have policies and procedures in place regarding home visits.

4. Interviews with the student of concern

Interviews with a student of concern oftentimes are critical in a threat assessment inquiry. School administrators and law enforcement officials and their respective legal counsels should follow existing policies or develop policies regarding interviews with students of concern. Issues that should be considered include:

- If and when to notify parents/guardians of an interview;
- Whether or when to invite parents/guardians to be present during an interview;
- Whether and how to use information from an interview for criminal justice proceedings; and
- Whether and when legal representation should be allowed, offered, or provided.

State and local laws differ with respect to requirements regarding these questions.

In some instances, the threat assessment team may determine that important information might be obtained through a search of a student's person or property, or the property of another individual to which the student has access. The search of a student in any context is a sensitive and legally complex issue that should be examined thoroughly by school administrators and their legal counsel and addressed in policies and procedures governing the conduct of a threat assessment inquiry.²¹

²¹ The U.S. Supreme Court has established that Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable search and seizure apply to students on school property, but the court has recognized school officials' authority to conduct searches that are reasonable (*New Jersey v. T.L.O.*).

The primary purpose of a student interview is to learn about the student's thinking, motives, and behavior. The tone of the interview should be professional, neutral, and non-confrontational, rather than accusatory or judgmental.

Before conducting an interview with a student of concern, the threat assessment team should be well-acquainted with the facts that brought the student to the attention of school administrators and others. In addition, prior to conducting the student interview, the threat assessment team should have reviewed available information concerning the student's background, interests, and behaviors. Background information can inform the threat assessment team's approach to and questioning of the student. This information may help the threat assessment team determine whether the student poses a threat to particular targets. In addition, knowledge of background information concerning the student prior to the interview may help the threat assessment team judge whether the student is forthcoming and straightforward. Generally, a student should be asked directly about his or her intentions. Often, adolescents will respond forthrightly to a direct question.

A student interview conducted during a threat assessment inquiry can elicit important information that permits the threat assessment team to better understand the situation of the student and possible targets. This understanding, in turn, will help the threat assessment team to assess the risk of violence that the student may pose in a given situation. Interviews with a student of concern also can generate leads for further inquiry.

An interview can also send the message to the student that his or her behavior has been noticed and has caused concern. Interviews give students of concern the opportunity to tell their personal stories, to be heard, and to reassess and redirect their behavior away from activities that are of concern. The interview may suggest to a student who has mixed feelings about attacking that there are people who are interested in his or her welfare, and that there are better, more effective ways to deal with problems or with specific people.

Although an interview with a student of concern can provide valuable information, relying too heavily on that interview as a basis for making judgments about whether that student poses a threat may present problems. The information offered by the student may be incomplete, misleading, or inaccurate. It therefore is important to collect information to corroborate and verify information learned from the student interview.

5. Potential target interview

Individuals who have been identified as potential targets of the student of concern also should be interviewed. The threat assessment team should inform the subject of the interview that the primary purpose of that interview is to gather information about a possible situation of concern.

A potential target should be asked about their relationship to the student of concern and queried about recent interactions with that student. The interviewer should gather information about grievances and grudges that the student of concern may hold against a target or against others.

Interviews with potential targets should be conducted with special sensitivity. Care must be taken to gather information without unduly alarming a potential target. If the threat assessment team believes that there may be a risk of violence to an identified target, that target should be offered assistance and support.

How should information be organized and analyzed?

Information gathered in a threat assessment inquiry should be examined for evidence of behavior and conditions that suggest that the student of concern is planning and preparing for an attack. Analysis of this information should, in the end, answer these questions: Is the behavior of the student consistent with movement on a pathway toward attack? Do the student's current situation and setting incline him or her toward or away from targeted violence?

Evaluation of information gathered from research and interviews conducted during a threat assessment inquiry should be guided by the following 11 key questions:

1. What are the student's motive(s) and goals?

- What motivated the student to make the statements or take the actions that caused him or her to come to attention?
- Does the situation or circumstance that led to these statements or actions still exist?
- Does the student have a major grievance or grudge? Against whom?
- What efforts have been made to resolve the problem and what has been the result? Does the potential attacker feel that any part of the problem is resolved or see any alternatives?

2. Have there been any communications suggesting ideas or intent to attack?

- What, if anything, has the student communicated to someone else (targets, friends, other students, teachers, family, others) or written in a diary, journal, or Web site concerning his or her ideas and/or intentions?
- Have friends been alerted or "warned away"?

3. Has the subject shown inappropriate interest in any of the following?

- school attacks or attackers;
- weapons (including recent acquisition of any relevant weapon); or
- incidents of mass violence (terrorism, workplace violence, mass murderers).

4. Has the student engaged in attack-related behaviors? These behaviors might include:

- developing an attack idea or plan;
- making efforts to acquire or practice with weapons;
- casing, or checking out, possible sites and areas for attack; or
- rehearsing attacks or ambushes.

5. Does the student have the *capacity* to carry out an act of targeted violence?

- How organized is the student's thinking and behavior?
- Does the student have the means, e.g., access to a weapon, to carry out an attack?

6. Is the student experiencing hopelessness, desperation, and/or despair?

- Is there information to suggest that the student is experiencing desperation and/or despair?
- Has the student experienced a recent failure, loss and/or loss of status?
- Is the student known to be having difficulty coping with a stressful event?
- Is the student now, or has the student ever been, suicidal or "accident-prone"? Has the student engaged in behavior that suggests that he or she has considered ending his or her life?

7. Does the student have a trusting relationship with at least one responsible adult?

- Does the student have at least one relationship with an adult where the student feels that he or she can confide in the adult and believes that the adult will listen without judging or jumping to conclusions? (Students with trusting relationships with adults may be directed away from violence and despair and toward hope.)
- Is the student emotionally connected to—or disconnected from—other students?
- Has the student previously come to someone's attention or raised concern in a way that suggested he or she needs intervention or supportive services?

8. Does the student see violence as an acceptable—or desirable—or the only—way to solve problems?

- Does the setting around the student (friends, fellow students, parents, teachers, adults) explicitly or implicitly support or endorse violence as a way of resolving problems or disputes?
- Has the student been "dared" by others to engage in an act of violence?

9. Is the student's conversation and "story" consistent with his or her actions?

- Does information from collateral interviews and from the student's own behavior confirm or dispute what the student says is going on?

10. Are other people concerned about the student's potential for violence?

- Are those who know the student concerned that he or she might take action based on violent ideas or plans?
- Are those who know the student concerned about a specific target?
- Have those who know the student witnessed recent changes or escalations in mood and behavior?

11. What circumstances might affect the likelihood of an attack?

- What factors in the student's life and/or environment might increase or decrease the likelihood that the student will attempt to mount an attack at school?
- What is the response of other persons who know about the student's ideas or plan to mount an attack? (Do those who know about the student's ideas actively discourage the student from acting violently, encourage the student to attack, deny the possibility of violence, passively collude with an attack, etc.?)

Thoughtful consideration of the answers to the above 11 questions will produce a sound foundation for the threat assessment team's response to the overarching question in a threat assessment inquiry: Does the student of concern pose a threat of targeted violence at school? If the threat assessment team concludes that:

- a. there is enough reliable information to answer the 11 key questions; and
- b. the weight of the information is convincing that the student does not pose a threat of targeted school violence; then
- c. the threat assessment team may conclude the threat assessment inquiry.

The threat assessment team may determine that closure of the inquiry is warranted, but conclude that the student, or previously suggested targets, need help coping with the behavior or problems that initially brought the threatening situation to the attention of authorities. In such situations, the team should work with school administrators and others to ensure that these individuals receive the assistance and continued support that they may need.

For example, if the student who was the focus of the threat assessment inquiry came to the attention of authorities because of behavior or communications that suggested

that he or she was contemplating suicide, that student should be offered—and receive—appropriate counseling or other services. Likewise, if the threat assessment team concludes that the student was a victim of false allegations, the team may wish to consider recommending actions to deal with malicious accusers.

Regardless of the outcome of the threat assessment inquiry, the threat assessment team should document carefully the inquiry and any actions taken. This documentation should be carried out in compliance with any applicable school or other relevant policies and/or legal considerations, and should include a record of the sources of, and content for, all key information considered in the threat assessment as well as the date that the information was acquired. In addition to documenting the facts that provided the basis for the findings in the threat assessment inquiry, it also is important to document the reasoning that led the threat assessment team to its decision in that inquiry.

If the team concludes that

- a. there is insufficient information for the threat assessment team to be reasonably certain that the student does not pose a threat; or
- b. the student appears to be on a path to attack; then
- c. the team should recommend that the matter be referred to the appropriate law enforcement agency for a threat assessment investigation.

The Threat Assessment Investigation

As explained earlier in this chapter, the focus of a threat assessment investigation—the information sought and questions asked—will be similar to that of a threat assessment inquiry. However, the scope of the threat assessment investigation’s collection and analysis of information will be broader than in an inquiry, reaching outside the school and across systems within the community.

In carrying out a threat assessment investigation, investigators should explore a student’s prior contacts with civil authorities and criminal and juvenile justice officials. These investigators may re-interview, in greater depth, individuals contacted during the threat assessment inquiry, such as a student’s family members; fellow students and friends; neighbors; and employers. Investigators will focus particularly on attack-related behaviors exhibited by the student, including efforts to acquire, buy, or gain access to weapons.

Investigators also may request the permission of the student or his parents to search a student’s computer, room, home, car, or workspace. In some cases, investigators may seek to obtain search warrants.

Investigators should evaluate information gathered during a threat assessment investigation in accord with the 11 key questions identified in the above discussion of procedures for conducting a threat assessment inquiry. Threat assessment investigators may consult with colleagues and with professionals in other fields and disciplines who possess special skills and experience in handling situations involving potential targeted violence. These professionals may include other law enforcement officers, mental health service providers, social workers, physicians, and others knowledgeable about stalking, domestic violence, and workplace violence. The knowledge, experience, and insights of these professionals may help the threat assessment investigator in evaluating and organizing information concerning situations that involve the threat of targeted school violence.

In addition, as investigators proceed with a threat assessment investigation, they continuously should ask themselves the following questions:

- Does the information collected prompt more concern or less concern about the possibility that the student is moving on a path toward a school attack?
- What information might prompt less concern?
- What information might heighten concern?
- What options exist for intervening in the behavior of or redirecting the student away from ideas of or plans for a school attack?
- Should potential targets be contacted, warned, and/or protected?

As with a threat assessment inquiry, it is critical that investigators document and keep a record of the information that they gather and evaluate in carrying out a school threat assessment investigation. A well-documented record provides baseline information about a student’s thinking and actions at a certain point in time. This information can be useful if the student comes to authorities’ attention again, or if at some point in the future investigators need to determine whether the subject has changed patterns of thinking and behavior. Also, should a threatening situation result in civil or criminal action against a student or others, a carefully documented investigative file will be an important asset in demonstrating that a threat assessment investigation was conducted properly and in compliance with applicable laws, policies, and procedures.

CHAPTER VI

MANAGING A THREATENING SITUATION



Threat assessment and threat management are integrated and interdependent functions. Many students who come to the attention of threat assessment teams may need help and support. Assisting, directing, and managing these young people and the situations they are in should be high priorities for threat assessment team members.

When the findings of a threat assessment inquiry or investigation suggest that a student has the interest, motive, and ability to mount a school attack, and has started down a path toward attack, the primary mission is to prevent the attack and protect possible targets. Accordingly, an individual management/monitoring plan should be developed for any student who is identified in a threat assessment inquiry or investigation as posing a threat of targeted school violence.

Key Components and Functions of a Management Strategy

Who should manage the threatening situation, and what the components of the plan are, will depend on the specific threatening situation. For example, a student who is under the jurisdiction of the juvenile or criminal justice system could be supervised or managed by court or justice system officials. If the student remains in school, school administrators might work with parents to impose and monitor the student's compliance with a supervision or management plan.

Successful management of a threatening situation requires substantial time and effort. Management of these situations comprises three related functions:

1. Controlling/containing the situation and/or student in a way that will prevent the possibility of an attack;
2. Protecting and aiding possible targets; and
3. Providing support and guidance to help the student deal successfully with his or her problems.

Considerations in Developing a Management Strategy

Managing Threatening Situations for the Short Term

Managing a student of concern involves short-term and longer-term considerations. In the short term, after a threat assessment investigation has concluded that a student poses a risk of targeted school violence, authorities must move immediately to intervene with that student to contain the threatening situation and reduce the potential for violence.

In some cases, subjecting the student to a threat assessment inquiry or investigation may have the added effect of containing future threatening behavior. As a result of

the inquiry or investigation, the potential attacker receives help in addressing the problems that may have prompted his or her action and abandons plans for the attack, believing that an attack is not feasible or necessary.

In other situations, there must be more overt containment of potential attackers. Containment and control in these situations may include supervision and/or confinement of the student of concern and the protection of possible targets.

Managing Threatening Situations for the Long Term

Once the immediate threat of a situation is believed to be under control for the short term, the threat assessment team should turn its attention to longer-term safety. The threat assessment team should address two central questions: What steps should be taken to contain a potential attacker over the longer term? What course of action should be pursued to deter the potential attacker from posing a future threat of violence?

The primary goal in a school threat assessment is to prevent an attack. The intervention or management strategy selected therefore should be the one with the greatest potential for long-term *preventive* power.

Threat managers should ask: "What will be the most effective and least damaging course of action?" When confronted with a problem, professionals often choose the tools with which they are most familiar: Police officers arrest; mental health professionals commit; workplace managers fire; principals suspend or expel. Caution should be used in a given situation of concern to make sure that the response of authorities is appropriate to the problem.

Those with responsibility to manage a student assessed as posing a threat of targeted violence should consider options for the long-term management of threatening situations in the context of the primary goal of prevention. The response with the greatest punitive power may or may not have the greatest preventive power.

The most familiar response may or may not be the best response, the best course of action for the longer term. For example, school administrators may feel pressured to "get tough" or "set an example" by suspending or expelling a student who threatens to bring a weapon to school. However, suspension or expulsion of a student can create the risk of triggering either an immediate or a delayed violent response unless such actions are coupled with containment and

support. A student who is expelled may conclude: "I have lost everything. I have only a short time to act. I will give them what they deserve." Acting upon those beliefs, the student may return to school with weapons and attack others. In addition, a student who is suspended or expelled without alternative educational placement may be under less supervision than if he or she were to remain in a school setting.

Those with responsibility to manage a student assessed as posing a threat of targeted violence should consider options for the long-term management of threatening situations in the context of the primary goal of prevention. The response with the greatest punitive power may or may not have the greatest preventive power. Although arresting a student may be necessary in a particular situation, without careful attention to the need for confinement, weapons removal, or interpersonal intervention, that action may be insufficient to prevent an eventual attack at school or otherwise protect a target. Similarly, referring a student to the mental health system, without seeing that referral in the context of an overall monitoring/management plan, may not be sufficient to prevent targeted violence.

An Integrated Systems Approach to Managing Threatening Situations

The *Safe School Initiative* found that school attackers' formulation of ideas about carrying out an attack oftentimes followed failed efforts to solve problems and reduce emotional pain through nonviolent means. Helping a student to see that he or she has a future, and directing that student to effective, non-violent ways to resolve disputes and conflicts, takes sensitivity, commitment, and an integrated systems approach to meeting the needs of that student.

An integrated systems approach can enhance the potential effectiveness of both short- and long-term strategies for managing threatening situations. Those responsible for managing a situation and student of concern—school officials, law enforcement officers, mental health professionals, youth service workers, court, probation, or correctional staff—should identify existing resources within the community that can play roles in managing students who pose threats of targeted school violence.

Discontinuation of Monitoring

A key focus of the threat assessment process is to connect the student to services and support systems that provide encouragement and hope, and reduce the likelihood that the student will engage in future threatening behavior. The ultimate objective is to enable the student to function without monitoring by responsible adult authorities. Monitoring of a student may be discontinued after responsible authorities have completed the following tasks:

- Assessing whether (and to what extent) the student has changed unacceptable thinking and behavior over time; and
- Developing and supporting intervention strategies that encourage and help the student to change.

After a determination is made that the subject no longer poses a threat of targeted school violence, formal monitoring is ended. However, the student still may remain involved with service systems within the community that will support his or her continued successful functioning.

CHAPTER VII

ACTION PLANS FOR SCHOOL LEADERS:

CREATING A SAFE AND
CONNECTED SCHOOL
CLIMATE AND
IMPLEMENTING A THREAT
ASSESSMENT PROGRAM



Creating a Safe and Connected School Climate

Creating cultures and climates of safety is essential to the prevention of violence in schools. How can a school, its teachers and administrators, and its students work toward implementing cultures of connection and climates of safety?

Major Components and Tasks for Creating a Safe/Connected School Climate

1. Assess the school's emotional climate.

Although no one wants to believe that this country's educational institutions are anything other than safe and positive environments that support the learning experience, it is incumbent upon those in positions of responsibility to take a step back and gain perspective on the emotional climate of their schools. This perspective can be gained by systematically surveying students, faculty, and other important stakeholders, such as parents, administrators, school board members, and representatives of community groups who interact with the school about the emotional climate of schools. Anonymous surveys, face-to-face interviews, focus groups, and psychological measures integrated into a total assessment package all have been used to varying degrees to gather key "real time" data. It is essential that school administrators, parents, and community leaders not assume that they know school climates as do those individuals—especially students—who are most directly affected by the educational experience on a daily basis. Absent a thorough assessment of climate process, school officials and leaders may never have the opportunity to find out what they did not know.

The findings of climate surveys can inform efforts to plan ways to enhance safety and respect within the educational environment. It is important to give feedback about school climate data to all involved and affected parties. Sharing climate data establishes a foundation for building an integrated systems approach that will bring the central "players" to the table; empower students to make change; and connect the school to the community and parental support.

2. Emphasize the importance of listening in schools.

Pupils must listen respectfully to adults and to their peers, and teachers, administrators, and other adults must listen respectfully to their students and to each other. Grownups often expect that students listen to adults in authority. However, all too frequently adults forget that respectful listening is a two-way street. A school with a culture of two-way listening will encourage and empower students to have the courage to break the ingrained code of silence.

Listening also must be expanded beyond academic concerns. Communications between teachers and students also should include listening to feelings, especially those of hurt and pain. In addition, it is important to "listen" to behaviors. Many

students, including some who consider violence an appropriate way to solve problems, have a difficult time finding the words to articulate the disenfranchisement, hurt, or fear that they may feel. Not knowing how to express their problems and feelings may prompt these students to take action. Adults who listen to behavior and assist students in learning how to articulate their feelings and experiences provide students with critical skills that can contribute to preventing and reducing violence.

3. Take a strong, but caring stance against the code of silence.

Silence leaves hurt unexposed and unacknowledged. Silence may encourage a young person to move along a path to violence.

4. Work actively to change the perception that talking to an adult about a student contemplating violence is considered snitching.

A school climate in which students connect to each other and to adults is one that promotes a safe and secure educational environment. A student who finds the courage to tell a caring adult about a friend in pain may save a life.

5. Find ways to stop bullying.

Bullying is a continuum of abuse, ranging from verbal taunts to physical threats to dangerous acts.²² Bullying is not playful behavior. In bullying, one student assumes power by word or deed over another in a mean-spirited and/or harmful manner. In a school with a culture of safety and connection, both the bully and the student who is the victim of the bullying are attended to in a respectful manner. Schools with climates of safety and respect are establishing foundations for pro-social behavior. These climates teach conflict resolution, peer mediation, active listening, and other non-violent ways to solve problems. In a safe school climate, adults do not bully students and do not bully each other - and they do not turn a blind eye to bullying behavior when they know that it is going on in the school.

6. Empower students by involving them in planning, creating, and sustaining a school culture of safety and respect.

Creating a safe school climate is a process that should involve all members of the school community, including teachers, students, parents, counselors, administrators, health staff, security professionals, and support personnel. Climates of safety should be collaborative ones. Helping students to engage in positive, productive activities or work in their local community can diminish isolation and enhance connection and safety.

²² For more detailed references on bullying, please refer to the Appendix.

7. Ensure that every student feels that he or she has a trusting relationship with at least one adult at school.

Trusting relationships between adults and students are the products of quality connection, interaction, and communications. These relationships evolve and do not develop simply because an adult, such as a homeroom teacher or a guidance counselor, and a student have been ordered or assigned to interact with one another. Schools with cultures and climates of safety monitor students on a regular basis. School administrators should take steps to ensure that at least one adult at school knows what is happening with each student.

8. Create mechanisms for developing and sustaining safe school climates.

A mechanism for developing and sustaining safe school climates should serve as a vehicle for planning and monitoring the climate and culture of the school. This mechanism may involve administrators, teachers, counselors, students, school law enforcement and security staff, and other personnel. Questions to be considered in implementing this mechanism might include: What should be done to develop and support climates of safety? To what extent are teachers, administrators, and other school staff encouraged to focus on students' social/emotional learning needs? How close is the school to achieving the goal of ensuring that every student feels that there is an adult to whom he or she can turn for talk, support, and advice if things get tough?

9. Be aware of physical environments and their effects on creating comfort zones.

Building structure, facility safety plans, lighting, space, and architecture, among other physical attributes of educational institutions, all can contribute to whether a school environment feels, or is in fact, safe or unsafe. In large schools, school administrators may wish to explore changes in the physical characteristics of the school that would permit the assignment of teachers and students to smaller, mutually intersecting and supportive groupings within the broader educational community.

10. Emphasize an integrated systems model.

People support most what they believe they have had genuine input in creating. This requires the difficult but necessary task of bringing all of the stakeholders to the table. Stakeholders include: students, teachers, administrators, school board members, parents, law enforcement personnel, after-school and community-based groups, and others. Stakeholders must struggle with questions such as the definition of "fairness," "threat," "consequence," and "change" as these concepts fit into the unique context of each school, school system, and the surrounding community.

11. All climates of safety ultimately are "local."

Many local factors contribute to the creation of a culture and climate of safety. These factors include: the leadership—"open-door"-role of the school principal; empowered buy-in of student groups; connections to the local community and its leaders; and the respectful integration into the safe school climates process of "safekeepers," such as parents and law enforcement personnel close to the school.

Schools that have succeeded in creating safe school climates have done so because of their recognition that such climates of safety actually raise the bar on sound educational expectations, which, in turn, keep students engaged and learning at high levels. Such schools achieve their aims by realizing that safe school climates are not created overnight. Implementation of the safe school climates process requires planning and dedicated work. Participants in this process need adequate feedback and evaluative processes to sustain and continually improve educational environments. To work effectively, safe school climates that create relationships of respect and connection between adults and students must be accepted as integral to the mission of threat assessment and management, and understood from the top down as integral to the success of the learning experience.

Implementing a Threat Assessment Program

Threat assessment policies and programs work best as components of school violence prevention strategies if these policies and programs are authorized, developed, and implemented by local officials, and developed in consultation with representatives of the broader community. The following course of action should be pursued in establishing a threat assessment approach in a community or school district.

1. A principal, superintendent, school board member, or other school official initiates a request to develop a process to evaluate and respond to threatening situations. The request is forwarded to the school board or other responsible oversight entity for policy approval.

Threatening situations might include: threats made directly against students, teachers, or other school officials; threats made indirectly by telephone, in writing, over the Internet, or through interpersonal contacts; communications or behaviors suggesting a student's intent to mount an attack at school; and allegations of bomb-making or that a student possesses a firearm.

2. The school district creates a planning team to develop or further refine a process to identify, assess, and manage threatening situations.

Members of the team should be drawn from the school district and the community. Team members should include representatives of law enforcement and mental health

agencies who work with the schools. Representatives from the school district should include administrators, teachers, attorneys, school security officials, and school psychologists and mental health workers.

The team appointed to develop a process to evaluate threatening situations should determine the status of each of the following:

- *Information-sharing:* What are the existing policies, procedures, and legal parameters in place for access to and sharing of school, law enforcement, and mental health records? The team should ascertain what information concerning students is available; where that information is located; how and under what conditions that information can be accessed; and who can access available information.
- *Existing policies regarding threats and threatening situations:* The team should review all existing school disciplinary policies, including those related to threats and threatening situations. This review should cover definition of threats and threatening situations and sanctions for engaging in threatening behavior. The team should assess the effectiveness of existing school discipline policies in this area.
- *Existing policies regarding the roles and responsibilities of law enforcement:* The team should review policies that cover when police are to be contacted by the school; what options are available to police officials for intervening in a situation once they are contacted; and interaction of the police and local school officials, such as principals, in responding to and managing threatening situations.
- *Existing approaches to creating and maintaining safe and respectful school climates and cultures:* The team should engage in an assessment of the emotional climate of the school. This assessment should include a review of policies; rules and regulations; and physical aspects of the school that may affect the overall safety and security of the educational institution.

3. The planning team should determine what policies, rules, regulations, procedures, and/or processes should be revised or created. Some schools already may have policies and protocols in place to deal with certain kinds of threats and threatening behaviors, such as e-mail threats, internet threats, potential suicides, and other behaviors that raise concern about potential violence. In particular, the planning team's deliberations in this area should produce answers to the following questions:

- What should be the roles and responsibilities of school administrators, teachers, security personnel, and other school officials in responding to threats and threatening situations? When should parents be contacted concerning a

threatening situation? Which situations should be handled within the school? Which situations require notification of, and intervention by, law enforcement officials?

- What should be the roles/responsibilities of law enforcement officials in responding to threats and threatening situations in schools?
- Under what conditions will information concerning a student or a threatening situation be shared? What types of information will be shared? With whom will it be shared?
- When should students who engage in threatening behavior be referred to outside services, such as mental health agencies, for assistance? How should referrals to outside agencies be handled?
- What actions should be taken to develop and support climates of safety within the educational institution? What steps could be taken by school officials to encourage students to come forward with concerns about potentially violent situations? What policies or actions would encourage students to bring their problems to the attention of adults? How can school officials and other adults work with students to resolve problems and remedy underlying conditions?

4. School administrators, teachers, law enforcement officials, parents, representatives of other community agencies and organizations, and representatives of the student body, where appropriate, review and provide feedback on revised and/or new recommended processes for threat assessment. These processes should include recommendations for implementation, training, and the periodic review, evaluation, and updating of the threat assessment program.

5. The school board reviews and acts upon recommended changes and additions to the threat assessment program.

6. Upon approval by the school board or other appropriate authorities, school officials will implement the threat assessment process.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSION:

THREAT ASSESSMENT AS
A DECISION-MAKING
TOOL



Developing a strategy to prevent and respond to potential incidents of targeted school violence is a challenging and complex task. There is no single, universal prescription that will be effective in dealing with every situation or crisis that will confront school administrators, law enforcement officials, parents, and other individuals and organizations in the community.

When a student's behavior raises the specter of potential violence, responsible adults will be forced to make judgments about the risk associated with that student's actions and how to respond to that threatening situation. The threat assessment process outlined in this *Guide* will not eliminate the need to make difficult judgments when the actions of an individual suggest that the safety and security of a school is at risk. Instead, the *Guide* is intended to assist officials in implementing a process that will inform these judgments and increase the likelihood that actions based upon these judgments will prevent incidents of targeted violence in schools.

The threat assessment process is rooted in the proposition that each situation of concern should be viewed and assessed individually and that targeted violence is the end result of a discernible process. No two cases involving the potential for targeted school violence are likely to be similar in all aspects. Application of that process is guided by the facts of that situation and carried out through the analysis of information about behaviors and situational references. Instead of basing judgments of risk on student traits or whether that student made specific threatening statements, the threat assessment process focuses upon evaluating that student's behaviors and communications and determining whether those behaviors and communications suggest that the student has the intent and capacity to carry out a school attack.

The work of the Secret Service and the Department of Education in examining the problem of targeted school violence suggests that the threat assessment process can help to develop and maintain key relationships between the school and the community. These relationships are critical elements in creating safe school climates. Schools and communities that think clearly about threat assessment and management will develop relationships, processes, and protocols that will contribute to reducing school violence and to creating safe and secure learning environments in this nation's schools.

Appendix
ANNOTATED
RESOURCES



The following section offers suggestions for further reading on specific topics related to responding to threatening situations in schools and to creating safe school climates. Each topic area is accompanied by a brief description of the documents listed within that topic. The list that follows is not intended to be exhaustive or all-inclusive. Instead, the list is offered as a starting point for additional reading in selected areas.

Bullying and the Creation of Respectful Climates

The following resources provide specific information on bullying behavior and more general information on the experiences of boys and young men in school and in society. The work by Olweus and related work by Graham and Juvonen review bullying behavior in schools. Olweus pioneered research on bullying behavior and provides an overview of decades of research on this topic. "Bullying behavior among U.S. youth" provides recent data on the prevalence of bullying behavior in America. The three books by William Pollack and his colleagues describe Pollack's work talking with boys and young men about their experiences in school and in the community. *Real boys* and *Real boys' voices* include findings from Pollack's work on the culture of boyhood in America; review certain assumptions that parents and other adults may bring to their interactions with boys and young men; and include suggested approaches and strategies for improving relationships with boys and young men. *Real boys workbook* contains specific exercises for parents and teachers to help enhance their interactions and communications with boys and young men. Olweus and colleagues' and Pollack and colleagues' work encourages parents, school leaders, and others to work to create respectful and safe school climates.

- Graham, S., & Juvonen, J. (2001). An Attributional Approach to Peer Victimization. In Juvonen, J. Graham, S. (eds.), *Peer Harassment in School: The Plight of the Vulnerable and Victimized*, pp. 49-72. New York: Guilford Press.
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- Pollack, W. (1998). *Real boys: Rescuing our sons from the myths of boyhood*. New York: Henry Holt, Inc.

- Pollack, W., & Cushman, K. (2001). *Real boys workbook*. New York: Villard.
- Pollack, W., & Shuster, T. (2000). *Real boys' voices*. New York: Random House.

Information-Sharing / Legal Issues

These resources provide an overview of the issues impacting the sharing of information about students in schools. *Sharing information* is a primer on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the federal regulation governing protection of educational records and other student information in schools. It includes the full text of FERPA, as well as detailed explanations on exceptions to FERPA restrictions. "Establishing and maintaining interagency information sharing" provides guidance on developing and implementing appropriate policies to permit or facilitate sharing of information about juveniles across agencies. *School violence: Sharing student information* provides further information on the protections afforded to student information and reviews recent state legislative initiatives designed to make sharing information about students easier to accomplish.

- Medaris, M.L., Campbell, E., & James, B. (1997, June). *Sharing information: A guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and participation in juvenile justice programs*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention and U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy Compliance Office.

Please also see the following Web site for updates on FERPA regulations since the 1997 publication of this document:

<http://www.ed.gov/offices/OM/fpc>

- Slayton, J. (2000, March). Establishing and maintaining interagency information sharing. *JAIBG Bulletin*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention.
- Thomerson, J. (2001, May). *School violence: Sharing student information*. Denver, Colo.: National Conference of State Legislatures.

School Violence and Crime

As of the publication date of this *Guide*, the resources included below represent some of the most recent data and statistics on violence, crime, and other behavior in American schools as well as in the community. Since currently there is no one central mechanism for reporting violence and crime perpetrated and experienced by

youths in American schools, these reports collectively represent a fairly comprehensive picture of school violence and crime in America.

- Anderson, M., et. al. (2001). School-associated violent deaths in the United States, 1994-1999. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 286, pp. 2695-2702 (2001).
- Kaufman, P., et. al. *Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2000*. U. S. Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice (NCJ-184176): Washington, D.C. (2000). Available at: http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/quarterly/winter/elementary/e_section4.html.
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- Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999). *Juvenile offenders and victims: 1999 National Report*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. Available at: <http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html>.
- U.S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (2002). *Digest of Education Statistics 2000*; Washington D.C.: Authors.
- U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999). *1999 Annual Report on School Safety*. Washington, D.C.: Authors.

Risk Assessment and General Aggression / Violence

"Assessing violence risk among youth" presents an overview of the known risk factors for general aggression and violence among youth. It summarizes the current scientific knowledge base on the topic and includes recommendations for clinicians tasked with assessing the risk of general aggression and violence (i.e. not targeted violence) in youth. *Manual for the SAVRY* presents a similar review of risk factors for general aggression and violence in youth and provides specific guidance and a structured assessment tool to help guide clinicians' assessment of risk for general aggression and violence within a particular individual (youth).

- Borum, R. (2000). Assessing violence risk among youth. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, 56, pp. 1263-1288.

- Borum, R., Bartel, P., & Forth, A. (2002). *Manual for the Structured Assessment of Violence Risk in Youth (SAVRY)*. Tampa: Fla.: University of South Florida.
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2001). *Youth violence: A report of the Surgeon General*. Rockville, Md.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, Center for Mental Health Services, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Mental Health. Available at: <http://www.surgeongeneral.gov/library/youthviolence>.

Threat Assessment and Targeted Violence

The following documents represent a sample of information currently available on various types of targeted violence and on threat assessment as a strategy to help prevent targeted attacks. "Defining an approach for evaluating targeted violence" is an academic paper that presents the general concepts of threat assessment and 10 key questions that investigators and others can use when gathering information about someone who may pose a threat of targeted violence. "Assassination in the United States" is also an academic paper that reviews the Exceptional Case Study Project and presents the study's findings. *Protective intelligence & threat assessment investigations* is a guide for state and local law enforcement officials and others with protective responsibilities. It sets forth guidelines for developing a threat assessment capacity for targeted violence against protected officials and others in a manner similar to that contained in this *Guide*. It also includes findings from the Exceptional Case Study Project. "Threat assessment" provides a brief and straightforward description of the threat assessment approach. "Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools" presents and compares the various assessment approaches schools currently have available for gauging the threat that a particular student may pose. The paper reviews profiling, structured clinical assessment, automated decision-making (e.g., the use of software or Web-based decision tools), and threat assessment.

- Defining an approach for evaluating risk of targeted violence. *Behavioral Sciences & the Law*, 17, pp. 323-337. Available at <http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm>.
- Fein, R.A., & Vossekuil, B.V. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers. *Journal of Forensic Sciences*, 44, pp. 321-333. Available at <http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm>.
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(NIJ/OJP/DOJ Publication No. 170612). Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice. Available at <http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm>.

- Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G.A. (1995, September). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *National Institute of Justice: Research in Action*, 1-7. Available at <http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm>.
- Reddy, M., Borum, R., Berglund, J., Vossekuil, B., Fein, R., & Modzeleski, W. (2001). Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches. *Psychology in the Schools*, 38, pp. 157-172. Available at <http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac.htm>.

Web Sites

United States Department of Educationwww.ed.gov

United States Secret Servicewww.secretservice.gov

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**THE FINAL REPORT AND
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IMPLICATIONS FOR
THE PREVENTION OF
SCHOOL ATTACKS IN
THE UNITED STATES

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE AND
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WASHINGTON, D. C.
July 2004



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by

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Washington, D. C.
June 2004

JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE SECRETARY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, AND THE DIRECTOR, U.S. SECRET SERVICE


Littleton, Colo.; Springfield, OR; West Paducah, KY; Jonesboro, AR. These communities have become familiar to many Americans as the locations where school shootings have occurred in recent years. School shootings are a rare, but significant, component of school violence in America. It is clear that other kinds of problems are far more common than the targeted attacks that have taken place in schools across this country. However, each school-based attack has had a tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the surrounding community, and the nation as a whole. In the aftermath of these tragic events, educators, law enforcement officials, mental health professionals, parents, and others have asked: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and "What can be done to prevent future attacks from occurring?"

In June 1999, following the attack at Columbine High School, our two agencies—the U.S. Secret Service and the U.S. Department of Education—launched a collaborative effort to begin to answer these questions. The result was the *Safe School Initiative*, an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school shootings and school attacks that occurred in the United States beginning with the earliest identified incident in 1974 through May 2000. The focus of the *Safe School Initiative* was on examining the thinking, planning, and other behaviors engaged in by students who carried out school attacks. Particular attention was given to identifying pre-attack behaviors and communications that might be detectable—or "knowable"—and could help in preventing some future attacks.

The *Safe School Initiative* was implemented through the Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program. The *Initiative* drew from the Secret Service's experience in studying and preventing assassination and other types of targeted violence and the Department of Education's expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff.

This document, the *Safe School Initiative's* final report, details how our two agencies studied school-based attacks and what we found. Some of the findings may surprise you. It is clear that there is no simple explanation as to why these attacks have occurred. Nor is there a simple solution to stop this problem. But the findings of the *Safe School Initiative* do suggest that some future attacks may be preventable if those responsible for safety in schools know what questions to ask and where to uncover information that may help with efforts to intervene before a school attack can occur.

Since it began in June 1999, our partnership has been a tremendous asset to each of our respective agencies and vital to the success of this study. It is our hope that the information we present in this final report is useful to those of you on the front lines of this problem—the administrators, educators, law enforcement officials, and others with protective responsibilities in schools—and to anyone concerned with children's safety. We encourage all of you in your efforts to keep our nation's children safe in school and hope this report helps you in those efforts.



Rod Paige
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W. Ralph Basham
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violence. At the Department of Education, these individuals are: Secretary of Education Rod Paige, former Secretary of Education Richard Riley and Connie Deshpande. Secret Service officials who provided guidance and support for this project are: Director Brian Stafford, Assistant Director Terry Samway, Deputy Assistant Directors Bob Byers and Tom Riopelle, Special Agent in Charge George Luczko and Resident Agent in Charge John Berglund. Special thanks are extended to Social Science Research Specialist Karissa Kumm who assisted with project data collection and was instrumental in organizing information from the *Safe School Initiative* kick-off meeting. Our thanks go also to Dean Terry, Michael Gelles and Marty Allen for providing extensive assistance with project data collection.

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Washington, D.C.
May 2002

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION:

THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE



Littleton, CO; Springfield, OR; West Paducah, KY; Jonesboro, AR. These communities have become familiar to many Americans as among the locations of those schools where shootings have occurred nationwide in recent years. In the aftermath of these tragic events, educators, law enforcement officials, mental health professionals and parents have pressed for answers to two central questions: "Could we have known that these attacks were being planned?" and, if so, "What could we have done to prevent these attacks from occurring?"

This publication, *The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States*, is a recent product of an ongoing collaboration between the U. S. Secret Service and the U. S. Department of Education to begin to answer these questions.¹ It is the culmination of an extensive examination of 37 incidents of targeted school violence that occurred in the United States from December 1974 through May 2000.²

The Safe School Initiative

Following the attack at Columbine High School in April 1999, the Secret Service and the Department of Education initiated, in June 1999, a study of the thinking, planning and other pre-attack behaviors engaged in by attackers who carried out school shootings. That study, the *Safe School Initiative*, was pursued under a partnership between the Secret Service and the Department of Education, and implemented through the Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center and the Department of Education's Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program. In its execution, the *Safe School Initiative* drew from the Secret Service's experience in studying and preventing targeted violence and from the Department of Education's expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty and staff.

The objective of the *Safe School Initiative* was to attempt to identify information that could be obtainable, or "knowable," prior to an attack. That information would then be analyzed and evaluated to produce a factual, accurate knowledge base on targeted school attacks. This knowledge could be used to help communities across the country to formulate policies and strategies aimed at preventing school-based attacks.

Key features of the *Safe School Initiative* were its focus on "targeted" school violence and its adaptation of earlier Secret Service research on assassination for its examination of incidents of school-based attacks.

¹ This report is an update and expansion of the earlier *Interim Report on the Prevention of Targeted Violence in Schools*, which was released in October 2000. This *Final Report* supercedes the *Interim Report* and should be used and referenced in place of the *Interim Report*.

² See Section I, "INTRODUCTION: THE SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE, Methodology," for a discussion of the approach used by the Secret Service to identify incidents of school-based attacks.

Defining "Targeted" School Violence

The *Safe School Initiative* examined incidents of "targeted violence" in school settings—school shootings and other school-based attacks where the school was deliberately selected as the location for the attack and was not simply a random site of opportunity. The term "targeted violence" evolved from the Secret Service's five-year study of the behavior of individuals who have carried out, or attempted, lethal attacks on public officials or prominent individuals. That study, the Secret Service's *Exceptional Case Study Project* (ECSP), was initiated in 1992 under funding provided by the U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs' National Institute of Justice.

The focus of the ECSP study was an operational analysis of the thinking and behavior of those who have assassinated, attacked or tried to attack a national public official or public figure in the United States since 1949. The ECSP defined "targeted violence" as any incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack.³ The purpose of the ECSP was to generate a better understanding of attacks against public officials that, in turn, would help Secret Service agents in their investigations of threats toward the president and others they protect and in the prevention of harm to these protected officials.⁴

The ECSP sought to identify what information might be knowable prior to an attack and to better enable intervention before an attack occurred. Findings from the ECSP helped to dispel several myths and misconceptions about assassination.

In addition to the ECSP's particular focus on incidents involving attacks on public officials and prominent individuals, other types of violence in which a victim is targeted specifically include assassinations, stalking, some forms of domestic violence, some types of workplace violence, and some types of school violence. In the case of targeted school violence, the target may be a specific individual, such as a particular classmate or teacher, or a group or category of individuals, such as "jocks" or "geeks." The target may even be the school itself.

The Secret Service Threat Assessment Approach

The findings of the ECSP also led to the Secret Service's development of a more thorough and focused process for conducting threat assessment investigations. As part of its mission, the Secret Service is responsible for protecting the president and vice president of the United States and their families and certain national and

international leaders, all of whom are referred to as "protectees." The Secret Service provides this protection by means of two distinct yet complementary strategies: the use of physical measures—including magnetometers, armored vehicles, perimeters of armed agents, and canine units—that are designed to both deter potential attacks and serve as protective barriers in the event someone tries to attack; and a second, far less visible component known as threat assessment.

Threat assessment is a process of identifying, assessing and, managing the threat that certain persons may pose to Secret Service protectees. The goal of threat assessment is to intervene before an attack can occur. The threat assessment process involves three principal steps—all before the person has the opportunity to attack:

- identifying individuals who have the idea or intent of attacking a Secret Service protectee;
- assessing whether the individual poses a risk to a protectee, after gathering sufficient information from multiple sources; and,
- managing the threat the individual poses, in those cases where the individual investigated is determined to pose a threat.

The Secret Service considers threat assessment to be as important to preventing targeted violence as the physical measures it employs.

In 1998, the Secret Service established the National Threat Assessment Center, an entity within the Secret Service that is dedicated to continuing efforts agency-wide to better understand and prevent targeted violence, and to share this developing knowledge with other constituencies responsible for public safety and violence prevention. Adaptation of its threat assessment protocols for use in addressing the problem of school-based attacks is the most recent of the Secret Service's initiatives to share this body of knowledge and expertise with other constituencies engaged in developing strategies to address targeted violence issues. In the late 1990s, the Secret Service and the Justice Department's National Institute of Justice joined forces to make information on the Secret Service's threat assessment protocols available to a wider law enforcement audience. *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials*, released in July 1998, offers state and local police officials insights into the elements of carrying out and evaluating the findings of threat assessment investigations.⁵

In addition, since the release of the *Safe School Initiative* Interim Report in October 2000, personnel from the Secret Service and the Department of Education have given over 100 seminars and briefings on the study to thousands of educators, law

³ Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1995). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *National Institute of Justice: Research in Action*, 1-7.

⁴ Fein, R., & Vossekuil, B. (1999). Assassination in the United States: An operational study of recent assassins, attackers, and near-lethal approachers. *Journal of Forensic Sciences*, 44, 321-333.

⁵ Fein, R. & Vossekuil, B. (1998). *Protective Intelligence & Threat Assessment Investigations: A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials*. U. S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice: Washington, D.C.

enforcement officials, mental health professionals and others across the United States. Several questions and discussion points raised by seminar attendees have been addressed in this final report.

Finally, the Department of Education and the Secret Service currently are completing work on a guide to investigating and responding to threats in schools. The guide is scheduled for publication in 2002. The guide will include recommendations for investigating and evaluating threats and other behaviors of concern in school; address considerations for developing policies and capacity to support threat assessment efforts in schools; and provide suggestions for approaches schools can adopt to foster school environments that reduce threats of targeted violence.

The Prevalence of Violence in American Schools

Public policy-makers, school administrators, police officials, and parents continue to search for explanations for the targeted violence that occurred at Columbine High School and other schools across the country, and seek assurance that similar incidents will not be repeated at educational institutions in their communities. While the quest for solutions to the problem of targeted school violence is of critical importance, reports from the Department of Education, the Justice Department, and other sources indicate that few children are likely to fall prey to life-threatening violence in school settings.⁶

To put the problem of targeted school-based attacks in context, from 1993 to 1997, the odds that a child in grades 9-12 would be threatened or injured with a weapon in school were 7 to 8 percent, or 1 in 13 or 14; the odds of getting into a physical fight at school were 15 percent, or 1 in 7.⁷ In contrast, the odds that a child would die in school—by homicide or suicide—are, fortunately, no greater than 1 in 1 million.⁸ In 1998, students in grades 9-12 were the victims of 1.6 million thefts and 1.2 million nonfatal violent crimes, while in this same period 60 school-associated violent deaths were reported for this student population.⁹

⁶ See, for example, Kaufman, P., et. al. (2000). *Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2000*. U. S. Department of Education (NCES 2001-017) and U. S. Department of Justice (NCJ-184176): Washington, D. C. Online Vers.: <http://nces.ed.gov/pubsearch/pubinfo.asp?pubid=2001017>; Anderson, M., et. al. (2001). School-associated Violent Deaths in the United States, 1994-1999. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 286, 2695-2702; and, National Research Council and Institute of Medicine, Committee on Law and Justice and Board on Children, Youth, and Families. (2001). *Juvenile Crime, Juvenile Justice*. Panel on Juvenile Crime: Prevention, Treatment, and Control. McCord, J., et. al. (Eds.). National Academy Press: Washington, D.C.

⁷ Snyder, H.N., & Sickmund, M. (1999). *Juvenile offenders and victims: 1999 National Report*. Washington, D.C.: Office of Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Department of Justice. Available online at <http://www.ncjrs.org/html/ojjdp/nationalreport99/index.html>.

⁸ U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Department of Justice (1999). *1999 Annual Report on School Safety*. Washington, D.C.: Authors.

⁹ Ibid.

The findings of the *Safe School Initiative's* extensive search for recorded incidents of targeted school-based attacks underscore the rarity of lethal attacks in school settings. The Department of Education reports that nearly 60 million children attend the nation's 119,000+ schools.¹⁰ The combined efforts of the Secret Service and the Department of Education identified 37 incidents of targeted school-based attacks, committed by 41 individuals over a 25-year period.¹¹

Nevertheless, the impact of targeted school-based attacks cannot be measured in statistics alone. While it is clear that other kinds of problems in American schools are far more common than the targeted violence that has taken place in them, the high-profile shootings that have occurred in schools over the past decade have resulted in increased fear among students, parents, and educators. School shootings are a rare, but significant, component of the problem of school violence. Each school-based attack has had a tremendous and lasting effect on the school in which it occurred, the surrounding community, and the nation as a whole. In the wake of these attacks, fear of future targeted school violence has become a driving force behind the efforts of school officials, law enforcement professionals, and parents to identify steps that can be taken to prevent incidents of violence in their schools.

Methodology

The Secret Service and the Department of Education began work on the *Safe School Initiative* study in June 1999. Research protocols employed in carrying out and analyzing the findings of this work reflect an adaptation of the ECSP operational approach to examining targeted attacks against public officials and prominent individuals. Researchers used a similar operational focus for the *Safe School Initiative* to develop information that could be useful to schools in better understanding and preventing targeted violence in school settings. The emphasis of the study was on examining the attackers' pre-incident thinking and behavior, to explore information that could aid in preventing future attacks.

For the purposes of this study, an incident of targeted school violence was defined as any incident where (i) a current student or recent former student attacked someone at his or her school with lethal means (e.g., a gun or knife); and, (ii) where the student attacker purposefully chose his or her school as the location of the attack. Consistent with this definition, incidents where the school was chosen simply as a site of opportunity, such as incidents that were solely related to gang or drug trade activity or to a violent interaction between individuals that just happened to occur at the school, were not included.

¹⁰ U.S. Department of Education. National Center for Education Statistics (2002). *Digest of Education Statistics 2000*; Washington D.C.: Authors

¹¹ *Supra* note 2.

Under the study's research strategy, each incident of targeted violence was assigned to a study review team comprised of criminal investigators and social science researchers. At least two reviewers were assigned to each incident.

The Secret Service and the Department of Education made every effort to ensure that the *Safe School Initiative* would produce information that would be useful for school administrators, educators, law enforcement officials, and others working with schools. To that end, researchers consulted regularly with experts in the fields of education, school violence, and juvenile homicide, among others, in the course of developing the study design and protocols. Feedback from these various experts was incorporated into the final study design.

The Study Population

Researchers from the Secret Service and the Department of Education initiated their study of targeted school violence with an extensive search for information that would identify incidents of targeted school violence that have occurred in the United States. Beginning with June 2000 and working back in time, researchers explored all relevant, searchable databases maintained in the public domain or available by subscription, such as public news databases and professional publications, to identify incidents meeting the definition of the study population. Researchers also consulted with law enforcement officials and school violence experts to develop leads on incidents of school violence that might meet the criteria for inclusion in the study constituency.

In the end, researchers identified 37 incidents of targeted school violence involving 41 attackers that occurred in the United States from 1974, the year in which the earliest incident identified took place, through June 2000, when data collection for the study was completed.¹² The school-based attacks included in the *Safe School Initiative* represent all of the incidents of targeted school violence meeting the study criteria that Secret Service and Department of Education researchers were able to identify in that time frame.

Sources of Information on Incidents of Targeted School Violence

Information on each incident of targeted school violence identified by Secret Service and Department of Education researchers was drawn principally from primary

¹² It is possible that incidents of targeted school violence other than those identified by *Safe School Initiative* researchers might have occurred prior to the 1974 incident included in the study, or between 1974 and the completion of data collection for the study in June 2000. For example, incidents that met the study definition, but that were not identifiable under the study search strategy, or that were not reported as school-based crimes, would have been unlikely to come to the attention of Secret Service and Department of Education researchers. In addition, incidents of targeted school violence that have occurred since June 2000 were outside the scope of the study.

source materials concerning the incident. These primary source materials included investigative, school, court, and mental health records.

In addition, study researchers conducted supplemental interviews with 10 of the perpetrators of incidents of the school-based attacks identified by the Secret Service and the Department of Education. These interviews provided researchers with further opportunity to examine the incident from the point of view of the attacker and to "walk through the process of the attack" from its conceptualization to its execution. Insights gleaned from these interviews have been used by the Secret Service primarily in training venues to illustrate particular aspects of incidents of targeted school violence.

Coding of Primary Source Materials

Each member of the review team assigned to a particular incident independently answered several hundred questions about each case, entering his or her answers to the questions in a codebook. Review team members were instructed to record information gathered from primary sources as it appeared in those sources, and not to engage in interpretation of facts presented.

Information gathered and reflected in incident reviewers' responses to the coded study questions included facts about:

- the attacker's development of an idea to harm the target, and progression from the original idea to the attack;
- the attacker's selection of the target(s);
- the attacker's motive(s) for the incident;
- any communications made by the attacker about his or her ideas and intent, including any threats made to the target(s) or about the target(s);
- evidence that the attacker planned the incident;
- the attacker's mental health and substance abuse history, if any; and,
- the attacker's life circumstances/situation at the time of the attack, including relationships with parents and other family members; performance in school; and treatment by fellow students.

Information regarding the attacker's demographic characteristics and personal history, including criminal and school history, also were coded. When each reviewer had completed his or her response to the questions, the review team met as a whole to compare responses and produce a single "reconciled" coding of the incident.

Analysis of Responses to the Coded Study Questions

Findings presented in Chapter III of this report reflect researchers' careful analysis of the coded responses to the extensive questionnaire employed in recording information gathered on each of the 37 school-based attacks and 41 attackers that were examined in the *Safe School Initiative*. Researchers were cautious not to overreach in drawing conclusions from this information.

Primary source materials reviewed for the 37 incidents did not provide answers in every case to all of the areas of inquiry covered in the questionnaire. In general, researchers declined to draw a conclusion if information directly responsive to a particular area of inquiry was available for fewer than half of the incidents reviewed.

Moreover, even when answers to a particular coded study question were available for the majority of incidents, these responses collectively did not suggest in all cases a common or shared characteristic. Here again, researchers were cautious not to draw a conclusion in a particular area of inquiry if that conclusion was supported by fewer than the majority of the responses to the subject question.

However, in some cases, researchers believed that the absence of a common or shared characteristic or behavior in the coded responses to inquiries—most notably with respect to the characteristics and behaviors of the attackers—was sufficiently compelling to note those observations as findings as well.

Organization of the Final Report

The remainder of this report is organized into four chapters. Chapter II: "Characteristics of Incidents of Targeted School Violence," presents basic descriptive information about the attacks examined by the *Safe School Initiative*, including incident, target, and victim characteristics. Chapter III: "Findings of the *Safe School Initiative*," describes the conclusions reached by *Safe School Initiative* researchers after careful analysis of the facts and other information collected in the course of the Secret Service's and the Department of Education's study of targeted school violence.

Chapter IV: "Implications of *Safe School Initiative* Findings for the Prevention of Targeted School Violence," will be of particular interest to educators, law enforcement officials, and others who are seeking guidance to inform efforts to address the problem of targeted school violence. In this chapter, the authors focus in on 10 key findings of the *Safe School Initiative* that appear to have implications for

the development of strategies to prevent targeted school violence. These findings specifically concern what information was known—or "knowable"—about these incidents prior to the attack, and that, in turn, might be relevant to efforts to prevent future attacks. Discussion of these key findings also includes consideration of how this information might be applicable to investigating threats and other behavior in schools that may raise concerns.

In the final chapter of this report, Chapter V: "Threat Assessment as a Promising Strategy for Preventing School Violence," the authors offer some concluding observations on how threat assessment protocols might be incorporated into strategies to prevent targeted violence in schools.

Overview of *Safe School Initiative* Findings

The findings of the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that there are productive actions that educators, law enforcement officials, and others can pursue in response to the problem of targeted school violence. Specifically, *Initiative* findings suggest that these officials may wish to consider focusing their efforts to formulate strategies for preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

- developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack; and,
- employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat assessments" in developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.

Support for these suggestions is found in 10 key findings of the *Safe School Initiative* study. These findings are as follows:

- Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely were sudden, impulsive acts.
- Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.
- Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
- There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted school violence.¹³
- Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
- Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.

¹³ Here the term "profile" refers to a set of demographic and other traits that a set of perpetrators of a crime have in common. Please refer to "Characterizing the Attacker" in Chapter III and to Reddy et al. (2001), "Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools" in the Resources section for further explanation of the term "profile."

- Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
- Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
- In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
- Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

CHAPTER II

CHARACTERISTICS OF INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE



The *Safe School Initiative* found that targeted school violence is not a new or recent phenomenon. The earliest case that researchers were able to identify occurred in 1974. In that incident, a student brought guns and homemade bombs to his school; set off the fire alarm; and shot at emergency and custodial personnel who responded to the alarm.

The *Safe School Initiative* identified 37 incidents involving 41 attackers that met the study definition of targeted school violence and occurred between 1974 and the end of the 2000 school year.¹⁴ These incidents took place in 26 states, with more than one incident occurring in Arkansas, California, Georgia, Kentucky, Missouri, and Tennessee.¹⁵

Analysis of the study findings identified the following characteristics of incidents of targeted school violence:

- In almost three-quarters of the incidents, the attacker killed one or more students, faculty, or others at the school (73 percent, n=27¹⁶). In the remaining incidents, the attackers used a weapon to injure at least one person at school (24 percent, n=9). In one incident, a student killed his family and then held his class hostage with a weapon.
- More than one-half of the attacks occurred during the school day (59 percent, n=22), with fewer occurring before school (22 percent, n=8) or after school (16 percent, n=6).
- Almost all of the attackers were current students at the school where they carried out their attacks (95 percent, n=39). Only two attackers were former students of the school where they carried out their attacks at the time of those attacks (5 percent, n=2).
- All of the incidents of targeted school violence examined in the *Safe School Initiative* were committed by boys or young men (100 percent, n=41).¹⁷
- In most of the incidents, the attackers carried out the attack alone (81 percent, n=30). In four of the incidents, the attacker engaged in the attack on his own but had assistance in planning the attack (11 percent, n=4). In three incidents, two or more attackers carried out the attack together (8 percent, n=3).

¹⁴ See Appendix B for a list of the dates of the incidents of targeted school violence examined by the Safe School Initiative.

¹⁵ See Appendix A for a list of the locations of the incidents of targeted school violence studied under the Safe School Initiative.

¹⁶ "N" refers to the number of attackers that corresponds to the reported percentage. Unless indicated otherwise, when the finding pertains to total attackers all Ns are out of a total of 41. When the finding pertains to total incidents (i.e., school-based attacks) all Ns are out of a total of 37 incidents.

¹⁷ While all the attackers in this study were boys, it would be misleading to read the findings of this study as suggesting that a girl could not or would not carry out a school-based attack. For example, an incident occurred after the completion of this study in which a girl shot her classmate at a parochial school in Williamsport, Pa. In addition, a well-publicized school shooting that occurred in San Diego, Calif., in 1976 was carried out by a woman. The San Diego incident was not included in this study because the attacker was not a current or former student of the school where she conducted her attack, but, rather, lived across the street from the school.

- Most attackers used some type of gun as their primary weapon, with over half of the attackers using handguns (61 percent, n=25), and nearly half of them using rifles or shotguns (49 percent, n=20).¹⁸ Three-quarters of the attackers used only one weapon (76 percent, n=31) to harm their victims, although almost half of the attackers had more than one weapon with them at time of the attack (46 percent, n=19).

Target and Victim Characteristics

Perpetrators of incidents of targeted school violence chose a range of targets for their attacks, including fellow students, faculty and staff, and the school itself. These incidents were usually planned in advance and for most part included intent to harm a specific, pre-selected target, whether or not the attacker's execution of the incident, in fact, resulted in harm to the target.

Target and victim characteristics identified by the *Safe School Initiative* were:

- In over half of the incidents (54 percent, n=22), the attacker had selected at least one school administrator, faculty member, or staff member as a target. Students were chosen as targets in fewer than half of the incidents (41 percent, n=15).
- In nearly half of the incidents, the attackers were known to have chosen more than one target prior to their attack (44 percent, n=16).
- Most attackers had a grievance against at least one of their targets prior to the attack (73 percent, n=30).¹⁹
- In almost half of the incidents (46 percent, n=17), individuals who were targeted prior to the attack also became victims (i.e., individuals actually harmed in the attack). However, other individuals at the school, who were not identified as original targets of the attack, were injured or killed as well. Among these non-targeted individuals, over half were other students (57 percent, n=21) and over one-third (39 percent, n=16) were school administrators, faculty, or staff.

¹⁸ These percentages include all weapons used (i.e., discharged) in the attack, and therefore total more than 100 percent.

¹⁹ For the purposes of this study, "grievance" was defined as "a belief that some other person or organization is directly or indirectly responsible for injury or harm to self and/or someone whom the subject cares about."

CHAPTER III

FINDINGS OF THE *SAFE SCHOOL INITIATIVE*



The findings of researchers' analysis of the 37 incidents of targeted school violence that were examined under the *Safe School Initiative* fall generally into five areas:

- characterizing the attacker;
- conceptualizing the attack;
- signaling the attack;
- advancing the attack; and,
- resolving the attack.

The findings in each of these areas are presented and explained below.

Characterizing the Attacker

Finding

There is no accurate or useful "profile" of students who engaged in targeted school violence.²⁰

Explanation

Although all of the attackers in this study were boys, there is no set of traits that described all—or even most—of the attackers. Instead, they varied considerably in demographic, background, and other characteristics.

- The attackers ranged in age from 11 to 21, with most attackers between the ages of 13 and 18 at the time of the attack (85 percent, n=35).
- Three-quarters of the attackers were white (76 percent, n=31). One-quarter of the attackers came from other racial and ethnic backgrounds, including African American (12 percent, n=5), Hispanic (5 percent, n=2), Native Alaskan (2 percent, n=1), Native American (2 percent, n=1), and Asian (2 percent, n=1).

The attackers came from a variety of family situations, ranging from intact families with numerous ties to the community, to foster homes with histories of neglect.

- Almost two-thirds of the attackers came from two-parent families (63 percent, n=26), living either with both biological parents (44 percent, n=18) or with one biological parent and one stepparent (19 percent, n=8).
- Some lived with one biological parent (19 percent, n=8) or split time between two biological parents (2 percent, n=1).
- Very few lived with a foster parent or legal guardian (5 percent, n=2).

²⁰ *Supra* note 13.

For those incidents for which information on the attackers' school performance was available, that information indicates that those attackers differed considerably from one another in their academic achievement in school, with grades ranging from excellent to failing (n=34).

- The attackers in the largest grouping were doing well in school at the time of the attack, generally receiving As and Bs in their courses (41 percent; n=17); some were even taking Advanced Placement courses at the time of the incident or had been on the honor roll repeatedly.
- Fewer of the attackers were receiving Bs and Cs (15 percent, n=6), or Cs and Ds (22 percent, n=9).
- Very few of the attackers were known to be failing in school (5 percent, n=2).

Attackers also varied in the types of social relationships they had established, ranging from socially isolated to popular among their peers.

- The largest group of attackers for whom this information was available appeared to socialize with mainstream students or were considered mainstream students themselves (41 percent, n=17).
- One-quarter of the attackers (27 percent, n=11) socialized with fellow students who were disliked by most mainstream students or were considered to be part of a "fringe" group.
- Few attackers had no close friends (12 percent, n=5).
- One-third of attackers had been characterized by others as "loners," or felt themselves to be loners (34 percent, n=14).
- However, nearly half of the attackers were involved in some organized social activities in or outside of school (44 percent, n=18). These activities included sports teams, school clubs, extracurricular activities, and mainstream religious groups.

Attackers' histories of disciplinary problems at school also varied. Some attackers had no observed behavioral problems, while others had multiple behaviors warranting reprimand and/or discipline.

- Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had never been in trouble or rarely were in trouble at school (63 percent, n=26).
- One-quarter of the attackers had ever been suspended from school (27 percent, n=11).
- Only a few attackers had ever been expelled from school (10 percent, n=4).

Most attackers showed *no marked change* in academic performance (56 percent, n=23), friendship patterns (73 percent, n=30), interest in school (59 percent, n=24), or school disciplinary problems (68 percent, n=28) prior to their attack.

- A few attackers even showed some *improvements* in academic performance (5 percent, n=2) or *declines* in disciplinary problems at school (7 percent, n=3) prior to the attack. In one case, the dean of students had commended a student a few weeks before he attacked his school for improvements in his grades and a decline in the number of disciplinary problems involving that student in school.

Finding

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

Explanation

Almost three-quarters of the attackers felt persecuted, bullied, threatened, attacked, or injured by others prior to the incident (71 percent, n=29).²¹

In several cases, individual attackers had experienced bullying and harassment that was long-standing and severe. In some of these cases the experience of being bullied seemed to have a significant impact on the attacker and appeared to have been a factor in his decision to mount an attack at the school.²² In one case, most of the attacker's schoolmates described the attacker as "the kid everyone teased." In witness statements from that incident, schoolmates alleged that nearly every child in the school had at some point thrown the attacker against a locker, tripped him in the hall, held his head under water in the pool, or thrown things at him. Several schoolmates had noted that the attacker seemed more annoyed by, and less tolerant of, the teasing than usual in the days preceding the attack.

Finding

A history of having been the subject of a mental health evaluation, diagnosed with a mental disorder, or involved in substance abuse did not appear to be prevalent among attackers. However, most attackers showed some history of suicidal attempts or thoughts, or a history of feeling extreme depression or desperation.

Explanation

- Only one-third of attackers had ever received a mental health evaluation (34 percent, n=14), and fewer than one-fifth had been diagnosed with mental health or behavior disorder prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).

²¹ It is important to note that the way in which information was gathered for the *Safe School Initiative* did not permit researchers to determine the exact proportion of attackers who had been victims of bullying specifically. Moreover, not every attacker in this study felt bullied.

²² The *Safe School Initiative's* approach to gathering information concerning incidents of targeted school violence did not permit researchers to determine conclusively whether the experience of being bullied—or perceptions that they had been bullied—caused the attacker to engage in targeted school violence.

- Although most attackers had not received a formal mental health evaluation or diagnosis, most attackers exhibited a history of suicide attempts or suicidal thoughts at some point prior to their attack (78 percent, n=32). More than half of the attackers had a documented history of feeling extremely depressed or desperate (61 percent, n=25).
- Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a known history of alcohol or substance abuse (24 percent, n=10).
- The only information collected that would indicate whether attackers had been prescribed psychiatric medications concerned medication non-compliance (i.e., failure to take medication as prescribed). Ten percent of the attackers (n=4) were known to be non-compliant with prescribed psychiatric medications.

Finding

Over half of the attackers demonstrated some interest in violence, through movies, video games, books, and other media (59 percent, n=24). However, there was no one common type of interest in violence indicated. Instead, the attackers' interest in violent themes took various forms.

Explanation

- Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent movies (27 percent, n=11).
- Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had exhibited an interest in violent books (24 percent, n=10).
- One-eighth of the attackers exhibited an interest in violent video games (12 percent, n=5).
- The largest group of attackers exhibited an interest in violence in their own writings, such as poems, essays, or journal entries (37 percent, n=15).

Finding

Most attackers had no history of prior violent or criminal behavior.

Explanation

- Fewer than one-third of the attackers were known to have acted violently toward others at some point prior to the incident (31 percent, n=13).
- Very few of the attackers were known to have harmed or killed an animal at any time prior to the incident (12 percent, n=5).
- Approximately one-quarter of the attackers had a prior history of arrest (27 percent, n=11).

Finding

Most attackers were known to have had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.

Explanation

Most attackers appeared to have difficulty coping with losses, personal failures, or other difficult circumstances. Almost all of the attackers had experienced or perceived some major loss prior to the attack (98 percent, n=40). These losses included a perceived failure or loss of status (66 percent, n=27); loss of a loved one or of a significant relationship, including a romantic relationship (51 percent, n=21); and a major illness experienced by the attacker or someone significant to him (15 percent, n=6). In one case, the attacker, who was a former student at the school where the attack occurred, was laid off from his job because he did not have a high school diploma. The attacker blamed the job loss on the teacher who failed him in a senior-year course, which kept him from graduating. He returned to the school a year after leaving the school, killed his former teacher and two students, and then held over 60 students hostage for 10 hours.

For most attackers, their outward behaviors suggested difficulty in coping with loss (83 percent, n=34). For example, the mother, the brother, and a friend of the attacker who lost his job each had commented that the attacker became depressed and withdrawn following the lay-off. The friend also reported that he knew that the attacker blamed his former teacher for his problems and had begun planning how to retaliate.

Conceptualizing the Attack

Finding

Incidents of targeted violence at school *rarely* are sudden, impulsive acts.

Explanation

Several findings of the *Safe School Initiative* indicate clearly that the school-based attacks studied were rarely impulsive. Rather, these attacks typically were thought out beforehand and involved some degree of advance planning. In many cases, the attacker's observable behavior prior to the attack suggested he might be planning or preparing for a school attack.

In nearly all of the incidents for which information concerning the attacker's conceptualization of the attack was available, researchers found that the attacker had

developed his *idea to harm* the target(s) before the attack (95 percent, n=39). The length of time that attackers held this idea prior to the actual attack varied considerably. Some attackers conceived of the attack as few as one or two days prior to advancing that attack; other attackers had held the idea of the attack for as long as a year prior to carrying it out. For those incidents where information was available to determine how long the attacker had an idea to harm the target (n=33), the analysis showed that a little over half of the attackers developed their idea for the incident at least a month prior to the attack (51 percent, n=17).

In addition, almost all of the attackers *planned* out the attack in advance of carrying it out (93 percent; n=38). Moreover, there was evidence from the attacker's *behavior* prior to the attack that the attacker had a plan or was preparing to harm the target(s) (93 percent, n=38). For example, one attacker asked his friends to help him get ammunition for one of his weapons; sawed off the end of a rifle to make it easier to conceal beneath his clothes; shopped for a long trench coat with his mother; and cut the pockets out of the coat so that he could conceal the weapon within the coat while holding the weapon through one of the cut-out pockets. That attacker had a well-known fascination with weapons and had told his friends on several occasions that he thought about killing certain students at school.

The length of time between the planning and execution of the attacks also varied considerably for the targeted school violence incidents studied. Some attackers developed their plans on the day of their attack or only one or two days prior; others developed their plans between six and eight months prior to the attack. In cases where there was information available to establish the date planning began (n=29), analysis of available information revealed that most of the attackers developed a plan at least two days prior to the attack (69 percent, n=21).

Revenge was a motive for more than half of the attackers (61 percent, n=25). Other motives included trying to solve a problem (34 percent, n=14); suicide or desperation (27 percent, n=11); and efforts to get attention or recognition (24 percent, n=10). More than half of the attackers had *multiple* motives or reasons for their school-based attacks (54 percent, n=22). In addition, most of the attackers held some sort of grievance at the time of the attack, either against their target(s) or against someone else (81 percent, n=33). Many attackers told other people about these grievances prior to their attacks (66 percent, n=27).²³

²³ *Supra* note 19.

Signaling the Attack

Finding

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.

Explanation

In most cases, other people knew about the attack before it took place. In over three-quarters of the incidents, at least one person had information that the attacker was thinking about or planning the school attack (81 percent, n=30). In nearly two-thirds of the incidents, *more than one* person had information about the attack before it occurred (59 percent, n=22). In nearly all of these cases, the person who knew was a peer—a friend, schoolmate, or sibling (93 percent, n=28/30). Some peers knew exactly what the attacker planned to do; others knew something "big" or "bad" was going to happen, and in several cases knew the time and date it was to occur. An adult had information about the idea or plan in only two cases.

In one incident, for example, the attacker had planned to shoot students in the lobby of his school prior to the beginning of the school day. He told two friends exactly what he had planned and asked three others to meet him that morning in the mezzanine overlooking the lobby, ostensibly so that these students would be out of harm's way. On most mornings, usually only a few students would congregate on the mezzanine before the school day began. However, by the time the attacker arrived at school on the morning of the attack, word about what was going to happen had spread to such an extent that 24 students were on the mezzanine waiting for the attack to begin. One student who knew the attack was to occur brought a camera so that he could take pictures of the event.

Finding

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

Explanation

The majority of the attackers in the targeted school violence incidents examined under the *Safe School Initiative* did not threaten their target(s) directly, i.e., did not tell the target they intended to harm them, whether in direct, indirect, or conditional language prior to the attack. Only one-sixth of the attackers threatened their target(s) directly prior to the attack (17 percent, n=7).

Finding

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

Explanation

Almost all of the attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the attack that caused others—school officials, parents, teachers, police, fellow students—to be concerned (93 percent, n=38). In most of the cases, at least one *adult* was concerned by the attacker’s behavior (88 percent, n=36). In three-quarters of the cases, at least three people—adults and other children—were concerned by the attacker’s behavior (76 percent, n=31). In one case, for example, the attacker made comments to at least 24 friends and classmates about his interest in killing other kids, building bombs, or carrying out an attack at the school. A school counselor was so concerned about this student’s behavior that the counselor asked to contact the attacker’s parents. The attacker’s parents also knew of his interest in guns.

The behaviors that led other individuals to be concerned about the attacker included both behaviors specifically related to the attack, such as efforts to get a gun, as well as other disturbing behaviors not related to the subsequent attack. In one case, the student’s English teacher became concerned about several poems and essays that the student submitted for class assignments because they treated the themes of homicide and suicide as possible solutions to his feelings of despair. In another case, the student worried his friends by talking frequently about plans to put rat poison in the cheese shakers at a popular pizza establishment. A friend of that student became so concerned that the student was going to carry out the rat poison plan, that the friend got out of bed late one night and left his house in search of his mother, who was not home at the time, to ask her what to do.

Advancing the Attack*Finding*

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.

Explanation

Although most attackers carried out their attacks on their own, many attackers were influenced or encouraged by others to engage in the attacks. Nearly half of the attackers were influenced by other individuals in deciding to mount an attack, dared or encouraged by others to attack, or both (44 percent; n=18). For example, one attacker’s original idea had been to bring a gun to school and let other students see

him with it. He wanted to look tough so that the students who had been harassing him would leave him alone. When he shared this idea with two friends, however, they convinced him that exhibiting the gun would not be sufficient and that he would have to *shoot at* people at the school in order to get the other students to leave him alone. It was after this conversation that this student decided to mount his school attack.

In other cases, friends assisted the attacker in his efforts to acquire a weapon or ammunition, discussed tactics for getting a weapon into school undetected, or helped gather information about the whereabouts of a target at a particular time during the school day.

Finding

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Explanation

Experience using weapons and access to them was common for many attackers. Nearly two-thirds of the attackers had a known history of weapons use, including knives, guns, and bombs (63 percent, n=26). Over half of the attackers had some experience specifically with a gun prior to the incident (59 percent, n=24), while others had experience with bombs or explosives (15 percent, n=6). However, fewer than half of the attackers demonstrated any fascination or excessive interest with weapons (44 percent, n=18), and fewer than one-third showed a fascination with explosives (32 percent, n=13) prior to their attacks. Over two-thirds of the attackers acquired the gun (or guns) used in their attacks from their own home or that of a relative (68 percent, n=28).

Resolving the Attack*Finding*

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

Explanation

Most school-based attacks were stopped through intervention by school administrators, educators, and students or by the attacker stopping on his own. In about one-third of the incidents, the attacker was apprehended by or surrendered to administrators, faculty, or school staff (27 percent, n=10) or to students (5 percent, n=2). In just over one-fifth of the incidents, the attacker stopped on his own or left

the school (22 percent, n=8). In a few incidents, the attacker killed himself during the course of the incident (13 percent, n=5).

Just over one-quarter of the incidents were stopped through law enforcement intervention (27 percent, n=10). Law enforcement personnel discharged weapons in only three of the incidents of targeted school violence studied (8 percent, n=3).

Close to half of the incidents were known to last 15 minutes or less from the beginning of the shooting to the time the attacker was apprehended, surrendered or stopped shooting (47 percent, n=16).²⁴ One-quarter of the incidents were over within five minutes of their inception (27 percent, n=9). The fact that it was not through law enforcement intervention that most of the targeted school violence incidents studied were stopped appears in large part to be a function of how brief most of these incidents were in duration.

²⁴ Information on incident duration was not available for seven of the incidents (19 percent).

CHAPTER IV

IMPLICATIONS OF *SAFE
SCHOOL INITIATIVE* FINDINGS
FOR THE PREVENTION OF
TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE



After careful review of the case histories of the 37 incidents of targeted school violence examined under the *Safe School Initiative*, 10 key findings were identified that highlight information that may have been known or knowable prior to school-based attacks and that therefore might inform some type of intervention in or prevention of future attacks. In this chapter, the authors discuss the implications that these findings may have for schools and communities in developing strategies for preventing targeted violence in schools.

In focusing in on these findings for their potential relevance to the development of prevention and intervention strategies, the authors acknowledge that these findings may raise other issues for consideration in addressing the problem of targeted school violence beyond those noted here. Moreover, the authors recognize that the conditions, circumstances and facts underlying the findings highlighted here may not manifest themselves in the same way in every school. Schools and communities therefore are in the best position to determine whether and how these findings and the implications suggested may apply to their particular problems and needs.

The 10 key findings that the authors believe may have implications for the development of strategies to address the problem of targeted school violence are as follows:

- Incidents of targeted violence at school rarely are sudden, impulsive acts.
- Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.
- Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.
- There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted school violence.
- Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.
- Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
- Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
- Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.
- In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.
- Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most shooting incidents were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention.

The Implications of Key Study Findings

Key Finding 1

Incidents of targeted violence at school *rarely* are sudden, impulsive acts.

Implications

Students who engaged in school-based attacks typically did not "just snap" and then engage in impulsive or random acts of targeted school violence. Instead, the attacks examined under the *Safe School Initiative* appeared to be the end result of a comprehensible process of thinking and behavior: behavior that typically began with an idea, progressed to the development of a plan, moved on to securing the means to carry out the plan, and culminated in an attack. This is a process that potentially may be knowable or discernible from the attacker's behaviors and communications.

To the extent that information about an attacker's intent and planning is knowable and may be uncovered before an incident, some attacks may be preventable. However, findings from the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that the time span between the attacker's decision to mount an attack and the actual incident may be short. Consequently, when indications that a student may pose a threat to the school community arise in the form of revelations about a planned attack, school administrators and law enforcement officials will need to move quickly to inquire about and intervene in that plan.²⁵

Key Finding 2

Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack. In most cases, those who knew were other kids—friends, schoolmates, siblings, and others. However, this information rarely made its way to an adult.

Implications

First and foremost, this finding suggests that students can be an important part of prevention efforts. A friend or schoolmate may be the first person to hear that a student is thinking about or planning to harm someone. Nevertheless, for a variety of reasons, those who have information about a potential incident of targeted school violence may not alert an adult on their own. Schools can encourage students to report this information in part by identifying and breaking down barriers in the

²⁵ The Department of Education and the Secret Service have prepared a companion work to the Final Report, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and Creating Safe School Climates*. This guide is scheduled for publication in May 2002. The guide will include recommendations for investigating and evaluating threats and other behaviors of concern in school; address considerations for developing policies and the capacity to support threat assessment efforts in schools; and provide suggestions for approaches schools can adopt to foster school environments that reduce violence.

school environment that inadvertently may discourage students from coming forward with this information. Schools also may benefit from ensuring that they have a fair, thoughtful, and effective system to respond to whatever information students do bring forward. If students have concerns about how adults will react to information that they bring forward, they may be even less inclined to volunteer such information.

In addition, this finding highlights the importance in an inquiry of attempts to gather all relevant information from anyone who may have contact with the student. Efforts to gather all potentially relevant pieces of information, however innocuous they may appear on their own, from all individuals with whom the student has contact may help to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student's ideas, activities, and plans. In the end, investigators may find that different people in the student's life have different pieces of the puzzle.

Key Finding 3

Most attackers did not threaten their targets directly prior to advancing the attack.

Implications

This finding underscores the importance of *not waiting* for a threat before beginning an inquiry. The *Safe School Initiative* found that most attackers in fact did not threaten their target directly and some made no threat at all. Instead, other behaviors and communications that may prompt concern, such as hearing that a child is talking about bringing a gun to school, are indicators that the child may pose a threat and therefore should prompt the initiation of efforts to gather information.

School administrators should respond to all students who make threats. The lack of response could be taken by the threatener as permission to proceed with carrying out the threat. In the end, however, it is important to distinguish between someone who *makes* a threat—tells people they intend to harm someone—and someone who *poses* a threat—engages in behaviors that indicate an intent, planning, or preparation for an attack. Those conducting inquiries should focus particular attention on any information that indicates that a student *poses* a threat, regardless of whether the student has told a potential target he or she intends to do them harm.

Key Finding 4

There is no accurate or useful profile of students who engaged in targeted school violence.

Implications

The demographic, personality, school history, and social characteristics of the attackers varied substantially. Knowing that a particular student shares

characteristics, behaviors, features or traits with prior school shooters does not help in determining whether that student is thinking about or planning for a violent act.

The use of profiles in this way likewise is not an effective approach to identifying students who may pose a risk for targeted school violence at school or for assessing the risk that a particular student may pose for a school-based attack, once a particular student has been identified. Reliance on profiles to predict future school attacks carries two substantial risks: (1) the great majority of students who fit any given profile of a "school shooter" will not actually pose a risk of targeted violence; and, (2) using profiles will fail to identify some students who in fact pose a risk of violence but share few if any characteristics with prior attackers.²⁶

Rather than trying to determine the "type" of student who may engage in targeted school violence, an inquiry should focus instead on a student's *behaviors and communications* to determine if that student appears to be planning or preparing for an attack. Rather than asking whether a particular student "looks like" those who have launched school-based attacks before, it is more productive to ask whether the student is engaging in behaviors that suggest preparations for an attack, if so how fast the student is moving toward attack, and where intervention may be possible.

Key Finding 5

Most attackers engaged in some behavior, prior to the incident, that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

Implications

Several key findings point to the fact that kids send signals—both directly and indirectly—to others regarding their problems. The boys who engaged in the targeted school violence examined by the *Safe School Initiative* were not "invisible" students. In fact nearly all of these students engaged in behaviors—prior to their attacks—that caused concern to at least one person, usually an adult, and most concerned at least three people.

This finding highlights the range of behaviors in a student's life that may be noticeable and that could prompt some additional probing by a caring adult. A student's family, teachers, friends and others may have information regarding aspects of a student's behavior that has raised concern. As was true in some of the incidents covered in this study, individuals in contact with the attacker may have observed something of concern about that student's behavior, but not of sufficient concern for them to notify anyone in a position to respond.

²⁶ Please refer to Reddy et al. (2001), "Evaluating risk for targeted violence in schools: Comparing risk assessment, threat assessment, and other approaches," for a full discussion of assessment approaches currently available to schools. The full citation for the article is listed in Appendix C of this document.

Educators and other adults can learn how to pick up on these signals and make appropriate referrals.²⁷ By inquiring about any information that may have prompted some concern, an investigator may be able to develop a more comprehensive picture of the student's past and current behavior, and identify any indications that the student is intent on or planning to attack. However, discretion should be exercised in determining whom to talk to about the student, so as not to alienate or stigmatize the student of concern. A significant challenge facing schools is to determine how best to respond to students who are already known to be in trouble or needing assistance.

Key Finding 6

Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Many had considered or attempted suicide.

Implications

Many students, not just those who engaged in school-based attacks, experience or perceive major losses in their lives. Most students who face a significant loss, or who have difficulty coping with such a loss, are not going to be at risk for a school-based attack. However, information that indicates a student is facing or having trouble dealing with a significantly difficult situation may indicate a need to refer the student to appropriate services and resources.

In cases where there is concern about the possibility that a student may engage in targeted violence, attention should be given to any indication that a student is having difficulty coping with major losses or perceived failures, particularly where these losses or failures appear to have prompted feelings of desperation and hopelessness. An inquiry also should anticipate changes in the life of a troubled student, and consider whether these changes might increase—or decrease—the threat the student poses.

Key Finding 7

Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.

Implications

Bullying was not a factor in every case, and clearly not every child who is bullied in school will pose a risk for targeted violence in school. Nevertheless, in a number of the incidents of targeted school violence studied, attackers described being bullied in terms that suggested that these experiences approached torment. These attackers

²⁷ See "Early Warning, Timely Response," listed in Appendix C of this report, for more information about how to identify students who may need assistance.

told of behaviors that, if they occurred in the workplace, likely would meet legal definitions of harassment and/or assault.

The prevalence of bullying found in this and other recent studies should strongly support ongoing efforts to reduce bullying in American schools.²⁸ Educators can play an important role in ensuring that students are not bullied in schools and that schools not only do not permit bullying but also empower other students to let adults in the school know if students are being bullied.

Key Finding 8

Most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.

Implications

Access to weapons among some students may be common. However, when the idea of an attack exists, *any* effort to acquire, prepare, or use a weapon or ammunition may be a significant move in the attacker's progression from idea to action. Any inquiry should include investigation of and attention to weapon access and use and communications about weapons. Attention should also be given to indications of any efforts by a student to build a bomb or acquire bomb-making components.

The large proportion of attackers who acquired their guns from home points to the need for schools and law enforcement officials to collaborate on policies and procedures for responding when a student is thought to have a firearm in school. In particular, schools should be aware of the provisions of the Federal Gun-Free Schools Act, which requires that all schools expel students who bring a gun to school and should report all violations to local law enforcement officials.²⁹

Key Finding 9

In many cases, other students were involved in the attack in some capacity.

Implications

This finding highlights the importance of considering what prompting or encouragement a student may receive from others in his life that influences his intent, planning, or preparations for a potential attack. Any investigation of potential targeted school violence should include attention to the role that a student's friends or peers may be playing in that student's thinking about and preparations for an

²⁸ See, for example, Nansel, T., Overpeck, M., Pilla, R., Ruan, J., Simons-Morton, B., & Scheidt, P. (2001). Bullying behavior among U.S. youth. *Journal of the American Medical Association*, 285, pp. 2094-2100.

²⁹ Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended by No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Title IV, Part A, Subpart 3, Section 4141.

attack. It is possible that feedback from friends or others may help to move a student from an unformed thought about attacking to developing and advancing a plan to carry out the attack.

Key Finding 10

Despite prompt law enforcement responses, most attacks were stopped by means other than law enforcement intervention, and most were brief in duration.

Implications

The short duration of most incidents of targeted school violence argues for the importance of developing preventive measures in addition to any emergency planning for a school or school district. The preventive measures should include protocols and procedures for responding to and managing threats and other behaviors of concern.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION: THREAT
ASSESSMENT AS A PROMISING
STRATEGY FOR PREVENTING
SCHOOL VIOLENCE



Taken together, the findings from the *Safe School Initiative* suggest that some future attacks may be preventable. Most incidents of targeted school violence were thought out and planned in advance. The attackers' behavior suggested that they were planning or preparing for an attack. Prior to most incidents, the attackers' peers knew the attack was to occur. And most attackers were not "invisible," but already were of concern to people in their lives.

In light of these findings, the use of a threat assessment approach may be a promising strategy for preventing a school-based attack. Educators, law enforcement officials and others with public safety responsibilities may be able to prevent some incidents of targeted school violence if they know what information to look for and what to do with such information when it is found. In sum, these officials may benefit from focusing their efforts on formulating strategies for preventing these attacks in two principal areas:

- developing the capacity to pick up on and evaluate available or knowable information that might indicate that there is a risk of a targeted school attack; and,
- employing the results of these risk evaluations or "threat assessments" in developing strategies to prevent potential school attacks from occurring.

Threat Assessment and Targeted School Violence Prevention

Threat assessment, as developed by the Secret Service and applied in the context of targeted school violence, is a fact-based investigative and analytical approach that focuses on what a particular student is doing and saying, and not on whether the student "looks like" those who have attacked schools in the past. Threat assessment emphasizes the importance of such behavior and communications for identifying, evaluating and reducing the risk posed by a student who may be thinking about or planning for a school-based attack. The Department of Education and the Secret Service currently are completing work on a publication that will provide school administrators and law enforcement officials with guidance on planning and implementing a threat assessment approach within school settings.³⁰

In relying on a fact-based threat assessment approach, school officials, law enforcement professionals and others involved in the assessment will need tools, mechanisms and legal processes that can facilitate their efforts to gather and analyze information regarding a student's behavior and communications. For example, school and law enforcement personnel should be offered training regarding what information to gather, how to gather and evaluate it, and how they might try to intervene in cases where the information collected suggests a student may be planning or preparing for a school-based attack.

³⁰ *Supra* note 25.

Several states have enacted legislation that makes it easier for schools to share student information with law enforcement agencies and others who are trying to determine whether a student might be moving toward a school-based attack.³¹ Localities and states may wish to explore such options for supporting threat assessment components in schools and facilitating sharing information across school, law enforcement and community systems participating in the threat assessment process.

Finally, educators can play a part in prevention by creating an environment where students feel comfortable telling an adult whenever they hear about someone who is considering doing harm to another person, or even whether the person is considering harming themselves. Once such an environment is created, it will remain important that the adults in that environment listen to students and handle the information they receive in a fair and responsible manner.

³¹ See "Legal Issues" in Appendix C of this report for listings of documents that include descriptions of state statutes in this area.

Appendix A

INCIDENTS OF
TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE, BY STATE

Appendix B

INCIDENTS OF
TARGETED SCHOOL
VIOLENCE, BY YEAR

Appendix C

RESOURCES

Contact Information



INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY STATE

STATE	TOWN OR COUNTY
Alabama	Lanett
Alaska	Bethel
Arkansas	Jonesboro, Stamps
California	Anaheim, Napa, Olivehurst, Palo Alto, Redlands
Colorado	Jefferson County (Littleton)
Florida	Lake Worth
Georgia	Conyers, Scottsdale
Idaho	Notus
Iowa	Manchester
Kansas	Goddard
Kentucky	Grayson, Union, West Paducah
Massachusetts	Great Barrington
Mississippi	Pearl
Missouri	DeKalb, Patterson
Montana	Lewistown
New Mexico	Deming
New York	Olean
North Carolina	Greensboro
Oklahoma	Fort Gibson
Oregon	Springfield
Pennsylvania	Edinboro
South Carolina	Blacksville
Tennessee	Fayetteville, Lynville
Texas	Austin
Virginia	Virginia Beach
Washington	Moses Lake
Wisconsin	Wauwatosa

INCIDENTS OF TARGETED SCHOOL VIOLENCE, BY YEAR

YEAR	MONTH AND DAY
1974	December 30
1978	May 18, October 15
1985	January 21
1986	December 4
1987	March 2
1988	December 14
1989	October 5
1992	May 1, May 14, December 14
1993	January 18, December 1
1994	May 26, October 12, November 8
1995	January 23, October 12, November 15
1996	February 2, February 8, March 25, September 25
1997	February 19, October 1, December 1, December 15
1998	March 24, April 24, May 19, May 24
1999	April 16, April 20, May 20, November 19, December 6
2000	May 26

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Web Sites

United States Department of Educationwww.ed.gov
United States Secret Servicewww.secretservice.gov

CONTACT INFORMATION

United States Secret Service	United States Department of Education
National Threat Assessment Center	Safe and Drug-Free Schools Program
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Web site: www.secretservice.gov/ntac	Web site: www.ed.gov/offices/OESE/SDFS

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CAMPUS ATTACKS

Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions
of Higher Education



April 2010

United States Secret Service • United States Department of Education • Federal Bureau of Investigation

CAMPUS ATTACKS
TARGETED VIOLENCE AFFECTING INSTITUTIONS OF HIGHER EDUCATION

United States Secret Service
United States Department of Education
Federal Bureau of Investigation

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A JOINT MESSAGE FROM THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE, THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, AND THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION


In response to the Virginia Tech incident on April 16, 2007, former cabinet Secretaries Michael Leavitt and Margaret Spellings, and former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales submitted the *Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy* dated June 13, 2007. The report included a recommendation that the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service), the U.S. Department of Education, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) explore the issue of violence at institutions of higher education (IHEs). Accordingly, we initiated a collaborative effort to understand the nature of this violence and identify ways of preventing future attacks that would affect our nation's colleges and universities.

This effort was implemented through the Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center, the Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, and the FBI's Behavioral Analysis Unit. The project drew from the Secret Service's experience in studying threat assessment and the prevention of targeted violence; the Department of Education's expertise in helping schools facilitate learning through the creation of safe environments for students, faculty, and staff; and, the FBI's threat assessment and investigative expertise.

The goal of this collaborative endeavor was to understand the scope of the problem of targeted violence at IHEs. To that end, this report offers preliminary findings from a review of 272 incidents of violence that affected IHEs in the United States from 1900 through 2008. We addressed fundamental questions regarding where, when, and how these incidents occurred, and captured information concerning the offenders and their relationship to the IHEs. When possible, we also identified factors that may have motivated or triggered the attacks.

We strived to create a product that will be useful for threat assessment and campus safety professionals charged with identifying, assessing, and managing violence risk at IHEs. These law enforcement, mental health, student affairs, and legal professionals provide an incredible service under unique and often challenging circumstances. Ensuring the safety of college and university communities—some of which resemble small cities—is a daunting task. Navigating the intricacies of privacy laws, preserving academic freedoms, complying with civil rights laws, and simultaneously ensuring a safe campus and workplace environment are tasks not easily accomplished. We hope that this preliminary report contributes to that effort.

The Secret Service, the Department of Education, and the FBI are keenly aware of the profound and devastating physical, emotional, and psychological injuries that result from acts of violence against IHE community members and their effect on the nation as a whole. Through our collaboration, we are working to better understand what drives individuals to carry out acts of violence and ultimately how to prevent them in the future.



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This project also benefited from the thoughtful comments of a subject matter expert group comprising representatives from campus law enforcement, threat assessment professionals, and higher education. Participants included: Eugene Deisinger, Ph.D., Christopher Flynn, Ph.D., Steven J. Healy, Gary Lyle, Kris Mohandie, Ph.D., Mario J. Scalora, Ph.D., and Vasti Torres, Ph.D.

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INTRODUCTION

On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho, 23, a student at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (“Virginia Tech”) in Blacksburg, Virginia, carried out what would become one of the deadliest school shootings in the world. Around 7:15 a.m., Cho fatally shot a female student in her dormitory room in West Ambler Johnston Residential Hall and then shot the building's residential advisor. Approximately two-and-a-half hours later, Cho entered Norris Hall, a lecture building, and shot numerous students and faculty before killing himself. In total, Cho killed 32 (27 students and five faculty members) and wounded 17. Some of the wounded individuals were struck by gunfire while others were injured trying to jump from the building.

This killing spree stunned the nation and questions echoed throughout the country from parents, administrators, and government officials alike. In response, Virginia Governor Timothy Kaine established the Virginia Tech Review Panel (VTRP) on June 18, 2007, to gain a better understanding of the incident and its underlying causes so that steps could be taken to minimize the chances of a similar tragedy happening again.¹

At the federal level, President George W. Bush charged Attorney General Alberto Gonzales, Department of Education Secretary Margaret Spellings, and Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Michael Leavitt to convene meetings throughout the country focused on the issues raised by the Virginia Tech tragedy. Meetings were subsequently held with college and university representatives, local and state leaders, law enforcement officials, and mental health care providers. President Bush instructed Secretary Leavitt to summarize the lessons learned from these meetings and to recommend how the federal government could help prevent similar incidents in the future.

On June 13, 2007, based upon the meeting discussions as well as other input, the *Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy* was issued.² This report presented a series of findings, common themes, observations, and recommendations, one of which stated: “The U.S. Department of Education, in collaboration with the U.S. Secret Service and the Department of Justice, should explore research of targeted violence in institutions of higher education and continue to share existing threat assessment methodology with interested institutions.”^{3,4} To that end, representatives from the U.S. Secret Service (Secret Service), the U.S. Department of Education, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) initiated a partnership in pursuit of this goal.

The three entities began by asking fundamental questions, such as: How prevalent are the incidents of targeted violence that affect institutions of higher education (IHEs)? Who are the

¹ Virginia Tech Review Panel. (2007, August). *Mass shootings at Virginia Tech, April 16, 2007: Report of the Review Panel*. Retrieved July 8, 2008, from www.vtreviewpanel.org/report/index.html.

² U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2007, June 13). *Report to the President on issues raised by the Virginia Tech tragedy*. Retrieved August 21, 2008, from <http://www.hhs.gov/vtreport.html#intro>. Hereafter referred to as the “Report to the President.”

³ “Targeted violence” is defined as an incident of violence where a known or knowable attacker selects a particular target prior to their violent attack. See Fein, R.A., Vossekuil, B., & Holden, G. (1995, September). Threat assessment: An approach to prevent targeted violence. *Research in Action (NCJ 155000)*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice.

⁴ *Report to the President*, p. 9.

perpetrators? Are they affiliated with the affected IHE? There was limited previous research on these issues, so the initial framework for the project became clear to the three agencies, which began a comprehensive effort to identify, through open-sources, incidents of targeted violence that have affected IHE communities.

This report provides an overview of these incidents and the involved subjects, discusses initial observations regarding behaviors of the subjects, and offers preliminary considerations regarding the data that may have relevance to threat assessment. While the participating agencies are aware of the limitations of an open-source descriptive review, this preliminary effort will be complemented by a more in-depth study to be conducted by the Department of Education and the FBI.

BACKGROUND

The specific phenomenon of targeted violence at institutions of higher education (IHEs) should be considered within its own context. This section begins by reviewing the previous incident-based research, defining the IHE community, and discussing what forms of criminal activity exist within this community.

Previous Incident-Based Research

To better understand the breadth of issues with which an IHE may be confronted as part of a threat assessment, the Secret Service, Department of Education, and the FBI sought to identify and review literature that specifically examined the full-range of incidents of targeted violence affecting IHEs.

As noted by former Secretary Spellings, along with former Attorney General Gonzales and former Secretary Leavitt, a number of law enforcement officers, mental health care providers, school officials, and educators have cited the publication, *Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates*.⁵ This guide was published jointly by the Secret Service and the Department of Education in May 2002. It was based upon the Safe School Initiative (SSI), a research project that examined 37 incidents of targeted school shootings that occurred between 1974 and 2000 at elementary, middle, and high schools. This landmark study identified observable pre-attack behaviors of student perpetrators in K-12 schools and highlighted several strategies for recognizing and managing persons who pose a threat to school populations.

When considering whether these findings are applicable to similar incidents within an IHE setting, it is important to note that specific and observable pre-attack behaviors demonstrated by attackers at the college or university level have yet to be thoroughly examined for comparison. Applying the findings of the SSI to IHE-based populations may provide appropriate prompts and insights to guide threat assessment, but there are important differences that may impact the threat assessment process.

At a basic level, the physical environment of a K-12 setting is vastly different from that of a college or university setting. Secondary schools typically comprise one to several buildings, utilize smaller classrooms, and provide an experience in which students have regular contact with the same faculty and staff. Communication between responsible parties regarding issues facing the student population is facilitated by this proximity. For the most part, numerous educators are aware of students' whereabouts and behaviors during each school day. Additionally, faculty meetings enable information sharing and increase the likelihood of recognizing behaviors of concern. In contrast, IHE campuses usually comprise many buildings, often with larger classrooms, separate faculty for each department, more uncontrolled access and egress, and irregular student schedules that minimize regular contact between educators and

⁵ Fein, R., Vossekuil, B., Borum, R., Pollack, W. S., Modzeleski, W., and Reddy, M. (2002, May). *Threat assessment in schools: A guide to managing threatening situations and to creating safe school climates*. Washington, DC: United States Secret Service and United States Department of Education.

students. These factors are less conducive to observing and recognizing behavioral concerns among the student population.

At a more nuanced level, the developmental and social differences between high school students and college students suggest that IHE-based subjects may engage in pre-attack behaviors that differ from those of their high school counterparts. A college or university campus may be both an educational and a residential environment, making it a setting in which significant developmental and transitional stressors are ushered into a person's life. This combination is not often found in other settings. For the student who has just moved away from home, there are numerous environmental changes that can introduce a new dimension of stress. Some challenges include establishing self-sufficiency and responsibility, academic pressures, social pressures, and personal health and safety decisions. The student's coping skills can range from positive, such as seeking counseling or talking with friends, to negative, such as social withdrawal and isolation or alcohol and drug abuse.

When behaviors of concern are identified among secondary school students, there exists the potential for educators and threat assessment personnel to communicate with parents to solicit family involvement. However, options for the IHE official are more limited, as regular communication with parents is less likely to occur for a variety of reasons and IHE students who live away from home must reach out for services independently.

Beyond the SSI, there is limited research on IHE-related targeted violence that contains comprehensive incident analysis. The majority of the literature offers practical guidance on conducting threat assessments, preventing targeted violence, and handling the aftermath of an incident. There is some research on handfuls of incidents across all educational levels, not just IHEs, and in-depth case analyses focused on only a few incidents. The research has also addressed particular aspects of violence on IHE campuses, such as stalking, domestic violence, courtship violence, campus sexual assault, hazing, and drug/alcohol induced violence. Various surveys have been published that attempt to assess the frequency of violent crime affecting IHE communities. However, these surveys collected limited information and were focused on specific campuses, geographical areas, and timeframes. The relevance of this information is not in question, but the existing literature has generally looked at these issues in isolation and does not allow us to look across types of violence to gauge the relative prevalence and context.

One of the few reports to look across the spectrum was Max L. Bromley's *Campus-Related Murders: A Content Analysis Review of News Articles*.⁶ Bromley examined *Chronicle of Higher Education* articles from 1989 to 2001 for incidents of campus murder to gain a deeper understanding of the offenders, victims, circumstances, and university or college response. Analysis of 33 incidents highlighted the fact that college campuses share commonalities with the communities at large with regard to murders. As in the general population, Bromley found, examples of domestic, intimate, and workplace violence were present in campus homicide cases. In a majority of the studied cases, there was some kind of relationship between the offender and the victim, and both tended to be members of the campus community (students, faculty, or staff).

⁶ Bromley, M. L. (2005). *Campus-related murders: A content analysis review of news articles*. Paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Southern Criminal Justice Association. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from <http://www.dcf.state.fl.us> Updated link retrieved on April 14, 2010: http://www.dcf.state.fl.us/initiatives/campussecurity/docs/Campus_Related_Murders050907.pdf.

Handguns and other weapons were used in about half of the campus murders, which mirrored the rate of murders involving handguns in the general community. Bromley noted that, despite these shared features, “little is known at this time about the nature and characteristics of murders on campus.”

As the professional literature does not offer a comprehensive perspective that examines the full-range of incidents faced by IHEs, the search focused on published lists of incidents of school-related violence. These lists typically reflected the following limitations: (1) the manner in which they were compiled was not always documented; (2) they lacked stated and clearly defined criteria for the inclusion of incidents; (3) they blended incidents from all educational levels (i.e., elementary, secondary, and postsecondary); (4) they often combined incidents that occurred within the United States and those that occurred on foreign soil; (5) they frequently focused on the more well-known incidents; and (6) they presented only basic information about each incident, such as the date, location, name of the subjects and/or victims, and a brief description of what occurred.

A review of the existing literature and resources confirmed the need for the Secret Service, the Department of Education, and the FBI to compile a comprehensive inventory of targeted violence incidents that have affected IHE communities.

Defining the IHE Community

According to the *Digest of Education Statistics: 2008 (The Digest)*,⁷ there were 6,563 postsecondary Title IV Institutions in 2006-07.⁸ Of these institutions, 4,314 were degree-granting⁹ and 2,222 were non-degree-granting.¹⁰

Focusing primarily on the 4,314 degree-granting institutions, 2,629 (approximately 60 percent) were four-year colleges or universities, and 1,685 (approximately 40 percent) were two-year colleges. Student enrollment in these institutions in the fall of 2006 measured 17.8 million (11.2 million in four-year institutions and 6.5 million in two-year institutions).^{11, 12} Of these students,

⁷ Snyder, T.D., Dillow, S.A., and Hoffman, C.M. (2009, March). *Digest of Education Statistics 2008 (NCES 2009-020)*. Washington, DC: National Center for Education Statistics, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education. Retrieved June 1, 2009, from <http://nces.ed.gov>. Hereafter referred to as “The Digest.”

⁸ Title IV institutions are defined as “all post-secondary institutions whose students are eligible to participate in the Title IV federal financial aid programs.” Table 5. Number of educational institutions, by level and control of institution: Selected years, 1980–81 through 2006–07, *The Digest*, p. 19.

⁹ Degree-granting institutions are defined as “postsecondary institutions that grant an associate’s or higher degree and whose students are eligible to participate in the Title IV federal financial aid programs. Degree-granting institutions include almost all 2- and 4-year colleges and universities; they exclude institutions offering only vocational programs of less than 2 years duration and continuing education programs.” *The Digest*, p. 269.

¹⁰ Non-degree granting included institutions that “did not offer accredited 4-year or 2-year degree programs, but were participating in Title IV federal financial aid programs. Includes some schools with non-accredited degree programs.” *The Digest*, p. 269.

¹¹ Table 186. Enrollment, staff, and degrees conferred in postsecondary institutions participating in Title IV programs, by type and control of institution, sex of student, type of staff, and type of degree: fall 2005, fall 2006, and 2006–07. *The Digest*, p. 276.

¹² These numbers may not equal the 17.8 million shown due to rounding. Not included in these numbers were an additional 446,604 students enrolled in non-degree-granting institutions.

42.7 percent were male and 57.3 percent were female. The youngest enrolled students were reported to be age 14; however, ages beyond 35 were not specified (see Table 1).¹³

The majority of the enrolled students in the fall of 2006 attended larger colleges and universities. Specifically, campuses boasting enrollment levels of 10,000 students or more represented only 12 percent of the institutions; however, they enrolled 55 percent of all college students.¹⁴ By comparison, 41 percent of the institutions had enrollment levels of less than 1,000 students, and these institutions enrolled only 4 percent of all college students.

In addition to students, IHE communities comprise employees that include faculty, administration, and support staff. In the fall of 2007, 3.6 million people were employed at degree-granting institutions.¹⁵ This number includes 2.6 million professional staff (including faculty, executive/administrative/ managerial personnel, graduate assistants, and other professionals) and 932,027 non-professional staff (including technical/clerical/secretarial personnel, skilled trade persons, and maintenance staff). Sixty-four percent of the employees worked on a full-time basis, while the remaining 36 percent were part-time. Overall, the employee population was 46 percent male and 54 percent female.¹⁶ Age distributions were not reported.

Table 1: Student Enrollment, by Age Group, Fall 2006

Age	Enrollment	%
14-17	231,000	1.3
18-19	3,769,000	21.2
20-21	3,648,000	20.5
22-24	3,193,000	18.0
25-29	2,401,000	13.5
30-34	1,409,000	7.9
Over 35	3,107,000	17.5
Total	17,758,000	100

IHE Campus Crime

Maintaining the safety of IHEs and the students and employees that comprise IHE communities is a vital task. The statistics reported as part of the *Crime Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990* offer a gauge of the level and type of crime that takes place on college campuses. Amended three times in 1992, 1998, and 2000, this act was renamed in 1998 the *Jeanne Clery Disclosure of Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act*, or the *Clery Act*, in memory of a student who was killed in her dormitory room in 1986. In response to the Virginia Tech shootings, Congress further amended the act in 2008, adding a campus emergency response plan to its requirements. The amendment requires IHEs to “immediately notify” the campus community as soon as an emergency is confirmed on the campus unless such notification would impede attempts to control the situation.

The *Clery Act* requires all colleges and universities that participate in the federal financial aid programs under Title IV of the *Higher Education Act* to maintain and disclose information about certain crimes committed on or near campuses. The *Clery Act* defines these crimes as they are defined in the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reporting Handbook (UCR).

Specifically, campus personnel must track and report criminal homicides, including murder, negligent and non-negligent manslaughter, sex offenses (including forcible and non-forcible),

¹³ Table 190. Total fall enrollment in degree-granting institutions, by sex, age, and attendance status: Selected years, 1970 through 2017. *The Digest*, p. 280.

¹⁴ *The Digest*, p. 270.

¹⁵ Statistics were reported for fall 2005 and fall 2007 only.

¹⁶ Table 243. Employees in degree-granting institutions, by sex, employment status, control and type of institution, and primary occupation: Selected years, fall 1987 through fall 2007. *The Digest*, p. 358.

robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, motor vehicle theft, and arson. They must also report whether any of these crimes, other crimes involving bodily harm, or larceny, theft, simple assault, intimidation, and destruction, damage or vandalism of property were hate crimes. Statistics are also required for arrests and disciplinary action referrals for weapons possession or drug and alcohol law violations.

Under the *Clery Act*, criminal activity must also be broken down by location, whether “on campus, in or on a non-campus building or property, or on public property within or immediately adjacent to and accessible from the campus.”¹⁷ Finally, the *Clery Act* does not make any distinction regarding the resolution of the reported crimes (unless deemed to be unfounded by law enforcement) and does not limit the reported crimes to those that affected or were committed by IHE students or employees.

Table 2 depicts the number of crimes reported to the Department of Education in compliance with the *Clery Act* from 2005 through 2008.¹⁸ Data were reported by public and private institutions ranging from four-year and above to less than two-year. Those institutions with multiple campuses reported data for each campus. Looking at all 235,599 crimes reported over this timeframe, 74.6 percent were burglaries and motor vehicle thefts, 9.2 percent were aggravated assaults, 8.4 percent were robberies, 5.9 percent were forcible sex offenses, 1.7 percent were arsons, and 0.1 percent were non-forcible sex offenses. The remaining 0.1 percent of reported crimes were murders and non-negligent manslaughter (0.07 percent, $n = 174$) and negligent manslaughter (0.02 percent, $n = 46$).¹⁹ Of the 174 murders and non-negligent manslaughters, 80 occurred on campus (13 of which took place in residence halls), 82 occurred on public property immediately adjacent to campuses, and 12 occurred at non-campus facilities.

Table 2: Crime Statistics Reported in Compliance with the *Clery Act*, by Type of Crime and Year: 2005-08

	Murder / Non- Negligent Manslaughter	Negligent Manslaughter	Forcible Sex Offense	Non- Forcible Sex Offense	Robbery	Aggravated Assault	Burglary	Motor Vehicle Theft	Arson
2005	28	33	3,583	55	5,432	5,943	37,800	11,890	1,219
2006	25	0	3,490	56	4,921	5,472	35,124	9,811	1,086
2007	66	8	3,482	62	4,985	5,234	33,010	8,744	915
2008	55	5	3,287	49	4,562	5,026	31,851	7,465	825
Total	174	46	13,842	222	19,900	21,675	137,785	37,910	4,045

Although murder and non-negligent homicide represent the second smallest percentage of crimes reported by campus officials, the prevention of these types of crimes is a priority among IHE officials. The current effort between the Secret Service, the Department of Education, and the FBI seeks to identify for study a subset of these crimes—that is, incidents of targeted violence—to support prevention efforts.

¹⁷ U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education. (2005, June). The handbook for campus crime reporting, p. 11. Retrieved September 25, 2008, from <http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook.pdf>. Also see Higher Education Act, 34 C.F.R. 668.46(a) for full definitions of campus, and public property.

¹⁸ U.S. Department of Education, Office of Postsecondary Education. (n.d.) The campus security data analysis cutting tool, aggregated data for calendar years 2005-07 and 2006-2008 [spreadsheets]. Retrieved July 22, 2009, from <http://ope.ed.gov/security/>. Numbers shown for 2005 were taken from the aggregate data for 2005-07. Numbers shown for 2006-08 were taken from the aggregate data for 2006-08.

¹⁹ These numbers may not equal the 0.1 percent shown due to rounding.

DEFINING AND IDENTIFYING THE INCIDENTS

The partner agencies designed and launched an effort to identify a broad range of incidents that have affected IHEs. The goal of this effort was to identify relevant incidents involving directed assaults and to gather information on the key incident elements that could be gleaned from open-source reporting. To ensure that the scope encompassed the many issues that an IHE may face, incidents affecting postsecondary vocational and proprietary schools were also included.²⁰

Inclusion Criteria

Criteria were determined in advance to guide the selection of incidents for inclusion. As the term “targeted violence” lacks the degree of specificity necessary for incident criteria, for the purposes of this report, we have selected and defined a more precise term that will reflect the full spectrum of incidents. Relevant incidents were defined as **directed assaults** in which open-source reporting suggested they met the following four criteria:

- (a) The Target(s):
 - (1) The subject(s) selected a *specific* IHE Student(s), IHE Employee(s), or IHE Facility/Event(s) as a target (see Appendix A for definitions), or
 - (2) The subject(s) selected a *random* IHE Student(s), IHE Employee(s), or IHE Facility/Event(s) because the target’s characteristics matched the subject’s victim profile.²¹
- (b) Timing of Target Selection:
 - (1) The target(s) was selected *prior to the initiation of the assault*, or
 - (2) The target(s) was selected *at the time of the assault* based on a victim profile or the subject’s personal pre-existing relationship with the target(s) (e.g., roommates, friends, romantics).
- (c) Lethality of Assault: The subject(s) *employed or had the present ability to employ lethal force*.²²
- (d) Timeframe and Geographical Limitations:
 - (1) The incident occurred between *January 1, 1900²³ and December 31, 2008*,
 - (2) The incident occurred **on-campus, off-campus**, or in/around a **non-campus** facility (see additional criteria below; see Appendix A for definitions), and
 - (3) The incident occurred *within the United States*.

²⁰ The question of whether the affected IHEs were Title IV institutions or degree-granting was set aside for case identification purposes as the Title IV designation was not in effect until after the passage of *The Higher Education Act of 1965* and the accreditation status of particular schools evolved over time.

²¹ “Victim profile” is defined as a set of demographic or other perceived static traits that the subject(s) sought in selecting a target(s). Example: A subject goes to an IHE campus looking for a blond college-aged female to abduct and kill as part of a fantasy.

²² “Lethal” is defined as causing or capable of causing death. Crimes of a sexual nature were included only if the subject actually employed lethal physical force.

²³ Due to the limited availability of searchable media reporting prior to 1900, this year was selected as the start date.

For incidents that took place off-campus and involved two persons in a romantic, spousal, or co-habitant/roommate relationship, both the subject and the target must have been affiliated with the affected IHE, with at least one of their affiliations current.

In general, incidents that fell within any of the following areas were excluded: hazing, pranks, crimes primarily motivated by material gain, murder-for-hire schemes connected to a separate crime, incidents perpetrated by ideological groups or arising from general social disorder, low-level assaults on facilities with little to no capacity to cause injuries or fatalities, gang and drug-related violence, spontaneous altercations between strangers, and incidents with insufficient information to determine whether they met the inclusion criteria. These latter incidents included those in which either the subject was not identified in open-source reports or the case remained unsolved at the time the research was performed. Additionally, incidents involving serial killers who were not formerly or currently affiliated with the affected IHE were also excluded.

Methodology and Limitations

Incidents were identified from open-source reporting via a three-step process. First, lists of school-related incidents of violence available on the Internet and published documents were reviewed. Thirty-one incidents from these previously compiled lists and publications met the definition of a directed assault. Second, a complex search string was developed and applied to the Nexis “All English News Group.” Language used to describe the incidents identified in the first step served as the basis for the construction of this search string. Although news articles from 1970 through 2008 were reviewed, it is important to note that the media coverage contained in Nexis is sparse until the 1990s. After reviewing over 111,800 search results, an additional 198 incidents were identified that met the definition of a directed assault. Finally, a phrase-based search was executed in NewspaperArchive.com on available articles from 1759 through 1990. After screening over 3,600 search results, 43 additional incidents were identified that met criteria for inclusion. At the completion of this effort, it was determined that only those cases that took place from 1900 onward would be included due to the limitations of the press coverage prior to that year. The final sample consists of 272 incidents identified through this search process.

Data gathered for each incident included specific case information and qualitative observations. The specific case information fell within the categories of incident overview (e.g., date, location, type of IHE), incident specifics (e.g., site of attack, weapon used), subject descriptors (e.g., affiliation with IHE, gender, age), and incident outcome (e.g., injuries, deaths, judicial status). Data underwent a four-stage review process by a minimum of three researchers to verify the information gathered. Variables were created to capture the qualitative observations, which characterized the subject’s apparent motives and triggers, targeting, and pre-incident behaviors. Two researchers independently coded these variables following a prescribed protocol. When necessary, additional research was performed to fill in gaps or clarify points using the three resources named above, Lexis-Nexis federal and state case law databases, and open Internet searches.

As all information obtained about the incidents was limited to open-source materials, it is important to emphasize a few of the limitations inherent in using such data for behavioral research. First, since this sample only includes those incidents that were reported in the media, it

is possible that there were other directed assaults at IHEs that met the inclusion criteria during the same timeframe. Second, as the level of detail reported varied significantly across incidents, data collected was limited to what could reasonably be collected for each case. Finally, we recognize that media reporting often contains objective and subjective errors. While the former are factual or mechanical in nature, the latter involve errors in the meaning or interpretation of the events.²⁴ When challenged with conflicting reports across sources, consideration was given to a number of factors, including the apparent quality of reporting, timing of the reporting, location of the media outlet in relation to the incident, and the source cited in the report. No efforts were made to check the veracity of reporting against primary sources other than when legal documents were available in Lexis. Given these limitations, the reader is reminded that this undertaking is purely descriptive, and is not comparative or predictive.

²⁴ Singletary, M. (1980, January 25). *Accuracy in the news reporting: A review of the research* (No. 25). Washington, DC: ANPA News Research Center. Retrieved on January 8, 2010, from http://www.eric.ed.gov/ERICDocs/data/ericdocs2sql/content_storage_01/0000019b/80/32/9e/5b.pdf; and, Maier, S. (2002). Getting it Right? Not in 59 Percent of Stories. *Newspaper Research Journal*, 23 (1). Retrieved on January 8, 2010, from <http://www.questia.com>.

THE FINDINGS

Although the following results should be viewed in light of the limitations related to open-source reporting, this information does offer perspectives on the breadth and key aspects of the 272 incidents of targeted violence that serve as the basis for this report.

Where in the United States did the incidents occur?

Incidents were identified in 42 states and the District of Columbia, with 57 percent ($n = 155$) of the incidents affecting IHEs located in only 10 states,²⁵ eight of which are among the 10 states with the most IHEs.²⁶ The majority of the incidents affected IHEs designated as 4-year institutions (84 percent, $n = 228$), followed by 2-year institutions (14 percent, $n = 38$), postsecondary vocational/technical schools (1 percent, $n = 4$), and those institutions identified as post-graduate only (1 percent, $n = 2$).²⁷ In all, incidents affected 218 distinct campuses.

When did the incidents occur?

Targeted violence affecting IHEs is not a new phenomenon (see Table 3). The first incident identified that met criteria occurred on April 29, 1909. On this date, a subject, who was not affiliated with the affected IHE, fatally shot his former girlfriend, a student, on her college campus. He then killed himself. The target had reportedly refused the subject's marriage proposals. He had come to the college two to three days earlier to persuade the target to change her mind.

The majority of incidents occurred during the 1990s and 2000s. It is unknown what may have caused the increase in incidents identified during the past 20 years. However, consideration should be given to the increased enrollment levels at IHEs as well as the increase in media coverage and digital reporting throughout the United States over the past few decades.

Figure 1 shows the increase in fall student enrollment levels at postsecondary, degree-granting institutions from 1909 through 2009 (projected).²⁸ It also shows the number of incidents identified by decade from the 1900s through the 2000s. Generally, as enrollment levels increased over time, so did the number of reported incidents.

Table 3: Directed Assaults by Decade, 1900-2008

Decade	$N =$	%
1900s	1	0.4
1910s	0	0.0
1920s	3	1.1
1930s	8	2.9
1940s	1	0.4
1950s	13	4.8
1960s	19	7.0
1970s	25	9.2
1980s	40	14.7
1990s	79	29.0
2000s*	83	30.5
Total	272	100.0

* Data collected through 2008.


²⁵ From highest to lowest number of incidents, these 10 states are: California, New York, Texas, Florida, Michigan, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Indiana, and North Carolina.

²⁶ Table 266: Degree-granting institutions and branches, by type and control of institution and state or jurisdiction: 2007–08. Of note, looking at the media sources searched in Lexis-Nexis, the largest resource used in identifying incidents, the states with the most incidents coincided with the states with the most newspapers and wire services.

²⁷ Percentages may add up to more than 100 percent due to rounding.

²⁸ Table 3. Enrollment in educational institutions, by level and control of institution: Selected years, 1869-70. *The Digest*, p. 16.


Figure 1



*Data was collected through 2008 and projected for 2009 based on the average number of incidents observed per year from 2000 to 2008. Pearson ($r = 0.924$, $p < 0.000$) correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed).

Incidents also occurred throughout the calendar year ($n = 270$).²⁹ Figure 2 shows that although there was a decrease in the frequency, incidents happened even during the summer months.

Figure 2



²⁹ For two of the incidents, the months in which they occurred could not be determined from open-source reporting.

Where did the incidents occur in relation to the IHE?

It may initially seem as though only incidents occurring on-campus are relevant to understanding targeted violence that affects IHEs. However, such a view neglects the role of campus safety departments and campus threat assessment teams in securing the area surrounding the campus and assessing the threats posed by and to IHE students, faculty, and staff, regardless of whether the ultimate act of violence occurs within the confines of the campus boundaries. Thus, the current project aimed to identify incidents that could fall within the purview of a campus threat assessment. A majority of the incidents occurred on-campus (79 percent, $n = 214$), while approximately one-fifth (19 percent, $n = 52$) were off-campus. The remaining six incidents occurred either at non-campus³⁰ locations (1 percent, $n = 3$) or at undetermined sites (1 percent, $n = 3$).

Of those incidents that occurred at on-campus or non-campus sites ($n = 217$), similar numbers of incidents took place in residential buildings (28 percent, $n = 60$), parking lots or campus grounds (27 percent, $n = 58$), and administrative and/or academic buildings such as offices, classrooms, laboratories (26 percent, $n = 56$; see Table 4). In only 3 percent ($n = 6$) of the on/non-campus incidents did the subject move from the campus grounds or parking lots to buildings, move between buildings, or cause injuries and/or deaths in more than one location on campus. In addition to the Virginia Tech attack in 2007, two other examples in which subjects moved from one location or building to another are the following:

Table 4: On and Non-campus Directed Assaults, by Building, 1900-2008

Buildings	$n =$	%
IHE Residence	60	27.7
IHE Grounds & Parking Lots	58	26.7
Administrative or Academic	56	25.8
Student/Employee Services	22	10.1
Other/Undetermined	15	6.9
Multiple Facilities/Buildings	6	2.8
Total	217	100.0

On August 1, 1966, a 25-year-old student and former marine seized an observation tower on campus, killing and/or injuring several people on his way up the tower, then randomly fired a rifle at passersby for approximately 96 minutes. He was eventually shot by police. In the aftermath, 13 people were killed and 31 were wounded on the campus. The evening before the incident, the subject typed a final letter of explanation detailing his thoughts. He then went to his mother's home, choking and fatally stabbing her shortly after midnight. After writing another letter, which he left there, he returned home and fatally stabbed his wife as she slept. Penning notes to other family members, he prepared for his attack later that day.

On December 14, 1992, an 18-year-old student killed one professor, one student, and wounded four others in a random sweep across campus. The subject first approached a security-guard shack on the campus and shot the guard inside. Critically wounding him, he then fatally shot a professor, who was driving past. From there, he walked to the library where he fatally shot a student. He then entered a dormitory and resumed firing. He surrendered to police after his rifle jammed and he called 911, informing them that he was the shooter. Reportedly, the subject held views that were perceived as racist, homophobic and anti-Semitic by fellow students and was not adjusting well to the campus environment.

See Appendix B for descriptions of the remaining three incidents.

³⁰ See Appendix A for definition.

Of the incidents that occurred within an IHE owned/operated building ($n = 159$), over half of them took place in dorm rooms or apartments, offices, and instructional areas such as classrooms, lecture halls, or laboratories ($n = 90$, 57 percent; see Table 5).

Table 5: Directed Assaults within IHE Buildings, by Locale, 1900-2008

Locales	$n =$	%
Dorm Room or Apartment	48	30.2
Office(s)	22	13.8
Instructional Area	20	12.6
Non-specific/Other/Undetermined	16	10.1
Common Area	15	9.4
Hallway(s)/Stairwell(s)/Restroom(s)	15	9.4
Student Services Locales/Cafeteria	10	6.3
Multiple Locales within the Same Building	7	4.4
Multiple Facilities/Buildings	6	3.8
Total	159	100

Several subjects also carried out their attacks in multiple locales within the same building, moving from offices and classrooms to common areas, causing injuries and deaths at the different locales (4 percent, $n = 7$). One example includes the following:

On October 28, 2002, a 41-year-old student entered a college building shortly before 8:30 a.m., looking for three instructors. The subject fatally shot the first in her 2nd-floor office. He then fatally shot the second in a 4th-floor classroom in front of approximately 20 students, walked to the back of the classroom and shot his final victim. Soon after, he released the students and shot himself. The subject had been failing and had mailed a 22-page letter and other documents to a local media outlet. In his letter, he sketched his failed marriage, poor health, and the slights he perceived from the nursing school he claimed treated male students as "tokens."

See Appendix B for descriptions of remaining six incidents.

In turning to those incidents that occurred off-campus ($n = 52$), most took place at a private residence (75 percent, $n = 39$), while approximately one-fifth of the incidents occurred outside of a structure (e.g., on a sidewalk, in a parking lot; 19 percent, $n = 10$). Two examples of incidents that occurred off-campus include the following:


On December 11, 1949, a 24-year-old student strangled his girlfriend, a fellow student, after a fraternity party at an off-campus men's rooming house. Two months prior, a university psychiatrist had treated the subject for suicidal ideations and an impulse to kill said girlfriend.

On February 16, 2004, a 38-year-old former student who had worked for a psychology professor at a test center stalked her, went to her off-campus private residence, stabbed, and decapitated her. He then stripped off his clothing and ran in front of a truck on the highway, killing himself.

Who were the subjects?

Efforts were made to gather information regarding the subjects who carried out the attacks. The majority of incidents were perpetrated by one individual ($n = 270$) and, of those, most of the subjects were male (94 percent, $n = 254$).³¹ In the incidents where age was reported ($n = 260$), the range was 16 to 62, with an average age of 28 ($Mdn = 25$, mode = 20). See Figure 3 for a depiction of the number of incidents by subject age groups.

Figure 3



The Youngest Subject:

On October 10, 1993, a 16-year-old male who was not affiliated with the affected IHE, detonated a pipe bomb outside the dorm room of two black students. Though no injuries were reported, the building was "severely damaged" by the racially motivated attack. The subject, who had tried to join a white supremacist organization, had admitted responsibility to witnesses and vowed to shoot all the black students at the college.

One of the Two Oldest Subjects:

On October 13, 2008, a 62-year-old, part-time librarian fatally shot a fellow full-time librarian, allegedly after a dispute the previous night over "work ethics." After the shooting, the subject sat down and calmly waited for police.

Of note, among the cases there were three subjects who carried out multiple attacks on the same campus within a one to two month timeframe. An example includes the following incident:

Beginning in December 1991, a 35-year-old former student, who had graduated 6 years prior, carried out two sniper-style attacks on his old campus. On December 12, 1991, the subject fatally shot a janitor in an auditorium. Then on January 29, 1992, he shot and wounded a female graduate student as she waited in a building for her husband. It was during a third similar incident that the subject was killed by police. On February 10, 1992, the subject was shooting at a student housing complex near the campus. After a foot pursuit, the subject was killed by police. Though he had been rejected from the graduate program four years prior, the motive for the attacks was not clear.

See Appendix B for descriptions of the remaining two incidents.

³¹ In two cases, the incidents were perpetrated by more than one subject so individual-level data regarding the subjects in those incidents were not gathered.

What were the subjects' affiliations with the IHEs?

In addition to basic descriptive information, the subjects' affiliations with the affected IHEs were examined. A subject's primary affiliation with the IHE was designated as either a *direct* affiliation (e.g., current or former student or employee) or *indirect* affiliation (e.g., a spouse, other immediate family member, non-spouse intimate partner, or friend of a current IHE student or employee). In addition, if the subject was affiliated with the affected IHE in more than one way, the subject's primary affiliation was captured (e.g., a full-time student who worked part-time on-campus was designated as a student rather than an employee).

Of those cases in which this information was reported ($n = 268$),³² a majority of the subjects were identified as either current or former students at the affected IHE (60 percent, $n = 161$), while approximately one-tenth were current or former employees of the IHE (11 percent, $n = 29$). An additional 20 percent ($n = 53$) of the subjects were indirectly affiliated with the IHE through a personal relationship with a current IHE student and/or employee. In less than one-tenth of the cases (9 percent, $n = 25$), the subject had no known affiliation with the affected IHE. See Table 6 for additional information specific to each affiliation type.

Table 6: Characteristics and Casualties Listed by Subjects' IHE Affiliation

	Students (<i>n</i> = 161)	Employees (<i>n</i> = 29)	Indirectly Affiliated (<i>n</i> = 53)	No Known (<i>n</i> = 25)
<i>Gender</i>				
Male	93%	97%	96%	92%
Female	7%	3%	4%	8%
<i>Average Age</i>	25.5 (<i>n</i> = 157)	38.7 (<i>n</i> = 27)	29.9 (<i>n</i> = 51)	27.4 (<i>n</i> = 23)
Median	23	37	27	23
Mode	22	25 ^a	19 ^b	23
Range	17 to 62	18 to 62	18 to 55	16 to 51
<i>Status</i>				
Current	121	17	20	Not Applicable
Former	39	12	33	
Unknown	1	0	0	
<i>Affiliation Details</i>				
	Undergrad (62%) Graduate (18%) Alumni (8%) 2-year (6%) Voc/Technical (2%) Undetermined (5%)	Included range of positions, such as professors, librarians, security, janitorial, other.	60% (<i>n</i> = 32) current or former non-spouse intimate partners. 15% (<i>n</i> = 8) current or former spouses.	Not Applicable
<i>Casualties (excluding subjects)</i>				
Injuries	170	10	28	37
Deaths	193	27	37	22

^a Multiple modes exist, smallest value is shown in Table 6 (25, 36, 37, 45).

^b Multiple modes exist, smallest value is shown in Table 6 (19, 24).

³² Multiple subject cases and those involving subjects whose affiliation could not be determined were excluded resulting in a total n of 268.

What method of attack was used?

Firearms were used most often (54 percent, $n = 148$), followed by knives/bladed weapons (21 percent, $n = 57$), a combination of weapons/methods (10 percent, $n = 26$), and strangulation either manually or with an implement (5 percent, $n = 14$). Of those incidents in which a combination of methods was used, most targets were strangled and stabbed. The remaining 27 incidents (10 percent) involved a blunt object, firebomb/incendiary/arson, explosives, poison, a vehicle, or a physical assault without a weapon.

Whom did the subjects harm?

Across all 272 incidents, the subjects caused 281 deaths and injured 247 individuals. Of the deaths, at least 190 were students and at least 72 were employees. Of the injured, at least 144 were students and at least 35 were employees. Not included in these numbers are the subjects themselves who were injured or killed either during or following the incident. In 26 percent ($n = 71$) of the incidents, the subject died of a self-inflicted injury incurred during implementation of the assault or within hours or days of the incident. In 4 percent of the incidents ($n = 11$), the subject survived his self-inflicted injuries and in an additional 4 percent of the incidents ($n = 10$), the subject was killed by law enforcement during or immediately following the assault.

QUALITATIVE OBSERVATIONS

Key elements of a thorough threat assessment include such items as the subject's motive and goal in carrying out an attack, triggering life events, target selection, and/or prior concerning or threatening behavior. These elements are at times difficult to discern due to the availability of information and subjectivity of their interpretation. Information related to these elements is particularly difficult to gather from open-sources, which do not always contain complete and accurate reporting.

Efforts were made to gather as much information as possible to provide an initial description of the motives and triggers, targeting, and pre-incident behaviors of concern. When the information was reported, judgments were made as to its completeness and apparent accuracy. A more in-depth analysis of each of these elements would require additional data other than what is available through open-source.

What factors motivated or triggered the attacks?

Generally, several categories were observed among the incidents regarding the factors that may have played a role in the subjects' decision to carry out the directed assault. These factors fall broadly within areas related to personal relations, academic performance, workplace issues, and/or individual stressors (see Table 7; for definitions, see Appendix C). Although it was recognized that multiple factors may have motivated or triggered the offenders' violent acts, efforts were made to identify the most prominent ones and the incidents were categorized accordingly. In 17 percent ($n = 45$) of the cases, either the motivating and/or triggering factors were completely unknown or they were less apparent as various factors specific to the subject and his/her environment appeared to influence the decision to engage in the violent behavior. Those incidents in which the motive and/or trigger was not apparent were excluded from Table 7.

Table 7: Factors that Motivated or Triggered the Directed Assaults

Categories	<i>n</i> =	%
Related to an Intimate Relationship	77	33.9
Retaliation for Specific Action(s)	31	13.7
Refused Advances or Obsession with the Target	23	10.1
Response to Academic Stress/Failure	23	10.1
Acquaintance/Stranger Based Sexual Violence	22	9.7
Psychotic Actions	18	7.9
Workplace Dismissal/Sanction	14	6.2
Need to Kill / Specific Victimology	7	3.1
Draw Attention to Self/Issue(s)	7	3.1
Bias Related	5	2.2
Total	227	100

As noted in Table 7, the most prevalent category identified related to current or former personal relationships between the subject and victim, followed by retaliation for specific actions. Future research should examine primary source materials, which may offer more insight into the underlying motives and triggers related to these incidents.

How did target selection compare with the actual victims?

Regarding the subject's apparent targeting and scope of his or her victims, efforts were made to distinguish those subjects who had specific targets from those who did not, and then designate whether the actual victims who were injured or killed appeared to be the intended victims.

Various items were taken into account when determining targeting, including the subject, the setting in which the subject was functioning, the context of the situation with which he or she was faced (e.g., relationship breakup, academic or work suspension, imminent or actual academic failure, loss of job, or delusions), and the subject's relationship to the target (e.g., current or former intimate partner, co-worker, professor, classmate, stranger). Additionally, consideration was given to the subject's reported actions before, during, and after the attack. Specific examples of factors considered in the decision-making process include the following:

- indications of planning,
- method and manner of the attack,
- travel by the subject to a locale where a specific person's presence could reasonably be anticipated,
- apparent triggering event,
- admissions of intent or other communications by the subject reported before, during, and/or after the incident, and
- the nature of the subject's relationship with the victim(s) prior to the attack.

Targeting: Specifically Named Individuals

In nearly three-quarters of the incidents (73 percent, $n = 198$), subjects targeted one or more specifically named individuals. From context, their target selections appeared closely related to triggering events (e.g., romantic breakup, an academic or workplace failure, or a dispute), and, more often than not, were limited to the person or persons whom the subject may have blamed for causing the event. In a small fraction of these cases (2 percent, $n = 6$), there was also some indication that the subjects intended to harm one or more random persons beyond the individuals they blamed. An example of the latter situation includes the following incident:

On April 17, 1981, upset over failing grades and a possible second academic dismissal from the IHE, a 22-year-old student tossed a firebomb into the hallway of a dormitory and opened fire with a sawed-off shotgun as the occupants evacuated. Two students were killed. When police searched the subject's room, they found a gas mask, a second gun, and more than 100 shotgun shells as well as a notepad containing the name of one of the victims in the case. According to reports, this led police to believe that among the subject's random targets, there was at least one specific target whom the subject intended to harm.

In over three-quarters of the incidents where specific individuals were targeted, these individuals were the only ones harmed (79 percent, $n = 156$). In the remaining cases ($n = 42$), the casualties

included collateral victims³³ and/or victims of opportunity.³⁴ Examples of variations among these types of cases include:

Specific Individual Targeted and Additional Collateral Victim Harmed During the Incident:

On April 5, 1975, upset over failing his oral exam, a 25-year-old doctoral candidate shot and wounded an assistant professor from the review committee. The victim was sitting in a classroom with others who were waiting for a lecture to begin. Also wounded was a student bystander who came into the line of fire when he stood at the same time as the intended target. Reportedly, the subject had threatened the professor two days prior and a pistol was taken from him by campus police; however, he was not taken into custody at that time.

Specific Individual Targeted and Victim of Opportunity Killed During the Incident:

On December 17, 1983, at 11:30 p.m. on Saturday night, a 26-year-old subject who was not affiliated with the affected IHE, arrived at a dormitory to see his former girlfriend, a student, with whom he had become obsessed. When he arrived at her room, she reluctantly agreed to see him. When it became tense, the subject held the girlfriend, her roommate, and five others hostage using a silenced rifle. After the former girlfriend convinced him to release all but herself and her roommate, the subject fatally shot them both. He then drove off and shot himself in the head, but survived the wound.

Targeting: Random Individuals

In approximately one-fifth of the incidents (21 percent, $n = 58$), the subject's targeting appeared to be directed toward a single random individual or multiple random individuals. Examples of this type of targeting include the following:

Random Individual Targeted:

On May 17, 2001, a 55-year-old subject who was not affiliated with the affected IHE, fatally shot an assistant music professor on a walkway outside a dormitory. He then took his own life. According to a note left behind, the subject chose the victim at random. He had become obsessed with another professor on that campus whom he had dated briefly in 1966. Though he had had no contact with her for nearly three decades, in 1995 he began stalking her. Frustrated at being rebuffed, he decided to kill himself and take someone else with him. He hoped that person would be someone known to her. In the note he left, the subject wrote, "I considered multiple murder but realized it's pointless. I finally decided to murder just one person. Just one is sufficient to teach a lesson."

Multiple Random Individuals Targeted:

On September 26, 1977, distraught over pressures to perform from his parents, a 22-year-old student fatally shot his apartment manager, then grabbed a rifle and one of his handguns and went to the campus. He entered a typing lab in the Business Administration Building, then, in front of 30-40 students, fired off a few shots. One shot struck a teacher's aide. He then sought one of the fleeing

³³ "Collateral Victim" is defined as a person who was injured or killed during the execution of the attack and (a) was not specifically selected or contemplated in advance, and (b) whose actual harm was incidental during the execution of the attack.


³⁴ "Victim of Opportunity" is defined as a person who was injured or killed during the execution of the attack and (a) was not specifically selected or contemplated in advance, but (b) whose selection as an appropriate object of harm, consistent with the subject's apparent motive or goals, was made at the time of the incident.

students, placed the rifle to her head, and pulled the trigger, however the rifle jammed. He then went to another classroom and fatally shot himself.

What pre-incident behaviors were directed toward the targets?

Though information on the subjects' behaviors prior to the incidents was not always reported, efforts were made to identify whether the subjects engaged in verbal and/or written threats, stalking or harassing behaviors, and/or physically aggressive acts directed toward the targets prior to the incidents. In 29 percent ($n = 79$) of the incidents, subjects engaged in one or more of these actions directed toward the target. Figure 4 illustrates how these behaviors overlapped.

Figure 4



Verbal/Written Threats

In 35 incidents (13 percent), open-sources reported that the subjects made verbal and/or written threats to cause harm to the target. These threats were both veiled and direct, and were conveyed to the target or to a third party about the target. An example includes:

On April 12, 1982, a 28-year-old former student entered the office of a psychology professor and fatally shot him before eight witnesses. According to investigators, the victim was warned several times about the subject's threats on his life. IHE officials reported that the week prior to the attack, they had received a call from a psychiatrist who said he was treating a man who once took the victim's class and now wanted to kill the professor. The victim reportedly had discussed the threats with students during classroom lectures on fear.

Stalking/Harassment

Open-sources reported stalking or harassing behavior in 52 incidents (19 percent). These behaviors occurred within the context of a current or former romantic relationship or in academic and other non-romantic settings. They took on various forms, including written communications (conventional and electronic), telephonic contact, and harassment of the target and/or the target's friends/family. Subjects also followed, visited, or damaged property belonging to target(s) or their families prior to the attack. Examples include the following incidents:

On July 25, 1989, a 24-year-old subject who was not affiliated with the affected IHE, tracked down his former girlfriend who had moved to another state to avoid him, and confronted her in the IHE parking lot as she walked with a male friend. When she would not go with the subject, he shot and killed them both. The subject had hired a private detective agency to track her down and was able to obtain information on the victim through bank records and the IHE registrar.

On April 10, 1996, upset over losing his friendship with the victim, a 19-year-old student confronted his former friend on campus, fatally shot him in the back of the head, flipped him over with his foot and fired another shot into his chest. Months prior to the incident, the victim reported to IHE administrators that the subject had been harassing him by sending e-mails and calling numerous times. The subject, who had completed his degree requirements in December 1995, was told by administrators to stay away from the campus. On the day of the incident, in accordance with an agreement he made with the IHE, the subject had informed the dean of his intended presence on campus that day. The subject had completed his degree requirements and was awaiting graduation.

Physically Aggressive Acts

Open-sources reported that subjects engaged in physically aggressive acts toward the targets in 26 incidents (10 percent). These behaviors took the form of physical assaults, menacing actions with weapons, or repeated physical violence to intimate partners. An example includes:

On August 12, 1996, upset over his girlfriend (student) breaking up with him 10 days prior, a 27-year-old subject (not affiliated with the IHE) arranged to meet her on campus. Once there, he fatally shot her in the parking lot, then himself. Witnesses described that the subject had been physically and mentally abusive toward the victim during their one-year relationship. Just four months before this attack, the subject held a 13-inch blade to the victim's throat, tying her hands with a scarf, and threatening to kill her.

Did others observe concerning behaviors just prior to the incidents?

Information on whether the subjects engaged in concerning pre-incident behaviors was not always reported. Open-sources may report their presence, but rarely confirm their absence. With this in mind, attempts were made to explore any discernable behaviors that may have occurred just prior to the incidents and warranted concern by those surrounding the subjects. The behaviors noted are purely descriptive and should not be considered comparative or predictive.

Concerning behaviors were observed by friends, family, associates, professors, or law enforcement in 85 incidents (31 percent).³⁵ These behaviors included, but were not limited to: paranoid ideas, delusional statements, changes in personality or performance, disciplinary problems on campus, depressed mood, suicidal ideation, non-specific threats of violence, increased isolation, “odd” or “bizarre” behavior, and interest in or acquisition of weapons. Examples include the following:

On May 19, 1936, possibly upset over academic pressures, a 19-year-old freshman fatally shot one student and wounded another as the students entered his dorm room. He then killed himself. He had reportedly purchased two guns from a mail order house a few days earlier. When this was discovered, the subject was ordered to turn the weapons over to the dean, which he promised a student adviser he would do. The subject's father also stated his son's recent letters had been "strange and hard to understand." A classmate stated that the subject had been "telling us fellows for a week that he had been planning suicide."

On January 26, 1992, a 22-year-old campus police officer pulled over a nursing student whom he did not know, drove her to a deserted campus parking lot, removed her clothing and shot her 14 times. Prior to the incident, the subject was linked to other crimes, which were known to the IHE. He was suspected in a series of campus fires, firing a bullet through a dormitory window, inventing a break-in, calling a suspect at home, and phoning in a bomb threat.

In 29 percent ($n = 25$) of the incidents involving concerning behaviors, the offenders also exhibited one or more acts involving stalking/harassment, written/verbal threats, or physically aggressive acts toward the target.

In those cases in which concerning behaviors were not observed ($n = 187$), media reports described other significant criminal, violent, or mental health histories unrelated to the incident ($n = 14$, 8 percent). This included multiple criminal or violent acts, a series of psychiatric hospitalizations, and/or the presence of psychotic symptoms over an extended period of time. An example is:

On January 12, 1980, the 24-year-old student manager of the tennis team fatally stabbed a campus tennis star outside of the dorm. During trial it was revealed that the subject had been expelled from six schools due to behavior problems, saw at least a dozen mental health professionals, and spent time in at least six hospitals. In addition, witnesses described specific violent incidents, such as hitting a neighbor's son with a hammer, setting fire to his house, attacking a stranger on a train platform, and striking a co-worker over the head with a metal pipe.

³⁵ It should be noted that those persons who reported the concerning behaviors were not necessarily trained in the recognition of psychiatric or psychological symptoms.

CONSIDERATIONS

Campus threat assessment teams that seek to employ reasoned and effective risk mitigation strategies may recognize the potential significance of findings presented in this preliminary report.³⁶

General Observations

Several general observations concerning the data have relevance to the domain of threat assessment and threat management.

- Incidents of targeted violence are a year-round issue. Campus safety resources may be required throughout the calendar year, not just during the academic year.
- On-campus targeted violence is not the only challenge, as 20 percent of the incidents took place off-campus or in non-campus IHE locations against targeted IHE members. This suggests that communication between campus safety professionals and municipal law enforcement agencies is essential.
- Of those incidents that occurred at on-campus or non-campus sites ($n = 217$), 36 percent took place in administrative/academic/services buildings, 28 percent took place in residential buildings, and 27 percent took place in parking lots or campus grounds. On-campus mitigation plans should equally cover responses to IHE buildings, IHE operated residences, and IHE parking lots and grounds.
- Only 3 percent of on/non-campus attackers ($n = 217$) moved *between* buildings. Of those that were carried out *within* the same building ($n = 159$), only 4 percent of the attackers moved to different locales (e.g., classrooms, offices, hallways). Though much attention has been given to the phenomenon of the “traveling” attacker, in context, it actually is a rare event. This finding may have tactical and strategic ramifications for first responders and emergency management professionals.
- Firearms and knives/bladed weapons were used most frequently (75 percent) during the incidents. The remaining 25 percent of the incidents involved strangulation, blunt objects, poison, vehicles, explosives, incendiary/arson methods, or physical assaults without a weapon. Understanding the varied weapons used in these incidents may prompt investigators to look beyond whether a subject possesses or has access to a more traditional weapon (firearm or knife) when evaluating his or her risk.

³⁶ Before implementing a threat assessment model, IHEs should consult with legal counsel as they develop their threat assessment process, policies, and protocols. Specifically, legal counsel should be asked to review and consider relevant federal and state statutes about information sharing, e.g., the *Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA)*, as well as those concerning an IHE’s civil rights obligations (e.g., the *Civil Rights Act of 1964* and the *Rehabilitation Act of 1973*). More information can be found at: <http://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/index.html>.

Diversity of the Subject Population

A great deal of concern is given to conducting threat assessments of current students who may pose a threat of targeted violence. This level of concern is not entirely misplaced as current students represented 45 percent ($n = 121$) of the subjects in those incidents in which the subjects' affiliations were identified ($n = 268$). The violence documented in the remaining 55 percent of the cases included former students (15 percent), current and former employees (11 percent), subjects indirectly affiliated with the IHE (20 percent), and subjects with no known affiliation with the IHE (9 percent). The unique and open nature of most universities necessitates acknowledgement of the many diverse threats to campus safety. It is clear that focusing solely on the student attacker as a potential threat to campus safety ignores the fact that many IHEs are workplaces, residences, and communities that routinely host a wide range of activities that attract a variety of individuals, many of whom do not have any direct relationship to the college or university.

From a threat assessment perspective, the fact that 30 percent of the subjects were either unaffiliated or indirectly affiliated with the IHE through students or employees, three-quarters of whom were current or former spouses or intimate partners, challenges campus and law enforcement personnel to design a threat assessment capability that can also identify and assess threats that go beyond their student and employee populations. By establishing connections to community resources ahead of time, campus safety professionals may enhance their ability to prevent a threat from materializing that originated from an indirectly affiliated subject.

Additionally, although the average subject age was 28 ($n = 260$, $Mdn = 25$, $mode = 20$), these preliminary findings highlight the wide range of offenders' ages (16 to 62) and suggest the need for a flexible analysis and response protocol. As developmental issues and situational stressors change across a lifespan, standard practices should incorporate multidimensional risk factors germane to specific stages, from adolescence to mature adulthood. Similarly, IHEs traditionally host multi-ethnic, culturally diverse populations, further requiring contextually appropriate considerations. While this phase of the project did not address the ethnic backgrounds of the subjects, it is anticipated that the Department of Education and the FBI, in the next stages of this research, will highlight the need for IHE threat assessment teams to recognize and assess behaviors exhibited by a pool of individuals representing a broad range of ages, cultures, past life experiences, and current situational contexts.

Diversity of Criminal and Other Concerning Behaviors

IHE campuses essentially function as mini-societies that must deal with the same types of societal issues found in almost any city or town in the United States. Whether the setting is a more traditional campus with distinct boundaries, an urban campus that is interlaced within a larger community, or somewhere in between, most campuses must contend with their own social norms, economy and culture. IHEs must then establish an infrastructure capable of providing the necessary services, support and protection to students, staff, and others who may have contact with the IHE. Looking at the protection side alone, as a mini-society, IHEs must contend with the full range of crimes committed by or against its members.

All forms of targeted violence were found among the incidents. The identified incidents dealt with domestic violence, workplace violence, stalking and obsessions, sexual assaults resulting in homicide, individualistic stressors, subjects acting on delusional beliefs, as well as serial killers. Because of this diversity of crime, those responsible for threat assessment may need to build a program that is flexible and comprehensive enough to address all aspects of targeted violence. This may require university threat assessment teams to employ a wider breadth of resources that will educate and support them as they address the full range of targeted violence.

CONCLUSION

For this paper, researchers relied on open-source information to capture the nature and magnitude of violence affecting America's colleges and universities. Therefore, the observations and recommendations are necessarily limited, and readers should be cautious to avoid drawing broad-based conclusions. What is offered here, then, is not the end of the process, but a preliminary look at the scope of this issue. Several of the key elements explored included the attackers' intent with regard to target selection, interpersonal relationships, personal stressors, and triggering events. Each of these elements seemingly played a significant role in the offenders' decision to commit an act of violence. In nearly three-quarters of the captured incidents, the offender appeared to have targeted one or more specifically named individuals. Only in a small percentage of the cases was there some indication that random persons were also targeted along with specific individuals. Hence, understanding what leads an offender to exclusively target random individuals remains a complex and difficult challenge.

For years, colleges and universities have worked to address this challenge—to create safe campuses where academic and personal growth can flourish. In the wake of the Virginia Tech tragedy, many universities were confronted with the troubling reality that one person can, in a few brief moments, devastate a college community through an act of targeted violence. In the effort to thwart such individuals, IHEs have created threat assessment teams. These teams typically comprise representatives from various departments within the college or university, including academic affairs, student affairs, the IHE's general legal counsel, mental health services, and public safety. IHE threat assessment teams seek to thoroughly evaluate persons of concern who may pose a potential risk of violence and generally engage in a three-step process:

- Identify individuals, whose behavior causes concern or disruption on or off campus, affecting IHE members such as students, faculty, or other staff.
- Assess whether the identified individual possesses the intent and ability to carry out an attack against the IHE or members of the IHE community, and if the individual has taken any steps to prepare for the attack.
- Manage the threat posed by the individual, to include disrupting potential plans of attack, mitigating the risk, and implementing strategies to facilitate long-term resolution.

IHE threat assessment teams that perform this important function are routinely faced with several key issues during each evaluation: identifying the specific behaviors that are suggestive of an attack against persons affiliated with an IHE (including students, faculty, and staff); considering whether concerning, suicidal, or threatening behaviors are warning signs of a violent act; and fostering a secure environment while simultaneously promoting academic freedom and creative expression, and protecting student privacy.³⁷

³⁷ The threat assessment process is based on the premise that each situation should be viewed and assessed individually and guided by the facts. Judgments about an individual's risk of violence should be based upon an analysis of his/her behaviors and the context in which they occur. Blanket characterizations, demographic profiles, or stereotypes do not provide a reliable basis for making judgments of the threat posed by a particular individual.

With these challenges in mind, the participating agencies in this study have collaborated in an effort to further understand targeted violence at colleges and universities. The goal of this phase of research was to identify and examine incidents of targeted violence that have occurred at IHEs or against members of the IHE community. As the project enters into the next phase, the FBI and the Department of Education will thoroughly examine case files and investigative records from campus attacks in an effort to better serve the professionals who work to ensure campus safety. The next phase will include a more detailed examination of characteristics that were difficult or impossible to measure due to inadequate or missing information in the open-sources (e.g., mental illness, past behavior). The researchers are optimistic that by exploring violence against IHE students, faculty, and staff, some offenders can be identified prior to an attack and many lives can be saved.

APPENDIX A: IHE Definitions

IHE Campus/Facility: IHE grounds (e.g., areas between buildings, landscaped areas), parking lots, buildings (e.g., classroom buildings, dining halls, student unions, research centers, dormitories, fraternity/sorority houses, other university-sponsored student housing), and built venues (e.g., stadiums) that are owned, leased, operated, or reserved by the IHE for permanent or temporary use.

IHE Employee: Member of an IHE's faculty, staff (e.g., mental health counselors, building maintenance personnel, campus law enforcement, financial aid counselors, medical personnel), or administration (e.g., dean, president, provost, vice president), an IHE contractor, or an individual employed by an IHE contractor.

IHE Event: IHE sporting, ceremonial (e.g., graduation, award dinners), entertainment, and educational activities (e.g., student government meetings) sponsored or sanctioned by the IHE or an association affiliated with the IHE.

IHE Student: Individual enrolled in a college or university (e.g., undergraduate, graduate, full- and part-time). The student may still be enrolled at the IHE even though he or she is not registered for classes at the time of the incident.

Non-Campus: "Any building or property owned or controlled by a student organization that is officially recognized by the institution; or Any building or property owned or controlled by an institution that is used in direct support of, or in relation to, the institution's educational purposes, is frequently used by students, and is not within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area of the institution."³⁸ Examples include research facilities, university-owned hospitals, off-campus student housing facility owned by a third party that has a written contract with the institution to provide student housing, student residential facility owned or controlled by the institution, a publicly owned athletic stadium that is leased by the institution for its football games.

Off-Campus: All other buildings or facilities that may be used by IHE students or IHE employees for housing and/or recreation but are not officially associated with an IHE. Examples include privately leased apartments, privately owned residences, social clubs, or restaurants.

On-Campus: "Any building or property owned or controlled by an institution within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area and used by the institution in direct support of, or in a manner related to, the institution's educational purposes, including residence halls."³⁹ Sorority or fraternity houses that are located within the same reasonably contiguous geographic area of the institution are included as on-campus, even if they are not controlled or owned by the IHE.

³⁸ *Higher Education Act*, 34 C.F.R. 668.46(a).

³⁹ *Ibid.*

APPENDIX B: Additional Examples of Incidents

Subjects who moved from one location/building to another:

On August 12, 1986, a 29-year-old student went on a shooting rampage on campus, injuring four and fatally shooting one. The subject had purchased two guns out of state the day before. When he returned, he went straight to the campus laboratory where he fatally shot one of his intended targets, a lab technician with whom he had worked. He then ran to the campus financial aid office in a second building, where he shot and wounded three more people, including the financial aid director who was another intended target. After firing shots at campus officers behind the second building, he raced into a third building, where he shot and wounded a security officer. After being cornered on a stairwell, he eventually surrendered to police. The attack appeared to be related to a dispute over \$717 in financial aid. He reportedly was due to receive the funds beginning the next month.

On November 1, 1991, a 28-year-old former student opened fire in two different buildings on campus. The subject had received his doctoral degree the previous May. Months before the shooting, he wrote five letters explaining the reasons for his planned actions. Intended for news organizations, they stated that he was angry and jealous that his doctoral dissertation had not received a prestigious academic award and he was upset over perceived mistreatment and his inability to find work. The subject allegedly had specific targets that included his academic advisor, the chairman of his department, an assistant professor and his former roommate. After fatally shooting them in his department building, he then walked three blocks to another building and asked to see the assistant vice president for academic affairs. After fatally shooting her, he turned and wounded the student assistant seated there. He eventually fatally shot himself.

On March 24, 1999, a 25-year-old former student fired a gun in the Agricultural Building on campus, striking a door. The shot just missed two female students in the hallway by a few inches. Approximately 20 minutes later, the subject fired another shot at a student sitting in a courtyard on the same campus, striking the student in the left arm. Though media reports did not reveal a motive for the attacks, they did connect him to another shooting on another campus the following day. In that incident, the subject fired a shot in the hallway of a new academic building on a campus with which he had no known affiliation. The shot grazed the side of a female who was on campus visiting her father, a professor on that campus.

Subjects who moved between multiple locales within the same building:

On April 25, 1950, a 54-year-old professor went to the second floor office of the college president, fatally shooting him. He then went downstairs to the office department chair, the subject's immediate supervisor, and fatally shot him. The subject then returned home and killed himself. Investigators found the body and several notes. Reportedly, the subject suspected he would be fired but had not been officially informed. When the new college catalogue was issued on the morning of the incident, the subject saw that his name was not included after 24 years with the college.

On November 11, 1971, a 21-year-old non-affiliated subject entered a campus church with a rifle, pick ax, and a sledgehammer. When he encountered the caretaker, the subject fatally shot him in the back. He then used the sledgehammer to smash statues, pews, and windows. He then ran outside, randomly firing at passersby, injuring four. He was later killed by police at the scene. Following the shooting, the subject's father blamed LSD, stating that his son had become a religious fanatic, convinced that "Christ was an imposter."

On October 6, 1979, shortly after midnight, a 19-year-old student opened fire at a crowded fraternity party in a dorm, shooting five students. He then ran outside and shot two more students. In total, five students were injured, two were killed. His defense attorney blamed a "second personality" and brain damage from a car wreck as a child. The prosecutors stated that the subject had attended one of the fraternity's parties two weeks prior and was mad that his two-dollar cover charge was not refunded after police broke it up.

On May 4, 1983, a former employee (age not reported) entered a campus library, shot and wounded the director of libraries in his office. He then walked into an adjacent conference room with 20 people inside and fired two shots at his former supervisor, missing both times. After reloading his weapon in a restroom, he left the floor and headed to the main desk. Once there, he unloaded his weapon, put it down and waited for police. The subject had been fired from the library just three months prior after 19 years of service.

On January 16, 2002, a 43-year-old former student went to the offices of the college dean and a professor, fatally shooting them both. He then descended a stairway into a common area and opened fire on a crowd of students, killing one and wounding three others. Days before the shooting, faculty had informed the subject that they were dismissing him from the school due to his failing grades. Police said the shooting occurred after he arrived to protest his dismissal.

On May 9, 2003, at 4 p.m., a 62-year-old former student, who had also been employed by the IHE in the past, opened fire on the exterior of the business school building on campus. He then used a sledgehammer to smash his way through the entry. He reportedly fired hundreds of rounds of ammunition while he wandered the halls of the building. One student was fatally shot, while a professor and student were wounded. The subject was reportedly looking for a computer lab technician whom the subject had sued for hacking into his Web site and he wanted to punish the university for protecting him. The attack ended about 11 p.m. when officers shot and wounded the subject.

Subjects who carried out multiple attacks on the same campus within 1-2 months:

Starting in February 1982, four separate shootings took place on a college campus and were committed by a 32-year-old former student, later identified as a neo-Nazi serial killer. On February 1, the subject fatally shot a popular local pastor in a men's room in a classroom building on campus. Later, on August 9 and August 27, he shot at two employees also in restrooms located on campus, missing one and killing the other. Three days later, he fatally shot a 17-year-old student enrolled in a high school equivalency program at a bus stop in front of the campus. The subject was also connected to another sniper-style attack that took place off-campus

at a train station that June. The victim wounded in that attack was not affiliated with the affected IHE.

On August 31 and September 22, 1999, a 41-year-old unemployed funeral embalmer and father of two set off two pipe bombs in restrooms in administrative and classroom buildings on campus. Both explosions were accompanied within minutes by racist phone calls to a local TV station, and the last one included a warning that the two blasts were “just the beginning.” Though there was only minimal damage with no injuries, 400 students withdrew from the university in the aftermath. The subject was a former vending company employee who once had a delivery route at the campus and had serviced machines in the two buildings where the bombs were detonated. He also held a university-issued ID card for this job, and a former coworker told investigators he did not return it when he left the company in July 1999.

Examples of stalking or harassing behaviors exhibited by subjects prior to the incidents:

Acquaintance Harassment:

On November 29, 1992, a box of candy was received by a 26-year-old female student. The student did not eat the candy; rather, she turned it over to police. According to the authorities, the candy was spiked with thallium. The unmarked package was traced to a former student who had studied at the IHE from August 1990 to May 1991. The target had rejected the subject’s romantic advances and leveled verified charges of harassment against him, causing him to be removed from the IHE. The subject had sent a similar package to another female student in another state. In that case, the victim consumed the candy as did her roommates. The victim and three others were hospitalized. After the subject was identified, it was revealed that he had a history of stalking the second victim in their native country of Belgium.

Stranger-Based Stalking:

On January 13, 1998, a 27-year-old subject, not affiliated with the affected IHE, killed an IHE campus police officer after striking him more than 20 times with a hatchet. The officer had been sitting in his squad car doing paperwork at the time. Witnesses would later testify that the subject stalked the victim prior to the incident and repeatedly informed family and friends that he wanted to kill a cop.

Academic-Based Harassment:

On August 24, 2006, upset over his dismissal from a master's degree program, a 25-year-old former graduate student set four small fires at a professor’s home. The professor and his two teenage children escaped the home without injury and the fires were extinguished with minimal damage to the home. The subject was later captured in a wooded area nearby where he had tried to kill himself with a drug overdose. In October 2005, the victim had filed a complaint with the police department that the subject was making harassing phone calls to his home. Additionally, the subject had sent e-mails to his internship supervisor that were sufficiently "aggressive" in tone that a police officer was stationed outside her classroom for the last three classes the subject attended.

APPENDIX C: Definitions of Incident Categories

Acquaintance/Stranger-Based Sexual Violence—Directed assaults that included sexual violence between persons known or not known to each other, excluding those subjects and targets who were current or former intimates.

Bias Related—Directed assaults in which the subject appeared to be motivated by a bias against the target based on race/ethnicity, religion, or other characteristics.

Draw Attention to Self/Issue(s) —Directed assaults in which the subject’s actions were intended to draw attention to the subject, the subject’s actions, or a specific issue other than one based on bias.

Need to Kill/Specific Victimology—Directed assaults in which the subject appears to be motivated by a general need to kill or selection of a target that matches a victim profile (a set of demographic or other perceived static traits that the subject(s) sought in selecting a target).

Psychotic Actions⁴⁰—Directed assaults where the subject’s actions appeared to be as a result of delusions, paranoia or hallucinations.

Refused Advances or Obsession with the Target—Directed assaults in which the subject’s actions appeared to be a response to romantic or interpersonal rejection and there was no clear indication that the subject and the target had an intimate relationship. This also includes a subject who was obsessed with a target, of which the target was never aware.

Related to an Intimate Relationship—Directed assaults in which the subject retaliated against a current or former intimate partner (e.g., husband, wife, boyfriend, girlfriend) for any reason (e.g., breakup, divorce, affair, filing court papers). This could also include retaliation against a proxy for that intimate partner (e.g., the current partner, or mistress).

Response to Academic Stress/Failure—Directed assaults in which the subject’s actions appeared to be the products of academic stress, rejection or failure.

Retaliation for Specific Action(s) —Directed assaults in which the subject’s actions were in retaliation for a specific act (including statements) committed by or perceived to be committed by the target, but that does not meet the definition of the other options. The retaliatory attack could be directed toward a third party.

Undetermined—Open-source did not contain enough information to determine one clear motive or trigger for these incidents.

Workplace Dismissal/Sanction—Directed assaults in which the subject appeared to be responding to an impending or actual dismissal/suspension or forced resignation, or was retaliating for a past or present workplace legal action or other difficulty.

⁴⁰ For a discussion on “psychotic action” see Junginger, J. (1996). Psychosis and Violence: The Case for a Content Analysis of Psychotic Experience. *Schizophrenia Bulletin*, 22 (1), 91-103.



New York City Police Department

Active Shooter

*Recommendations and Analysis
for Risk Mitigation*

Raymond W. Kelly
Police Commissioner



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Part I: Introduction

Active shooter attacks are dynamic incidents that vary greatly from one attack to another. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines an active shooter as “an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.” In its definition, DHS notes that, “in most cases, active shooters use firearms(s) and there is no pattern or method to their selection of victims.” The New York City Police Department (NYPD) has limited this definition to include only those cases that spill beyond an intended victim to others.¹

The type of police response to an active shooter attack depends on the unique circumstances of the incident. In the event of such an attack, private security personnel should follow the instructions of the first-responders from the NYPD.

Because active shooter attacks are dynamic events, the NYPD cannot put forward a single set of best-practices for private security response to such incidents. However, the NYPD has compiled a list of recommendations for building security personnel to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The recommendations draw on previous studies of active shooter attacks and are presented in Part II.²

The NYPD developed these recommendations based on a close analysis of active shooter incidents from 1966 to 2010. This Compendium of cases, presented in the Appendix, includes 281 active shooter incidents. It is organized chronologically by type of facility targeted, including office buildings, open commercial areas, factories and warehouses, schools, and other settings.

The NYPD performed a statistical analysis on a subset of these cases to identify common characteristics among active shooter attacks. This analysis is presented in Part III and the underlying methodology is presented in Part IV. The analysis found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution.

¹ *E.g.*, a case of a grievance against an employer leads to an attack targeting not only the direct supervisor but also others in the workplace.

² U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond,” October 2008, http://www.lpinformation.com/Portals/0/DHS_ActiveShooter_FlipBook.pdf; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, “Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips,” 2008, www.ucpd.ucla.edu/2008/activeshootersafetytips.pdf; US Secret Service, U.S. Department of the Treasury, “The Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States,” May 2002, http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, “Workplace Violence; Issues in Response,” June 2002, <http://www.fbi.gov/publications/violence.pdf>; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, “Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery,” October 2001, http://hawaii.gov/ag/cpja/quicklinks/workplace_violence/WVfull.pdf; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, “Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees,” <http://www.doli.state.mn.us/WSC/PDF/WorkplaceViolencePreventionGuide.pdf>.

Part II: Recommendations

The NYPD compiled a list of recommendations to mitigate the risks from active shooter attacks. The NYPD developed these recommendations based on analysis of past active shooter incidents and careful review of previous studies.³ Unlike other works on active shooter attacks, this guide provides recommendations tailored to building security personnel. The NYPD organized its recommendations into three categories: procedures, systems, and training.

Procedures:

- Conduct a realistic security assessment to determine the facility's vulnerability to an active shooter attack.
- Identify multiple evacuation routes and practice evacuations under varying conditions; post evacuation routes in conspicuous locations throughout the facility; ensure that evacuation routes account for individuals with special needs and disabilities.
- Designate shelter locations with thick walls, solid doors with locks, minimal interior windows, first-aid emergency kits, communication devices, and duress alarms.
- Designate a point-of-contact with knowledge of the facility's security procedures and floor plan to liaise with police and other emergency agencies in the event of an attack.
- Incorporate an active shooter drill into the organization's emergency preparedness procedures.
- Vary security guards' patrols and patterns of operation.
- Limit access to blueprints, floor plans, and other documents containing sensitive security information, but make sure these documents are available to law enforcement responding to an incident.
- Establish a central command station for building security.

Systems:

- Put in place credential-based access control systems that provide accurate attendance reporting, limit unauthorized entry, and do not impede emergency egress.
- Put in place closed-circuit television systems that provide domain awareness of the entire facility and its perimeter; ensure that video feeds are viewable from a central command station.

³ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, "Active Shooter: How to Respond"; University of California Police Department, University of California at Los Angeles, "Your Response to an Active Shooter: Safety Tips"; Federal Bureau of Investigation, US Department of Justice, "Workplace Violence: Issues in Response"; Hawaii Workplace Violence Working Group Committee, "Workplace Violence: Prevention, Intervention and Recovery"; Department of Labor and Industry, State of Minnesota, "Workplace Violence Prevention: A Comprehensive Guide for Employers and Employees."

- Put in place communications infrastructure that allows for facility-wide, real-time messaging.
- Put in place elevator systems that may be controlled or locked down from a central command station.

Training:

- Train building occupants on response options outlined by the Department of Homeland Security in “Active Shooter: How to Respond” when an active shooter is in the vicinity:⁴
 - **Evacuate:** Building occupants should evacuate the facility if safe to do so; evacuees should leave behind their belongings, visualize their entire escape route before beginning to move, and avoid using elevators or escalators.
 - **Hide:** If evacuating the facility is not possible, building occupants should hide in a secure area (preferably a designated shelter location), lock the door, blockade the door with heavy furniture, cover all windows, turn off all lights, silence any electronic devices, lie on the floor, and remain silent.
 - **Take Action:** If neither evacuating the facility nor seeking shelter is possible, building occupants should attempt to disrupt and/or incapacitate the active shooter by throwing objects, using aggressive force, and yelling.
- Train building occupants to call 911 as soon as it is safe to do so.
- Train building occupants on how to respond when law enforcement arrives on scene: follow all official instructions, remain calm, keep hands empty and visible at all times, and avoid making sudden or alarming movements.

⁴ U.S. Department of Homeland Security, “Active Shooter: How to Respond.”

Part III: Analysis

The NYPD identified a subset of the active shooter cases included in the Compendium and ran statistical analyses of the data set (see Part IV for an explanation of the analytic methodology). This subset, called the “active shooter data set,” includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that were foiled before the attack occurred. In total, the active shooter data set includes 202 cases.

Although this analysis identified some common characteristics among active shooters, the NYPD found a large degree of variation among attacks across some broad categories, including: sex of the attacker, age of the attacker, number of attackers, planning tactics, targets, number of casualties, location of the attack, weapons used, and attack resolution.


Sex of Attacker

The NYPD’s analysis demonstrates that active shooters are an overwhelmingly male group. Only 8 out of 202 cases (4%) in the active shooter data set involved female attackers. Taking into account reporting biases (*i.e.*, the possibility that the relative rarity of female attackers leads to increased attention paid to those attacks), the actual percentage of female attackers may be even lower.

Age of Attacker

The NYPD’s analysis demonstrates that the median age of active shooters in the active shooter data set is 35. This median, however, conceals a more complicated, yet unsurprising distribution, depicted in Figure 1. The distribution of ages is bimodal, with a first peak for shootings at schools by 15-19 year-olds, and a second peak in non-school facilities by 35-44 year-olds.

Figure 1: Attacker Ages by Number of Attackers



Number of Attackers

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that 98% of active shooter incidents in the active shooter data set were carried out by a single attacker.

Planning Tactics


The NYPD's analysis demonstrates a broad range of tactical sophistication in the planning stage of active shooter attacks. Some active shooters do little to no planning and attack impulsively, while others do extensive planning, including pre-operational surveillance. A few active shooters even set up pre-planned defenses intended to trap victims and prolong their attacks, such as chaining doors and blocking entrances. Some attackers appear to have learned from previous active shooter incidents.

Targets

The NYPD organized relationships between attackers and victims in the active shooter data set into five categories: professional, academic, familial, other, and none.⁵

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that active shooters are often members of the communities they target. Figure 2 shows that the majority of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set occurred when the perpetrator had either a professional or academic relationship with at least one of the victims.⁶ However, 22% of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set occurred when the active shooter had no prior relationship to the victims, demonstrating that active shooter attacks can occur even without any prior altercation or grievance.

Figure 2: Attacker's Relationship to Victims



Moreover, of the 82 attacks that involved professional relationships, fewer than one-third were perpetrated by individuals who were no longer employed by the organization at the time of the attack, implying that the threat from active shooter attacks is not limited to

⁵ The NYPD categorized attacks against significant others and former significant others as "Other."

⁶ In cases in which the attacker had multiple victims, the NYPD determined the relationship classification based on the attacker's relationship to the "closest" victim. *E.g.*, In an active shooter incident in which an attacker shoots his spouse and his spouse's coworker, the relationship classification is "familial."

downsized employees. In fact, in many cases, active shooter attacks resulted from disagreements among current employees of the organization.

Number of Casualties


Determining the typical number of casualties in an active shooter attack is complex because the distribution of the number of deaths and woundings in the active shooter data set has a long tail.⁷ In other words, the active shooter data set includes a small number of attacks with a large number of casualties; these cases inflate the average. For this reason, the median is a better measure of the typical number of casualties than the average.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that the median number of deaths in cases included in the active shooter data set is 2, and the average is 3.0. The majority of attacks included in the active shooter data set resulted in 0 to 5 deaths. The median number of wounded is 2, and the average is 3.6.

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that the distribution of the number of wounded is similar to the distribution of the number of dead. The distributions differ slightly in that there are a few more attacks with large numbers of wounded than there are attacks with large numbers of dead.

Figure 3 shows the distributions of the number of attacks by casualty count for both dead and wounded. These distributions demonstrate that a typical active shooter attack results in 0-2 deaths and 0-2 wounded.

Figure 3: Casualty Counts by Number of Incidents



⁷ In this section, the NYPD only included deaths or woundings of victims (not attackers) in the casualty counts.

Location of Attack

The NYPD organized attack locations in the active shooter data set into five categories: office buildings, open commercial areas,⁸ schools, factories and warehouses, and other facilities.⁹

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that less than one-third of attacks included in the active shooter data set took place at schools; and roughly one-half occurred at commercial facilities, such as office buildings, factories and warehouses, and open commercial areas. Moreover, Table 1 shows that attacks at restricted commercial facilities, such as office buildings, factories, and warehouses, occurred more frequently than attacks at open commercial facilities, such as retail stores or restaurants.¹⁰

Table 1: Number of Incidents by Location

Location Type	Number of Incidents	Percentage
School	64	29%
Office Building	29	13%
Open Commercial	52	23%
Factory/Warehouse	30	13%
Other	49	22%
Total	224*	100%

* The 202 cases in the active shooter data set occurred at 224 locations because several attacks involved more than one location.

Weapons

The NYPD's analysis demonstrates that 36% of active shooter attacks in the active shooter data set involved more than one weapon. In some instances, one of the weapons was a close combat weapon, such as a knife. In one case, a single attacker carried seven weapons, including a rifle, two shotguns, and four handguns.

In several cases, the attackers used firearms that they had stolen from relatives or friends. This pattern was most apparent in school-related shootings where attackers stole weapons from parents.

Reporting on weapons involved in active shooter attacks is often inconsistent and inaccurate. For some attacks, news reports state the exact make and model of the firearm involved; for other attacks, reports do not include specific information on weapons. Moreover, reports often refer to semi-automatic rifles as "machine guns" or "assault weapons"; neither term is particularly descriptive, and often times both terms are inaccurate. Additionally, in some cases, the make and model of a weapon is not enough

⁸ The NYPD defines "Open Commercial" as commercial locations to which members of the public have open, unfettered access. *E.g.*, shopping malls, department stores, restaurants, etc.

⁹ Several of the cases included in the "Other" category occurred at: airports, medical centers, and religious facilities. The NYPD chose not to break these types of locations out into their own categories because the number of attacks at each type of location did not exceed a 5% threshold.

¹⁰ Classification of some events required analyst judgment.

information to fully decipher its capabilities, since aftermarket kits are available to convert certain firearms from semi-automatic to fully-automatic.

Attack Resolution

The NYPD organized attack resolutions in the active shooter data set into four categories: applied force, no applied force, suicide or attempted suicide, and attacker fled.

Table 2 shows that the vast majority of attacks in the active shooter data set ended violently, either by force applied by law enforcement, private security, bystanders, or the attackers themselves. Only 14% ended without applied force, such as by a negotiated surrender.

Table 2: Number of Incidents by Incident Resolution

Resolution	Number of Incidents	Percentage
Applied Force	93	46%
No Applied Force	28	14%
Suicide/Attempted Suicide	80	40%
Attacker Fled	1	<1%
Total	202	100%

Part IV: Analytic Methodology

The Compendium of active shooter incidents presented in the Appendix includes 281 cases: 244 attacks with at least one casualty, two attacks resulting in zero casualties, and 35 plots foiled in the planning stages. The incidents in the Compendium occurred between 1966 and December 31, 2010. The NYPD compiled these cases from internet news sources identified using online search. The NYPD did not use special-access government sources to compile the cases in the Compendium; all information is open-source and publicly available.

The NYPD included only those incidents carried out by attackers that met the DHS definition of an active shooter: an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area. The NYPD further restricted this definition to exclude: gang-related shootings, shootings that solely occurred in domestic settings, robberies, drive-by shootings, attacks that did not involve a firearm, and attacks categorized primarily as hostage-taking incidents.

The search technique used by the NYPD to identify the cases included in the Compendium had some limitations that resulted in sampling biases. First, since the NYPD gathered the data through an internet search, the Compendium has a strong sample bias towards recent incidents. For attacks that occurred between 2000 and 2010, the Compendium is nearly comprehensive. For attacks that occurred prior to 2000, the Compendium may not be comprehensive because the attacks pre-date widespread internet news reporting. Second, for incidents that occurred before 2000, the Compendium is biased towards attacks with higher dead and wounded counts, which tended to attract greater media attention and were thus easier to find in news reports.

To facilitate the quantitative analysis, the NYPD organized the information about each case into categories. Some incidents were difficult to classify and required analyst judgment to resolve. For all cases, the Compendium includes a footnote to the original source material that allows readers to obtain further detail or clarification.

Occasionally, multiple sources related to a single attack presented conflicting information about that attack. Generally, when the NYPD identified discrepancies between sources, the NYPD included the information presented in the more recent source; this is particularly relevant for the counts of dead and wounded, where later sources tend to be more accurate. In cases where the NYPD identified discrepancies between a government source and a news outlet, the NYPD included the information presented in the government source.

The NYPD prepared a subset of the Compendium cases suitable for quantitative analysis. The active shooter data set includes all cases in the Compendium, except: 1) those that occurred outside of the United States; 2) those that did not result in casualties of either victims or attackers; and 3) those that were foiled before the attack occurred. In total, the active shooter data set includes 202 cases.

The NYPD chose to restrict quantitative analysis to cases that took place within the United States because the NYPD limited its internet searches to English-language sites, creating a strong sampling bias against international incidents. Table 3 presents the number of cases in the Compendium by country.

Table 3: Number of Incidents by Country

Country	Number of Incidents	Country	Number of Incidents
U.S.	237	Denmark	1
Canada	8	Egypt	1
Germany	6	France	1
Australia	5	Greece	1
Israel	3	Italy	1
United Kingdom	4	The Netherlands	1
Finland	2	Slovakia	1
India	2	Somalia	1
Argentina	1	Sweden	1
Austria	1	Thailand	1
Bosnia	1	Yemen	1

The NYPD chose to restrict quantitative analysis to cases with one or more documented casualties to compensate for a strong sampling bias. Although the NYPD identified in the Compendium 35 foiled attacks and two attacks resulting in zero casualties, this portion of the Compendium is not comprehensive, given the comparatively limited amount of news coverage these attacks received.¹¹

Although it would be useful to comment on trends in the frequency of active shooter incidents, the NYPD determined that it is not possible to do so given the limitations of the active shooter data set. The sampling bias caused by using internet news as the primary source skews any observed patterns.

As a general rule, the ability to make generalizations regarding a group of events improves as the number of events in the sample increases. Accordingly, it is difficult to make precise statistical judgments with limited data. For this reason, many research questions that would have been interesting to investigate, such as the average number of deaths in active shooter incidents in each state, cannot be answered with this data set.

¹¹ Incidents in which the attacker was the only casualty may also suffer from limited news reporting, making this portion of the data set incomplete.

APPENDIX

COMPENDIUM OF ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS (1966-2010)

OFFICE BUILDINGS

Case #1

August 17, 2010: Patrick Sharp opened fire outside the Department of Public Safety in McKinney, Texas. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Sharp began his attack by setting his truck on fire to lure people out of the building. He then retreated across the street and fired 100 rounds of ammunition on employees standing outside the building. Sharp was unsuccessful in attempting to ignite the trailer attached to his truck, which was filled with explosives. Prior to the attack, Sharp made references to his plot on a social networking site and expressed his desire to kill people in correspondence with a Facebook friend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Department of Public Safety in McKinney, Texas
Attacker Information:	Patrick Gray Sharp (29/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun (12-gauge); handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Matthew Haag, Dallas Morning News, “‘I Enjoy Watching People Beg for their Life,’ McKinney Shooter Patrick Sharp told Facebook Friend,” August 19, 2010, <http://www.dallasnews.com/sharedcontent/dws/dn/latestnews/stories/081810dnmetmckinneyshoot.66e01f0d.html>.
2. CNN, “Heavily Armed Man Orchestrates Attack on Texas Police Building,” August 17, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-08-17/justice/texas.shooting_1_kowalski-public-safety-building-assault-rifle?_s=PM:CRIME.

Case #2

July 12, 2010: Robert Reza opened fire at Emcore Corporation, where he was formerly employed, killing two people and wounding four others, including his ex-girlfriend. Reza began his attack outside the office building and then later forced his way inside the facility. Reports state that the attack occurred after Reza and his ex-girlfriend were involved in a domestic dispute.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Emcore Corp in Albuquerque, New Mexico
Attacker Information:	Robert Reza (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Edecio Martinez, CBS News, "Emcore Shooter Robert Reza Kills Two, Self, Say Police," July 12, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20010291-504083.html.
2. Trip Jennings, The New Mexico Independent, "Two Women Killed by Shooter Monday were Victims of Chance, APD Chief Says" July 13, 2010, <http://newmexicoindependent.com/59273/two-women-killed-by-shooter-monday-were-victims-of-chance-apd-chief-says>.

Case #3

March 4, 2010: John Bedell opened fire on Pentagon police officers after an officer asked him for his credentials at the security checkpoint of the Pentagon's main entrance. Three guards returned fire and fatally wounded the gunman.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pentagon in Arlington County, Virginia
Attacker Information:	John Patrick Bedell, (36/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handguns (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Christian Davenport, Washington Post, "Officers who Shot Pentagon Gunman Recall Moments of Mayhem," March 9, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/08/AR2010030803897.html>.

Case #4

November 10, 2009: Robert Beiser opened fire in a drug-testing clinic where his wife was employed, killing her and injuring two of her co-workers. The attack came one week after Beiser's wife filed for divorce.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Legacy Metro Lab in Tualatin, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Robert Beiser (39/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 injured
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun; handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, KPTV, "Gunman Had Multiple Weapons, Police Say," November 10, 2009, <http://www.kptv.com/news/21575706/detail.html>.
2. Bill Oram, Oregonian, "Gunman Kills Estranged Wife at Tualatin Lab, Injures Two, Kills Self," November 10, 2009, http://www.oregonlive.com/tualatin/index.ssf/2009/11/police_responding_to_tualatin_shooting.html.

Case #5

November 6, 2009: Jason Rodriguez opened fire at his former workplace, killing one employee and wounding five others. The assailant surrendered at his mother's apartment after a two hour manhunt.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Reynolds, Smith & Hills in Orlando, Florida
Attacker Information:	Jason Rodriguez (40/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, Shaila Dewan, "Lawyer Cites Mental Illness in Orlando Shooting," November 7, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/08/us/08orlando.html?_r=2.
2. Orlando Sentinel, "Jason Rodriguez: Shooting at Downtown Orlando Office Building Leaves 5 Hurt, 1 Dead," November 6, 2009,

<http://www.orlandosentinel.com/news/crime/os-shooting-reported-downtown-orlando-20091106,0,2873337.story>.

Case #6

November 14, 2008: Jing Hua Wu opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people, including the CEO. Wu had been laid-off hours prior to the attack and returned to the office to request a meeting with company officials. Wu shot and killed all three victims during this meeting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	SiPort Company offices in Santa Clara, California
Attacker Information:	Jing Hua Wu (47/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Michael Harvey, Times Online, "Tech Engineer Kills Three Bosses at Silicon Valley Start-Up After Being Sacked," November 16, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article5167198.ece.

Case #7

October 4, 2007: John Ashley, a Baptist deacon, opened fire in a downtown law office, killing two people and injuring three others. Police shot and killed him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Giordano & Giordano Law Office in Alexandria, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	John Ashley (63/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Abbey Brown and Warren Hayes, USA Today, "Standoff at Louisiana Law Firm Leaves 3 Dead," October 5, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-10-05-louisiana-shooting_N.htm.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Louisiana Police Kill Gunman Who Killed 2, Wounded 3 in Law Office," October 5, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,299507,00.html>.

Case #8

August 30, 2007: Paulino Valenzuela, a terminated janitor, opened fire at his former workplace, killing his ex-supervisor and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	RiverBay Corporation in Bronx, New York
Attacker Information:	Paulino Valenzuela (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Nicole Bode, Kerry Burke and Tina Moore, New York Daily News, "Bronx Slay Suspect Paulino Valenzuela Claiming Self-Defense," September 3, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/09/03/2007-09-03_bronx_slay_suspect_paulino_valenzuela_cl-1.html.
2. WCBSTV.com, "Bronx Workplace Shooting Leaves 1 Dead, 2 Wounded," August 30, 2007, <http://wcbstv.com/topstories/shooting.the.bronx.2.246871.html>.

Case #9

April 9, 2007: Anthony LaCalamita opened fire at an accounting firm where he was formerly employed, killing one person and injuring two others. LaCalamita had been fired from the company prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Gordon Advisors in Troy, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Anthony LaCalamita (38/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Source:

1. Ellen Piligian and Libby Sandler, New York Times, "Shooting at Accounting Firm Leaves One Dead and 2 Hurt," April 10, 2007,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9B06EEDD153FF933A25757C0A9619C8B63>.

Case #10

February 13, 2007: Vincent J. Dortch opened fire in a conference room at the Naval Business Center, killing three business executives and wounding a fourth.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Philadelphia Naval Business Center in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information: Vincent J. Dortch (44/M)
Casualties: 3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons: 2
Weapon Information: Rifle (AK-47); handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Richard G. Jones, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 3 Members of Investment Firm and Himself," February 14, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/02/14/us/14board.html>.
2. Adam Taylor, Terri Sanginiti and Andrew Tangel, Delaware Online, "Bear Man Kills 3, Himself Over Deal Gone Bad,"
<http://www.delawareonline.com/article/20070214/NEWS/702140361/Bear-man-kills-3-himself-over-deal-gone-bad>.

Case #11

December 9, 2006: Joe Jackson opened fire at a law firm, killing three people and wounding one other. Jackson forced a security guard, at gunpoint, to take him to the 38th floor of the legal offices. He chained the office doors behind him. SWAT snipers fatally shot Jackson after a 45-minute standoff, during which he took a bystander hostage. Reports state that Jackson believed he had been cheated over an invention of a toilet designed for tractor-trailers.

Number of attack locations: 1

Location Information:	Wood, Phillips, Katz, Clark & Mortimer in Chicago, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Joseph Jackson (59/M)
Casualties:	3 dead, 1 wounded
Number of weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Revolver; knife; other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Chicago Tribune, "Deadly Pursuit," December 11, 2006, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2006-12-11/news/0612110299_1_joe-jackson-attorney-george-jackson.
2. Amy S. Clark, CBS News, "Shooting May Be Over 'Truck Toilet' Patent," December 9, 2006, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/12/08/national/main2243640.shtml?source=RSSattr=HOME_2243640.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Ill. Gunman Felt Cheated Over Invention," December 9, 2006, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/16114776/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.

Case #12

October 21, 2004: Pelayo Errasti opened fire at the Beltservice Corporation Headquarters, injuring one employee. Reports state that Errasti, who had been fired from the company a year prior to the attack, intended to shoot his former boss.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Beltservice Corporation Headquarters in Earth City, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Pelayo Errasti (48/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. St. Louis County Police, "Press Release: Warrants Issued on 48 Year Old Man Suspected of Office Shooting in Earth City," October 22, 2004, <http://www.co.st-louis.mo.us/scripts/PD/press/view.cfm?ViewMe=5255>.
2. Associated Press, Washington Post, "Nation in Brief," October 24, 2004, <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/access/721913001.html?FMT=ABS>

&FMTS=ABS:FT&date=Oct+24%2C+2004&author=&desc=NATION+IN+BRIEF.

Case #13

April 2, 2004: William Case opened fire at his workplace, killing his manager and wounding a co-worker. Reports state that Case had an argument with his manager about unemployment benefits prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Employment Security Commission office in Hendersonville, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	William Case (30/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. WRAL.com, "Hendersonville ESC Office Set to Reopen," April 8, 2004, <http://www.wral.com/news/local/story/1090411/>.

Case #14

February 2, 2004: Louis Darrell Kinyon opened fire at his workplace, killing his supervisor. He then attempted to commit suicide. The attack occurred one week after Kinyon was suspended for violating company policy.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Provo River Water Users Association in Pleasant Grove, Utah
Attacker Information:	Louis Darrell Kinyon (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted suicide

Sources:

1. Jesse Hyde Deseret, Deseret News, "'Gentle Giant' Loved Family," February 4, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20040204/ai_n11443709/.

2. Jesse Hyde Deseret, Deseret News, "Shooting Suspect is Offered a Plea Deal," April 12, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20050412/ai_n13593327/.

Case #15

February 25, 2003: Emanuel Burl Patterson opened fire at a temporary employment agency, killing four people and injuring another. Reports state Patterson had argued with people who were waiting in line prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Labor Ready Inc. in Huntsville, Alabama
Attacker Information:	Emanuel Burl Patterson (23/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Gunman Kills Four at Alabama Job Agency," February 26, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/26/us/gunman-kills-four-at-alabama-job-agency.html>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "Four Dead in Shooting in Ala., Gunman Surrenders," February 25, 2003, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2003-02-25-ala-shooting_x.htm.

Case #16

December 26, 2000: Michael McDermott opened fire at the Edgewater Technology firm, killing seven co-workers. At the end of his rampage, McDermott sat in the reception area and waited for law enforcement to arrive.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Edgewater Technology in Wakefield, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Michael McDermott (42/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); shotgun; handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Carey Goldberg, New York Times, "A Deadly Turn to a Normal Work Day," December 28, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/28/us/a-deadly-turn-to-a-normal-work-day.html>.
2. New York Times, "Man Convicted of Killing 7 Co-Workers," April 25, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/25/us/man-convicted-of-killing-7-co-workers.html>.

Case #17

November 2, 1999: Bryan Koji Uyesugi opened fire at a Xerox facility, killing his supervisor and six co-workers. Uyesugi fled in a van and was arrested after a five-hour standoff with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Xerox Engineering Systems in Iwilei, Hawaii
Attacker Information:	Bryan Uyesugi (40/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Jaymes K. Song, Star Bulletin, "7 Dead in Nimitz Hwy. Xerox Shooting," November 2, 1999, <http://archives.starbulletin.com/1999/11/02/news/story1.html>.

Case #18

August 5, 1999: Alan Eugene Miller opened fire at a heating and air conditioning firm, killing two co-workers. Miller then shot and killed his former supervisor at another company.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Ferguson Enterprises and Post Airgas offices in Pelham, Alabama
Attacker Information:	Alan Eugene Miller (34/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "Alabama Man Faces Murder Charges for Office Shooting Spree," August 5, 1999, <http://www-cgi.cnn.com/US/9908/05/alabama.shooting.03/>.

Case #19

July 29, 1999: Mark Barton opened fire at two brokerage offices, including one where he was formerly employed, killing nine people and wounding 12 others. Prior to the attack, Barton killed his wife and two children at their home with a hammer. Reports state that he had lost more than \$400,000 on his investments shortly before the attacks.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Momentum Securities and the All-Tech Investment Group in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Mark O. Barton (44/M)
Casualties:	9 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter and one .45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Kevin Sack, New York Times, "Shootings in Atlanta: The Overview," July 30, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/07/30/us/shootings-in-atlanta-the-overview-gunman-in-atlanta-slays-9-then-himself.html?scp=2&sq=Barton Shooting atlanta 1999&st=cse>.

Case #20

June 11, 1999: Joseph Brooks opened fire at his former psychiatrist's clinic, killing two people and injuring four others. Brooks then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Office of Dr. Bar-Levav in Southfield, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Joseph Brooks, Jr. (27/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Ex-Patient Kills Psychiatrist, Self," June 12, 1999, <http://articles.latimes.com/keyword/murder-suicides-michigan>.
2. Associated Press, Lundington Daily News, "Family, Friends Remember Slain Psychiatrist as Mentor, Teacher," June 14, 1999, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=110&dat=19990614&id=AdILAAAAIBAJ&sjid=0FUDAAAIBAJ&pg=4308,8035071>.

Case #21

March 18, 1999: Walter Shell opened fire at his ex-wife's lawyer's law offices, killing the lawyer and one of the lawyer's clients. Reports state that Shell was upset that the lawyer excluded him from his ex-wife's will days before she died.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Goodin Law Office in Johnson City, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Walter K. Shell (71/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. Becky Campbell, TimesNews.net, "DA Vows to Fight 'Tooth and Nail' to Keep Man Who Shot Johnson City Attorney, Judge Behind Bars," March 6, 2009, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9012237>.

Case #22

January 13, 1999: Di-Kieu Duy opened fire in the lobby of the KSL television station, wounding the building manager. Duy then shot an AT&T employee before being tackled by the victim's co-worker. Reports state that Duy, a diagnosed paranoid schizophrenic, believed she had been harassed by an employee of KSL-TV.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Triad Center Office building in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	De-Kieu Duy (24/F)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Leigh Dethman, Desert Morning News, "Woman in Triad Case Still Cannot be Tried," September 1, 2005, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20050901/ai_n15336865/.
2. Wendy Ogata, Desert News, "Infamous Shooting Incidents in Salt Lake County," January 14, 1999, <http://www.deseretnews.com/article/660195182/Infamous-shooting-incidents-in-Salt-Lake-County.html>.

Case #23

March 6, 1998: Matthew Beck opened fire at the Connecticut Lottery, killing four of his supervisors. Reports state that Beck was unhappy about his salary and his failure to earn a promotion prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connecticut Lottery headquarters in Newington, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Matthew Beck (35/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Jonathan Rabinovitz, New York Times, "Connecticut Lottery Worker Kills 4 Bosses, Then Himself," March 7, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/07/nyregion/rampage-connecticut-overview-connecticut-lottery-worker-kills-4-bosses-then.html>.

Case #24

July 19, 1995: Willie Woods opened fire at the C. Erwin Piper Technical Center in Los Angeles, killing four supervisors in their cubicles.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	C. Erwin Piper Technical Center in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Willie Woods (42/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (Glock, semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "9 Fatally Shot in California in 2 incidents over 2 Days," July 20, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/07/20/us/9-fatally-shot-in-california-in-2-incidents-over-2-days.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #25

December 2, 1993: Alan Winterbourne, an unemployed computer engineer, opened fire at a state unemployment center in Oxnard, killing four people and injuring four others. Winterbourne was fatally shot after he led responding officers on a car chase towards Ventura's unemployment center. Winterbourne concealed his weapons in a brown bag.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	California Employment Development Department in Oxnard and Ventura, California
Attacker Information:	Alan Winterbourne (33/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Handgun; shotgun; 2 rifles
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Julie Fields, Los Angeles Times, "Gunman Kills 4, Is Slain By Police," December 3, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-12-03/news/mn-63376_1_police-officers.

2. Seth Mydans, New York Times, "5 Die in Gunman's Rampage in 2 California Cities," December 3, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/03/us/5-die-in-gunman-s-rampage-in-2-california-cities.html?scp=1&sq=december%203,%201993%20winterbourne%20&st=cse>.
3. Tom Kiskien, Ventura County Star, "Shattered Lives," November 30, 2003, <http://www.vcstar.com/news/2003/Nov/30/shattered-lives/>.

Case #26

July 1, 1993: John Luigi Ferri opened fire at the Pettit & Martin law office, killing eight people and wounding six others. Reports state that Ferri was dissatisfied with the legal services he received.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pettit & Martin Law Offices in San Francisco, California
Attacker Information:	John Luigi Ferri (55/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (two semi-automatic TEC-9s and one .45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Robert Reinhold, New York Times, "Seeking Motive in the Killing of 8: Insane Ramblings Are Little Help," July 4, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/04/us/seeking-motive-in-the-killing-of-8-insane-ramblings-are-little-help.html>.
2. SFGate, Susan Sward, "101 California -- Legacy of Horror / Highrise Massacre Left Behind Change, Challenges," June 30, 1998, http://articles.sfgate.com/1998-06-30/news/17724389_1_response-system-police-chief-earl-sanders-assault-weapons.

Case #27

June 18, 1990: James Edward Pough opened fire at a General Motors Acceptance Corporation Office, killing nine people and wounding four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	General Motors Acceptance Corporation office in Jacksonville, Florida
Attacker Information:	James E. Pough (42/M)

Casualties:	9 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	June 19, 1990
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ronald Smothers, New York Times, "Florida Gunman kills 8 and Wounds 6 in office," June 18, 1990, <http://www.nytimes.com/1990/06/19/us/florida-gunman-kills-8-and-wounds-6-in-office.html?scp=1&sq=June%201990,%20General%20Motors%20shooting&st=cse>.
2. Ron Word, Associated Press, St. Petersburg Times, "10th GMAC Victim Dies," June 28, 1990, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=8-YNAAAAIABAJ&sjid=eXUDAAAAIABAJ&pg=7007,1942591&dq=james+edward+pough>.

Case #28

February 16, 1988: Richard Farley opened fire at his former workplace, killing seven people and injuring four others. Farley surrendered after a five-hour standoff with police officers. Reports state that prior to the attack, Farley was angry that a former co-worker rejected his advances. Farley was fired from the company in 1986 after threatening to kill that same co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Electromagnetic Systems Lab Corp. in Sunnyvale, California
Attacker Information:	Richard Farley (40/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	7
Weapon Information:	1 rifle; 2 shotguns; 4 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "California: Another Fatal Attraction," February 29, 1988, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,966785,00.html?promoid=googlep>.
2. National Institute for the Prevention of Workplace Violence, "An Obsession with Laura," <http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/20010406-19.htm>.

FOILED OFFICE BUILDING

Case #29

December 29, 2010: Five men were arrested for planning a shooting attack on the offices of Jyllands-Posten, the Danish newspaper that published satirical cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad in 2005.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jyllands-Posten in Copenhagen, Denmark
Attacker Information:	unknown (44/M); unknown (29/M); unknown (30/M); unknown (26/M); unknown (37/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun; handgun
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when authorities learned of the assailants' plans, following months of investigation.

Sources:

1. Jan M. Olsen, Washington Post, "Iraqi Suspect Says Unaware of Danish Terror Plot," December 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/31/AR2010123100657.html>.
2. J. David Goodman, New York Times, "Police Arrest 5 in Danish Terror Plot," December 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/30/world/europe/30denmark.html>.
3. Niclas Rolander and Paul Sonne, Wall Street Journal, "Alleged Terror Plot Foiled in Denmark," December 29, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203525404576049431521312142.html>.

OPEN COMMERCIAL

Case #30

August 30, 2010: Lubomir Harman opened fire in his neighbor's apartment, killing six people. Harman then left the apartment and indiscriminately opened fire on bystanders in the street, killing one person and wounding 15 others. Reports state that Harman may have been motivated by racism, as well as loud noise emanating from the neighbor's apartment.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Devinska Nova Ves District in Bratislava, Slovakia
Attacker Information:	Lubomir Harman (48/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 15 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns; submachine gun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Dan Bilefsky, New York Times, "Slovakia Stunned by Rampaging Gunman," August 30, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/31/world/europe/31slovak.html>.
2. Rafael Gurbisz, Washington Times, "Police: Slovak Shooter Angry Over Neighbors' Noise," August 31, 2010, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/31/police-slovak-shooter-angry-over-neighbors-noise/>.

Case #31

August 14, 2010: Riccardo McCray opened fire in a crowded restaurant, killing four people and injuring four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Grill in Buffalo, New York
Attacker Information:	Riccardo M. McCray (23/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Matt Gryta and Lou Michel, Buffalo News, "Grand Jury Indicts McCray in City Grill Killings; Bail Revoked," September 1, 2010, <http://www.buffalonews.com/city/article178208.ece>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Suspect in Deadly Buffalo, NY, Street Shooting Pleads Not Guilty to 4 Counts of Murder," August 26, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/26/suspect-deadly-buffalo-ny-street-shooting-pleads-guilty-counts-murder/>.

Case #32

June 6, 2010: Gerardo Regalado opened fire outside the restaurant where his estranged wife was employed, killing four people and injuring three others. Regalado fled the scene and was found dead several blocks away.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Yoyito Restaurant in Hialeah, Florida
Attacker Information:	Gerardo Regalado (38/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Caroline Black, CBS News, "Florida Man Kills Four Women in Restaurant Shooting," June 7, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20006983-504083.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
2. Christian Red, New York Daily News, "Former Yankees, Mets Pitcher Orlando 'El Duque' Hernandez "in shock" Over Half-Brother's Shootings," June 9, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/sports/baseball/yankees/2010/06/09/2010-06-09_shootings_put_duque_in_shock.html.
3. CBS4, "Hialeah Shooting Spree Survivor Recalls Crime," June 16, 2010, <http://cbs4.com/local/Hialeah.Restaurant.Masacre.2.1755823.html>.

Case #33

June 2, 2010: Derrick Bird opened fire during a three-hour shooting spree, killing 12 people and wounding 11 others. Bird began his attack by shooting his twin brother, family lawyer and three fellow taxi drivers. He then drove across Cumbria County, firing randomly at bystanders and occasionally pulling over to shoot more victims.

Number of Attack Locations:	6
Location Information:	Cumbria in England, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Derrick Bird (52/M)
Casualties:	12 dead; 11 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. John F. Burns, New York Times, "Cameron Rejects Rush to Tighten Gun Laws," June 3, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/04/world/europe/04britain.html>.
2. Alistair Macdonald and Paul Sonne, Wall Street Journal, "U.K. Mulls Tighter Gun-control Laws After Shootings," June 4, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704025304575284243009612802.html>.
3. James Tozer, Chris Brooke and Paul Sims, Daily Mail, "Timetable of Mass Murder: Derrick Bird's Slaughter in the Lake District Reconstructed," June 4, 2010, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1283579/CUMBRIA-SHOOTINGS-Derrick-Birds-killing-spree-moment-moment.html>.

Case #34

January 12, 2010: Jesse James Warren opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people and wounding two others. Warren was fired from the truck rental company several months prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Penske Truck Rental in Kennesaw, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Jesse James Warren (60/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Shane Blatt, Alexis Stevens and Ralph Ellis, Cobb County News, "Cobb Shooter Chose Victims at Random, Company Official Says," January 14, 2010, <http://www.ajc.com/news/cobb/cobb-shooter-chose-victims-273801.html>.
2. Jon Gillooly, Marietta Daily Journal, "Accused Penske Killer of 3 Enters Plea of Not Guilty," July 24, 2010,

- http://www.mdjonline.com/view/full_story/8869872/article-Accused-Penske-killer-of-3-enters-plea-of-not-guilty.
3. MyFoxAtlanta, "Man Pleads Not Guilty in Penske Shooting," July 23, 2010, http://www.myfoxatlanta.com/dpp/news/local_news/Penske-Shooting-Suspect-Due-in-Court-20100723-am-sd.

Case #35

November 29, 2009: Maurice Clemmons opened fire at a coffee shop, killing four uniformed Washington police officers who were working on their laptops. Clemmons was found and killed by a policeman following a two-day manhunt. Reports state that Clemmons had confided to a friend his plans to shoot police officers the night before his attack.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Forza Coffee Shop in Lakewood, Washington
Attacker Information:	Maurice Clemmons (37/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Seattle Times, "Lakewood Police Shooting Suspect Killed by Officer in South Seattle Early Today," December 1, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010393433_webarrest01m.html.
2. William Yardley, New York Times, "Tacoma Suspect Said to Threaten to Shoot Officers," November 30, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.html>.
3. Lewis Kamb, News Tribune, "Clemmons' Last Days: A Timeline of Tragedy," December 3, 2009, <http://www.thenewstribune.com/2009/12/02/v-printerfriendly/977113/clemmons-last-days-a-timeline.html>.

Case #36

November 20, 2009: Li Zhong Ren opened fire at a shooting range where he was employed, killing two adults and two children. Ren then drove to a park where he opened fire on a group of Korean tourists. Ren had left several suicide notes prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
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Location Information:	Kannat Tabla and Last Command Post Park in Saipan, Northern Mariana Islands
Attacker Information:	Li Zhong Ren (42/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 6-9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 Rifles (.223-caliber and .22-caliber Magnum); shotgun (.410-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Police Identify Gunman in Saipan Rampage," November 22, 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/11/22/world/main5735021.shtml>.
2. Ferdie de la Torre, Saipan Tribune, "Gunman Fired Guns More Than 40 Times," November 26, 2009, <http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=95381&cat=1>.
3. Ferdie de la Torre, Saipan Tribune, "Shooting Rampage Stuns CNMI," <http://www.saipantribune.com/newsstory.aspx?newsID=96206&cat=1>.

Case #37

November 8, 2009: Richard Moreau opened fire in a bar, killing one customer and injuring three others. Reports state that Moreau got into an argument inside the bar and was escorted out by employees prior to the attack.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Sandbar Sports Grill in West Vail, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Richard Moreau (63/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Washington Times, "Suspect in Vail Bar Shooting Faces Murder Charge," November 9, 2009, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2009/nov/9/suspect-vail-bar-shooting-faces-murder-charge/print/>.
2. Beth Potter, Denver Post, "One dead in Vail Bar Shooting; Suspect Jailed," November 8, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_13743040.

3. Huffington Post, “Ricahrd Moreau Murder Charges: Vail Bar Killer May Have Had PTSD,” November 8, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/11/09/richard-moreau-murder-cha_n_350920.html.

Case #38

August 4, 2009: George Sodini opened fire on a L.A. Fitness dance class, killing three women and injured nine others. Reports state that Sodini was angry about being disrespected by women.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	L.A. Fitness in Collier Township, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	George Sodini (48/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (two 9-millimeter semi-automatic, one .45-caliber semi-automatic revolver, and one .32-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CTV.ca, “Gunman in Health Club Shooting a 48-Year-Old Loner,” August 5, 2009,
http://www.ctv.ca/servlet/ArticleNews/story/CTVNews/20090805/health_club_090805/20090805?hub=World.
2. Lee Ferran, Chris Cuomo, Sarah Netter, Lindsay Goldwert, ABC News, “Pa. Gunman ‘Hell-Bent’ on Killings, Had 4 Guns,” August 5, 2009,
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=8255530&page=1>.

Case #39

September 9, 2009: Todd Buchanan opened fire at a bar, wounding three people. Reports state that Buchanan was involved in a fight at the bar and was ejected prior to the attack. He was arrested in his home several hours after the shooting.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Independent Bar in Orlando, Florida
Attacker Information:	Todd Garland Buchanan (29/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Walter Pacheco, Orlando Sentinel, "Naked Man Arrested After Shooting at Bar," September 10, 2009, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2009-09-10/news/0909100010_1_downtown-orlando-buchanan-orlando-man.
2. WFTV, "Accused Orlando Bar Gunman Denied Bond," September 10, 2009, <http://www.wftv.com/news/20835174/detail.html>.
3. WFTV, "Suspect Arrested in Shooting at Downtown Orlando Club," September 9, 2009, <http://www.wftv.com/news/20807598/detail.html>.

Case #40

July 24, 2009: An unknown assailant opened fire at a nightclub, killing one employee and wounding two others. Reports state that the assailant had been ejected from the club following a disturbance prior to the attack. The gunman fled the scene.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Club LT Tranz in North Houston, Texas
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attacker fled

Sources:

1. ABC News, "Nightclub Employee Killed in Shooting," July 25, 2009, <http://abclocal.go.com/ktrk/story?section=news/local&id=6932947>.
Alexander Supgul, MyFox, "Images from Night of Deadly Club Shooting," July 29, 2009, http://www.myfoxhouston.com/dpp/news/local/090729_pasadena_shooting_convenience.

Case #41

June 10, 2009: James W. Von Brunn opened fire at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, killing a security guard. Reports state that von Brunn was a white supremacist.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	United States Holocaust Memorial Museum in Washington, D.C.
Attacker Information:	James W. von Brunn, (88/M)
Casualties:	1 dead
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. David Stout, New York Times, "Museum Gunman a Longtime Foe of Government," June 10, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/11/us/11shoot.html?_r=1.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Guard Dies After Holocaust Museum Shooting," June 10, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/31208188/>.

Case #42

May 30, 2009: Marcus J. Blanton opened fire at a strip club, killing one person and injuring four others. Blanton stabbed a sixth person before he was arrested on scene.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Club 418 in Springfield, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Marcus J. Blanton (24/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 4 wounded
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun; knife
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. John M. Guilfoil, Boston Globe, "One Dead, Several Injured in Springfield Strip Club Rampage," May 30, 2009, http://www.boston.com/news/local/breaking_news/2009/05/one_death_sever.html.

Case #43

April 3, 2009: Jiverly Wong, a naturalized immigrant, opened fire at the American Civic Association Immigration Center in Binghamton, killing 13 people and injuring four others. Wong had been taking English classes at the Center prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	American Civic Association Immigration Center in Binghamton, New York
Attacker Information:	Jiverly Wong (41/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter and one .45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Richard Esposito et al., ABC News “Binghamton Rampage Leaves 14 Dead, Police Don’t Know Motive,” April 3, 2009, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=7249853&page=1>.
2. Ray Rivera and Nate Schweber, New York Times, “Before Killings, Hints of Plans and Grievance,” April 4, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/05/nyregion/05suspect.html>.

Case #44

March 24, 2009: Lonnie Glasco, a veteran Metropolitan Transit System employee, opened fire at a bus depot complex, killing one co-worker and injuring another.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Metropolitan Transit System in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Lonnie Glasco (47/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 magnum)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Tony Perry, Los Angeles Times, “Man Shoots 2 Co-workers; 1 dies,” March 25, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/25/local/me-briefs25.S2>.

2. R. Stickney and Monica Dean, NBC San Diego, "MTS Shooter, Victim Identified," March 24, 2009, www.nbcsandiego.com/.../2-Shot-in-MTS-Workplace-Shooting.html.
3. San Diego10News, "Motive Remains Mystery in Bus Depot Shooting," March 25, 2009, <http://www.10news.com/news/19015034/detail.html>.

Case #45

February 24, 2009: An unknown gunman indiscriminately opened fire at a Mardi Gras parade, wounding seven people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Charles Ave. in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/unknown)
Casualties:	0 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter semi-automatic and one .40-caliber); revolver
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Corey Dade, Wall Street Journal, "Mardi Gras Revives, but Shooting Scars Party," February 25, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123551171997163137.html>.
2. United States of America v. Mark Brooks. 10-212. U.S. District Court Eastern District of Louisiana, http://www.justice.gov/usao/lae/press/2010/downloads/factual_basis_mark_brooks.pdf.
3. Gwen Filosa, Times-Picayune, "Jury Frees 19-year-old New Orleans Man of 2009 Mardi Gras Parade Shooting Charge," August 26, 2010, <http://nola.live.advance.net/news/t-p/neworleans/index.ssf?/base/news-15/1282890635287520.xml&coll=1>.
4. Gwen Filosa, Times-Picayune, "Prosecutors Work to Keep Cases Touched by Danziger Bridge Investigation on Track," April 08, 2010, http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2010/04/prosecutors_work_to_keep_cases.html

Case #46

January 24, 2009: Erik Salvador Ayala opened fire outside a nightclub, killing two people and injuring 7 others.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	The Zone in Portland, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Erik Salvador Ayala (24/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 injured
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Steve Miletich, Seattle Times, "Washington Exchange Student From Peru Among Portland Shooter's Victims," January 26, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/localnews/2008670663_whitesalmon26m.html.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Gunman in Portland, Oregon Shooting Spree Dies," January 27, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28882699/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.

Case #47

November 26, 2008: 10 militants launched a series of coordinated shooting and bombing attacks throughout Mumbai, killing 188 people and wounding 372 others. The attackers were trained in Pakistan by the Islamic terrorist group, Lashkar-e-Taiba. Nine of the assailants were killed during the standoff with law enforcement.

Number of Attack Locations:	10
Location Information:	Cama Hospital; Rail Terminus; Leopold Café; Mumbai Chabad House; Oberoi Trident Hotel; Taj Mahal Hotel in Mumbai
Attacker Information:	Ajmal Kasab (21/M); Ismail Khan (25/M); Hafiz Arshad (23/M); Javed (22/M); Shoaib (21/M); Nazir (28/M); Nasr (23/M); Babr Imran (25/M); Abdul Rahman (21/M); Fahad Ullah (23/M)
Casualties:	188 dead; 372 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter); 2 rifles (one AK-47 and one AK-56)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	November 29, 2008
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Jeremy Kahn and Robert F. Worth, New York Times, "Mumbai Attackers Called Part of Larger Band of Recruits," December 9, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/10/world/asia/10mumbai.html>.
2. China Daily, "India Charges Mumbai Gunman with Murder," February 25, 2009, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-02/25/content_7513194.htm.

Case #48

March 12, 2008: Robert Lanham opened fire at the bank where his ex-wife worked, killing her, a customer and a bank manager. Reports state that Lanham was distraught over his recent divorce.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Regions Bank in McComb, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Robert Lanham (35/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun/ (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. McComb-Enterprise Journal, "Four, Including Gunman, Killed in Bank Shooting," March 12, 2008, <http://www.enterprise-journal.com/articles/2008/03/12/news/01.txt>.

Case #49

March 3, 2008: Alburn Edward Blake opened fire in a Wendy's restaurant, killing a paramedic and wounding five other people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Wendy's in West Palm Beach, Florida
Attacker Information:	Alburn Blake (60/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Times Online, "Police Baffled by Mystery of Gunman Who Shot Dead Firefighter at Wendy's," March 4, 2008,
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article3482368.ece.

Case #50

December 5, 2007: Robert Hawkins opened fire at an Omaha mall, killing eight people and wounding 5 others. Reports state that Hawkins was angry about losing his job and breaking up with his girlfriend prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Westroads Mall in Omaha, Nebraska
Attacker Information:	Robert Hawkins (19/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Teen's Downward Spiral Ends in Gunfire, Death," December 6, 2007,
<http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22116784//;http://www.kptm.com/Global/story.asp?S=7457887>.
2. CNN, "Police: Nine Killed in Shooting at Omaha Mall, Including Gunman," December 6, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/05/mall.shooting/>.
3. Associated Press, CBS News, "Omaha Mall, Scene of Mass Killing, Reopens," December 8, 2007,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/08/national/main3594414.shtml>.

Case #51

April 30, 2007: David Logsdon opened fire at a crowded Target parking lot, killing two people and wounding seven others. Logsdon was fatally shot by police following the attack. Reports state that Logsdon was unhappy over his termination from the Target store prior to the attack. Police believe the gunman was also responsible for the death of his neighbor earlier that day.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ward Parkway Shopping Center in Kansas City, Missouri

Attacker Information:	David W. Logsdon (51/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 handguns; rifle (.30-caliber carbine)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Kansas City Mall Shooter Disgruntled Over Denied Security Job License," April 30, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,269215,00.html>.
2. KMBC, "Police: Gunman Wanted to Cause Havoc at Mall," April 30, 2007, <http://www.kmbc.com/r/13220624/detail.html>.
3. The Estate of Luke A. Nilges, Joann Nilges, and Wayna Nilges v. Shawnee Gun Shop, Kansas State Court of Appeals, 103, 175. <http://www.kscourts.org/Cases-and-Opinions/opinions/CtApp/2010/20101105/103175.pdf>.

Case #52

February 12, 2007: Sulejman Talovic opened fire at Trolley Square Mall, killing five bystanders and wounding four others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Trolley Square Mall in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	Sulejman Talovic (18/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Sean Alfano, CBS News, "Police: Off-Duty Cop Saved Lives in Mall," February 13, 2007, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/02/13/national/main2466711.shtml>.
2. Martin Stolz, New York Times, "After a Rampage, Trying to Grasp What Led a Son to Kill," February 20, 2007, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9802E2DE123EF933A15751C0A9619C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.

Case #53

April 18, 2006: Herbert Chalmers Jr. opened fire at his workplace, killing two people and wounding another. Chalmers launched his attack shortly after raping an ex-girlfriend and killing the mother of his child at separate locations.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Finneger's Catering in St. Louis, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Herbert Chambers Jr. (55/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Man Kills Woman, 2 Others," April 18, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12375826/from/RSS/>.
2. New York Times, "National Briefing, Midwest: Missouri: Another Victim in Shooting Rampage," April 22, 2008, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE2D9153FF931A15757C0A9609C8B63>.
3. Jeremy Kohler, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, "I Could Have Stopped Them," April 20, 2006, <http://www.newnation.vg/forums/showthread.php?t=40370>

Case #54

April 4, 2006: Grant Gallaher opened fire in the Baker City Post Office parking lot, killing his supervisor after initially striking him with his vehicle. Gallaher also intended to kill his postmaster. Reports state that Gallaher was upset about his supervisor's decision to add extra work to his delivery route.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Baker City Post Office in Baker City, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Grant Gallaher (41/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. Chris Collins, Baker City Herald, "Shooting Car Was Allegedly Suspect's Last Act," April 7, 2006, <http://www.bakercityherald.com/Local-News/Shooting-car-was-allegedly-suspect-s-last-act>.

Case #55

February 13, 2005: Robert Bonelli opened fire at the Hudson Valley Mall, wounding two people. He was tackled by mall employees when he ran out of ammunition.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hudson Valley Mall, Kingston, New York
Attacker Information:	Robert Bonelli (26/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Mid-Hudson News, "Bonelli to Appear in Court," March 15, 2006, http://www.midhudsonnews.com/News/Archive/Bonelli_ct-15Mar06.htm.
2. CNN, "Shooter Wounds Two at New York Mall," February 13, 2005, <http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/02/13/mall.shooting/>.

Case #56

December 8, 2004: Nathan Gale, a former marine, opened fire at a nightclub, killing four people and wounding two others. Gale was shot by responding police officers after taking a hostage behind the stage.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alrosa Villa in Columbus, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Nathan Gale (25/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter Beretta)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rick Lyman and Albert Salvato, New York Times, "After a Concert Shooting, a Who but Not a Why," December 10, 2004,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9400EEDE1131F933A25751C1A9629C8B63&sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>.
2. John Esterbrook, CBS News, "Inside the Mind of a Killer," December 10, 2004,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/12/14/national/main661127.shtml>.

Case #57

November 18, 2004: Justin Cudar opened fire in a Radioshack store, killing two people and wounding another. Cudar was being investigated for a road-rage incident and managed to evade police prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Radioshack in St. Petersburg, Florida
Attacker Information:	Justin Cudar (25/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Jamie Thompson and Carrie Johnson, St. Petersburg Times, "Gunman Kills Two, Self at Gateway Mall," November 19, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/19/Tampabay/Gunman_kills_two__sel.shtml.
2. Jamie Thompson and Carrie Johnson, St. Petersburg Times, "Shooting is Last Act of a Traumatic, Violent Life," November 20, 2004,
http://www.sptimes.com/2004/11/20/Southpinellas/Shooting_is_last_act_.shtml.

Case #58

August 29, 2003: Thomas Edgar Harrison opened fire at his ex-girlfriend's workplace, killing one employee. Harrison was initially denied access to the workplace but returned shortly thereafter and began his attack. He engaged in an hour-long standoff with a SWAT team before committing suicide. Prior to the attack, Harrison raped and kidnapped his ex-girlfriend, who was then issued an order of protection against him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Electric Picture Co. in Nashville, Tennessee

Attacker Information:	Thomas Edgar Harrison (43/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	August 30, 2003
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Two Dead in Tennessee Store Shooting," August 30, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/aug/30/nation/na-shooting30>.
2. Seattle Times, "Man Kills Shop Owner, Self in Pursuit of Ex-Girlfriend," August 31, 2003, <http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=20030831&slug=ndig31>.

Case #59

July 28, 2003: Andres Casarrubias opened fire at the nursery where his estranged wife worked, killing two employees, including his wife, and injuring another. Reports state that Casarrubias believed his wife was having an affair with a co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Gold Leaf Nursery in Boynton Beach, Florida
Attacker Information:	Andres Casarrubias (44/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. WPBF.com, "Man Shoots Estranged Wife, Co-Worker at Garden Center," July 29, 2003, <http://www.wpbfl.com/news/2363718/detail.html>.

Case #60

July 23, 2003: Ron Thomas opened fire at the Century 21 real estate office where he was employed, killing two people and wounding another. Thomas committed suicide after engaging the police in a car chase.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Century 21 office in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Ron Thomas (unknown/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Two Women Dead, One Hurt in San Antonio Office Shooting," July 24, 2003, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,92766,00.html>.
2. Jim Ventura, Laredo Morning Times, "Police: Shooter Was 'Control Freak,'" July 25, 2003, <http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archive/072503/pagea8.pdf>.

Case #61

March 20, 2000: Robert Wayne Harris opened fire at his former workplace, killing five employees and injuring another. Harris was fired three days prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mi-T-Fine Car Wash in Irving, Texas
Attacker Information:	Robert Wayne Harris (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Matt Curry, ABC News, "Guilty Verdict in Car Wash Killings," September 26, 2000, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=95626&page=1>.

Case #62

December 20, 1997: Anthony Deculit opened fire at his workplace, killing one employee and wounding two others, including his supervisor. Reports state that Deculit had been reprimanded by a supervisor for sleeping at work and rejected for a promotion prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Milwaukee Post Office in Milwaukee, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Anthony Deculit (37/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Postal Worker Kills Self After Fatal Rampage," December 20, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-521>.

Case #63

November 17, 1997: Six gunmen opened fire at the ancient Temple of Queen Hatshepsut, killing 62 people, including 58 foreigners, and wounding 26 others. Following the attack, the assailants' bodies were discovered in a cave in an apparent suicide. The Islamic Group and Jihad Talaat al-Fath claimed credit for the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Temple of Hatshepsut in Deir el-Bahri, Egypt
Attacker Information:	Karam Mohammad Ismail (18/M); Essmat Erian (24/M); Mahmoud Ahmed Karim (23/M); Saeed Mohammed Shawaki (23/M); Medhat Abdel Rahman (32/M); unknown (unknown/unknown)
Casualties:	62 dead; 26 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle; handgun; knife; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Daniel J. Wakin, New York Times, "Egypt Shores Up Security, but Tourism is Shaky," November 3, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/03/world/egypt-shores-up-security-but-tourism-is-shaky.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. BBC News, "Egypt Tourist Massacre," November 17, 1997, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/31958.stm>.
3. BBC News, "Swiss Abandon Luxor Massacre Inquiry," March 10, 2000, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/673013.stm.

4. BBC News, "Massacre at Luxor," December 6, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/2546737.stm>.
5. Wright, Lawrence, *The Looming Tower* (New York, NY: Random House, 2006). p. 292.

Case #64

October 7, 1997: Charles Lee White opened fire at the ProtoCall store where his ex-girlfriend worked, killing two people. White then fatally shot himself.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ProtoCall retail store in San Antonio, Texas
Attacker Information:	Charles Lee White (42/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Victoria Advocate, "Gunman Kills 2, Takes Own Life," October 8, 1997, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=861&dat=19971008&id=ljUKAAAAIBAJ&sjid=PEsDAAAAIBAJ&pg=6951,1352262>.
2. Chip Brown, Associated Press, "Three Dead, One Wounded in Shooting at San Antonio Business," http://www.sosinc.org/victim_stories.php.

Case #65

September 2, 1997: Jesus Antonio Tamayo open fired at a post office, wounding two women, including his ex-wife.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Miami Beach Post Office, Florida
Attacker Information:	Jesus Antonio Tamayo (64/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. New York Times, "Postal Worker Shoots 2 and Then Kills Himself," September 3, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/09/03/us/postal-worker-shoots-2-and-then-kills-himself.html?scp=1&sq=September%203rd,%201997%20Jesus%20Antonio%20Tamayo&st=cse>.

Case #66

February 23, 1997: Ali Abu Kamal opened fire at the Empire State Building's observation deck, killing one person and wounding six others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Empire State Building in New York, New York
Attacker Information:	Ali Abu Kamal (69/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber Beretta)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "Gunman Shoots 7, Kills Self at Empire State Building," February 24, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9702/24/empire.shooting/>.

Case #67

April 28, 1996: Martin Bryant opened fire during an extended shooting spree, killing 35 people and wounding 21 others. Bryant began the attack by stabbing the owner of a Seascope guest accommodation site. He then entered the Broad Arrow café and shot 20 people dead in a span of 15 seconds. The gunman continued to open fire on the crowd outside of the café as well as under a tour bus where tourists were hiding for cover. Bryant then escaped in a car, shooting pedestrians and vehicle passengers along the way. Following the shooting spree, Bryant took a man hostage and entered a Seascope guest house, where authorities negotiated with Bryant for six hours until his phone battery died. Bryant was captured the next morning.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Broad Arrow Café and Port Arthur in Tasmania, Australia
Attacker Information:	Martin Bryant (28/M)
Casualties:	35 dead; 21 wounded

Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one AR 15 and one FN)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	April 29, 1996
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Australia Gunman Called a Loner with a Mental History," April 30, 1996,
[http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/australia-gunman-called-a-loner-with-a-mental-history.html?scp=3&sq="Martin+Bryant"&st=nyt](http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/30/world/australia-gunman-called-a-loner-with-a-mental-history.html?scp=3&sq=).
2. Patrick Bellamy, TruTV.com, "Suddenly One Sunday,"
http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/bryant/index_1.html.

Case #68

May 6, 1993: Larry Jasion opened fire at a post office, killing one person and wounding two others. Reports state that Jasion, a postal worker, was angry over losing a promotion to a woman prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Dearborn, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Larry Jasion (unknown/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "Post Office Murders," May 17, 1993,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,978524,00.html>.

Case #69

May 6, 1993: Mark Hilbun opened fire at a post office, killing a co-worker and wounding three others. Reports state that Hilbun was fired prior to the attack for stalking a co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dana Point Post Office in Dana Point, California
Attacker Information:	Mark R. Hilbun (38/M)

Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Ex-Postal Employee is Arrested in Deaths of Two in California," May 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/09/us/ex-postal-employee-is-arrested-in-deaths-of-two-in-california.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Marle Cone and Jodi Wilgoren, Los Angeles Times, "Fired Mail Carrier Said to be Manic-Depressive," May 7, 1993, http://articles.latimes.com/1993-05-07/news/mn-32377_1_mail-carrier.

Case #70

November 14, 1991: Thomas McIlvane opened fire at a post office, killing three people and injuring six others. McIlvane had been fired from the post office prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Royal Oak Post Office in Royal Oak, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Thomas McIlvane (31/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Doron P. Levin, New York Times, "Ex-Postal Worker Kills 3 and Wounds 6 in Michigan," November 15, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/15/us/ex-postal-worker-kills-3-and-wounds-6-in-michigan.html?scp=1&sq=November%2015,%201991%20Royal%20Oak&st=ce>.

Case #71

October 16, 1991: George Jo Hennard opened fire in a restaurant during lunchtime, killing 22 people and wounding 20 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Luby's Cafeteria in Killeen, Texas
Attacker Information:	George Jo Hennard (35/M)
Casualties:	22 dead; 20 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Thomas C. Hayes, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 22 and Himself in Texas Cafeteria," October 17, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/17/us/gunman-kills-22-and-himself-in-texas-cafeteria.html?sec=travel>.

Case #72

October 10, 1991: Joseph Harris opened fire at a post office, killing two former co-workers. The night before, Harris had killed his former supervisor with a three-foot samurai sword and fatally shot her fiancé in their home. During the post office attack, Harris was armed with several guns, hand grenades, and a samurai sword.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ridgewood Post Office in Ridgewood, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Joseph Harris (35/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Machine gun; other; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Services Conducted in New Jersey for Slain Postal Service Workers," October 15, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/10/15/nyregion/services-conducted-in-new-jersey-for-slain-postal-service-workers.html>.

Case #73

August 17, 1991: Wade Frankum opened fire in a shopping mall, killing six people and wounding eight others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Strathfield Shopping Plaza in Strathfield, Australia
Attacker Information:	Wade Frankum (33/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 8 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "A Masked Gunman Kills 6 at a Mall in Australia," August 18, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/08/18/world/a-masked-gunman-kills-6-at-a-mall-in-australia.html>.

Case #74

August 10, 1989: John Merlin Taylor opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing two co-workers and injuring another. Prior to the attack, Taylor fatally shot his wife in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Orange Glen, California
Attacker Information:	John Merlin Taylor (52/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Tom Gorman and Richard Serrano, Los Angeles Times, "Postal Employee Kills Wife, 2 Co-Workers," August 11, 1989, http://articles.latimes.com/1989-08-11/news/mn-207_1_postal-employee.

Case #75

December 14, 1988: Warren Murphy opened fire at the post office where he was employed, wounding two co-workers and his supervisor. Murphy surrendered after holding a female hostage for 13 hours.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	New Orleans Post Office in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Warren Murphy (39/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	December 15, 1988
Resolution:	No Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Mail Handler Shoots 3 at Post Office," December 15, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-12-15/news/mn-524_1_post-office.
2. Washington Post, "3 Shot in New Orleans as Suspect Holes Up," December 15, 1988, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-1295435.html>.

Case #76

December 8, 1987: Frank Vitkovic opened fire on three floors at a post office, killing eight people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post Office in Melbourne, Australia
Attacker Information:	Frank Vitkovic (22/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. The Age, "Melbourne Remembers Queen Street Massacre," December 6, 2007, <http://www.theage.com.au/news/National/Melbourne-remembers-Queen-St-massacre/2007/12/06/1196812912743.html>.
2. Kenneth Polk, *When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1994) p. 137.

Case #77

August 19, 1987: Michael Ryan opened fire during a shooting spree, killing 16 people and wounding 15 others. Ryan's attack began in Wiltshire where he shot a woman in a forest and a cashier at a gas station. The assailant then killed his mother and fired

indiscriminately on bystanders as he drove to a busy shopping area. Ryan committed suicide shortly after the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Wiltshire and Hungerford in Berkshire, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Michael Ryan (27/M)
Casualties:	16 dead; 15 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Kalashnikov); rifle (automatic); handgun (Beretta); other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Douglas Hurd, Economicexpert.com, "Report of Mr. Colin Smith CVO QPM. Chief Constable Thames Valley Police to the RT Hon Douglas Hurd CBE, MP. Secretary of State for the Home Department," August 1987, <http://www.economicexpert.com/a/Hungerford:Report.html>.
2. Stewart Tendler, Andrew Morgan, David Sapsted and Michael McCarthy, Times Online, "Times Archive, 1987: 14 Die as Gunman Runs Amok," August 20, 1987, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/archive/tol_archive/article7142452.ece?token=null&offset=0&page=1.
3. Richard Ford, Times Online, "Factfile: British Shooting Massacres," August 1987, <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/uk/crime/article7142484.ece>.

Case #78

August 20, 1986: Patrick Sherrill opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing 14 people and injuring seven others. Reports state that prior to the attack, Sherrill believed he was going to be fired from his job.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Edmond Post Office in Edmond, Oklahoma
Attacker Information:	Patrick Henry Sherrill (44/M)
Casualties:	14 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (two .45-caliber semi-automatic and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rachael Bell, TruTV.com, "Workplace Homicide," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/work_homicide/4.html.

Case #79

March 6, 1985: Steven Brownlee opened fire at a post office, killing two co-workers and wounding a third.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlanta Post Office in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Steven W. Brownlee (30/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Felicity Barringer, New York Times, "Postal Officials Examine System After 2 Killings," May 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/08/us/postal-officials-examine-system-after-2-killings.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Clerk Kills Fellow Worker, Wounds Two in Shooting Spree at Atlanta Post Office," March 7, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-03-07/news/mn-34494_1.

Case #80

July 18, 1984: James Huberty opened fire in a McDonald's restaurant, killing 21 people and injuring 19 others. Huberty was dressed in camouflage during his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	McDonald's in San Ysidro, California
Attacker Information:	James Oliver Huberty (41/M)
Casualties:	21 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun (Uzi); shotgun; handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Jessica Gresko, Associated Press, "20 Years Later, San Ysidro McDonald's Massacre Remembered," July 18, 2004,
http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/article_2ba4343e-7009-54ce-98df-79a23ff8d0d7.html.

Case #81

December 2, 1983: James Howard Brooks opened fire at the post office where he was employed, killing one person and wounding another. He then surrendered to police. Reports state that Brooks was angry at having been criticized by his supervisor.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Anniston Post Office in Anniston, Alabama
Attacker Information:	James Howard Brooks (53/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow's Headlines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pg. 151.
2. Associated Press, Ocala Star-Banner, "Postal Worker Held in Death of Postmaster," December 3, 1983,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=qZoTAAAAIBAJ&sjid=YQYEAAAAIBAJ&pg=6908,1058534&dq=anniston+alabama+shooting+1983>.

Case #82

August 19, 1983: Perry Smith opened fire at a post office, killing a co-worker and wounding two others. Reports state that Smith felt he was mistreated by co-workers after his son committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Post office and convenience store in Johnston, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Perry Smith (unknown/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Felicity Barringer, New York Times, "Postal Officials Examine System After 2 Killings," May 8, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/08/us/postal-officials-examine-system-after-2-killings.html?pagewanted=all>
2. Mark Ames, AlterNet, "Excerpt: Breaking Down at the Post Office," October 3, 2005, http://www.alternet.org/media/24798/excerpt:_breaking_down_at_the_post_office/.

Case #83

August 20, 1982: Carl Brow opened fire in a welding shop, killing eight people and injuring three others. Reports state that Brown was upset that the welding shop charged him \$20 for repairs on a lawnmower engine.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Bob Moore's Weldong & Machine Services, Inc. in Miami, Florida
Attacker Information:	Carl Brown (51/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "Murderer's Row," August 30, 1982, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,921255,00.html?iid=chix-sphere>.

Case #84

January 1, 1972: Mark Essex launched a series of attacks over the course of a week, killing nine people and wounding 13 others. In one attack Essex hid in a parking lot across the street from the New Orleans Police Department and randomly shot at officers. Essex then broke into various facilities shooting civilians and responding officers before being killed by police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Mark James Robert Essex (23/M)
Casualties:	9 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.44-caliber Magnum); handgun (.38-caliber Colt revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	January 7, 1972
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Anthony Walsh, *Race and Crime: A Biosocial Analysis* (Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2004, pp. 38-39.
2. Chuck Hustmyre, TruTV.com, "Notorious Murders: Mark Essex," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/mark_essex/index.html.

FACTORIES & WAREHOUSES

Case #85

September 9, 2010: Yvonne Hiller opened fire at her workplace, killing two people and wounding another. Hiller was suspended from her job and escorted off the premises ten minutes prior to the attack. She drove through a security barrier before entering the facility on foot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kraft Food plant in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Yvonne Hiller (43/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 Magnum)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Troy Graham, Mike Newall and Michael Brocker, Philadelphia Inquirer, "Before Kraft Shooting Rampage Growing Alarm Over Suspect's Behavior," September 11, 2010, http://www.philly.com/inquirer/front_page/20100911_Before_Kraft_shooting_rampage__growing_alarm_over_suspect_s_behavior.html.
2. Sean Alfano, NY Daily News, "Suspended Female Employee Guns Down Two in Shooting Spree at Kraft Factory in Philadelphia," September 10, 2010, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/09/10/2010-09-10_suspended_female_employee_opens_fire_at_kraft_foods_facility_in_philly_killing_t.html.

Case #86

August 3, 2010: Omar Thornton opened fire at his workplace, killing eight people and injuring two others. Thornton hid his weapons in a lunchbox. Reports state that he was angry after being asked to resign for stealing beer from the warehouse in which he worked.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hartford Distributors in Manchester, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Omar Thornton (34/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 2 wounded

Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ray Rivera and Christine Haughney, New York Times, "Amid Mourning, Eerie Details Emerge About Connecticut Shootings," August 4, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/05/nyregion/05shooting.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Conn. Warehouse Gunman Targeted Managers," August 4, 2010, <http://www.foxnews.com/us/2010/08/03/dead-wounded-conn-workplace-shooting/>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "9 Dead in Shooting at Connecticut Beer Distributor," August 4, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/38535909/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts.
4. Emily Friedman, ABC News, "911 Tapes from Connecticut Shooting Describe Gunman's Deadly Rampage," August 4, 2010, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/connecticut-shooter-omar-thornton-chased-victims-beer-distributor/story?id=11322281&page=1>

Case #87

January 7, 2010: Timothy Hendron opened fire at the electrical equipment plant where he worked, killing three people and injuring five others. Hendron was in the midst of a 2006 lawsuit against his employer regarding the company's retirement plan.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ABB Inc. in St. Louis, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Timothy Hendron (51/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 injured
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun; handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CNN, "Police Investigating Motive for Shooting in St. Louis That Left 4 Dead," January 8, 2010, http://articles.cnn.com/2010-01-08/justice/factory.shootings_1_abb-motive-dead?_s=PM:CRIME.
2. Liz Robbins, New York Times, "Gunman Kills 3 Co-Workers in St. Louis Factory and Then Himself," January 7, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/08/us/08gunman.html>.

Case #88

August 1, 2008: Robert Diamond opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, killing two former co-workers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Simon & Schuster book warehouse in Bristol, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Robert Diamond (32/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Smith & Wesson)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. CBS, "Former Employee Arrested in Deadly Pa. Shooting," August 2, 2008, <http://cbs3.com/topstories/shooting.simon.and.2.785808.html>.
2. ABC, "Former Employee Kills Two at Bristol Warehouse," August 2, 2008, <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6301504>.

Case #89

June 25, 2008: Wesley Neal Higdon opened fire at his workplace, killing five co-workers and wounding another. Reports state that Higdon had been reprimanded by a supervisor for having an argument with a co-worker prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlantis Plastics in Henderson, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Wesley Neal Higdon (25/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Bob Driehaus, New York Times, "Man in Kentucky Kills 5 Co-Workers," June 25, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/25/us/26kentuckycnd.html?_r=1.

Case #90

April 1, 2008: Howard Trang opened fire in a factory, injuring one co-worker.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alloy Fabricators in Randolph, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Howard Trang (48/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. TheBostonChannel.com, "1 Dead, 1 Wounded in Workplace Shooting," April 1, 2008, <http://www.thebostonchannel.com/news/15760103/detail.html>.
2. EnterpriseNews.com, "Family of Randolph Shooting Victim Gropes for Answers," April 1, 2008, <http://www.enterprisenews.com/homepage/x325171363>.

Case #91

March 19, 2008: Lee Isaac Bedwell Leeds opened fire at the Black Road Auto office, killing his father, a customer and two co-workers. His father owned the office.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Black Road Auto wrecking yard in Santa Maria, California
Attacker Information:	Lee Isaac Bedwell Leeds (31/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Keyt.com, "Lee Leeds Makes Court Appearance," April 1, 2008, <http://www.keyt.com/news/local/17194121.html>.
2. Associated Press, North County Times, "Son of Owner Held in Santa Maria Wrecking Yard Slayings," March 20, 2008, http://www.nctimes.com/news/state-and-regional/article_e2ffbed6-d594-50f0-8150-d64fe67a60f7.html.

Case #92

April 27, 2007. Steven Harold Smith opened fire at the Lode Street Wastewater Facility where he was employed, killing his estranged wife and a supervisor.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lode Street Wastewater Facility in Santa Cruz, California
Attacker Information:	Steven Harold Smith (50/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "2 Die in Shootings at Water Plant," April 28, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/apr/28/local/me-shooting28>.

Case #93

March 5, 2007: Jose Mendez opened fire at his workplace, wounding three co-workers. Reports state that Mendez was angry that his working hours had been reduced at the menu printing plant.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kenyon Press plant in Signal Hill, California
Attacker Information:	Jose Mendez (68/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Megan Garvey, Los Angeles Times, "Man Wounds 3 Co-Workers and Then Kills Himself in Signal Hill," March 6, 2007, <http://articles.latimes.com/2007/mar/06/local/me-shooting6>.

Case #94

January 11, 2007: Jason Burnam opened fire at Crossroads Industrial Services, where he was employed, wounding three people in the cafeteria and one in an office of the factory. Reports state that Burnam had been taking medication for bipolar disorder and claimed that he launched the attack to gain respect.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Crossroads Industrial Services in Indianapolis, Indiana
Attacker Information:	Jason Burnman (24/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "4 Hurt in Ind. Workplace Shooting," January 11, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-01-11-indiana-shooting_x.htm.

Case #95

June 26, 2006: Michael Julius Ford opened fire at a Safeway warehouse, killing one co-worker and wounding four other people, including a police officer.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Safeway Inc. in Denver, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Michael Julius Ford (22/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. The Denver Channel, "Suspect, Victims in Safeway Shooting Rampage Identified," June 27, 2006, <http://www.thedenverchannel.com/news/9424239/detail.html>.
2. Associated Press, New York Times, "Gunman Killed After Fatal Denver Shooting," June 26, 2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/06/26/us/26gunman.html?_r=1.

Case #96

April 21, 2006: Julian English opened fire at a Tyson Foods Inc. poultry processing plant where he was employed, wounding a co-worker. English had been suspended from his job prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tyson Foods Inc. in Pine Bluff, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Julian English (24/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, "Suspended Worker Opens Fire at Plant," April 21, 2006, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=s7IaAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=JEUEAAAAIIBAJ&pg=5058,353778&dq=tyson+worker+shoots+co-worker&hl=en>.

Case #97

January 29, 2006: Jennifer San Marco opened fire at a postal facility, killing six people hours after killing her neighbor. San Marco then fatally shot herself. The assailant was a former postal worker at the facility she targeted and was on medical leave. Reports state that San Marco entered the facility gates by following closely behind another car and gained access through the front door by taking another employee's electronic identification badge at gunpoint.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Santa Barbara Processing and Distribution Center in Santa Barbara, California
Attacker Information:	Jennifer San Marco (44/F)
Casualties:	7 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Profesional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC "Police Look for Motive in Deadly Postal Shooting," January 31, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11107022/>.

2. Randal C. Archibold, et. al., New York Times, "Death Toll Climbs to 8 in California Postal Plant Rampage," February 2, 2006,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F04E7D91F3FF931A35751C0A9609C8B63>.

Case #98

November 23, 2005: Joe Cobb opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, wounding two supervisors. Cobb then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	H&M Wagner and Sons food distribution office in Glen Burnie, Maryland
Attacker Information:	Joseph Allen Cobb (54/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "Fired Man Shoots Supervisors, Himself," November 23, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-11-23-job-shooting_x.htm
2. Jeff Horseman and Penny Riordan, The Maryland Gazette, "Shooting Victims Out of Hospital," November 26, 2005,
<http://www.hometownglenburnie.com/news/mdgazette/2005/11/26-07>

Case #99

September 27, 2005: Victor M. Piazza opened fire at a nail polish factory where he was formerly employed, killing one supervisor and wounding two others. Piazza was fired from the company after child pornography charges were filed against him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Verla International factory in New Windsor, New York
Attacker Information:	Victor M. Piazza (55/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-Caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. John Holl, New York Times, "Shot on Job, Woman Dies 4 Days Later," October 1, 2005,
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A04E1DF1030F932A35753C1A9639C8B63>.
2. John Doherty and Alexa James, Times Herald-Record, "Fired Sex Offender Shoots 3, Kills Self," September 27, 2005,
<http://archive.recordonline.com/archive/2005/09/27/shoot27.htm>.
3. Michelle O'Donnell and John Holl, New York Times, "Ex-Employee Kills Himself After Shooting 3 in Factory," September 27, 2005,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2005/09/27/nyregion/27shoot.html>.

Case #100

February 21, 2005: Alexander L. Lett opened fire at his workplace, wounding two co-workers. The attack ended when Lett was detained by other employees.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Northrop Grumman Ships Systems in Pascagoula, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Alexander L. Lett (41/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Los Angeles Times, "Two Hurt in Shipyard Shooting; Worker Held," February 22, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/22/nation/na-briefs22.2>.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Suspect in Miss. Shipyard Shooting Held," February 21, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,148258,00.html>.

Case #101

January 26, 2005: Myles Meyers opened fire at his workplace, killing one person and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jeep Liberty Plant in Toledo, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Myles Meyers (54/M)

Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (20-gauge, double-barrel shotgun)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Autoworker's Grudge Turns Deadly," January 27, 2005, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/01/26/national/main669662.shtml>.
2. George Windau, Labor Notes, "Pressure Led to Shootings at Jeep," March 1, 2005, <http://www.labornotes.org/node/843>.

Case #102

July 2, 2004: Elijah Brown opened fire at the food plant where he was employed, killing five people and injuring two others. Brown then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	ConAgra Foods Inc. plant in Kansas City, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Elijah Brown (21/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Six Dead in Kansas Workplace Shooting," July 3, 2004, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5353964>.

Case #103

December 9, 2003: John Gardner opened fire at the PrintXcel plant, killing one employee. He then set multiple fires in the plant. Gardner had been fired from the company prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	PrintXcel in Visalia, California
Attacker Information:	John Gardner (45/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Azadeh Moaveni, Los Angeles Times, "Man Fatally Shoots Worker, Then Himself," December 10, 2003, <http://articles.latimes.com/2003/dec/10/local/me-workshoot10>.

Case #104

August 27, 2003: Alexander L. Lett opened fire at a warehouse where he was formerly employed, killing six former co-workers. Lett was fired shortly before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Windy City Core Supply in Chicago, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Salvador Tapia (36/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Joel Roberts, CBS News, "7 Dead in Chicago Rampage," August 27, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/08/28/national/main570552.shtml>.

Case #105

August 19, 2003: Ricky Shadle opened fire at his workplace, killing one co-worker and wounding two others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Andover Industries in Andover, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Ricky Shadle (32/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (one 10-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. R. Kropko, Associated Press, "Man Threatened Suicide Before Factor Shooting, His Parents Say," August 21, 2003,
http://www.enquirer.com/editions/2003/08/21/loc_oh-plantshooting21.html.

Case #106

July 9, 2003: Douglas Williams opened fire at the Lockheed Martin assembly plant where he was employed, killing five people and injuring nine others. Williams then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lockheed Martin assembly plant in Meridian, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Doug Williams (48/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); rifle (.223-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Jarrett Murphy, CBS News, "Six Dead in Mississippi Massacre," July 9, 2003,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/07/09/national/main562301.shtml>.

Case #107

July 1, 2003: Jonathon Russell opened fire at his workplace, killing three people and wounding five others. Russell committed suicide following a shootout with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Modine Manufacturing Co. in Jefferson City, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Jonathon Russell (25/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Paul Sioca, Associated Press, "Three Killed, Several Injured in Shooting at Missouri Manufacturing," July 2, 2003, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4188/is_20030702/ai_n11402211/.

Case #108

December 6, 2001: Robert Wissman opened fire at the Nu-Wood Decorative Millwork plant, killing one person and wounding six others. Reports state that prior to the attack, Wissman was involved in a dispute with his employer over his possible termination.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Nu-Wood Decorative Millwork factory in Goshen, Indiana
Attacker Information:	Robert Wissman (36/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Jodi Wilgoren, New York Times, "Indiana Factory Shooting Leaves 2 Dead and 6 Hurt," December 7, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/07/us/indiana-factory-shooting-leaves-2-dead-and-6-hurt.html>.
2. John W. Fountain, New York Times, "Factory Feud Is Cited in Shooting in Indiana," December 8, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/12/08/us/factory-feud-is-cited-in-shooting-in-indiana.html>.
3. Katina Hull, Laredo Morning Times, "Factory Gunman in Indiana Rampage in 'Love Triangle,'" December 8, 2001, <http://airwolf.lmtonline.com/news/archive/120801/page11.pdf>.

Case #109

February 5, 2001: William Baker opened fire at the Navistar International factory where he was employed, killing four co-workers and wounding four others. Baker concealed his weapons in a golf bag.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Navistar International plant in Melrose Park, Illinois
Attacker Information:	William D. Baker (66/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, Lubbock Avalanche-Journal, "Five Workers Die in Shooting Rampage at Chicago Navistar Plant," February 6, 2001, http://www.lubbockonline.com/stories/020601/nat_020601041.shtml.

Case #110

September 15, 1997: Arthur Hastings Wise opened fire at his former workplace, killing four people and injuring three others, including a security guard. Wise had been recently fired from the company prior to the attack. Reports state that after Wise shot the security guard, he tore out the telephone lines in the guard station and then entered the building.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	R.E. Phelon Co. factory in Aikens County, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Arthur Hastings Wise (43/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted Suicide

Sources:

1. State v. Wise. 25819., South Carolina Judicial Department, May 11, 2004, <http://www.judicial.state.sc.us/opinions/displayOpinion.cfm?caseNo=25819>.
2. Jeffrey Collins, The Times and Democrat, "Hastings Wise a 'Volunteer' for Execution; His is Scheduled for This Evening," http://www.thetandd.com/news/article_931d7ad1-28eb-53a8-aa06-cd5bf8d05595.html.
3. Joshua Quinn, NBC Augusta, "Arthur Hastings Wise Put to Death for Aiken Murders," August 16, 2007, <http://www.nbcaugusta.com/news/local/1835431.html>.

Case #111

June 5, 1997: Daniel S. Marsden opened fire at his workplace, killing two co-workers and wounding four others. He committed suicide two hours later. Reports state that

Marsden began his attack after retrieving a gun from his car following an argument with co-workers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Omni Plastic plant in Santa Fe Springs, California
Attacker Information:	Daniel S. Marsden (38/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Matea Gold and John Cox, Los Angeles Times, "Gunman Felt He Was Taunted, Police Say," June 7, 1997, http://articles.latimes.com/1997-06-07/local/me-919_1_santa-fe-springs.

Case #112

April 3, 1995: James Simpson opened fire at on oil refinery inspection plant where he was formerly employed, killing five workers. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Walter Rossler Company in Corpus Christi, Texas
Attacker Information:	James Simpson (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic); handgun (.32-caliber semi-automatic revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. New York Times, "6 Die in Texas Office Shooting," April 4, 1995, <http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/04/us/6-die-in-texas-office-shooting.html?scp=3&sq=April%20,201995%20Corpus%20Christi&st=cse>.
2. Kelly Shannon, Associated Press, "Employee Kills 5, Self at Texas Refinery," April 5, 1995, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1356&dat=19950404&id=fzUVAAAI BAJ&sjid=xgcEAAAIBAJ&pg=6965,2886531>.

Case #113

March 14, 1994: Tuan Nguyen opened fire at his former workplace, killing three people and wounding two others. Nguyen was fired from the company shortly before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Extron Electronics factory in Santa Fe Springs, California
Attacker Information:	Tuan Nguyen (29/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Seattle Times, "Some Recent Workplace Shootings," July 31, 1999,
<http://www.workplaceviolence911.com/docs/WorkplaceViolenceIncidents.html>.
2. "Across the Nation," March 15, 1994,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19940315&slug=1900389>.

Case #114

September 14, 1989: Joseph T. Wesbecker opened fire in the printing plant where he was employed, killing eight people and wounding twelve others. Wesbecker was on disability leave for mental illness at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Standard Gravure Corporation plant in Louisville, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Joseph T. Wesbecker (47/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	6
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (two semi-automatic MAC-11s, one .38-caliber revolver, and one 9-millimeter); rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Worker on Disability Leave Kills 7, Then Himself, in Printing Plant," September 15, 1989,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1989/09/15/us/worker-on-disability-leave-kills-7-then-himself-in-printing-plant.html?scp=1&sq=September%2015,%201989%20Kentucky%20shooting&st=cse>.
2. Associated Press, The Victoria Advocate, "Records Show Killer Having Mental Illness," September 24, 1989,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=wb8LAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=cVYDAAAIBAJ&pg=3936,4855278&dq=joseph+wesbecker>.

SCHOOLS

Case #115

December 14, 2010: Clay A. Duke opened fire at a Florida school board meeting. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Duke, who had an extensive criminal record, held the board members hostage at gunpoint and tried to shoot the superintendent. Duke committed suicide after a security guard shot him in the leg. Reports state that the assailant was unhappy about paying taxes and his wife being fired from her workplace.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Bay District School Board meeting in Panama City, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clay A. Duke (56/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Anahad O’Conner, New York Times, “Video Captures Man Confronting School Board Before Shooting,” December 14, 2010, <http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/14/video-captures-man-confronting-school-board-before-shooting/>.
2. Associated Press, Washington Post, “School Board Shooting: Clay Duke Kills Self After Pulling Gun at Meeting,” December 15, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/12/15/AR2010121500632.html>.
3. Nina Mandell, Meena Hartenstein and Michael Sheridan, NY Daily News, “School Board Shooting: Florida Man Clay Duke Opens Fire at Meeting, Kills Himself, Police Say,” http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/2010/12/15/2010-12-15_school_board_shooting_florida_man_opens_fire_at_meeting_kills_self_video_capture.html.

Case #116

October 8, 2010: Brendan O’Rourke opened fire on the playground of Kelly Elementary School, wounding two girls. O’Rourke then walked to a second playground and shot and missed at three boys and a school aide. Three construction workers tackled O’Rourke while he was reloading his gun, and held him until police arrived.

Number of attack locations:	1
Location Information:	Kelly Elementary School in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Brendan O'Rourke (41/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357 Magnum revolver); other
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Paul Krueger, Lindsay Hood, Eric S. Page and Michelle Wayland, NBC San Diego, "Details Emerge About School-Shooting Suspect," October 11, 2010, <http://www.nbcsandiego.com/news/local-beat/Kelly-Elementary-Gunman--104734879.html>.
2. Elliot Spagat, SFGate.com, "School Shooting Suspect Pleads Not Guilty," October 14, 2010, http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-10-14/bay-area/24134110_1_court-judge-marshall-hockett-school-shooting-school-aide.
3. Sarah Gordon, North County Times, "Accused School Shooter Pleads Not Guilty to Attempted Murder," October 13, 2010, http://www.nctimes.com/news/local/carlsbad/article_9edbfd8d-f9e4-557a-8122-adce57af7c83.html.

Case #117

September 27, 2010: Colton Joshua Tooley opened fire on the University of Texas in Austin campus. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Tooley, wearing a dark suit and ski mask, fired toward a campus church before entering the library where he committed suicide. The attack began near the University of Texas Tower, the site of Charles Whitman's deadly shooting rampage in 1966.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Texas in Austen, Texas
Attacker Information:	Colton Joshua Tooley (19/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Texas: Gunfire at a University," September 29, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/29/us/29brfs-guntexas.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS News, "Student Opens Fire at UT Austin, Kills Self," September 28, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/09/28/national/main6907650.shtml>.

Case #118

August 30, 2010: Thomas Cowan entered Sullivan Central High School, where his brother was employed as a custodian, and pointed a gun at the principal's head. A school officer intervened and urged Cowan to drop his weapon. Cowan lunged for the school officer's gun and a 13-minute standoff ensued until two deputies arrived and fatally shot him to death. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Reports state that Cowan repeatedly asked for the whereabouts of the school fire alarm, allegedly to lure students out of the building and into the line of fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Sullivan Central High School in Blountville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Thomas Richard Cowan (62/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .38-caliber semi-automatic and one .25-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rain Smith, Times News, "We Have a Man With a Gun at Central High School...He's Ready to Shoot...Listen to the 911 Calls," August 31, 2010, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9025927>.
2. Rain Smith, Times News, "Police Officers Kill Gunman at Sullivan Central," August 30, 2010, <http://www.timesnews.net/article.php?id=9025899>.
3. Claire Galofaro and Daniel Gilbert, TriCities, "Gunman Killed at Sullivan Central," August 31, 2010, <http://www2.tricitie.com/news/2010/aug/31/incident-sullivan-central-high-school-ar-479580/>.

Case #119

March 9, 2010: Nathaniel Brown opened fire in an Ohio State University facility, killing one co-worker and injuring another. He then committed suicide. Brown was an Ohio State University custodian who had recently been informed that he would be fired.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Maintenance building at Ohio State University
Attacker Information:	Nathaniel Brown (51/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Ian Urbina, New York Times, "Ohio State Employee Kills Co-Worker, Then Self, Police Say," March 9, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/10/us/10ohio.html>.
2. Everdeen Mason, The Lantern, "Updated: OSU Janitor Kills a Supervisor, Wounds Another, Then Shoots and Kills Himself," March 9, 2010, <http://www.thelantern.com/campus/updated-osu-janitor-kills-a-supervisor-wounds-another-then-shoots-and-kills-himself-1.1260849>.

Case #120

February 26, 2010: Jed Waits open fired in the parking lot of Birney Elementary School, killing a special education teacher. Before he was killed by a deputy sheriff, Waits also shot at and missed a bystander who had witnessed the shooting. Reports states that the victim had obtained a civil anti-harassment order against Waits in 2008 after he had repeatedly stalked her beginning in 2003.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Birney Elementary School in Tacoma, Washington
Attacker Information:	Jed Waits (30/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	1 handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Nancy Bartley and Christine Clarridge, Seattle Times, "Slain Tacoma Teacher had Been Harassed by Gunman for Years," February 26, 2010, http://seattletimes.nwsources.com/html/localnews/2011195554_teachershot26m.html.

Case #121

February 23, 2010: Bruce Strongeagle Eastwood opened fire in the parking lot of Deer Creek Middle School, injuring two students. Eastwood was tackled by a math teacher who held him until police arrived.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Deer Creek Middle School in Littleton, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Bruce Strongeagle Eastwood (32/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, CBS News, "David Benke, Hero Teacher: Hailed for Tackling Gunman, Says He Hope He Would Be Ready," February 25, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-6239395-504083.html?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
2. Kirk Mitchell, Denver Post, "Suspect's Dad Laments Lack of Mental-Health Care," February 28, 2010, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_14485435?source=rss.

Case #122

February 12, 2010: Amy Bishop, an assistant professor of biological science at the University of Alabama, opened fire in a faculty meeting, killing three people and wounding three others. Five of the victims were members of the faculty and the sixth was an employee of the university. Reports state that Bishop was angry after being denied tenure.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	The University of Alabama in Huntsville, Alabama

Attacker Information:	Amy Bishop (42/F)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	1 handgun (9 millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. USA Today, "Alabama Campus Reels After Shooting," February 15, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2010-02-15-professor_N.htm.

Case #123

April 26, 2009: Odane Greg Maye opened fire at a Hampton University dormitory, wounding a pizza delivery man and the dormitory manager. Before the shooting began, Maye, a former student at Hampton University, parked his car off campus to avoid a vehicle checkpoint. He then attempted to commit suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hampton University in Hampton, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Odane Greg Maye (18/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attempted suicide

Sources:

1. Janet DiGiacomo, CNN, "Three Wounded in Hampton University Shooting," April 26, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/04/26/hampton.university.shooting/>.
2. Associated Press, WSAV.com, "Richmond Man Charged in Hampton University Shooting," April 30, 2009, http://www2.wsav.com/sav/news/national/article/richmond_man_charged_in_hampton_university_shooting/11833.

Case #124

March 11, 2009: Tim Kretschmer opened fire at his high school in Germany, killing 15 people and wounding nine others. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Albertville-Realschule Winnenden school in Winnenden, Germany
Attacker Information:	Tim Kretschmer (17/M)
Casualties:	15 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "German Rampage Victims Mostly Female," March 12, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/europe/03/11/germany.school.shooting/>.

Case #125

October 16, 2008: Two teenage gunmen opened fire after exiting from a black sport utility vehicle, killing one person and wounding three others. The gunmen targeted students who were leaving school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Henry Ford High School in Detroit, Michigan
Attacker Information:	Devon Bell (18/M); William Morton (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. ClickonDetroit.com, "3 Arraigned on Murder Charges for Shooting," October 20, 2008, <http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/17735433/detail.html>.
2. Robert Brignall, Examiner, "Second Shooter Gets Prison Term for Role in 2008 High School Ambush," November 26, 2009, <http://www.examiner.com/crime-in-detroit/second-shooter-gets-prison-term-for-role-2008-high-school-ambush>.

Case #126

September 23, 2008: Matti Juhani Saari opened fire at his university in Finland, killing 10 people. He then committed suicide after setting a fire on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Kauhajoki School of Hospitality in Kauhajoki, Finland
Attacker Information:	Mattie Juhani Saari (22/M)
Casualties:	10 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. BBC News, "Finnish College Gunman Kills 10," September 23, 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7630969.stm>.

Case #127

March 6, 2008: Alaa Abu Dhein opened fire in a crowded library at the Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, killing eight teenage students and wounding 11 others. The gunman was killed in a gunfight between the assailant and Israeli security forces.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mercaz Harav Yeshiva in Jerusalem, Israel
Attacker Information:	(26/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 11 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Terror Shooting at Mercaz Harav Kook Yeshiva in Jerusalem," March 6, 2008, <http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+2000/Terror+shooting+at+Mercaz+Harav+Yeshiva+in+Jerusalem+6-Mar-2008.htm>.

Case #128

February 14, 2008: Steven Phillip Kazmierczak, a former graduate student at Northern Illinois University, opened fire in a university lecture hall, killing five people. Kazmierczak carried his weapons onto the campus in a guitar case, stepped from behind a screen on the stage, and began firing at students.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Northern Illinois University in DeKalb, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Steven Phillip Kazmierczak (27/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	3 handguns; shotgun (pump-action)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. MSNBC, "College Shooter's Deadly Rampage Baffles Friends," February 16, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/23171567/%20http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2008/02/15/illinois-shooting.html>.

Case #129

February 8, 2008: Latina Williams opened fire in a classroom at Louisiana Technical College in Baton Rouge, killing two students.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Louisiana Technical College in Baton Rouge, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Latina Williams (23/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "List of Recently Deadly Campus Shootings," February 15, 2008, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-02-15-campus-shootings_N.htm.
2. Doug Simpson, Associated Press, "Student Kills 2, Self at La. College," February 8, 2008, http://www.boston.com/news/nation/articles/2008/02/08/woman_kills_2_then_self_at_la_college/.

Case #130

December 9, 2007: Matthew Murray opened fire in a missionary training center dormitory, killing two people and wounding four others. He then walked 70 miles to an evangelical church in Colorado Springs and fatally shot two more people. Murray had been expelled from the training center three years prior to the attack. Reports state that he sent hate mail to the center several weeks prior to the attack.

Number of attack locations:	2
Location Information:	Youth With a Mission Training Center in Arvada, Colorado; New Life Church in Colorado Springs, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Matthew Murray (24/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	1 rifle; 2 handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Maria Newman and John Holusha, New York Times, "Man Committed Both Colo. Shootings, Police Say," December 10, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/10/us/10cnd-shoot.html>.
2. Associated Press, Fox News, "Colorado Church Gunman Sought Revenge After He Was Kicked Out of Missionary Training," December 11, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,316387,00.html>.
3. Eric Marrapodi, CNN, "Colorado Gunman Killed Himself," December 11, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/US/12/11/colorado.shootings/>.

Case #131

November 7, 2007: Pekka-Eric Auvinen opened fire at his high school, killing seven students and a teacher and wounding 12 other people. Auvinen had previously posted a video on the internet stating he was going to "eliminate" everyone who he deemed "unfit."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jokela High School in Tuusula, Finland
Attacker Information:	Pekka-Eric Auvinen (18/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 12 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. BBC News, "Finland Mourns Shooting Victims," November 8, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7084349.stm>.
2. YLE.fi, "Nine Dead in School Shooting," November 7, 2007, http://www.yle.fi/uutiset/news/2007/11/nine_dead_in_school_shooting_256579.html.

Case #132

October 10, 2007: Asa Coon opened fire in his school, injuring two students and two teachers. Reports state that prior to the attack Coon was angry at being suspended for his involvement in a fight.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	SuccessTech in Cleveland, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Asa H. Coon (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .38-caliber and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Chris Maag and Ian Urbina, New York Times, "Student, 14, Shoots 4 and Kills Himself in Cleveland School," October 11, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/11/us/11cleveland.html>.

Case #133

September 21, 2007: Loyer D. Braden, a student at Delaware State University, opened fire in the campus dining hall, killing one student and injuring another.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Delaware State University in Dover, Delaware
Attacker Information:	Loyer Braden (18/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Victim in Delaware State University Shooting Dies of Injuries," October 23, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,304625,00.html>.
2. Susan Kinzie, Washington Post, "Freshman Charged in Shooting of Two at Delaware State," September 25, 2007, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/24/AR2007092401822.html>.

Case #134

April 16, 2007: Seung-Hui Cho, a Virginia Polytechnic Institute student, opened fire inside a university dormitory and in several classrooms, killing 32 people and wounding 20 others. He committed suicide after the attack. Reports state that Cho had a history of mental and behavioral problems.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Virginia Polytechnic Institute in Blacksburg, Virginia
Attacker Information: Seung-Hui Cho (23/M)
Casualties: 32 dead; 20 wounded
Number of Weapons: 2
Weapon Information: 2 handguns (one .22-caliber semi-automatic and one 9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Source:

1. Virginia Tech Review Panel, "Report of the Virginia Tech Review Panel," <http://www.governor.virginia.gov/TempContent/techPanelReport.cfm>.

Case #135

November 20, 2006: Sebastian Bosse opened fire at his former high school, injuring five people. The gunman was armed with guns, pipe bombs and smoke bombs. Reports state that Bosse had left a suicide note prior to the attack and indicated his plans on an internet site.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Geschwister Scholl in Erfurt, Germany
Attacker Information: Sebastian Bosse (18/M)

Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 rifles (one small-bore and two sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Gulf Times, "School Shooter in Germany Shot Himself, Autopsy Shows," November 22, 2006, http://www.gulf-times.com/site/topics/article.asp?cu_no=2&item_no=118844&version=1&template_id=39&parent_id=21.

Case #136

October 2, 2006: Charles Carl Roberts IV opened fire in a one-room Amish schoolhouse, killing five female students. Roberts barricaded himself in the school before carrying out the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Amish schoolhouse in Lancaster County, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Charles Carl Roberts, IV (32/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (semi-automatic); rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CNN, "Fifth Girl Dies After Amish School Shooting," 10/3/2006, <http://www.cnn.com/2006/US/10/02/amish.shooting/index.html>.

Case #137

September 29, 2006: Eric Hainstock aimed a shotgun at his high school teacher before the weapon was wrestled from him by a custodian. The gunman then took his second firearm and opened fire, killing a principal. Hainstock had previously complained to teachers and school administrators about being teased by his fellow students. Additionally, he had been issued a disciplinary warning for possessing tobacco the day before the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Weston Schools in Cazenovia, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Eric Hainstock (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, USA Today, "Wisconsin Principal Dies after School Shooting," September 30, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-09-29-principal-shot_x.htm.

Case #138

September 13, 2006: Kimveer Singh Gill opened fire on students in a Canadian college, killing one person and wounding 19 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dawson College in Montreal, Canada
Attacker Information:	Kimveer Gill (25/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. CBS News, "Montreal Gunman Called Himself 'Angel of Death,'" September 14, 2006, <http://www.cbc.ca/canada/story/2006/09/14/gunman-shooting.html>.

Case #139

August 30, 2006: Alvaro Castillo opened fire and set off pipe bombs in the parking lot of his former high school, wounding two students. Prior to the attack, Castillo fatally shot his father in his home and sent an e-mail to the principal of Columbine High School warning of his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Orange High School in Hillsborough, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	Alvaro Castillo (19/M)

Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (sawed-off); rifle (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Teenager is Accused of Multiple Shootings," September 1, 2006,
[http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E3D81E3EF932A3575AC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=.](http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9A07E3D81E3EF932A3575AC0A9609C8B63&sec=&spon=)
2. Beth Karas, CNN, "Man Obsessed with Columbine Convicted of Murder," August 21, 2009,
[http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/08/21/north.carolina.castillo.trial/.](http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/08/21/north.carolina.castillo.trial/)

Case #140

August 24, 2006: Christopher Williams opened fire at the school where his ex-girlfriend taught, killing one teacher and wounding another. Reports state that the gunman was angry over his breakup with his girlfriend and was searching for her at the school. Prior to the school attack, Williams fatally shot his ex-girlfriend's mother in her home. After the attack, the gunman drove to his friend's house and shot his friend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Essex Elementary School in Essex, Vermont
Attacker Information:	Christopher Williams (27/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Christian Avar, Vermont Guardian, "Beyond the Abuse: Putting the Essex Murders in Context," September 1, 2006,
[http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/092006/EssexMurders.shtml.](http://www.vermontguardian.com/local/092006/EssexMurders.shtml)
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "Suspect in Vermont School Shooting Rampage Pleads Not Guilty," August 25, 2006,
[http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210531,00.html.](http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,210531,00.html)

Case #141

March 14, 2006: James Scott Newman opened fire outside his middle school cafeteria, injuring two classmates.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pine Middle School in Reno, Nevada
Attacker Information:	James S. Newman (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "Two Hurt in Reno Middle School Shooting," March 14, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,187860,00.html>.

Case #142

November 8, 2005: Kenneth Bartley Jr. opened fire in his high school principal's office, killing one assistant principal and wounding two others. Bartley began his attack when he was called into the principal's office because students had seen him with a gun on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Campbell County Comprehensive High School in Jacksboro, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Ken Bartley, Jr. (15/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Boy in School Shooting May be Tried as an Adult," November 9, 2005, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9970713/>.

Case #143

March 21, 2005: Jeff Weise opened fire at an Indian reservation high school, killing seven fellow students and wounding seven others. The shooting spree lasted 10 minutes. Prior to the attack Weise fatally shot his grandparents at their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Red Lake High School in Red Lake, Minnesota
Attacker Information:	Jeff Weise (16/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "High School Shooting Spree Leaves 10 Dead," March 22, 2005, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,151085,00.html>.
2. BBC News, "Town Reels from Teenage Killing," March 22, 2005, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4373661.stm>.

Case #144

September 28, 2004: A middle school student opened fire at his school, killing four students and wounding five others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Middle school in Carmen de Patagones, Argentina
Attacker Information:	Rafael (15/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "4 Die in Argentina School Shooting," September 28, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/09/28/world/main646126.shtml>.
2. China Daily, "Teen Opens Fire in Argentine School: 4 Dead," September 29, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-09/29/content_378671.htm.

3. Bill Cormier, Associated Press, "School Shooting in Argentina Kills Four," September 29, 2004,
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4176/is_20040929/ai_n14586339/.

Case #145

February 9, 2004: John Romano opened fire at his high school, injuring a teacher. An assistant principal tackled and disarmed Romano. Reports state that Romano loaded his gun in the bathroom prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Columbia High School in East Greenbush, New York
Attacker Information:	Jon W. Romano (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge pump-action)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Marc Santora, New York Times, "Student Opens Fire at a High School near Albany, Hitting a Teacher," February 10, 2004,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2004/02/10/nyregion/student-opens-fire-at-a-high-school-near-albany-hitting-a-teacher.html>.

Case #146

September 24, 2003: John McLaughlin opened fire at his high school, killing two students. He then aimed his gun at a gym coach, but ultimately put the gun down. The gym coach then took the suspect to the school office without a struggle.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Rocori High School in St. Cloud, Minnesota
Attacker Information:	John Jason McLaughlin (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Minnesota Public Radio, "Teen Convicted of Murder in Rocori High School Shootings," July 18, 2005,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2005/07/18_postt_rocoriverdict/.
2. Minnesota Public Radio, "Veteran Teacher Called Hero in Cold Spring School Shootings," September 25, 2003,
http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/09/25_baxtera_reax/.

Case #147

July 17, 2003: Richard Dean "Rusty" Bright opened fire at a Kanawha County Board of Education meeting, wounding a teacher. Bright, a maintenance worker for the Board of Education, began his attack by dousing his supervisor and a personnel official with gasoline. After his lighter failed, he shot the teacher. Police later discovered additional weapons in Bright's vehicle.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Kanawha County Board of Education school board meeting in Charleston, West Virginia
Attacker Information:	Richard Dean "Rusty" Bright (58/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Associated Press, Tuscaloosa News, "School Board Meeting Onlookers Thwart Attack by Maintenance Worker," July 19, 2003,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1817&dat=20030719&id=DEcuAAAAI BAJ&sjid=f6YEAAAIBAJ&pg=6717,4505726>.

Case #148

June 6, 2003: Anatcha Boonkwan opened fire in a school field, killing two people and wounding four others. Boonkwan targeted students gathering to listen to a campaign speech from a student body presidential candidate. He used a pistol that he stole from his father.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pak Phanang in Nakorn Srithammarat, Thailand
Attacker Information:	Anatcha Boonkwan (17/M)

Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, "One Killed, Several Injured in Southern Thailand School Shooting," June 6, 2003, <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P1-74476631.html>.
2. Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, "Second Student Dies of Gunshot Wound," June 9, 2003, http://www.accessmylibrary.com/coms2/summary_0286-23495780_ITM.

Case #149

May 9, 2003: Biswanath Halder opened fire at a Case Western Reserve University building, killing one person and wounding two others. The attack lasted seven hours. Reports state that Halder was upset because he believed a university student hacked into his web site.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Biswanath Halder (62/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Danny Hakim, New York Times, "Ex-Employee Held in Campus Attack," May 11, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/11/us/ex-employee-held-in-campus-attack.html?pagewanted=all>.

Case #150

October 29, 2002: Robert Flores opened fire in an instructor's office at the University of Arizona Nursing College, killing three of his instructors. Reports state that Flores was a failing student.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Arizona in Tucson, Arizona

Attacker Information:	Robert S. Flores, Jr. (41/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic, one .40-caliber semi-automatic, one .357-caliber revolver, and one 9-millimeter revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. M. Broder, New York Times, "Arizona Gunman Chose Victims in Advance," October 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/10/30/us/arizona-gunman-chose-victims-in-advance.html>.

Case #151

October 21, 2002: Huan Yun Xiang opened fire in a Melbourne University classroom, killing two students and wounding five others. Reports state that before firing, Xiang, a fourth-year honors student, stood on his desk, pointed his gun at students and yelled, "you never understand me."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Monash University in Melbourne, Australia
Attacker Information:	Huan Yun "Allen" Xiang (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Padraic Murphy, Misha Ketchell, and Andrew Heasley, Sydney Morning Herald, "Two Die as Gunman Attacks His Own Class," October 22, 2002, <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/10/21/1034561446759.html>.
2. Jamie Barry, The Age, "Student Believed Monash Killings Were 'His Destiny,'" September 12, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/09/11/1063268520181.html>.
3. David Rood, The Age, "Reluctant Heroes Draw Positives from Pain," October 21, 2003, <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/10/20/1066631353598.html>.

Case #152

April 29, 2002: Dragoslav Petkovic opened fire at his high school, killing one teacher and wounding another.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Vlasenica High School in Vlasenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina
Attacker Information:	Dragoslav Petkovic (17/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (7.65-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. New York Times, "Bosnia Student Kills Teacher and Himself," April 30, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/30/world/bosnia-student-kills-teacher-and-himself.html>.

Case #153

April 26, 2002: Robert Steinhäuser opened fire at a German high school, killing 13 teachers, two students, and a policeman. The attack lasted for 20 minutes. Steinhäuser was expelled from the school prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Johann Gutenberg High School in Erfurt, Germany
Attacker Information:	Robert Steinhäuser (19/M)
Casualties:	16 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. CNN, "Brave Teacher Stopped Gun Rampage," April 27, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/04/27/germany.shooting/>.
2. Edmund L. Andrews, New York Times, "Shooting Rampage at German School," April 27, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/04/27/world/shooting-rampage-at-german-school.html>.

Case #154

February 19, 2002: A gunman opened fire at a factory where he was formerly employed, killing two people. The gunman then opened fire at his former school, killing a headmaster and wounding a teacher. The assailant also detonated at least two homemade pipe bombs in the school. He had been expelled from the school prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Factory in Eching; high school in Freising, Germany
Attacker Information:	unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, *The Copycat Effect: How the Media and Popular Culture Trigger the Mayhem in Tomorrow's Headlines* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004), pg. 177.
2. "A School Principal is Killed by Gunfire," <http://www.keystosaferschools.com/FREISINGGermany21902.htm>.

Case #155

January 16, 2002: Peter Odighizuwa opened fire on the campus of the Appalachian School of law, killing the dean, a student and a professor, and wounding three other people. Reports state that Odighizuwa, a graduate student, was angry over recently being dismissed from the school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Appalachian School of Law in Grundy, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Peter Odighizuwa (42/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Thomas J. Lueck, New York Times, "3 Slain at Law School; Student is Held," January 17, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/17/college/coll17SHOO.html>.

Case #156

May 17, 2001: Donald Cowan opened fire at a Pacific Lutheran University dormitory, killing a music professor. Cowan left a 16-page suicide note expressing anger at a colleague of the victim, whom Cowan briefly dated as a teenager.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pacific Lutheran University in Tacoma, Washington
Attacker Information:	Donald Cowan (55/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rebecca Cook, ABC News, "Professor Shot in Tacoma," <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=93280&page=1>.

Case #157

March 22, 2001: Jason Hoffman opened fire at his high school, wounding five people. The attack began when a school dean questioned Hoffman as to why he was carrying a gun over his shoulder. After shooting and missing the dean, Hoffman ran toward the administration offices while randomly shooting into windows and a doorway.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Granite Hills High School in El Cajon, California
Attacker Information:	Jason Anthony Hoffman (18/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Greg Krikorian, Los Angeles Times, "Violence Marks Life of School Gunfire Suspect," April 23, 2001, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/apr/23/local/me-54634>.

Case #158

March 5, 2001: Charles Andrews Williams opened fire at his high school, killing two schoolmates and wounding 13 others. He began his shooting spree by firing randomly inside a bathroom and around the courtyard. Reports state that Williams had warned classmates he would bring a weapon to school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Santana High School in Santee, California
Attacker Information:	Charles Andrews Williams (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CNN, "Suspect Had Talked About Shooting at School," March 5, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/03/05/school.shooting.07/index.html>.
2. Michigan Daily, "2 Dead, 13 Hurt in Rampage," March 6, 2001, <http://www.michigandaily.com/content/2-dead-13-hurt-rampage>.

Case #159

December 7, 1999: A gunman opened fire at his high school, injuring five people. The gunman began targeting students in a hallway and a computer room. Reports state that the attack was fueled by a feud between the assailant's family and one of the victims' family. Prior to the attack, one of the victim's family members had asked police for protection from the assailant, but their request was denied.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	De Leijgraaf High School in Veghel, Netherlands
Attacker Information:	Unknown (17/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Victoria Advance, "Family Feud Behind Dutch School Shooting, Police Say," December 9, 1999,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=861&dat=19991209&id=qiYPAAAAIBAJ&sjid=VIUDAAAAIBAJ&pg=5645,1881212>.
2. Anthony Deutsch, Laredo Morning Times, "Student Wounds Four in Denmark," December 8, 1999,
<http://docs.google.com/gview?a=v&q=cache%3AVNdHkrg4HI0J%3Aairwolf.lmtonline.com%2Fnews%2Farchive%2F1208%2Fpagea14.pdf+Dutch+school+shooting+%2B+17&hl=en&gl=us&sig=AFQjCNHSYl4rNhRBxN7jiWXc3Be6ykAvJA&pli=1>.
3. Emergency Disaster Management, Inc., "School Shootings,"
http://www.emergency-management.net/school_shoot.htm.

Case #160

December 6, 1999: Seth Trickey opened fire on a crowd of students at his middle school, wounding four people. He was then subdued by a teacher.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Gibson Middle School in Fort Gibson, Oklahoma
Attacker Information:	Seth Trickey (13/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Renee Ruble, Associated Press, "Four Wounded in Oklahoma School Shooting; Suspect in Custody," December 6, 1999,
<http://www.boston.com/news/daily/06/shooting.htm>.

Case #161

May 21, 1999: Thomas Solomon opened fire at his high school, wounding six students. Solomon was eventually disarmed by an assistant principal after attempting to commit suicide. Authorities later discovered printouts of bomb recipes and notes detailing his plot to plant explosives in the school building in Solomon's bedroom. Reports state that Solomon was distraught over a recent breakup with his girlfriend.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Heritage High School in Conyers, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Thomas Solomon, Jr. (15/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. TIME, "Just a Routine School Shooting," May 31, 1999,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991076,00.html>.

Case #162

April 28, 1999: Todd Smith, a high school drop-out, opened fire at his former high school, killing one person and wounding one other. Reports state that Smith's mother claimed her son was obsessed with violent movies and video games, endured incessant bullying by his peers and displayed signs of depression before the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	W.R. Myers High School in Alberta, Canada
Attacker Information:	Todd Cameron Smith (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Calgary Herald, "Grim Record of School Killings," December 5, 2009,
<http://www2.canada.com/nanaimodailynews/news/story.html?id=2307283>.
2. CBS News Online, "Tragedy in Taber," April 27, 2004,
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/taber/>.

Case #163

April 20, 1999: Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold opened fire at Columbine High School, killing 12 fellow students and a teacher and wounding 24 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Eric Harris (18/M); Dylan Klebold (17/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 24 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 shotguns (sawed-off); handgun (TEC-9); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, Michael A. Lindenberg, "Ten Years After Columbine, It's Easier to Bear Arms," April 20, 2009, <http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891416,00.html>.
2. Greg Toppo, USA Today, "10 Years Later, the Real Story Behind Columbine," April 14, 2009, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-04-13-columbine-myths_N.htm.

Case #164

April 16, 1999: Shawn Cooper opened fire at his high school. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Students barricaded themselves in classrooms when Cooper began firing his shotgun at students and faculty. Cooper surrendered after a 20-minute standoff with police. Reports state that Cooper had been taking Ritalin prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Notus Junior-Senior High School in Notus, Idaho
Attacker Information:	Shawn Cooper (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. University of Michigan, "School Violence," http://sitemaker.umich.edu/356.dolan/list_of_school_shooters.
2. Kelly Patricia O'Meara, Insight on the News, "Doping Kids," June 28, 1999, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_24_15/ai_54968252/.

Case #165

May 21, 1998: Kip Kinkel opened fire in the cafeteria of his high school, killing two students and wounding 22 other people. Prior to the attack, Kinkel fatally shot his parents at home. Although several students were aware that Kinkel had devised a “hit-list” prior to the attack, no one alerted authorities.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Thurston High School in Springfield, Oregon
Attacker Information:	Kip Kinkel (15/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 22 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Unknown

Sources:

1. ABC News, “School Shooter: ‘I Didn’t Realize’ They Would Die,”
<http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Story?id=5040342&page=2>.
2. Sam Howe Verhovek, New York Times, “Teenager to Spend Life in Prison for Shootings,” November 11, 1999,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/11/us/teenager-to-spend-life-in-prison-for-shootings.html>.

Case #166

March 24, 1998: Mitchell Johnson and Andrew Golden opened fire outside their middle school, killing five people and wounding 10 others. Prior to the attack, Johnson and Golden pulled the fire alarm, luring the students and teachers outside the building and into the gunmen’s line of fire. The boys stole a cache of weapons from Golden’s grandfather’s house. Reports state that the boys had warned classmates of the impending attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Andrew Golden (11/M); Mitchell Johnson (13/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 10 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-06 Remington); rifle (.30 carbine Universal); handgun (semi-automatic); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Rick Bragg, et. al., New York Times, "From Wild Talk and Friendship to Five Deaths in a Schoolyard," March 29, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/29/us/from-wild-talk-and-friendship-to-five-deaths-in-a-schoolyard.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
2. Kenneth Heard, Arkansas Democrat Gazette, "Public Defenders Agency to Pay for Jonesboro Shooters Civil Case," July 27, 1999, <http://www.arkansasonline.com/news/1999/jul/27/public-defenders-agency-pay-jonesboro-shooters-civ/>.
3. Rick Bragg, New York Times, "Judge Punishes Arkansas Boys Who Killed 5," August 12, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/08/12/us/judge-punishes-arkansas-boys-who-killed-5.html?ref=andrewgolden&pagewanted=1>.

Case #167

December 15, 1997: Joseph Colt Todd opened fire outside his high school, injuring two students. Todd hid in the woods next to his school and shot at students in the parking lot. Reports state that Todd was angry at being teased by classmates.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Stamps High School in Stamps, Arkansas
Attacker Information: Joseph "Colt" Todd (14/M)
Casualties: 0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons: Unknown
Weapon Information: Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. Rick Bragg, New York Times, "5 Are Killed at School; Boys, 11 and 13 are Held," March 25, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/03/25/us/5-are-killed-at-school-boys-11-and-13-are-held.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Los Angeles Times, "Boy, 14, Charged in Shooting at School," December 20, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-660>.

Case #168

December 1, 1997: Michael Carneal opened fire on a prayer group at Heath High School, killing three girls and wounding five others. A classmate and friend of the

assailant persuaded Carneal to put the gun down. Carneal had warned several classmates of his plan.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Heath High School in West Paducah, Kentucky
Attacker Information:	Michael Carneal (17/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 shotguns; 2 rifles (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Julie Grace and West Paducah, Time Magazine, "When the Silence Fell," June 24, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/printout/0,8816,137027,00.html>.
2. CNN, "Third student dies in Kentucky school shooting," December 2, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9712/02/school.shooting.on/>.

Case #169

October 1, 1997: Luke Woodham opened fire at his high school, killing two people and wounding seven others. Prior to the attack, Woodham stabbed his mother to death in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Luke Woodham (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-.30)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Howard Chua-Eoan, Time Magazine, "Mississippi Gothic," June 24, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,136736,00.html>.
2. CNN, "Teen pleads innocent in high school shooting," October 2, 1997, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9710/02/miss.shooting.folo/>.

Case #170

March 30, 1997: Mohammad Ahman al-Naziri (also known as Hassan Ali al-Baadani) opened fire at two neighboring schools, killing eight people, including six children and wounding 14 others. The gunman claimed his daughter was raped by an administrator at one of the schools.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tala'l Private School and Musa Bin Nusayr School in Sanaa, Yemen
Attacker Information:	Mohammad Ahman al-Naziri (48/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Kalishnikov)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CNN, "Gunman kills eight at two schools in Yemen," March 30, 1997;
<http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9703/30/briefs/yemen.html>.
2. Seattle Times, "Around The World," April 2, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970402&slug=2531929>.

Case #171

February 19, 1997: Evan Ramsey opened fire at his high school, killing a student, a principal, and wounding two others. Reports state that Ramsey had been bullied by classmates and had openly discussed his plans with friends prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Bethel Regional High School in Bethel, Alaska
Attacker Information:	Evan Ramsey (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Jim Avila, Reynolds Holding, Terri Whitcraft and Beth Tribolet, ABC News, "School Shooter: 'I Didn't Realize' They Would Die," June 11, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=5040342&page=1>.
2. CBS News, "Rage: A look at a Teen Killer," March 7, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/08/17/60II/main58625.shtml>.

Case #172

March 13, 1996: Thomas Hamilton opened fire at a primary school, killing 17 students and teachers. Hamilton was fired from his post as a Scout Master prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dunblane Primary School in Dunblane, Scotland
Attacker Information:	Thomas Hamilton (43/M)
Casualties:	17 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	4 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Rachael Bell, TruTV.com, "The Dunblane Massacre," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/notorious_murders/mass/dunblane_massacre/index.html.

Case #173

February 8, 1996: Douglas Bradley opened fire on his high school's basketball court, injuring three students. Bradley drove his car onto the court and threw money out the window to draw people into his line of fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Mid-Peninsula Education Center in Palo Alto, California
Attacker Information:	Douglas Bradley (16/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Loren Coleman, Public Entity Risk Institute, "The Copycat Effect: School Shootings and Recommendations," 2004
https://www.riskinstitute.org/peri/component/option,com_bookmarks/Itemid,44/camid,30/navstart,0/task,detail/mode,0/id,796/search.
2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 37.

Case #174

February 2, 1996: Barry Loukaitis opened fire on his middle school algebra class, killing a teacher and two students and wounding another. Loukaitis held hostages for 10 minutes and released some of the wounded before he was disarmed by a gym instructor. Loukaitis wore a duster jacket to hide his weapons.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Frontier Middle School in Moses Lake, Washington
Attacker Information:	Barry Loukaitis (14/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.30-.30); 2 handguns (one .22-caliber revolver and one .25-caliber semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Celin Childs, AssociatedContent.com, "Barry Loukaitis: Teenage Killer," November 28, 2007,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/458224/barry_loukaitis_teenage_killer.html?cat=17.
2. Alex Tizon, Seattle Times, "Scarred by Killings, Moses Lake asks: What has this Town Become?" February 23, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970223&slug=2525360>.
3. Ronald K. Fitten and Arthur Santana, Seattle Times, "Teen's Trial a No-Win Case – Loukaitis' Attorney Calls for New Kind of Verdict: Guilty but Mentally Ill," September 25, 1997,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19970925&slug=2562274>.

Case #175

November 15, 1995: Jamie Rouse opened fire at his high school, killing a teacher and a student, and wounding another teacher. Reports state that Rouse was angry at being socially ostracized at school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Richland High School in Lynville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Jamie Rouse (17/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber rifle)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Rebecca Leung, CBS News, "Student Serving Life Sentence for Killing Two Teachers, One Friend," April 14, 2004, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2004/04/12/48hours/main611470.shtml>.
2. Laurie Goodstein and William Glaberson, New York Times, "The Well-Marked Roads to Homicidal Rage," April 10, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/10/us/the-well-marked-roads-to-homicidal-rage.html?sec=health&spon=&pagewanted=1>.

Case #176

October 12, 1995: Toby Sincino opened fire at his high school, killing one teacher and wounding another. Sincino began his attack by shooting his math teacher in the face. He then walked to the guidance counselor's office, but after being unable to unlock the door, he shot another math teacher. Reports state that Sincino was angry over being bullied at school and warned classmates that he possessed a gun. He had been suspended the day before the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Blackville-Hilda High School in Blackville, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Toby Sincino (16/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.32-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Neil Ribner, The California School of Professional Psychology, *Handbook of Juvenile Forensic Psychology*, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2002), p. 232.
2. James R. Langford, *Augusta Chronicle*, "Teen's Life Full of Contradictions – the 15-year-old who shot two teachers and then himself hinted that he would not be alive much longer," October 22, 1995, <http://www.ssristories.com/show.php?item=1568>.
3. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 339.

Case #177

November 7, 1994: Keith A. Ledeger opened fire at his former middle school, killing a custodian and wounding two staff members. He then shot a police officer near the main entrance. Ledeger had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Wickliffe Middle School in Wickliffe, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Keith A. Ledeger (37/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Man Fires Shotgun in School, Killing One and Injuring 3," November 8, 1994, <http://www.nytimes.com/1994/11/08/us/man-fires-shotgun-in-school-killing-one-and-injuring-3.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #178

October 20, 1994: Ta Phu Cuong opened fire at a high school, injuring two staff members. Reports state that Cuong was disappointed with his grades.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Brockton High School in Toronto, Canada
Attacker Information:	Ta Phu Cuong (27/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Sources:

1. TheStar.com, "Shooting violence in Canadian schools 1975-2007," May 23, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/news/article/217023>.
2. Alan Cairns, Toronto Sun, "Green is No Stranger to Justice Perception of Fairness is Crucial, Says New Judge," August 17, 2006, <http://www.caf.ca/Admin.aspx?AppModule=TxAppFramework.Web.Admin&Command=EMBEDDEDFILE&DataObjectID=701&ColumnID=3581&FieldName=CONTENT&Lang=EN&RecordID=726>.

Case #179

January 18, 1993: Gary Scott Pennington opened fired at a high school English class, killing a teacher and a custodian. Pennington then held 22 students hostage.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: East Carter High School in Grayson, Kentucky
Attacker Information: Gary Scott Pennington (17/M)
Casualties: 2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons: Unknown
Weapon Information: Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Academic
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: No force

Sources:

1. Jerry Buckley, U.S. News, "The Tragedy in Room 108," October 31, 1993, http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/931108/archive_016061_4.htm.
2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 337.
3. Susan Reed, People.com, "Reading, Writing and Murder," June 14, 1993, <http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20110610,00.html>.

Case #180

December 14, 1992: Wayne Lo opened fire on his school's campus, killing two people and wounding four others. Lo began his attack by shooting a security guard and a professor before targeting students in the library and dormitories. Prior to the attack, school administrators were notified that Lo had received a package from an ammunition company, but determined the school had no authority to interfere with the package. In

addition, the school resident director was warned that Lo threatened to kill her and her husband.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Simon's Rock College of Bard in Great Barrington, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Wayne Lo (18/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Anthony DePalma, New York Times, "Questions Outweigh Answers in Shooting Spree at College," December 28, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/12/28/us/questions-outweigh-answers-in-shooting-spree-at-college.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. FindLaw.com, *RLI INSURANCE COMPANY* vs. *SIMON'S ROCK EARLY COLLEGE & others*, <http://caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/scripts/getcase.pl?court=ma&vol=appslip/appmarc h02i&invol=1>.

Case #181

September 11, 1992: Randy Matthews opened fire at his high school pep rally, wounding six fellow students. Another student was trampled by the fleeing mob of students. Reports state that although Matthews initially targeted a student with whom he had fought, he continued to spray bullets at other students in the hallway.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Palo Duro High School in Amarillo, Texas
Attacker Information:	Randy Earl Matthews (17/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 6 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. New York Times, "Student Wounds 6 at High School," September 12, 1992, <http://www.nytimes.com/1992/09/12/us/student-wounds-6-at-high-school.html>.

Case #182

August 24, 1992: Valery Fabrikant, a mechanical engineering professor, opened fired at Concordia University's Henry F. Hall Building, killing four colleagues and wounding another. Fabrikant barricaded himself in an office with two hostages who ultimately tackled and disarmed him.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Concordia University in Quebec, Canada
Attacker Information:	Valery Fabrikant (52/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one .38-caliber Smith & Wesson revolver, one 6.35-millimeter semi-automatic, and one 7.65-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. John Scott Cowan, "Lessons from the Fabrikant File: A Report to the Board of Governors of Concordia University," May 1994, http://archives3.concordia.ca/timeline/histories/Cowan_report.pdf.
2. David R. Lyon, Stephen D. Hart, and Christopher D. Webster, "Violence and Risk Assessment," in *Introduction to Psychology and Law: Canadian Perspectives* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press Incorporated, 2001), chap. 11, pp. 314-315.
3. Wilfred Cude, "The Rogue Professor," in *The Ph.D Trap Revisited* (Toronto: Dundurn Press, 2001), chap. 5, pp. 114-130, http://books.google.com/books?id=9HlgQOHVcRMC&dq=The+Ph.D+Trap+%2B+Wilfred+Cude&printsec=frontcover&source=bn&hl=en&ei=TjahS8mJlcGblgfqzuGkDg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5&ved=0CBIQ6AEwBA#v=onepage&q=&f=false.

Case #183

May 14, 1992: John McMahan opened fire on a middle school science class, wounding two fellow students. Reports state that McMahan was angry over being bullied in school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Silverado Middle School in Napa, California
Attacker Information:	John McMahan (14/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 83.
2. Lynn M. Stuter, "Weapons of Violence in Schools since 1990," March 2005, http://www.learn-usa.com/relevant_to_et/Youth_Violence.pdf.

Case #184

May 1, 1992: Eric Houston opened fire at his former high school, killing four people and wounding nine others. During the attack, Houston held dozens of students hostage on campus.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lindhurst High School in Hoyt, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Eric Houston (20/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge); rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Mark Gladstone and Carl Ingram, Los Angeles Times, "Man Surrenders After Terrorizing School," May 02, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-05-02/news/mn-1318_1_high-school-diploma.
2. Kymm Mann, Appeal-Democrat.com, "School Shooting Turns Unwanted Attention to Lindhurst," April 16, 2007, <http://www.appeal-democrat.com/news/school-47104-shooting-eckardt.html>.
3. Meg Sommerfeld, Education Week, "Classes to Resume at California School where Gunman Killed 4 and Wounded 9," May 13, 1992, <http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1992/05/13/34olive.h11.html>.

Case #185

November 1, 1991: Gang Lu, a graduate student, opened fire on the University of Iowa campus, killing five people and wounding another. Lu's victims included two professors, a department chair, an associate professor, an associate vice president and a student

employee. Reports state that Lu was angry over the unenthusiastic reception his dissertation received. Investigators recovered letters in which Mr. Lu enumerated a list of targets and outlined his plans to exact revenge.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Iowa in Iowa City, Iowa
Attacker Information:	Gang Lu (28/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	handgun (.38-caliber revolver); handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Michel Marriott, New York Times, "Iowa Gunman was Torn by Academic Challenge," November 4, 1991, <http://www.nytimes.com/1991/11/04/us/iowa-gunman-was-torn-by-academic-challenge.html>.
2. Steve Maravetz, *FYI Faculty & Staff News*, "Remembering November 1: A University Tragedy 10 Years Later," October 2001, http://www.uiowa.edu/~fyi/issues/issues2001_v39/10192001/november.html.

Case #186

December 6, 1989: Marc Lepine opened fire at a university, killing 14 people and wounding 14 others. Lepine began his attack by splitting up students in a classroom by gender and systematically shooting nine female students. He then targeted women in the corridors, cafeteria and classrooms.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Ecole Polytechnique in Quebec, Canada
Attacker Information:	Marc Lepine (25/M)
Casualties:	14 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Sturm Ruger brand rifle, mini-14 model)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Teresa Z. Sourour, "Report of Coroner's Investigation," May 10, 1991 http://www.diarmani.com/Montreal_Coroners_Report.pdf.

Case #187

January 17, 1989: Patrick Purdy opened fire at an elementary school playground, killing five people and wounding 29 others. Purdy had attended the school 16 years prior to his attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Cleveland Elementary School in Stockade, California
Attacker Information:	Patrick Edward Purdy (24/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 29 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.56-caliber); handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Robert Reinhold, New York Times, "After Shooting, Horror but Few Answers," January 19, 1989, <http://www.nytimes.com/1989/01/19/us/after-shooting-horror-but-few-answers.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Time Magazine, "Slaughter in a School Yard," June 24 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,151105,00.html>.

Case #188

December 16, 1988: Nicholas Elliot opened fire at his high school, killing a teacher and wounding two others. Elliot hid his gun in his backpack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Atlantic Shores Christian School in Virginia Beach, Virginia
Attacker Information:	Nicholas Elliot (16/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Erik Larson, *The Atlantic*, "The Story of a Gun," January 1993, <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1993/01/the-story-of-a-gun/3531/>.

2. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 336.

Case #189

September 26, 1988: James Wilson opened fire at an elementary school, killing two young girls and wounding nine other people. Reports state that Wilson was angry about being teased for his weight and for taking psychiatric drugs.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Oakland Elementary School in Breenwood, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	James William Wilson (19/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Man Held in School Shooting is Depicted as Jobless," September 28, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/28/us/man-held-in-school-shooting-is-depicted-as-jobless-recluse.html>.
2. Associated Press, New York Times, "Second Victim Dies after School Shooting Incident," September 30, 1988, <http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/30/us/second-victim-dies-after-school-shooting-incident.html>.

Case #190

May 20, 1988: Laurie Dann opened fire at an elementary school, killing a second-grader and wounding five other students. Dann then shot a man in a nearby house. Prior to the attacks, Dunn, who had a history of mental illness, lit a house on fire, attempted to firebomb a school, and delivered poisoned snacks to people she knew.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hubbard Woods School in Winnetka, Illinois
Attacker Information:	Laurie Dann (30/F)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .22-caliber semi-automatic and one .32-caliber)

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. ABC News, "School Shooting Remembered 20 Years Later," May 20, 2008, <http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=news/local&id=6154968>.
2. Mark Walsh, Education Week, "Winnetka School's Staff is Praised for Courage Amid Shooting Spree," June 1, 1988, <http://www.edweek.org/login.html?source=http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/06/01/x36nut.h07.html&destination=http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/1988/06/01/x36nut.h07.html&levelId=2100>.
3. Jennifer Halperin, Northern Illinois University Libraries, "The Education of a Crusader," December 14, 1993, <http://www.lib.niu.edu/1993/ii931211.html>.

Case #191

December 4, 1986: Kristofer Hans opened fire at his high school, killing one person and wounding three others. Hans initially tried to kill his teacher, but shot and killed her substitute instead. Hans then fired several shots as he fled the school building, wounding two students and a vice principal. Reports state that Hans was angry about failing a French class.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fergus High School in Lewiston, Montana
Attacker Information:	Kristofer Hans (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, "Failing Grade is Linked to Shooting of Teacher," December 6, 1986, <http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/06/us/failing-grade-is-linked-to-shooting-of-teacher.html>.
2. Len Iwanski, The Free Lance-Star, "Student on Rampage Kills Teacher, Hurts 3," December 5, 1986, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19861205&id=LXEQAAAAIBAJ&sjid=UosDAAAIBAJ&pg=6835,761096>.
3. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 336.

Case #192

December 10, 1985: Floyd Warmasley opened fire at his junior high school, killing a custodian and injuring the principal and secretary. After shooting the three victims, Warmasley roamed the school and took a student hostage for more than a half-hour.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Portland Junior High School in Portland, Connecticut
Attacker Information:	Floyd Warmasley (13/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Connecticut Student Held in Shooting Death of Custodian," December 11, 1985, http://articles.latimes.com/1985-12-11/news/mn-898_1.
2. Associated Press, Reading Eagle, "13-year old Fatally Guns Down School Custodian, Injures Two," December 11, 1985, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1955&dat=19851211&id=BBoiAAAAIBAJ&sjid=gqYFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3025,244519>.
3. Associated Press, Lewiston Daily Sun, "Concord Superintendent Offers to Help Conn. School," December 13, 1985, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1928&dat=19851213&id=sIIpAAAAIBAJ&sjid=FGgFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3413,2700214>.

Case #193

January 21, 1985: James Alan Kearbey opened fire at his high school, killing the principal and wounding two teachers and a student. Kearbey's classmates claimed he was fascinated with military weapons and war.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Goddard Junior High School in Goddard, Kansas
Attacker Information:	James Alan Kearbey (14/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (M1-A); handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, The Free Lance-Star "14-year-old charged in Shooting Spree," January 22, 1985,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1298&dat=19850122&id=V1MQAAA AIBAJ&sjid=V4sDAAAAIIBAJ&pg=5241,2995151>.
2. Indianapolis Star, "School Violence Around the World," October 2, 2006,
http://www2.indystar.com/library/factfiles/crime/school_violence/school_shootin gs.html.

Case #194

January 21, 1983: David F. Lawler opened fire in his junior high school study hall, killing one student and wounding another. After Lawler committed suicide, investigators discovered a three-page suicide note in his bag.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:Parkway South Junior High School in
Manchester, Missouri**Attacker Information:**

David F. Lawler (14/M)

Casualties:

1 dead; 1 wounded

Number of Weapons:

3

Weapon Information:

2 handguns (.22-caliber); knife

Closest Relationship to the Victim:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

Same day

Resolution:

Suicide

Sources:

1. United Press International, New York Times "Around the Nation: 8th Grader Kills Youth, then Himself at School," January 21, 1983,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1983/01/21/us/around-the-nation-8th-grader-kills-youth-then-himself-at-school.html>.
2. Mark Ribbing, Baltimore Sun, "Fatal Junior High Shooting Still Haunts 16 Years Later," May 02, 1999, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1999-05-02/topic/9905040373_1_senti-firecracker-beneath.

Case #195

January 29, 1979: Brenda Spencer opened fire at an elementary school, killing the principal and a custodian and wounding eight children and a police officer. Spencer fired the shots from her house across the street from the school.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:	Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, California
Attacker Information:	Brenda Spencer (16/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Peter Rowe, San Diego Union-Tribune "1979 School Shooting Inspired Boy to Teach," October 6, 2007, http://legacy.signonsandiego.com/uniontrib/20071006/news_1n6teacher.html.
2. Katherine Ramsland, TruTV.com, "School Killers," http://www.trutv.com/library/crime/serial_killers/weird/kids1/index_1.html.
3. Associated Press, USAToday.com, "Parole Denied in School Shooting," June 19, 2001, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2001-04-18-spencer.htm>.

Case #196

July 12, 1976: Edward Charles Allaway opened fire in the basement of a library where he was employed as a custodian, killing seven people and wounding two others. Allaway then called the police and surrendered.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	California State University in Fullerton, California
Attacker Information:	Edward Charles Allaway (37/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Rene Lynch, Los Angeles Times, "Slayer of Seven is Sent Back to Atascadero," December 17, 1992, http://articles.latimes.com/1992-12-17/local/me-3115_1_napa-state-hospital.
2. Associated Press, Anchorage Daily News, "Library Shooting Kills 7," July 19, 1976, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1828&dat=19760710&id=XjUeAAAAIBAJ&sjid=fb4EAAAAIBAJ&pg=1447,1114782>.

Case #197

October 27, 1975: Robert Poulin opened fire in a classroom at St. Pius X High School, killing one person and injuring five others. Prior to the attack, Poulin raped and fatally burned a female teenager at his home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Pius X High School in Ottawa, Canada
Attacker Information:	Robert Poulin (18/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (sawed-off)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Joseph A. Lieberman, *School Shootings: What Every Parent and Educator Needs to Know to Protect our Children* (New York: Kensington Publishing Corp., 2008) p. 334.
2. Associated Press, The Miami News, "Student Opens Fire on Class, Kills Self," October 27, 1975,
<http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=2206&dat=19751027&id=k5YzAAAAIBAJ&sjid=DuwFAAAAIBAJ&pg=3696,2884442>.

Case #198

May 28, 1975: Michael Slobodian opened fire at a secondary school, killing a teacher and a student and injuring 13 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Centennial Secondary School in Ontario, Canada
Attacker Information:	Michael Slobodian (16/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 13 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one .44-Magnum lever action and one .22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Andrew Hanon, Edmonton Sun, "Canada's First School Shooting Recalled," March 12, 2009, <http://cnews.canoe.ca/CNEWS/Canada/2009/03/12/8718126-sun.html>.
2. Associated Press, Bulletin, "Teenager Takes Own Life After Killing 2, Wounding 13," May 29, 1975, <http://news.google.de/newspapers?id=eTYVAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=8vcDAAAAIIBAJ&pg=1363,432029&dq=>.
3. Associated Press, Ocala Star-Banner, "School Killer 'Sought Revenge,'" May 28, 1975, http://news.google.de/newspapers?id=_BcVAAAAIIBAJ&sjid=8QUEAAAAIIBAJ&pg=3004,6164509&dq=slobodian&hl=en.

Case #199

December 30, 1974: Anthony Barbaro opened fire at his high school, killing three people and wounding nine others. Equipped with guns and homemade bombs, Barbaro began his attack by setting several fires in the school. He then shot a janitor and fired from a third-floor window at responding firemen and bystanders. A search Barbaro's home revealed handmade bombs and a diary detailing five months of planning.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Olean High School in Olean, New York
Attacker Information:	Anthony Barbaro (18/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 9 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle; shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Caitlin Lovinger, New York Times, "The Nation: After the Madness, Violence, Even Before the Internet," April 25, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/25/weekinreview/the-nation-after-the-madness-violence-even-before-the-internet.html>.
2. St. Petersburg Times, "Sniper Suspect Found Hanged in New York Jail Cell," November 2, 1975, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?id=XLgMAAAAIBAJ&sjid=K2ADAAAAIBAJ&pg=6000,541166&dq=olean>.
3. New York Times, Ford Fessenden, "They Threaten, Seethe and Unhinge, Then Kill in Quantity," April 9, 2000, <http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/09/us/they-threaten-seethe-and-unhinge-then-kill-in-quantity.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=1>.

Case #200

May 15, 1974: Terrorists from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine opened fire at an elementary school in a series of attacks that killed 26 people and wounded 70 others. The assailants then took students hostage and demanded that Israel release political prisoners. Prior to attacking the school, the gunmen attacked a van, killed a family in an apartment and shot a bystander. They were ultimately killed by Israeli fire.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Netiv Meir School in Ma'a lot, Israel
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	26 dead; 70 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "Middle East: Bullets, Bombs and a Sign of Hope," May 27, 1974, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,911276-1,00.html>.
2. Jack Khoury, Haaretz, "U.S. Filmmakers Plan Documentary on Ma'alot Massacre," March 7, 2007, <http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/833554.html>.
3. BBC, "1974: Teenagers Die in Israeli School Attack," http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/may/15/newsid_4307000/4307545.stm.

Case #201

August 1, 1966: Charles Joseph Whitman, an architectural engineering student, opened fire from an observation desk on the University of Texas campus, killing 13 people and wounding 31 others. Whitman's attack ended after he was shot by a police officer.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	University of Texas in Austin, Texas
Attacker Information:	Charles Joseph Whitman (25/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 31 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (high-power .30-06); shotgun (sawed-off); and handgun (.357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Time Magazine, "The Madman in the Tower," August 12, 1966,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,842584,00.html>.

FOILED SCHOOL

Case #202

August 26, 2010: Austin Cook was arrested when authorities uncovered his plan to "break the record" of the Columbine and Virginia Tech school shootings at his high school. Police seized a rifle, bow and arrow, several gun-related books and a Columbine video game from the suspect's home. Prior to his arrest, Cook attempted to recruit someone to help him conduct the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Leto High School in Tampa, Florida
Attacker Information:	Austin James Cook (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22 caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when law enforcement investigated a tip that was reported to Campus Crime Stoppers.

Sources:

1. Jessica Vander Velde, St. Petersburg Times, "Tip About Planned Shooting at Leto High School Leads to Arrest of 17-Year-Old," August 26, 2010,
<http://www.tampabay.com/news/publicsafety/crime/article1117431.ece>.
2. Bill Logan, ABC News, "Leto High Moves on After Mass Murder Threat," August 26, 2010,
http://www.abcactionnews.com/dpp/news/region_tampa/leto-high-moves-on-after-mass-murder-threat.
3. Theresa Collington, WTSP News, "Deputies: Mass Shooting Thwarted at Leto High School," August 26, 2010,
<http://www.wtsp.com/news/local/story.aspx?storyid=142887>.

Case #203

May 7, 2010: Christopher Franko and his girlfriend, Dana Saltzman, were arrested for planning an attack on their high school. Reports state that the suspects sought to purchase

shotguns and randomly shoot students, faculty and staff at Franko's former school. Prior to this plot, Franko had been accused of similar shooting attempts at his school.

Number of Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connetquot High School in Long Island, New York
Attacker Information:	Christopher Franko (17/M); Dana Saltzman (16/F)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Shotguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when Franko's social worker alerted police as to her suspicions that the two suspects might be planning an attack.

Sources:

1. Frank Eltman, Huffington Post, "Christopher Franko Charged: Connetquot High School Student charged with Second Columbine-Style Plot in three Years," June 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/06/08/christopher-franko-charge_n_604717.html.
2. Carlin DeGuerin Miller, CBS News, "Columbine-Style Attack on Long Island High School Foiled, Two Teens Arrested, Say Police," May 10, 2010, http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504083_162-20004559-504083.html.
3. Associated Press, Huffington Post, "Dana Saltzman, Christopher Franko Arrested in Plot to Attack Long Island High School: Columbine-Style Shooting Planned for Connetquot High School," May 8, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/05/08/dana-saltzman-christopher_n_568930.html.

Case #204

March 4, 2010: Charles Mustoe was arrested for planning an attack at Chelan High School. Mustoe planned to carry out the attack on April 20, 2011, the anniversary of the Columbine High school shooting. Reports state that Mustoe was angry about being bullied at school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Chelan High School in Chelan, Washington
Attacker Information:	Charles T. Mustoe (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	10
Weapon Information:	3 shotguns; 5 rifles; 2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when the parents of a girl with whom Mustoe had discussed his plans alerted authorities.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Columbian, "Brewster Teen Charged in Alleged School Shooting Plot," March 4, 2010, <http://www.columbian.com/news/2010/mar/04/brewster-teen-charged-alleged-school-shooting-plot/>.
2. K.C. Mehaffey, Wenatchee World, "Charges Reduced for Teen Police Say Planned Columbine-Type Shooting," December 2, 2010, <http://www.wenatcheeworld.com/news/2010/dec/02/charges-for-brewster-teen-reduced/>.

Case #205

February 14, 2010: A student was arrested for planning a shooting spree at Marshall High School.

Number of Locations:

1

Location Information:

Marshall High School in San Antonio, Texas

Attacker Information:

Unknown (16/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Unknown

Weapon Information:

Unknown

Closest Relationship to Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when the suspect revealed his plans to a man with whom he was playing an online video game; the man immediately notified law enforcement.

Sources:

1. Crystal Mazza, WOAI, "Student Arrested for Plotting Attack Against High School," February 15, 2010, http://www.woai.com/news/local/story/Student-arrested-for-plotting-attack-against-high/I6d_yPrPjUenlu5DnyGrGg.csp.
2. ABC News – KSAT, "Alleged School Shooting Plot Foiled," February 15, 2010, <http://www.ksat.com/news/22570319/detail.html#>.

Case #206

May 4, 2009: Two high school students were arrested for plotting to randomly shoot classmates at Covina High School during a school assembly. Authorities discovered two loaded handguns as well as violent drawings at the home of one of the teenagers. The boys admitted to having brought their weapons to the school three times in the past.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Covina High School in West Covina, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one Glock .40-caliber and one Smith & Wesson .357-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a man reported the theft of two handguns from his home, enabling police to trace the theft to the victim's stepson.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: 2 Teens were Plotting School Shooting," May 1, 2009, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30526342/>.
2. KTLA.com, "Local Teens Plead Not Guilty in School Shootings," May 4, 2009, <http://www.ktla.com/news/local/ktla-covina-guns-school,0,5371888.story>.

Case #207

April 9, 2009: During an investigation of two teenagers who were arrested in New Mexico on suspicion of burglary, authorities uncovered the teenagers' plans for a shooting attack at Dove Creek High School. The teenagers planned to shoot students, the school principal, the superintendent, the County Sheriff, and the Undersheriff. A stash of weapons was discovered in one of the teenagers' home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Dove Creek High School in Colorado
Attacker Information:	Cody Barr (19/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Over 9
Weapon Information:	7 rifles; handguns (.22-caliber); shotguns; rifle (M1 carbine); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when one of the suspects informed his family about the plot.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Sheriff: Teen Planned School Shooting," April 9, 2009, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/09/national/main4933195.shtml>.
2. Associated Press, Denver Post, "2 Teens Arrested in Shooting Plot at Dove Creek School," April 09, 2009, http://www.denverpost.com/news/ci_12109381.

Case #208

April 8, 2009: Three high school students were arrested for plotting to bomb their high school after police discovered 28 pipe bombs, Molotov cocktails, shotguns, violent videos, and a hit-list of students' names at one of the teenagers' home. Two years prior, one of the teenagers had served three months of supervised probation for possessing a hoax explosive device around the date of the Columbine High School attack anniversary.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Landstown High School in Virginia Beach, Virginia

Attacker Information:

Phillip Bay (17/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Over 30

Weapon Information:

2 shotguns; other

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when the suspects' friend alerted authorities of their plan to bomb the school.

Sources:

1. Kathy Adams and Shawn Day, Virginia Pilot, "Beach Teen Charged with Making Explosives in Plot on School," April 8, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/beach-teen-charged-making-explosives-plot-school>.
2. Kathy Adams, Virginia Pilot, "More Arrests Made in Possible Bomb Plot at Va. Beach School," April 18, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/04/more-arrests-made-possible-bomb-plot-va-beach-school>.
3. Shawn Day, Virginia Pilot, "Sanity is at Issue in case of Landstown Bomb Plot Teen," August 27, 2009, <http://hamptonroads.com/2009/08/sanity-issue-case-landstown-bomb-plot-teen>.

Case #209

December 8, 2008: Gregory Nason was arrested for plotting to shoot students at Blue Mountain High School. Police found multiple weapons, replica guns, a gas mask, a fake hand grenade, shooting gloves, replica explosive devices and paramilitary clothing at his home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Blue Mountain High School in North Manheim, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Gregory N. Nason (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	5
Weapon Information:	2 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when several students informed school officials that they suspected Nason might conduct a school shooting.

Sources:

1. Mike Urban, ReadingEagle.com, "Student Charged in Planned Assault at Blue Mountain High School after Arms Cache is Found," December 19, 2008, <http://readingeagle.com/article.aspx?id=118243>.
2. Chris A. Courogen, Patriot News, "Schuylkill County Student Charged with Planning School Shooting," December 19, 2008, http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2008/12/schuylkill_county_student_char.html.

Case #210

December 4, 2008: Richard Yanis was arrested after stealing three guns and hundreds of rounds of ammunition from his father. Reports state that Yanis's intention was to conduct a shooting spree at Pottstown High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pottstown High School in Montco, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Richard Yanis (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one Smith & Wesson .357 caliber revolver; one Smith & Wesson .22 caliber semi-automatic; one Colt .45 caliber semi-automatic)

Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect's father reported three handguns stolen from a secured gun locker in his basement. Simultaneously, a school friend of the suspect alerted a teacher about his friend's weapons. The teacher immediately contacted authorities.

Sources:

1. CNN, "Pennsylvania Teen Charged with Plotting to Kill School Enemies," December 9, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/US/12/09/school.plot/index.html>.
2. ABC Local, "Alleged Plot Foiled at Pottstown H.S.," January 7, 2009, <http://abclocal.go.com/wpvi/story?section=news/local&id=6545748>.

Case #211

October 29, 2008: Five teenage boys were arrested for plotting to shoot students, teachers, and staff at Big Bear High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Big Bear High School in Big Bear, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when fellow students overheard the plans and alerted school authorities.

Source:

1. David Kelly, Los Angeles Times, "Teens Allegedly Plotted Shooting," October 31, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2008/oct/31/local/me-briefs31.S4>.

Case #212

March 6, 2008: A high school student was arrested when his plot to murder classmates and teachers in New Jersey was foiled by fellow students. Reports state that the student had begun surveying school security and mapping escape routes. The student had also drafted a hit-list of intended victims.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Belvidere High School in Belvidere, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Unknown (17/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the suspect warned classmates about a hit-list he had drafted. Worried students notified school administrators.

Sources:

1. Laura Batchelor, CNN, "Student's School Shooting Plot Foiled, Police Say," March 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/06/nj.school.plot/index.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS News, "Alleged 'Plot to Kill' Foiled at N.J. School," March 6, 2008, <http://cbs3.com/topstories/Plot.to.Kill.2.670663.html>.

Case #213

November 28, 2007: Three high school students were arrested for planning to attack their school on the 11th anniversary of the Columbine High School shooting attacks.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Arlington High School in Lagrangeville, New York
Attacker Information:	Patrick Quigley (16/M); Joseph Saia (16/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when a student saw a MySpace posting detailing the attack and reported it to the high school principal.

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Daily News, "Hudson Valley High Students Arrested, Charged with Plotting School Attack, November 28, 2007, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/ny_crime/2007/11/28/2007-11-28_hudson_valley_high_students_arrested_cha.html.

Case #214

November 18, 2007: Two teenagers were arrested for planning an attack on their high school on the anniversary of a 2006 school shooting in Germany. After being questioned by law enforcement, one of the youths committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train. The other suspect confessed to the plot. Air guns, crossbows and a possible hit-list of intended victims were discovered in one of the suspects' home.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Georg-Buechner Gymnasium in Cologne, Germany

Attacker Information:

Unknown (17/M); unknown (18/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

Unknown

Weapon Information:

Other

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when classmates informed school authorities that the suspects were studying a website containing images of the Columbine massacre. One of the suspects had also warned several students of an imminent attack.

Sources:

1. BBC News, "Germany 'Fails School Massacre,'" November 19, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7101689.stm>.
2. CNN, "Attack on German High School Prevented, Police Say," November 18, 2007, <http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/11/18/germany.school.plot/index.html>.

Case #215

October 12, 2007: Dillon Cossey was arrested for stockpiling weapons and plotting a school attack. Police found more than 35 weapons, a bomb-making book and violent journals and videos of the 1999 Columbine High School shooting in Cossey's bedroom. Reports state that Cossey was angry about being bullied at his school and told a friend that he wanted to stage an attack similar to the assault on Columbine High School.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Plymouth Whitemarsh High School in Norristown, Pennsylvania
Attacker Information:	Dillon Cossey (14/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Over 35
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber); 2 rifles (one .22-caliber and one 9-millimeter semi-automatic); 30 rifle (air-powered); rifle (9-millimeter semi-automatic with a laser scope)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a high school student informed police officers of the impending attack.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Police: Mother Bought Guns for Pennsylvania Boy Charged with School Plot," October 12, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,301379,00.html>.
2. David Schoetz and Russell Goldman, ABC News, "Online, Teens 'Idolized Columbine Killers,'" November 13, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/story?id=3848474&page=1>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "14-year-old Admits to Illegally Stockpiling Guns," October 26, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21490224/wid/6448213/>.
4. Associated Press, CBS News, "Pa. Student Admits Stockpiling Weapons," October 26, 2007, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/10/26/national/main3414966.shtml?source=related_story.

Case #216

July 13, 2007: Two teenagers were arrested for planning an assault at the Connetquot High School in Long Island on the anniversary of the Columbine High School rampage. The teenagers detailed their plot in journals and a video in which they identified several

victims by name. The teenagers also considered throwing bombs in the McDonald's where they worked and made numerous unsuccessful attempts to purchase weapons.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Connetquot High School in Long Island, New York
Attacker Information:	Michael McDonough (17/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one Uzi automatic one AK-47); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a journal belonging to one of the suspects was turned over to authorities after it was discovered by a customer in a McDonald's parking lot. The journal contained numerous threats and detailed plans to attack the school.

Sources:

1. Winnie Hu, New York Times, "Long Island Teenagers Are Accused in Attack Plot on a School," July 14, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/14/nyregion/14school.html>.
2. David Schoetz, ABC News, "Samaritan Helps Foil Columbine-Style Shooting," July 13, 2007, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=3374965&page=1>.
3. Verena Dobnik, USA Today, "2 NY Teens Charged with School Plot," July 14, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-07-13-3180234222_x.htm.
4. Associated Press, USA Today, "Boy, 15 Pleads Guilty to School Plot," August 1, 2007, http://www.usatoday.com/news/topstories/2007-08-01-3180234222_x.htm.

Case #217

September 21, 2006: Three high school seniors were arrested for plotting an attack on their high school. Investigators discovered an arsenal of guns and bombs in the suspects' homes. Reports state that the teenagers spent two years planning the attack because they were angry over being disrespected by female students. Authorities also confiscated a black leather trench coat and a book titled "Bully: A True Story of High School Revenge."

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	East High School in Green Bay, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	William Cornell (17/M); Shawn Sturtz, (17/M); Bradley Netwal (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; rifles; handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a friend of the suspects informed an associate principal of the plan.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "3 Wisconsin Teens Charged in Planned School-Shooting Plot," September 22, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,215145,00.html>.
2. Corinthia McCoy, Green Bay Press Gazette, "Cornell gets Six Years in Prison for East High Bomb Plot," October 2, 2007, <http://www.greenbaypressgazette.com/article/20071002/GPG0101/710020536/Cornell-gets-six-years-in-prison-for-East-High-bomb-plot>.

Case #218

April 25, 2006: Brian Michael Evans was arrested for plotting a shooting attack on his high school. Investigators discovered weapons and a book containing directions to make explosives in Evans's home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Rogers High School in Puyallup, Washington
Attacker Information:	Brian Michael Evans (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of weapons:	5
Weapon Information:	2 rifles; 2 handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student who had received an online message from Evans outlining his shooting plans alerted school authorities.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, Fox News, "Student Plotting Washington School Shooting Charged," April 25, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,193003,00.html>.

2. Christine Lagorio, CBS News, "School Plot Stopped in Washington," April 25, 2006, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/25/national/main1541731.shtml?tag=contentMain;contentBody>.

Case #219

April 24, 2006: A group of six seventh-graders were arrested for planning an attack on their middle school. The students intended to cut off power and telephone service to their school and kill classmates and faculty with guns and knives. Reports state that the students claimed to have been bullied by other students and sought to exact revenge.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	North Pole Middle School in Anchorage, Alaska
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student informed a parent about rumors that were circulating in school regarding the plot; the parent alerted police.

Sources:

1. Associated Press, FOX News, "North Pole Unnerved by Alleged Plot to Kill Students," April 25, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,192981,00.html>.
2. Associated Press, Sydney Morning Herald, "School Slaughter Plot Foiled in Alaska," April 23, 2006, <http://www.smh.com.au/news/world/school-slaughter-plot-foiled-in-alaska/2006/04/23/1145730804837.html>.

Case #220

April 20, 2006: Five students were arrested hours before they planned to carry out a shooting spree on their school campus. Police were notified about a hit-list as well as a message on MySpace that warned students to wear bullet proof vests and flak jackets to school on April 20 – the anniversary of the Columbine High School massacre. Weapons

and coded messages were discovered in the bedroom of one suspect and documents about firearms and references to Armageddon were found in two suspects' school lockers.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Riverton High School in Riverton, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M);
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Handguns; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when school officials were notified about a threatening message on one of the suspects' MySpace page. A teenager who chatted with one of the suspects on MySpace received a list of a dozen potential victims from the suspect and immediately notified law enforcement.

Sources:

1. Christine Lagorio, CBS News, "Kansas School Shooting Plot Foiled," April 20, 2006, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/04/20/national/main1524759.shtml>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "5 Kan. Students Arrested in Alleged Plot," April 21, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2006-04-20-kansas_x.htm.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Charges Mulled in Alleged School Shooting Plot," April 23, 2006, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/12409480/>.

Case #221

April 10, 2006: Four students were arrested for plotting to shoot fellow students, teachers and residents of their community. The students planned to start a food fight during school lunch to cause a distraction and then begin executing students and teachers from a hit-list before continuing their shooting rampage off-campus. The students surveyed school security and mapped escape routes but failed to obtain any weapons before school officials were alerted to the plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Winslow Township High School in Camden, New Jersey

Attacker Information:	Edwin DeLeon, (15/M); Peter Cunningham (16/M); David Cruz Jr. (16/M); James Whelan (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	N/A
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the principal at Winslow Township High School heard about the alleged plot and alerted police.

Sources:

1. Laura Batchelor, CNN, "Student's School Shooting Plot Foiled, Police Say," March 6, 2008, <http://www.cnn.com/2008/CRIME/03/06/nj.school.plot/index.html>.
2. Associated Press, FOX News, "New Jersey Teen Gets 6 Years in Prison for School Shooting Plot," October 6, 2006, <http://origin.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,218362,00.html>.
3. Associated Press, New York Times, "Camden: Teenagers Admit to Shooting Plan," August 11, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/11/nyregion/11mbrfs-008.html>.
4. Troy Graham, Philadelphia Inquirer "Boy, 15 to Get 5 Years in School Plot," July 12, 2006, <http://www.accessmylibrary.com/article-1G1-148112791/boy-16-get-5.html>.

Case #222

December 15, 2005: Two teenage friends were arrested for plotting an attack on their high school. The teenagers obtained ammunition and improvised explosive devices which they practiced detonating in the Antelope Valley Desert.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Quartz Hill High School in Quartz Hill, California
Attacker Information:	Johnny Alvarez Cases (17/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student who overheard the suspects discussing their plans

to cut her arms and legs off during the attack alerted the assistant principal.

Sources:

3. Jonathan Abrams, Los Angeles Times, "Columbine II? Behind the Alleged Plot," May 20, 2006, <http://articles.latimes.com/2006/may/20/local/me-quartz20>.
4. Associated Press, FOX News, "Officials: Students Plotted Attack on California High School," May 21, 2006, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,196318,00.html>.

Case #223

September 21, 2005: Two boys were arrested for planning a shooting at their middle school. The students planned to shoot a school resource officer before randomly firing on students. One of the suspects had already caught the attention of authorities after firing a handgun in his bedroom.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pickens Middle School in Pickens, South Carolina
Attacker Information:	Unknown (11/M); unknown (12/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic and one .25-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	A suspect's sister alerted her parents about her brother's plot.

Source:

1. Charmaine Smith, Anderson Independent-Mail, "No Motive Apparent in Foiled School Shooting," September 21, 2005, <http://www.independentmail.com/news/2005/sep/21/no-motive-apparent-in-foiled-school-shooting/>.

Case #224

March 16, 2005: Two students were arrested for plotting to open fire in their high school. Upon searching the boys' homes, authorities discovered a rifle as well as maps and notes detailing the plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	St. John Bosco High School in Bellflower, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when one of the suspects confided in a school counselor and admitted to the plot.

Source:

1. Nicholas Shields, Los Angeles Times, "2 Boys Charged in Plot," March 16, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/16/local/me-plot16>.

Case #225

February 10, 2004: Two high school students were arrested for plotting to shoot fellow students and detonate explosive devices on campus. The students had planned to burglarize a store, obtain weapons, and use those weapons to shoot fellow students. One of the teenagers obtained a map of the school and stole his parents' .22-caliber rifle from their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Laguna Creek High School in Elk Grove, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a parent overheard a conversation about the plot and alerted authorities.

Sources:

1. Cynthia Daniels, Los Angeles Times, "Teen Charged in Attack Plot at High School," February 12, 2004, <http://articles.latimes.com/2004/feb/12/local/me-plot12>.
2. KCRA.com, "Students Arrested In Alleged Campus Plot," February 11, 2004, <http://www.kcra.com/news/2837756/detail.html>.

Case #226

November 2001: Three teenagers were arrested after they confessed to planning a school attack that would surpass the death toll at the Columbine High School massacre. The students called themselves the Trenchcoat Mafia, the name used by the Columbine High School attackers, and planned to blow up the school and then gun down fleeing teachers and students. They were caught with a stash of ammunition, knives, Nazi photographs, bomb-making recipes and drug paraphernalia at their homes. In addition, a school janitor found a letter outlining plans for an attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	New Bedford High School in New Bedford, Massachusetts
Attacker Information:	Eric McKeehan (17/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student alerted authorities to the plot after hearing a rumor on campus about an imminent shooting.

Sources:

1. Fox Butterfield and Robert D. McFadden, New York Times, "3 Teenagers Held in Plot at Massachusetts School," November 26, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/26/us/3-teenagers-held-in-plot-at-massachusetts-school.html>.
2. Jim Avila, Reynolds Holding, Teri Whitcraft and Beth Tribolet, ABC News, "School Shooter: 'I Didn't Realize' They Would Die," June 11, 2008, <http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=5040342>.
3. ABC News Online, "US Students Charged with School Massacre Plot," November 27, 2001, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/newsitems/200111/s426269.htm>.

Case #227

February 14, 2001: Jeremy Getman was arrested after carrying a cache of weapons into his school. His bag contained firearms, pipe bombs, a propane tank and a bag full of ammunition. Reports state that Getman planned to kill as many of his classmates and teachers as possible.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Southside High School in Elmira, New York

Attacker Information:	Jeremy Getman (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	20
Weapon Information:	Shotgun; handgun (.22-caliber); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student received a threatening note from the suspect claiming that he had a gun. She then alerted authorities to the suspect's cache of weapons.

Source:

1. CBS News, "Arsenal in a Gym Bag," February 15, 2001, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2001/02/15/national/main272129.shtml>.

Case #228

February 8, 2001: Alexander Vukodinovich, Scott William Parent and Chad Meininger were arrested for plotting an attack on their junior high school. One of the boys admitted to having shown drawings of the planned attack to several students. Reports state that the teenagers had discussed trying to replicate the Columbine High School attacks at their school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Preston Junior High School in Fort Collins, Colorado
Attacker Information:	Alexander Vukodinovich (14/M); Scott William Parent (14/M); Chad Meininger (15/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	6
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one TEC-9 semi-automatic and one .38-caliber); 2 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when four girls alerted police to a phone conversation they had with one of the suspects in which he threatened their lives and discussed the plot.

Source:

1. Kevin Vaughan and Deborah Frazier, Rocky Mountain News, "'Columbine' Talk Escaped Adults," February 9, 2001,

<http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2001/feb/09/columbine-talk-escaped-adults/>.

Case #229

February 6, 2001: Three students were arrested for planning an attack on their high school. Upon searching their homes, police discovered firearms, 400 rounds of ammunition, bomb making materials, a floor plan of their high school, Nazi drawings and black trench coats similar to those worn by the Columbine High School gunmen.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Royal Valley High in Hoyt, Kansas
Attacker Information:	Unknown (16/M); unknown (17/M); unknown (18/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (modified assault); other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a student notified school officials after hearing rumors about the students' alleged plan.

Source:

1. ABC News, "In Kansas Police Stop School Attack," February 6, 2001,
<http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94120&page=1>.

Case #230

January 29, 2001: Al DeGuzman was arrested for planning to attack his community college. Reports state that DeGuzman spent two years crafting his attack plan. Police discovered a 19-minute audiotape detailing DeGuzman's plot to kill as many people at the college as possible.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	De Anza Community College in Cupertino, California
Attacker Information:	Al DeGuzman (19/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	54
Weapon Information:	3 rifles; shotgun; other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A

Resolution:

Plot was foiled when a drugstore photo clerk notified police that a customer had developed photos of himself surrounded by guns and bombs.

Sources:

1. Johanna McGeary, Time Magazine, "The Copycat?" February 4, 2001, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,97997,00.html>.
2. Bay City News, "Man who Planned Massacre at De Anza College Commits Suicide," August 9, 2004, http://articles.sfgate.com/2004-08-09/news/17437299_1_prison-officials-sentence-folsom.
3. Maria Alicia Gaura, Matthew B. Stannard and Stacy Fin, San Francisco Chronicle, "De Anza College Bloodbath Foiled," January 31, 2001, http://articles.sfgate.com/2001-01-31/news/17582292_1_miceli-al-deguzman-bombs.
4. May Wong, ABC News, "Police Thwart 'Columbine-Style' Campus Assault," January 30, 2001, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=94253&page=1>.

Case #231

April 23, 1999: Four boys were arrested for plotting to attack their junior high school with guns and explosives. Authorities discovered gunpowder and bomb-making instructions in the suspects' homes. Reports state that the students drafted a list of teachers and students they wished to target.

Number of Attack Locations:

1

Location Information:

Danforth Junior High School in Wimberley, Texas

Attacker Information:

Unknown (14/M); unknown (14/M);
unknown (14/M); unknown (14/M)

Casualties:

N/A

Number of Weapons:

N/A

Weapon Information:

N/A

Closest Relationship to the Target:

Academic

Date Attack Concluded:

N/A

Resolution:

Students alerted authorities after overhearing the suspects bragging about their planned attack.

Sources:

1. Tammerlin Drummond, Hilary Hylton, Austin and Andrew Purvis, Time Magazine, "Battling the Columbine Copycats," May 10, 1999, <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,990949,00.html>.
2. Associated Press, USA Today, "Five Texas Teens Charged in Assault Plot," April 24, 1999, <http://www.usatoday.com/news/index/colo/colo64.htm>.

Case #232

November 16, 1998: Five teenagers were arrested for plotting to kill staff members and students at their high school. Reports state that the teenagers planned on using guns stolen from one of the suspects' home and intended to target people who had bullied them in school.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Burlington High School in Burlington, Wisconsin
Attacker Information:	Unknown (15/M); unknown (15/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M); unknown (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	N/A
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when the girlfriend of a suspect told her parents about the alleged plot. Rumors of the plot had been circulating among the student body after one of the suspects told certain individuals not to be in school on the day of the proposed attack.

Sources:

1. Pam Belluck, New York Times, "Students Accused of Plotting Mass Slayings," November 17, 1998, <http://www.nytimes.com/1998/11/17/us/students-accused-of-plotting-mass-slaying.html>.
2. Associated Press, Los Angeles Times, "Teens Accused in School Murder Plot," November 17, 1998, <http://articles.latimes.com/1998/nov/17/news/mn-43830>.

Case #233

October 7, 1997: Six teenagers were arrested in Mississippi for plotting to kill classmates at their high school. The arrest came nearly a week after their friend, Luke Woodham, killed two students and wounded seven in a shooting at the same school. The six students planned to terrorize the school by starting fires, cutting telephone lines and killing classmates. Reports state that they then planned to flee to Louisiana, Mexico and Cuba. Several suspects documented their plot.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Pearl High School in Pearl, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Marshall Grant Boyette Jr. (18/M); Donald Brooks Jr. (17/M); Justin Sledge (16/M), Wesley Brownell (17/M); Daniel Thompson (16/M); Delbert Shaw (16/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Academic
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when police were advised by students and parents to investigate Woodham's friends following his attack. One particular suspect came to the attention of authorities for publicly defending Woodham during a candlelight vigil for victims of Woodham's shooting rampage.

Sources:

1. Kevin Sack, New York Times, "Southern Town Stunned by Arrests in Murder Plot," October 9, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/09/us/southern-town-stunned-by-arrests-in-murder-plot.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. Los Angeles Times, "6 Teenagers Charged with Murder Plot," October 8, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/oct/08/news/mn-40448>.

OTHER

Case #234

October 4, 2010: Clifford Miller Jr. opened fire throughout his neighborhood during a 13-minute shooting spree, killing his father and wounding five others. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	5
Location Information:	Gainesville neighborhood, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clifford Miller Jr. (24/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Fla. Gunman Kills Father, Self, Wounds 5," October 5, 2010, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39509403/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts/.
2. Chad Smith, Cindy Swirko & Karen Voyles, Gainesville Sun, "Details Emerge About Gunman in Shooting," October 6, 2010, <http://www.gainesville.com/article/20101006/ARTICLES/101009671>.

Case #235

September 19, 2010: Sabine Radmacher opened fire in the gynecology unit of St. Elisabeth Hospital in Germany, killing a nurse and wounding three other people, including a police officer. Radmacher killed her estranged husband and son at their apartment across the street minutes before the attack at the hospital.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	St. Elisabeth Hospital in Lorrach, Germany
Attacker Information:	Sabine Radmacher (41/F)
Casualties:	3 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Allan Hall, News.Scotman.com, “Woman Who Opened Fire at Hospital Had Killed Family,” September 21, 2010, <http://news.scotsman.com/world/Woman-who-opened-fire-at.6541415.jp>.
2. BBC News, “Fatal Shooting at German Hospital,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11366024>.

Case #236

September 19, 2010: Two gunmen opened fire on tourists at a 17th century New Delhi mosque, wounding two people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jama Masjid Mosque in New Delhi, India
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M); unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (automatic)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Attacker fled

Sources:

1. Jim Yardley and Hari Kumar, New York Times, “Taiwanese Tourists Shot in New Delhi,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/20/world/asia/20delhi.html>.
2. Associated Press, BBC News, “Tourists Shot Near Delhi Mosque,” September 19, 2010, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11361549>.

Case #237

August 24, 2010: A group of three Al-Shabaab insurgents opened fire at the Muna Hotel in Somalia, killing roughly 30 people and injuring 16 others. The gunmen, who were disguised in government military uniforms, targeted bystanders, hotel staff and armed guards. The insurgents moved throughout different floors in the hotel during the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Muna Hotel in Mogadishu, Somalia
Attacker Information:	2
Casualties:	30-33 dead; 16 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle (assault)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Sarah Childress, Wall Street Journal, "Militants Kill at Least 31 in Somalia," August 25, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575448932323995708.html>.
2. Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post, "Al-Qaeda-Linked Somali Militants Storm Mogadishu Hotel, Kill at Least 33," August 24, 2010, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/24/AR2010082403049.html>.
3. Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, "At Least 30 Killed in Somalia Hotel Attack," August 24, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/25/world/africa/25somalia.html?_r=4&hp.

Case #238

April 19, 2010: Abdo Ibssa opened fire in the Parkwest Medical Center parking lot, killing one hospital employee and wounding two others. Reports state that Ibssa, who had a history of mental illness, was convinced that a monitoring device had been implanted in him during an appendectomy in 2001.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Parkwest Medical Center in Knoxville, Tennessee
Attacker Information: Abdo Ibssa (38/M)
Casualties: 1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons: 1
Weapon Information: Handgun (.357-caliber magnum revolver)
Closest Relationship to Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS News, "Hospital Shooter Thought Doc Implanted Chip," April 20, 2010, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/04/20/national/main6414982.shtml>.
2. Chloe Morrison, Daily Times, "Parkwest Shooter was Mentally Ill, Left Note at Home," April 21, 2010, <http://www.thedailytimes.com/article/20100421/NEWS/304219984>.

Case #239

January 4, 2010: Johnny Wicks opened fire in the lobby of a federal courthouse, killing a security officer and wounding a deputy United States Marshal. Wicks was fatally shot by police. Reports state that the gunman was disgruntled over a reduction in his Social Security benefits.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Federal District Courthouse in Las Vegas, Nevada
Attacker Information:	Johnny Lee Wicks (66/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Steve Friess, New York Times, "Two Killed in Las Vegas Courthouse," January 4, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/us/05vegas.html>.
2. Ashley Powers, Los Angeles Times, "Shootout at Las Vegas courthouse Kills 2," January 4, 2010, <http://articles.latimes.com/2010/jan/04/nation/la-naw-vegas-shooting5-2010jan05>.

Case #240

November 5, 2009: Nidal Malik Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, opened fire at the Fort Hood army base, killing 13 people and wounding 31 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Hood Solider Readiness Center in Killeen, Texas
Attacker Information:	Nidal Malik Hasan (39/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 31 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one FN Herstal 5.7 tactical semi-automatic and one .357-magnum Smith & Wesson revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. James C. McKinley Jr. and James Dao, New York Times, "Fort Hood Gunman Gave Signals Before his Rampage," November 8, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/09/us/09reconstruct.html?_r=2&hp.
2. CNN, "Investigators look for Missed Signals in Fort Hood Probe," November 10, 2009, <http://www.cnn.com/2009/CRIME/11/09/fort.hood.shootings/>.

Case #241

July 2, 2009: Jamie Paredes opened fire at a dental office, killing his wife and wounding three other people. Reports state that Paredes was distraught about his wife seeking a divorce.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Family Dental Care Center in Simi Valley, California
Attacker Information:	Jaime Paredes (29/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, CBS, "Victim ID'd in SoCal Dental Office Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://cbs2.com/local/dental.office.shooting.2.1069067.html>.
2. Associated Press, CBS, "1 Dead, 3 Injured in Simi Valley Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://cbs2.com/local/1.Dead.3.2.1068016.html>.
3. Keyt.com, "A suspected Lover's Quarrel Spurred Simi Valley Shooting," July 2, 2009, <http://www.keyt.com/news/local/49716897.html>.

Case #242

June 1, 2009: Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammad opened fire outside an Army recruiting booth, killing a soldier and wounding another. Reports state that Muhammad targeted soldiers because of U.S. policies toward the Muslim world.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	U.S. Army Recruiting Booth in Little Rock, Arkansas
Attacker Information:	Abdulhakim Mujahid Muhammed (23/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2

Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber); handgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Steve Barnes and James Dao, New York Times, "Gunman Kills Soldier Outside Recruiting Station," June 1, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/us/02recruit.html?_r=1.

Case #243

April 17, 2009: Mario Ramirez opened fire at the hospital where he worked, killing his boss and wounding another person. He then committed suicide.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Long Beach Memorial Medical Center in Long Beach, California
Attacker Information:	Mario Ramirez (50/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. James Wagner and Jessica Garrison, Los Angeles Times, "Long Beach Hospital Shootings Make 'no sense'," April 18, 2009, <http://articles.latimes.com/2009/apr/18/local/me-hospital-shooting18>.
2. Associated Press, MSNBC, "California Hospital Shooter Described as Family Man," April 17, 2009, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/30255221/ns/us_news-crime_and_courts.

Case #244

March 29, 2009: Robert Stewart opened fire at a nursing home, killing seven elderly residents and a nurse, and wounding four other people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Pinelake Health and Rehab Center in Carthage, North Carolina
Attacker Information:	Robert Stewart (45/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 4 wounded

Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. Shaila Dewan, New York Times, "Alleged Gunamn's Wife Worked at Nursing Home," March 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/03/31/us/31shooting.html?_r=2&scp=3&sq=carthage shooting&st=cse.

Case #245

March 21, 2009: Lovelle Mixon opened fire near a police substation, killing four police officers and wounding another. Mixon was on parole at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Police station in Oakland, California
Attacker Information:	Lovelle Mixon (26/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47); handgun (semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Demian Bulwa and Jaxon Van Derbeken, San Francisco Chronicle, "Killer of 4 Officers Wanted to Avoid Prison," March 23, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/23/MNH016L58R.DTL>.
2. Phillip Matier and Andrew Ross, San Francisco Chronicle, "Doomed SWAT Sergeants Didn't Expect an AK-47," March 23, 2009, <http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/03/22/BAV116KEU0.DTL>.

Case #246

February 14, 2009: Frank Garcia opened fire at his former workplace, killing a nurse and a bystander. Reports state that Garcia, who worked at the hospital as a nursing supervisor before being fired, was angry at co-workers who had accused him of sexual harassment. Earlier in the day, Garcia also killed another former co-worker and her husband in their home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	Lakeside Memorial Hospital in Brockport, New York
Attacker Information:	Frank Garcia (35/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Glock)
Closest Relationship to Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Ben Dobbin, Huffington Post, "Frank Garcia Guilty of Murder Rampage," December 16, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/16/frank-garcia-guilty-of-mu_n_394172.html.
2. Ben Dobbin, Huffington Post, "Frank Garcia Guilty: Valentine's Day Killer Convicted," November 30, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/12/01/frank-garcia-guilty-valen_n_375066.html.

Case #247

July 27, 2008: Jim D. Adkisson opened fire at a church during a children's performance of the musical "Annie," killing two people and wounding seven others. Adkisson, an anti-liberal activist, left a suicide note in his car explaining his motives for the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Tennessee Valley Unitarian Church in Knoxville, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Jim D. Adkisson (58/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 7 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun (12-gauge)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Shaila Dewan, New York Times, "Hatred Said to Motivate Tenn. Shooter," July 28, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/28/us/28shooting.html>.
2. J.J. Stambaugh, Knoxville.com, "Takedown of Alleged Shooter Recounted," July 29, 2008, <http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/29/takedown-alleged-shooter-recounted/>.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Police: Killer Targeted Church for Liberal Views," July 28, 2008, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/25872864>.

Case #248

February 7, 2008: Charles Lee “Cookie” Thornton opened fire on Kirkwood’s City Council, killing five people and wounding two others. Thornton began his attack by fatally shooting a police sergeant outside City Hall. He then grabbed the sergeant’s gun, and continued his shooting spree inside the council chambers. Reports state that Thornton had a history of disputes with the city government and had been arrested twice at council meetings prior to the attack. The gunman left a suicide note.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Hall in Kirkwood, Missouri
Attacker Information:	Charles Lee Thornton (50/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one .357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Times Online, “Missouri Man, Charles Lee Thornton, Shoots Dead Five in Row Over Kirkwood Council Fines,” February 8, 2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/us_and_americas/article3333114.ece.
2. CBS News, “Six Dead in Missouri City Council Shooting,” February 8, 2008, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/02/07/national/main3805672.shtml>.
3. Monica Davey, New York Times, “Gunman Kills 5 People at City Council Meeting,” February 8, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/08/us/08missouri.html>.

Case #249

May 20, 2007: Jason Hamilton opened fired at a courthouse, killing a police officer and wounding a sheriff's deputy and a bystander. Hamilton then killed a caretaker in a nearby church.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	Latah County Courthouse and First Presbyterian Church in Moscow, Idaho
Attacker Information:	Jason Hamilton (37/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 rifles (one Springfield M-1A and one AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None

Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Suicide

Sources:

1. Bill Loftus and William Yardley, New York Times, "Idaho Gunman Also Killed Wife, Police Say," May 22, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/22/us/22sniper.html>.
2. John K. Wiley, Fox News, "Police Probe Idaho Shooter's Arsenal," May 23, 2007,
http://www.foxnews.com/printer_friendly_wires/2007May23/0,4675,IdahoShootings,00.html.
3. Associated Press, MSNBC, "Idaho Police Officer Injured in Shooting Dies," May 21, 2007, <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18766089/>.

Case #250

May 9, 2005: Gregory Gray opened fire at his former workplace, killing a former co-worker. An employee tackled and subdued Gray as he reached for his second gun. Gray was fired from the mental health center a year prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations: 1
Location Information: Conard Community Service Center in San Francisco, California
Attacker Information: Gregory Gary (54/M)
Casualties: 1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons: 1
Weapon Information: Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim: Professional
Date Attack Concluded: Same day
Resolution: Force

Source:

1. Jaxon Van Derbeken and Wyatt Buchanan, San Francisco Chronicle, "Colleagues Recall Clashes with man Held in Slaying," May 18, 2005,
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2005/05/18/BAGSLCQQ1L1.DTL>.

Case #251

February 25, 2005: A gunman opened fire at his workplace, killing his boss and another employee. The maintenance worker began his attack after being reprimanded for arriving late to work.

Number of Attack Locations: 1

Location Information:	Bureau of Street Services maintenance yard in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Unknown (unknown/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Hector Becerra, Los Angeles Times, "L.A. River Marker System is Getting Back on Track," November 16, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/nov/16/local/me-river16>.
2. Natasha Lee, Los Angeles Times, "2 Are Shot to Death at Maintenance Yard," February 25, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/feb/25/local/me-double25>.

Case #252

May 7, 2004: Jean Delagrave opened fire at his workplace, killing one person and wounding two others. Delagrave surrendered to law enforcement shortly after the shooting.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Liquiterminals Ltd. Trucking facility in Mississauga, Canada
Attacker Information:	Jean Delagrave (49/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Canadian Press, CTV.ca, "Suspect in Workplace Shooting Has Bail Hearing," May 08, 2004, http://toronto.ctv.ca/servlet/an/plocal/CTVNews/20040508/workplace_shooting_040508/20040508/?hub=TorontoHome.
2. Bob Mitchell, The Star, "Family Wants Killer in Maximum Security," January 24, 2007, <http://www.thestar.com/article/174228>.

Case #253

November 6, 2003: Tom West opened fire at his former workplace, killing two people and wounding three others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Watkins Motor Lines in West Chester, Ohio
Attacker Information:	Tom West (50/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. ABC News, "Two Dead, Three Wounded in Ohio Shooting," November 6, 2003, <http://abcnews.go.com/US/Story?id=90171&page=1>.

Case #254

October 7, 2003: Michael Gardner opened fire at his workplace, targeting employees and responding police officers. The attack resulted in zero casualties. Gardner surrendered when law enforcement arrived on scene. Gardner had been taking medication for mental health issues at the time of the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Alvin C. York Veterans Affairs Medical Center in Murfreesboro, Tennessee
Attacker Information:	Michael Gardner (50/M)
Casualties:	0 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Rob Johnson, Tennessean, "VA Pharmacist Treated Troubled Man," March 7, 2005, <http://www.hwyllaw.com/CM/Articles/VA-pharmacist-treated-troubled-man.pdf>.
2. Ian Demsky, Tennessean, "Friends Support Suspect in Shooting at VA Hospital," October 25, 2003, <http://www.hwyllaw.com/CM/Articles/Friends-support-suspect-in-shooting-at-VA-hospital.pdf>.

Case #255

October 5, 2003: Sheila W. Chaney Wilson opened fire at an Atlanta church before Sunday morning services, killing her mother and the minister. She then committed suicide. Wilson had recently been taken out of a mental health facility.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Turner Monumental AME Church in Atlanta, Georgia
Attacker Information:	Sheila W. Chaney Wilson (43/F)
Casualties:	2 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.44-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Familial
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Lauren Johnston, CBS News, "Murder-Suicide in Atlanta Church," October 6, 2003, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/19/national/main574325.shtml>.
2. Jeffrey Gettleman, New York Times, "Pastor and 2 Others Are Killed in Shooting at Atlanta Church," October 6, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/06/us/pastor-and-2-others-are-killed-in-shooting-at-atlanta-church.html>.

Case #256

July 23, 2003: Othniel Askew opened fire at City Hall in New York City, killing a city councilman. Askew was a political rival of the victim. Authorities found extra cartridges in the Askew's socks.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	City Hall in New York, New York
Attacker Information:	Othniel Askew (31/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.40-caliber Smith & Wesson)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "NYC Councilman Killed by Political Rival," July 24, 2003, <http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Northeast/07/23/ny.shooting/>.

Case #257

October 2 2002: John Allen Muhammad and Lee Boyd Malvo opened fire on random targets during a three-week sniper rampage along Interstate 95 around the Virginia and Washington, D.C. Metro area.

Number of Attack Locations:	14
Location Information:	Various locations in the Washington, D.C. metro area
Attacker Information:	John Allen Muhammad (42/M); Lee Boyd Malvo (16/M)
Casualties:	10 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Rifle (Bushmaster XM-15); handgun (.223-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	October 22, 2002
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. J.J. Stambaugh, Knoxnews.com, "Takedown of Alleged Shooter Recounted," July 29, 2008, <http://m.knoxnews.com/news/2008/jul/29/takedown-alleged-shooter-recounted/>.
2. Liza Porteus, Fox News, "Timeline: Tracking the Sniper's Trail," October 29, 2002, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,66630,00.html>.

Case #258

July 8, 2002: Patrick Gott opened fire in the Louis Armstrong International Airport, killing one person and wounding another. Reports state that Gott, a former Marine, was angry about bystanders ridiculing his turban.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Louis Armstrong International Airport in New Orleans, Louisiana
Attacker Information:	Patrick Gott (43/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, CBS News, "Cops: Airport Shooter Acted Alone," May 23, 2002,
<http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/05/23/national/main509955.shtml>.
2. Free Republic, "Man Declared Insane in N.O. Airport Killing," July 11, 2005,
<http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1440602/posts>.

Case #259

July 4, 2002: Hesham Mohamed Hadayet opened fire at Los Angeles International Airport, killing two people and wounding four others. Hadayet began his attack while standing in line at the ticket counter of Israel's El-Al Airlines.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Los Angeles International Airport in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Hesham Mohamed Hadayet (41/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 4 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.45-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. CNN, "Los Angeles Airport Shooting Kills 3," July 5, 2002,
<http://archives.cnn.com/2002/US/07/04/la.airport.shooting/>.

Case #260

March 27, 2002: Richard Durn opened fire at a meeting of councilors in Nanterre Town Hall, killing eight counselors and wounding 19 other people. Durn died the following day after leaping from a police station window during questioning. Police officers discovered a 13-page suicide note at Mr. Durn's home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Nanterre Town Hall in Nanterre, France
Attacker Information:	Richard Durn (33/M)
Casualties:	8 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one semi-automatic and one .357-magnum)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Suzanne Daley, New York Times, "Man Who Fatally Shot 8 French Officials Jumps to His Death," March 29, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/29/world/man-who-fatally-shot-8-french-officials-jumps-to-his-death.html?pagewanted=2>.
2. CNN, "Paris Killer Leap: Police Cleared," April 6, 2002, http://articles.cnn.com/2002-04-06/world/police.shooting_1_apparent-suicide-richard-durn-licence?_s=PM:europa.
3. BBC News, "Eight Dead in Paris Shooting," March 27, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1895751.stm>.

Case #261

September 9, 2001: Joseph Ferguson opened fire at his workplace, killing five people, including his girlfriend, and wounding two others. The attack occurred a week after Ferguson had been suspended from his job as a security guard. During the 24-hour incident, Ferguson took hostages and left behind a suicide video explaining the motives behind his attack. The attack concluded when Ferguson committed suicide amidst a standoff with police.

Number of Attack Locations:	2
Location Information:	City equipment yard and City marina in Sacramento, California
Attacker Information:	Joseph Ferguson (20/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	1 rifle (AK-47); 1 handgun (9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	September 10, 2001
Resolution:	Suicide

Sources:

1. Eric Baily and Robin Fields, Los Angeles Times, "Shootout Vowed in Chilling Video," September 11, 2001, <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/sep/11/news/mn-44550>.
2. Andrew Gumbel, The Independent, "Gunamn's Suicide Ends Sacramento Rampage," September 11, 2001, <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/gunmans-suicide-ends-sacramento-rampage-668920.html>.
3. New York Times, "Suspect Sought in Killings of 4 in Sacramento," September 9, 2001, <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/09/10/us/suspect-sought-in-killings-of-4-in-sacramento.html>.

4. CNN, "Gunman was 'Hellbent on Killing More,'" September 11, 2001, <http://archives.cnn.com/2001/US/09/10/sacramento.shooting/index.html>.

Case #262

July 23, 2001: Keith Adams opened fire at a construction site where he was employed, killing a co-worker and wounding another. Police recovered more than 80 live rounds from Adam's truck.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Construction site in Palm Beach Gardens, Florida
Attacker Information:	Keith James Adams (28/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Bob Markey, Sun Sentinel, "Shooting Victim Battles Serious Injuries to Leg," August 1, 2001, http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2001-08-01/news/0108010125_1_co-worker-assault-rifle-keith-adams.
2. BNET, "Construction Worker Opens Fire; 1 Dead," July 24, 2001, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qn4179/is_20010724/ai_n11768176/.

Case #263

December 30, 1999: Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva opened fire at the Radisson Hotel where he was employed, killing four co-workers and wounding three others. Izquierdo-Leyva then killed a fifth person who would not give him her car.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Radisson Bay Harbor Hotel in Tampa, Florida
Attacker Information:	Silvio Izquierdo-Leyva (38/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 3 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one 9-millimeter semi-automatic and one .38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Christopher Goffard, St. Petersburg Times, "He Killed ... For No Reason," April 18, 2002,
http://www.sptimes.com/2002/04/18/TampaBay/_He_killed_for_no_re.shtml.
2. Law Enforcement News, "Shooting Gallery," December 15/31, 1999,
<http://www.lib.jjay.cuny.edu/len/1999/12.30/gallery.html>.

Case #264

November 4, 1999: Kevin Cruz opened fire at a shipyard, killing two people and wounding two others. Cruz fled the scene and was arrested months later.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Northlake Shipyard in Seattle, Washington
Attacker Information:	Kevin Cruz (29/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Elizabeth Murtaugh, Associated Press, "Cruz Gets Life in Prison for Shipyard Slayings," March 8, 2002,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=20020308&slug=webcruz08>.
2. Nancy Bartley, The Seattle Times, "Testimony Begins in Trial for '99 Shipyard Slayings; Victim Reported 'Threats,'" January 3, 2002,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=20020103&slug=cruz03m>.
3. Mike Carter, Steve Miletich, Nancy Bartley, and Dave Birkland, The Seattle Times, "Manhunt in Seattle – Shooting Not Random – Killer Had a Target, Police Say," November 4, 1999,
<http://community.seattletimes.nwsourc.com/archive/?date=19991104&slug=2993178>.

Case #265

September 14, 1999: Dung Trinh opened fire at a hospital, killing three employees. He was disarmed by an employee of the hospital. Reports state that Trinh was distraught over his mother's death and intended to kill his mother's nurse.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
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Location Information:	West Anaheim Medical Center in Anaheim, California
Attacker Information:	Dung Trinh (43/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Handgun (revolver); handgun (revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Other
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. CBS News, "3 Dead in Hospital Shooting," September 14, 1999, <http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/1999/09/14/national/main11932.shtml>.
2. Jack Leonard and Scott Gold, Los Angeles Times, "Police Study Motives for Hospital Shooting," September 16, 1999, <http://articles.latimes.com/1999/sep/16/local/me-10747/2>.
3. City of Anaheim, "Anaheim Police Department History: 1990," <http://www.anaheim.net/article.asp?id=674>.

Case #266

August 12, 1999: Buford O'Neal Furrow Jr. opened fire at a day care center in the North Valley Jewish Community Center, injuring five people. Furrow then shot and killed a letter carrier after leaving the community center. Furrow had an extensive criminal record prior to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jewish Community Center in Los Angeles, California
Attacker Information:	Buford O'Neal Furrow, Jr. (38/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AR 15); submachine gun (Uzi); Handgun (Glock 9-millimeter)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Sources:

1. Timothy Egan, New York Times, "Racist Shootings Test Limits of Health System, and Laws," August 14, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/08/14/us/racist-shootings-test-limits-of-health-system-and-laws.html?sec=&spon=&pagewanted=all>.
2. Mike Carter and Keiko Morris, Seattle Times, "Furrow's Gun Originally a Police Weapon," August 13, 1999,

<http://community.seattletimes.nwsources.com/archive/?date=19990813&slug=2977109>.

3. Frank Gibney Jr., Pat Dawson, Julie Grace, David Jackson, Michael Krantz, Flora Tartakovsky and Dick Thompson, Time Magazine, "The Kids Got in the Way," <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,991784-2,00.html>.

Case #267

April 15, 1999: Sergei Babarin opened fire at a Mormon library, killing two people and wounding five others. He was shot by police. Reports state that Barbarin, a diagnosed schizophrenic, had stopped taking his medication for several months leading up to the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Temple Square Mormon Church in Salt Lake City, Utah
Attacker Information:	Sergei S. Barbarin (70/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 5 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (.22-caliber)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Source:

1. James Brooke, New York Times, "3 Are Killed and 5 Hurt in Shootout in Utah City," April 16, 1999, <http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/16/us/3-are-killed-and-5-hurt-in-shootout-in-utah-city.html?scp=4&sq=Sergei Babarin 1999 salt lake&st=cse>.

Case #268

July 24, 1998: Russell Eugene Weston Jr. opened fire at a security checkpoint at the United States Capitol, killing a police officer and wounding a tourist. Weston then fatally shot a plain-clothed detective stationed outside of Representative Tom Delay's office. Weston began his attack when a Capitol police officer confronted Weston about trying to avoid the metal detector.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	United States Capitol Building in Washington, D.C.
Attacker Information:	Russell E. Weston, Jr. (41/M)
Casualties:	2 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1

Weapon Information:	Handgun (.38-caliber revolver)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Martin Weil, Washington Post, "Gunman Shoots His Way into Capitol; Two Officers Killed, Suspect Captured," July 25, 1998, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/shooting/stories/main072598.htm>.
2. CNN, "Weston: A Man with a History of Mental Illness," July 26, 1998, <http://www.cnn.com/US/9807/26/cap.shooting.weston/>.

Case #269

December 18, 1997: Arturo Reyes Torres opened fire at a California maintenance yard where he was formerly employed, killing four employees and wounding two others. The attack concluded when Torres was killed by police. He had recently been fired from the company for stealing.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Caltrans Maintenance Yard in Orange County, California
Attacker Information:	Arturo Reyes Torres (unknown/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 2 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-47)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. New York Times, "Dismissed Worker Kills 4 and Then is Slain," December 20, 1997, <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9907E1DD163EF933A15751C1A961958260>.
2. Nick Anderson, David Reyes and Esther Schrader, Los Angeles Times, "4 Workers, Gunman Die in Caltrans Yard Attack," December 19, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/19/news/mn-172>.
3. Nick Anderson, Lee Romney and David Haldane, Los Angeles Times, "Aftermath of a Killer's Fury," December 29, 1997, <http://articles.latimes.com/1997/dec/20/news/mn-431>.

Case #270

April 24, 1996: Kenneth Tornes opened fire at the firehouse where he worked, killing four supervisors. He then engaged police in a shootout at a shopping center after leading the officers on a chase. Prior to the attack, Tornes killed his estranged wife in her home.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Jackson Fire Department in Jackson, Mississippi
Attacker Information:	Kenneth Tornes (32/M)
Casualties:	4 dead; 0 wounded
Number of Weapons:	4
Weapon Information:	3 handguns (one .45-caliber semi-automatic and one TEC-9semi-automatic); rifle (Mac 11)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Firefighter Kills Wife and 4 Officials," April 25, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/04/25/us/firefighter-kills-wife-and-4-officials.html?partner=rssnyt&emc=rss>.
2. Associated Press, Eugene Register Guard, "Firefighter Guns down Wife, Superiors," April 25, 1996, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1310&dat=19960425&id=EnYVAAAAIBAJ&sjid=6-oDAAAIBAJ&pg=6888,5993878>.

Case #271

February 9, 1996: Clifton McCree opened fire in a trailer, killing five former colleagues and wounding another. Reports state that McCree, a former maintenance crew worker, was angry about being fired from his job for illegal drug use 14 months earlier.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Lauderdale Beach in Fort Lauderdale, Florida
Attacker Information:	Clifton McCree (41/M)
Casualties:	5 dead; 1 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	2 handguns (one revolver and one semi-automatic)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Suicide

Source:

1. Associated Press, New York Times, "Florida Killer Said Victims Were Racists, Police Say," February 11, 1996, <http://www.nytimes.com/1996/02/11/us/florida-killer-said-victims-were-racists-police-say.html?pagewanted=1>.

Case #272

June 11, 1994: Mattias Flink, a police lieutenant, opened fire at an army base and on public streets, killing seven people.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Army base and public streets in Falun, Sweden
Attacker Information:	Mattias Flink (24/M)
Casualties:	7 dead
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Rifle (AK-5)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Reuters, "TIMELINE – Shooting Incident in Finland," December 31, 2009, <http://in.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idINIndia-45088320091231>.
2. The Local, "Mass Murderer Denied Request for Reduced Sentence," September 3, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/14112/20080903/>.
3. The Local, "Court Affirms Mass Murderer's Life Sentence," October 27, 2008, <http://www.thelocal.se/15240/20081027/>.

Case #273

December 7, 1993: Colin Ferguson opened fire in a crowded car on a Long Island Railroad train, killing six passengers and wounding 19 others.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Long Island Railroad car to Hicksville, Garden City, New York
Attacker Information:	Colin Ferguson (37/M)
Casualties:	6 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Handgun (9-millimeter Ruger)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day

Resolution:

Force

Sources:

1. Francis X. Clines, New York Times, "DEATH ON THE L.I.R.R.: The Rampage; Gunman in a Train Aisle Passes Out Death," December 9, 1993, <http://www.nytimes.com/1993/12/09/nyregion/death-on-the-lirr-the-rampage-gunman-in-a-train-aisle-passes-out-death.html?pagewanted=all>.
2. Legal Information Institute, "The 'Insanity Defense' and Diminished Capacity: Colin Ferguson – the Long Island Railroad Gunman," Cornell Law School, <http://www.law.cornell.edu/background/insane/lirr.html>.
3. Pat Milton, Associated Press, "Ferguson Guilty in LIRR Massacre," February 18, 1995, <http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=OtrppQHxQ5wC&dat=19950218&printsec=frontpage>.

Case #274

April 30, 1989: Robert Sartin opened fire throughout the town of Monkseaton, killing one person and wounding 14 others. Sartin's 20-minute shooting spree concluded when he was cornered by police officers near a seafront. He stole his father's shotgun to carry out the attack.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Monkseaton in North Tyneside, United Kingdom
Attacker Information:	Robert Sartin (22/M)
Casualties:	1 dead; 14 wounded
Number of Weapons:	1
Weapon Information:	Shotgun
Closest Relationship to Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Adrian Pitches, BBC News, "Town Struggles to Recall Shooting," May 2, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/tyne/8029888.stm.
2. Rob Pattinson, Sunday Sun, "Monkseaton Mourns Victim of Gunman Robert Sartin," April 26, 2009, <http://www.sundaysun.co.uk/news/north-east-news/2009/04/26/monkseaton-mourns-victim-of-gunman-robert-sartin-79310-23473229/>.

Case #275

August 9, 1987: Julian Knight opened fire on pedestrians and cars from atop a billboard platform, killing seven people and wounding 19 others. Knight was a failed army cadet.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Hoddle Street in Melbourne Australia
Attacker Information:	Julian Knight (19/M)
Casualties:	7 dead; 19 wounded
Number of Weapons:	3
Weapon Information:	Rifle (.22-caliber Ruger); shotgun (12-gauge pump-action); rifle (M14)
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No Force

Sources:

1. Reuters, Los Angeles Times, "Australia Killer Gets 460 Years in Prison," November 11, 1988, http://articles.latimes.com/1988-11-11/news/mn-863_1_years-prison-australia.
2. Elissa Hunt, Herald Sun, "Hoddle St. Killer Julian Knight has Legal Win in Parole Bid," August 11, 2010, <http://www.heraldsun.com.au/news/victoria/hoddle-st-killer-julian-knight-has-his-first-legal-win-parole-bid/story-e6frf7kx-1225903849955>.
3. Australian Government Attorney General's Department, *The Australian Journal of Emergency Management*, November 2004, [http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/\(3273BD3F76A7A5DEDAE36942A54D7D90\)~AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf/\\$file/AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf](http://www.ag.gov.au/www/emaweb/rwpattach.nsf/VAP/(3273BD3F76A7A5DEDAE36942A54D7D90)~AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf/$file/AJEM_Vol19_Issue4.pdf).
4. "Hoddle Street," Victoria Police Magazine, August 2007, pg. 6-11, www.police.vic.gov.au/retrievemedia.asp?Media_ID=20148.

Case #276

December 27, 1985: Four gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization opened fire at the El-Al and Trans World Airlines ticket counters at Rome's Leonardo da Vinci Airport, killing 13 people and wounding 75 others. Italian police and Israeli security guards killed three of the gunmen and captured the fourth. The gunmen were armed with grenades and automatic rifles.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Leonardo da Vinci Airport in Rome, Italy
Attacker Information:	Ibrahim Mohammed Khaled (unknown/M)
Casualties:	13 dead; 75 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Rifle; other

Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Roberto Suro, New York Times, "Palestinian Gets 30 Years for Rome Airport Attack," February 13, 1988,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/world/palestinian-gets-30-years-for-rome-airport-attack.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,"
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/pubs/fs/5902.htm>.

Case #277

December 27, 1985: Three gunmen belonging to the Abu Nidal Organization opened fire at the El-Al ticket counter at Vienna's Schwechat Airport, killing three people and wounding 30 others. Austrian police killed one of the gunmen and captured the other two.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Schwechat Airport in Vienna, Austria
Attacker Information:	Unknown
Casualties:	3 dead; 30 wounded
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Submachine gun; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force

Sources:

1. Roberto Suro, New York Times, "Palestinian Gets 30 Years for Rome Airport Attack," February 13, 1988,
<http://www.nytimes.com/1988/02/13/world/palestinian-gets-30-years-for-rome-airport-attack.html?pagewanted=1>.
2. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of the Historian, "Significant Terrorist Incidents, 1961-2003: A Brief Chronology,"
http://www.fas.org/irp/threat/terror_chron.html

Case #278

August 5, 1973: Sehud Muhammad and Talat Hussan opened fire and threw grenades in a crowded passenger lounge at Athens Airport, killing three people and wounding 55

others. The passengers in the lounge were about to board a flight for Israel. The Palestinian gunmen surrendered after taking 35 passengers hostage for two hours.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Athens Airport in Athens, Greece
Attacker Information:	Sehud Muhammad (unknown/M); Talat Hussan (unknown/M)
Casualties:	3 dead; 55 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	No force

Source:

1. BBC, "1973: Athens Attack Leaves Three Dead,"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/august/5/newsid_4533000/4533763.stm.

Case #279

May 29, 1972: Kozo Okamoto, Tsuyoshi Okudaira and Yasuyuki Yasuda opened fire on crowds at the Lod International Airport in Israel, killing 26 people and injuring 72 others. As the three Japanese gunmen arrived at the airport from Paris, they began randomly targeting victims using automatic guns and hand grenades. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine recruited the gunmen from the Japanese Red Army.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Lod International Airport in Airport City, Israel
Attacker Information:	Kozo Okamoto (24/M); Tsuyoshi Okudaira (unknown/M); Yasuyuki Yasuda (unknown/M)
Casualties:	26 dead; 72 wounded
Number of Weapons:	2
Weapon Information:	Unknown firearm; other
Closest Relationship to the Victim:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	Same day
Resolution:	Force and suicide

Sources:

1. Time Magazine, "Israel: Terrorist on Trial," July 24, 1972,
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,906148-1,00.html>.

2. BBC, "1972: Japanese Kill 26 at Tel Aviv Airport,"
http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthistday/hi/dates/stories/may/29/newsid_2542000/2542263.stm.

FOILED OTHER

Case #280

May 8, 2007: Mohamad Ibraim Shnewer, Dritan Duka, Eljvir Duka, Shain Duka, Serdar Tatar, and Agron Abdullahu were arrested for planning an attack on the Fort Dix Army Base. The six men from Eastern Europe and the Middle East were apprehended by authorities while trying to purchase automatic weapons from undercover FBI agents. They also spoke of attacking U.S. warships and conducted surveillance on Fort Monmouth in New Jersey, Dover Air Force Base in Delaware and other military installations.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Fort Dix Army base in Burlington County, New Jersey
Attacker Information:	Mohamad Ibraim Shnewer (22/M); Dritan Duka (28/M); Eljvir Duka (23/M); Shain Duka (26/M); Serdar Tatar (23/M); Agron Abdullahu (24/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	N/A
Weapon Information:	AK-47 assault weapons, M-16s, other
Closest Relationship to the Target:	None
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when a shopkeeper at a video store alerted authorities to the men after he had been asked to copy a suspicious video onto a DVD. The video displayed 10 young men shooting weapons at a firing range while calling for jihad.

Sources:

1. Kareem Fahim, New York Times, "Six Ordinary Lives That Took a Detour to a World of Terror," May 9, 2007,
<http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/nyregion/09suspects.html?pagewanted=print>.
2. David Kocieniewski, New York Times, "6 Men Arrested in a Terror Plot against Fort Dix," May 9, 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/us/09plot.html?_r=1&pagewanted=1.

3. Associated Press, FOX News, "Store Clerk Helps Feds Bust 6 in Alleged 'Jihad' Plot to Kill U.S. Soldiers at Fort Dix," May 8, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,270601,00.html>.
4. NPR, "Plot to Attack Fort Dix Foiled, Authorities Say," May 8, 2007, <http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10072697>.

Case #281

June 24, 2009: John Rosser was arrested for plotting to kill his former boss at the Duke Energy Convention Center. Rosser was fired from the Convention Center two years before the plot was uncovered.

Number of Attack Locations:	1
Location Information:	Duke Energy Convention Center in Cincinnati, Ohio
Attacker Information:	John Rosser (28/M)
Casualties:	N/A
Number of Weapons:	Unknown
Weapon Information:	Unknown
Closest Relationship to the Target:	Professional
Date Attack Concluded:	N/A
Resolution:	Plot was foiled when Rosser told his landlord about the plot, who then alerted authorities. Officers captured Rosser, who was armed with a gun, about 100 yards from the Convention Center.

Source:

1. United Press International, "Cincy Police Foil Workplace Shooting," June 24, 2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/2009/06/24/Cincy-police-foil-workplace-shooting/UPI-20451245863259/.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Protective Security Coordination Division
Office of Infrastructure Protection



Infrastructure Protection Report Series

Elementary and Secondary Schools

Approximately fifty million students attend nearly 100,000 public elementary and secondary schools throughout the Nation. Elementary and secondary schools are relatively open-access, limited egress congregation points for children, and have been successfully targeted by terrorists in the past.



Potential Indicators of Terrorist Activity

Terrorists have a wide variety of weapons and tactics available to achieve their objectives. Specific threats of most concern to schools include:

- Small arms attack
- Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)
- Vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices (VBIEDs)
- Arson or incendiary attack
- Chemical or biological attack

Terrorist activity indicators are observable anomalies or incidents that may precede a terrorist attack. Indicators of an imminent attack requiring immediate action may include the following:

- Persons in crowded areas (e.g., school auditorium, cafeteria, athletic facilities) wearing unusually bulky clothing that might conceal suicide explosives or weapons
- Vehicles approaching the school at an unusually high speed or steering around barriers and traffic controls
- Suspicious or illegally parked vehicles on or near school grounds
- Unattended packages (e.g., backpack, briefcase, box) that may contain explosives. Packages may be left in

open areas or may be hidden in trash receptacles, lockers, or similar containers.

- Evidence of unauthorized access to heating, ventilation, and air-conditioning (HVAC) areas of a school; indications of unusual substances near air intakes
- Suspicious packages and/or letters received by mail that might contain explosives or chemical/biological/radiological agents.

Indicators of potential surveillance by terrorists include:

- Persons using or carrying video/camera/observation equipment in or near the school over an extended period
- Persons parking, standing, or loitering in the same area over a multiple-day period with no reasonable explanation
- Persons questioning school employees off-site about practices pertaining to the school and its operations
- Persons discovered with school maps, photos, or diagrams with key components or sensitive areas highlighted
- Suspicious personal e-mail, telephone, fax, or postal mail requests for information about the school or its operations
- A noted pattern of false alarms requiring a response by law enforcement or emergency services
- Threats by telephone, mail, or e-mail and/or increase in reports of threats from known reliable sources

Common Vulnerabilities

The following are key common vulnerabilities of elementary and secondary schools:

- Relatively open access to school grounds and buildings
- Limited or no vehicle access controls
- Large concentrations of students gathering in open areas outside school buildings on a regular and readily observable schedule
- Proximity of schools and neighboring facilities, especially in urban areas
- Limited or no inspection of students' personal articles, particularly in lower-crime areas
- Limited security on school buses

Protective Measures

Protective measures include equipment, personnel, and procedures designed to protect a facility against threats and to mitigate the effects of an attack. Protective measures for elementary and secondary schools include:

• Planning and Preparedness

- Designate an employee as security director to develop, implement, and coordinate all security-related activities
- Conduct security audits on a regular and continuing basis. Develop a comprehensive security plan and emergency response plan for the school
- Conduct regular exercises of emergency plans
- Establish liaison and regular communication with local law enforcement and emergency responders

• Personnel

- Conduct background checks on all school employees
- Incorporate security into employee training programs
- Provide security information and training to all students

• Access Control

- Define the facility perimeter and areas within the facility that require access control. Maintain building access points to the minimum needed
- Issue photo identification badges to all school employees and students
- Require visitors check in with the front office upon arrival and departure
- Provide visitors with school issued identification badges when on school grounds.
- Positively identify all vehicles and drivers that enter the school parking lots
- Institute a policy restricting other vehicles from accessing the bus-loading zone
- Secure ladders, awnings, and parapets that provide access to building roofs, HVAC systems, and other critical equipment

• Barriers

- Install appropriate perimeter barriers and gates. Maintain clear area at perimeter barriers to enable continuous monitoring and to inhibit concealment of people or packages
- Establish a clear zone adjacent to buildings. Keep zone free of vegetation and other obstructions
- Install barriers to protect doors and windows from small arms fire and explosive blast effects

• Communication and Notification

- Install system(s) that provide communication with all people at the school, including employees, students, emergency response teams, and visitors
- Develop a plan for communicating with parents during emergency situations
- Develop a notification protocol that outlines who should be contacted in emergencies.

- Develop a procedure for communicating with the public and the media regarding security issues

• Monitoring, Surveillance, Inspection

- Evaluate needs and design a monitoring, surveillance, and inspection program
- Provide visual surveillance capability (e.g., designated surveillance points, cleared lines of sight)
- Install intrusion detection and alarm systems
- Deploy personnel assigned to security duty to regularly inspect sensitive or critical areas
- Continuously monitor all people entering and leaving the facility for suspicious behavior
- Continuously monitor all vehicles approaching the facility for signs of threatening behavior

• Infrastructure Interdependencies

- Ensure that the school has adequate utility service capacity to meet normal and emergency needs
- Ensure that employees are familiar with how to shut off utility services
- Provide adequate physical security for utility services

• Cyber Security

- Develop and implement a security plan for computer and information systems hardware and software
- Maintain a well-trained computer security staff

• Incident Response

- Ensure that an adequate number of emergency response personnel are on duty and/or on call
- Provide training and equipment to emergency response personnel to enable them to deal with terrorist-related incidents
- Check the status of all emergency response equipment and supplies on a regular basis
- Develop a plan for discharging students following incident resolution

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Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan

An Annex to the Government Facilities
Sector-Specific Plan

2010



Homeland
Security



Department of
Education



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Executive Summary

Critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) provide the essential services that support basic elements of American society. Compromise of these CIKR could disrupt key government and industry activities, facilities, and systems, producing cascading effects throughout the Nation's economy and society and profoundly affecting our national prestige and morale. Protection of U.S. CIKR is therefore vital to our Nation's security, economic vitality, and way of life. Because the functional categories of schools and higher education are aligned with the Government Facilities Sector (GFS), the Education Facilities Subsector (EFS) is a GFS subsector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) for coordinating infrastructure protection efforts for schools and higher education institutions. The U.S. Department of Education's (ED) Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) serves as the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for the subsector under the NIPP, as designated by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

ED's mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access. Within ED, OSDFS administers, coordinates, and recommends policy for improving quality and excellence of programs and activities involving student health and safety, including guidance and information on emergency management efforts for schools and higher education institutions. OSDFS supports ED's mission by building school emergency management capacity and resilience at the Federal, State, and local levels. As the EFS SSA, OSDFS provides guidance and information to the education community in relation to infrastructure and security programs and resources for subsector CIKR protection.

Prior to ED's work under the NIPP, OSDFS was involved in various joint efforts with Federal agencies, including DHS, health and mental healthcare professionals, various associations and organizations, school district security chiefs, and State School Safety Centers to promote school preparedness and protection regarding emergency management as it relates to schools. In 2006, ED's OSDFS became engaged in DHS' NIPP effort and, as the SSA, developed a Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) that focused on school and university protective efforts. As part of the NIPP process, EFS participates in sector activities and assumes NIPP-related responsibilities while continuing to provide emergency management guidance and information to the education community.

Throughout its history with school emergency management, OSDFS has developed a substantive knowledge base for understanding key issues, concerns, and challenges facing education facilities as they refine comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans. OSDFS' knowledge and experience of key principles and elements of emergency management as they relate to schools informed EFS' goal that all education facilities, preK–12 through higher education, including DoD and American-sponsored overseas schools, have comprehensive emergency management plans to deal with all hazards (including cyber) and that address the four phases of emergency management—prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery.

EFS consists of prekindergarten (preK) programs; all public and private K–12 schools (including charter schools); public and private higher education schools and institutions; U.S. Department of Defense schools; and American-sponsored overseas schools assisted by the U.S. Department of State.

Education facilities (preK through postsecondary) differ in comparison to other CIKR sectors or subsectors requiring infrastructure protection, as education facilities house mostly students for the majority of the day, five days a week or more, and often include after-school and evening activities and events. Further, education facilities are nontraditional emergency response agents, making comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans that are practiced and coordinated with community partners (e.g., law enforcement, fire, emergency management services, public health, local government) critical for the subsector. EFS realizes that although most schools have some level of security, plans that increase infrastructure protection and resilience constitute a universally applicable and subsector appropriate protective measure that can work to prevent or mitigate an incident and the subsequent consequences, enhancing resilience for the education facility and the surrounding community. Therefore, such plans are the primary focus of EFS infrastructure protective efforts and are the focus of EFS' CIKR protection goal and objectives under the NIPP.

The need for comprehensive, all-hazards plans has been highlighted historically and in recent years, as the subsector has been affected by incidents from school violence (e.g., the Virginia Tech shooting) to devastating natural disasters (e.g., Hurricane Katrina). In addition, education facilities have been affected by hazardous materials and chemical spills that have forced students and staff to evacuate. Also, infectious disease outbreaks, (e.g., H1N1, Methicillin-Resistant *Staphylococcus Aureus*), and food recalls have also had significant impacts on the subsector.

A challenge to this goal for the SSA is that given the decentralized role of our Nation's education system, education facilities are not required to report emergency management efforts to ED. As a result, comprehensive data does not currently exist regarding whether existing school or higher education emergency management plans are all-hazards and comprehensive, or if the plans are developed and exercised with community partners, reviewed, or updated regularly.

OSDFS and Emergency Management

A focus on emergency management for schools is not new to OSDFS. Part of the mission of OSDFS is to provide guidance and information to the education community regarding safe schools. Through its discretionary grant programs, training, a variety of tools, and established partnerships, OSDFS is directly involved with emergency management for the subsector. OSDFS works with a host of partners at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels to enhance school and university preparedness. Throughout the years, these established relationships have fostered cooperation and mutual understanding of the key principles for school emergency management. Such collaborative efforts have produced a variety of tools for the education community to assist in all aspects of increasing infrastructure protection and enhancing resilience that are available via emergency management Web sites established by ED (www.ed.gov/emergencyplan; <http://rem.ed.gov>). The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) discretionary grant and the Emergency Management for Higher Education (EMHE) discretionary grant are key protective programs available to local educational agencies (LEAs) and to higher education institutions (HEIs) for developing and refining emergency management plans. OSDFS' REMS Technical Assistance Center supports the subsector in its emergency preparedness efforts including the development and implementation of comprehensive emergency management plans through posting emergency management guidance, information, materials, and technical assistance for the subsector. In addition, OSDFS has conducted trainings for REMS and EMHE grantees and nongrantees, public school districts, school security and law enforcement officials, Federal partners, and private schools interested in enhancing their preparedness efforts for schools and HEIs. Historically and ongoing, OSDFS works to provide guidance and information to the education community in relation to safe schools and emergency preparedness in the form of grants, training, collaborations with partners, tools, and emergency management-related materials for education facilities in the interest of comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans.

Summary of the Education Facilities Document

Consistent with specific DHS guidance, the 2010 EFS SSP addresses key changes to the 2009 NIPP (e.g., all-hazards approaches and an emphasis on resilience), describing the EFS vision and goal in terms of these changes and as they relate to protective efforts and associated metrics. The SSP also provides an overview of the education facilities profile, assets, risk assessment, prioritization, protective programs and resilience strategies, metrics, research and development (R&D), and subsector management. Protective efforts for EFS assets emphasize primarily the protection of human life, and secondarily the protection of physical (structural) assets, followed necessarily by cyber assets. To address growing concerns regarding cyber protective measures for all sectors, EFS provides supplementary information to the 2007 iteration of the SSP as it relates to cybersecurity in the subsector.

In addition to addressing changes to the NIPP, this iteration more fully addresses CIKR partnerships and protection, including updates to protective efforts and emergency management guidance, information, and tools. The plan presents important partnerships and collaborative efforts that have resulted in additional protective efforts for the subsector, including programs, guidance, and tools, in addition to cross-sector efforts to enhance CIKR protection and resilience. This document also identifies ongoing and emerging information and data collection efforts at the Federal and State levels.

Further, this document relates the NIPP risk management framework to schools and HEIs regarding the use of risk assessment, the screening of infrastructure, and the assessment of consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats. EFS has worked with Federal and non-Federal partners, including DHS, to develop a guide to the risk assessment process and risk assessment tool selection for schools. Therefore, EFS' plan not only states that all schools and universities should conduct a vulnerability assessment as part of their overall emergency management efforts, but now also provides a tool to assist them in doing so.

EFS' plan also describes the key protective programs for the subsector (discretionary grants, training, collaboration, emergency management-related materials, and implementation of emergency management plans). Although the 2006 EFS SSP identified one protective program limited to one component of education facilities (LEAs), EFS now has an additional program to address higher education emergency management, in addition to increased tools, trainings, collaborations, and documents. These are described throughout the document and are available on ED's emergency management Web sites.

To measure progress, the document identifies EFS' approach to measuring effectiveness as it relates to the goal, and has identified, along with partners, specific metrics to assist in this measurement process that are applicable to the goal and appropriate to the unique subsector.

The document also presents an updated overview of existing R&D school technology efforts, including categories of technology in use by the subsector. Finally, the plan describes the current approaches to managing subsector responsibilities and information-sharing structures.

EFS has achieved much since its first iteration of the SSP. Expanding partnerships, programs, training, tools, guidance, and emergency management tools have moved EFS forward toward its goal. More LEAs and now institutions of higher education¹ have received emergency management discretionary grants, affecting thousands of students and staff and their communities nationwide. Subsector awareness can be further enhanced by additional emergency management resources available online to the subsector at large. Partnerships and ongoing initiatives have provided additional guidance in relation to emergency management for extant and emergent needs. However, more work is required to reach its ultimate goal of all schools and higher education institutions having an all-hazards, comprehensive plan. Overall, the 2010 SSP helps to demonstrate tremendous progress made to date, and illuminates the path forward toward the subsector goal.

¹ Institutions of higher education (IHEs) refer to 2- and 4-year degree granting institutions.



Introduction

Critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) provide the essential services that support basic elements of American society. Protection of U.S. CIKR is therefore vital to our Nation's security, economic vitality, and way of life. Because the functional categories of schools and higher education are aligned with the Government Facilities Sector (GFS), the Education Facilities Subsector (EFS) is a GFS subsector under the NIPP for coordinating infrastructure protection efforts for schools and higher education. The U.S. Department of Education's (ED) Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) serves as the SSA for the subsector under the NIPP as designated by DHS.

OSDFS has developed a Sector-Specific Plan (SSP) that focused on school and higher education protective efforts under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). Subsequently, the role of EFS is to provide guidance and information to the education community regarding the protection of education facilities. Toward that end, EFS provides guidance and information primarily on topics of school or higher education emergency management to the subsector.

EFS consists of prekindergarten (preK) programs; all public and private K–12 schools (including charter schools); higher education schools and institutions; U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) schools; and American-sponsored overseas schools assisted by the U.S. Department of State (DOS).

The EFS goal remains: That all education facilities, preK–12 through higher education, including DoD and American-sponsored overseas schools, have comprehensive emergency management plans to deal with all hazards (including cyber) and that address the four phases of emergency management—prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. These plans would be practiced and updated regularly; coordinated with appropriate State and local partners; developed in close collaboration with first responders and the community; and include a written plan for infectious disease, including a pandemic influenza outbreak, and a written food defense plan that includes the four phases of emergency management and is designed to safeguard the school's food supply, including all food storage and preparation facilities and delivery areas within the school district. In addition, the plan should incorporate measures to address special needs students and staff.

Tied to the goal, protective efforts include emergency management grants, training, emergency management-related tools, collaborations, and emergency management plan implementation. The 2010 SSP demonstrates its protective efforts' inherent relationship to all hazards (comprehensive plans are all hazards by definition) and resilience. In addition, numerous updates, including expanded protective programs, partnerships, metrics development, data sources, and initiatives are described in this plan.

For example, since the 2007 plan, EFS has expanded its protective programming to higher education, has expanded its partnership and outreach to nonpublic education and preK. Further, since the 2007 plan, EFS has increased its resources to include an emergency management guide for higher education and a vulnerability assessment guide for schools, increased its online resources, coordinated with cross-sector partners to produce mitigation guidance for schools in response to the H1N1 pandemic influenza, and increased the number of emergency management grantees.



1. Subsector Profile and Goal

1.1 Subsector Profile

In 2006, DHS asked OSDFS to develop a subsector plan that focused on school and university protective efforts as part of the overall NIPP effort; this document serves as the triennial iteration of the first plan, which was published in 2007. OSDFS serves as the Subsector-Specific Agency (SSA), and is referred to throughout this report as the SSA and EFS; when referencing the subsector itself (preK–12 and higher education institutions (HEIs)), it is referred to simply as the subsector.

ED's mission is to promote student achievement and preparation for global competitiveness by fostering educational excellence and ensuring equal access.² The OSDFS administers, coordinates, and recommends policy for improving quality and excellence of programs and activities designed to prevent drug use and violence; support emergency management efforts for schools and institutions of higher education and address student health concerns including physical activity, nutrition, and counseling and mental health service needs. OSDFS supports ED's mission by building school emergency management capacity and resilience at the Federal, State, and local levels. Within ED, OSDFS serves as the EFS SSA. OSDFS' Center for School Preparedness (CSP) manages the EFS. CSP provides guidance and information to the education community regarding emergency management. EFS consists of preK programs; all public and private K–12 schools (including charter schools); higher education schools and institutions; DoD schools; and American-sponsored overseas schools assisted by DOS.

EFS has human, physical, and cyber assets. However, the EFS assets of primary concern are human and physical. Human assets include people on school or campus grounds, including students and staff of all ages. These include preK–12 public school districts, charter schools, nonpublic schools, public and private higher education schools and institutions, and staff. Physical assets include school buildings, portable classrooms, and school or campus grounds. Comparatively, cyber elements may play a smaller role in the subsector than in other sectors. Cybersecurity concerns, although important throughout the subsector, increase with education level given the type and amount of data and computer-dependent systems. Although cyber assets play a relatively minor role for preK–12, the increasing use of online student information management systems in upper grades increases the need for cyber-protective measures.

The predominant characteristics of individual preK–12 schools vary tremendously within EFS. Facilities supporting these students and staff are widely dispersed throughout the country and in all geographical regions with differing social and physical environments. The communities supporting the schools vary by population density as well, including urban, suburban, and rural locations. The owners/operators of these preK–12 school facilities are most often local educational agencies (LEAs) or, in some cases, their own boards or individual States. Proprietary schools or nonprofit facilities are often owned by private entities. For HEIs, the owners and operators are primarily private entities although a significant number of these institutions are

² <http://www.ed.gov/about/landing.jhtml>.

operated by State or local entities. The physical size of a campus and the size of its student body, faculty, and staff vary as well, with some schools educating tens of thousands of students and providing housing for a significant proportion of those students and others enrolling fewer than 100 students.

Schools often serve as the hub of their community, providing meeting places for a range of community-based activities. As a result of this role, education facilities are usually easily identifiable and generally accessible to the public. Unique to this subsector is the fact that the preK–12 schools predominantly house children and youth, as well as staff, five days a week, most for at least one-third of the day. For many students, time at school (K–12 through higher education) is even longer as they participate in extracurricular school activities taking place on school grounds after traditional educational hours or community activities held at the school or campus. For many students, schools are the primary setting for critical services including food, health, and mental health services. Furthermore, there is an expectation that schools provide for the cognitive, physical, social, and emotional development of students. Therefore, the priority for this subsector surrounds guidance and information for and administration of appropriate protective measures that not only complement a positive learning environment, but also support the promotion of protective measures as appropriate for the school setting.

Higher education facilities share some but not all of the same characteristics as K–12 schools, though they are more often larger entities. HEIs are often small communities and sometimes small cities unto themselves. Some higher education campuses have their own infrastructure, including police forces, public works departments, and health care facilities, and maintain multiple types and sizes of facilities (e.g., academic, research, administrative, housing, athletic, social). These facilities provide for a large number of students and staff living, studying, and working on campus; are used to collect, manage, and store sensitive information; and are sometimes responsible for the safe storage and use of hazardous materials. Therefore, protective measures must be able to take into account the variety of characteristics and circumstances unique to higher education.

For higher education, the importance of cyber assets increases due to large databases of student and staff personal, educational, health, and financial information, as well as emergency management and security information. In addition, institutions of higher education also frequently maintain data that support research, including research projects sponsored by DHS and DoD. Some of these projects may include maintenance and use of sensitive data or storage and use of hazardous materials.

Cybersecurity considerations for the subsector identified in previous subsector reports involved (1) risks associated with the compromise of personal data (including health information), and (2) emergency management data housed electronically, i.e., institutions whose business continuity relies on a functioning information technology system and malicious exploits, such as distributed denial-of-service attacks on data systems and networks that implement essential functions (e.g., governance, utility service, maintenance, and campus security). These issues remain important cybersecurity considerations for EFS, and the SSA continues to work with partners to understand cyber issues and security throughout the subsector.

Key Authorities

EFS recognizes that the ultimate responsibility for the protection of particular assets in the subsector lies within local communities, the individual States, or private owners, as the United States has a highly decentralized system of education. The Tenth Amendment (1791) of the U.S. Constitution (1787) states: “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” Therefore, the general authority to create and administer public schools is reserved for the States. There is no national school system nor are there national requirements that prescribe curricula or control most other aspects of education. Although it plays an important role in education, the Federal Government does not establish or license schools or govern educational institutions at any level.³

³ “Education in the United States: A Brief Overview” U.S. Department of Education. (September 2005).

Commonly, key attributes of State education governance structures affect policy development and the policy implementation process. One common governance role is that of the Chief State School Officer, who heads the State Education Agency (SEA) and the State Board of Education. The Chief State School officer can be appointed or elected and can distribute State funds to local education authorities (about 94 percent of all funds spent on public elementary and secondary schools in the United States comes from State or local sources); interpret and administer State school laws; and provide advisory services to local superintendents and school boards.

At the local level, governance occurs through local school districts or LEAs and a local board of education, members of which are most often elected by citizens within the district but in some instances are appointed by government officials. Consistent with State law and official policy, the local board operates the public school system, or LEA, through the superintendent and the district staff, who enact State regulations to govern the operation of schools. Indeed, the limitations of school boards are those established by the State legislature, or by the SEA, which in most cases prescribe minimum standards for all local school districts. In addition, LEA enrollments range from fewer than one hundred students to more than one million students.

Legislation Supporting School and Higher Education Emergency Management Capacity Building and Data Gathering⁴

The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended (ESEA), requires that LEAs that receive funding from the Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act State Grants Program have a crisis management plan for responding to violent or traumatic incidents on school grounds. For general institutional data gathering, the Higher Education Act (HEA) requires that institutions that participate in the Federal student financial assistance programs must participate in the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (IPEDS) data gathering system (to provide data such as enrollments, faculty and staff, graduation, and finances). Finally, Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA), National Programs authorizes use of program funds for a variety of purposes related to preventing youth violence and drug use. ED has used this authority to implement Project School Emergency Response to Violence (Project SERV), an initiative that provides rapid assistance to LEAs, SEAs, or institutions of higher education whose learning environments have been disrupted by a violent or traumatic incident.

Nonpublic schools are operated privately and are not subject to all of the requirements that must be met by public schools. However, Title IX of ESEA does require that some programs provide equitable services to private school students and teachers. Title IX, section 9501 of ESEA requires that SEAs, LEAs, or other entities receiving funds under SDFSCA provide for the equitable participation of private school children, their teachers, and other educational personnel in private schools located in areas served by the grant recipient. In order to ensure that grant program activities address the needs of private school children, LEAs must engage in timely and meaningful consultation with private school officials during the design and development of the program. This consultation must take place before any decision is made that affects the opportunities of eligible private school children, teachers, and other education personnel to participate.

In order to ensure equitable participation of private school children, teachers, and other educational personnel, an LEA must consult with private school officials on such issues as: hazards/vulnerabilities unique to private schools in the LEA's service area, training needs, and existing emergency management plans and resources already available at private schools.

State Mandates and School Emergency Management

Since its 2007 SSP, EFS has begun identifying common State mandates that are aligned with and therefore help promulgate the EFS vision and goal. Such legislation includes information on school emergency management. Across the Nation, EFS has identified common State mandates (e.g., statutes, rules, and regulations, and administrative code) on the following activities regarding school emergency management: establishing a plan, performing assessments in relation to school emergency management,

⁴ Key authorities are listed in Appendix 1.

and conducting drills. The number of common mandates demonstrates an additional data source when making nationwide assessments of local school emergency management capacity. This data effort will be further described in section 2.2.

Interdependencies

Interdependencies in the subsector relate to the relationship between EFS' schools and their surrounding community. Education facilities are not traditional response organizations; they are more typically recipients of first responder services provided by fire and rescue, emergency medical, and law enforcement agencies. This traditional relationship is acknowledged in building emergency management capacity. District, school, and campus participation in the local government's preparedness efforts is essential to ensure that first responder services are delivered to campuses in a timely and effective manner. This relationship and mutual goal is supported and facilitated by the EFS mission and protective programming put forth. Additional interdependencies include community use of schools as shelters during emergencies (recent examples include Gulf Coast hurricanes and West Coast wildfires).

Furthermore, EFS facilities and campuses have additional assets that fall under the purview of other sectors whose protective measures include those specific assets. For example, the school campus can possess numerous critical assets and systems to be administered and maintained, such as transportation systems, campus stadiums and arenas, and food delivery, storage, preparation, and distribution, including the Department of Agriculture Child Nutrition Programs such as the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs. Many higher education campus settings can also include hospitals and research facilities employing chemical or nuclear materials, in addition to biologically hazardous or radioactive material. Such assets constitute cross-sector assets and fall within the primary authority of other sectors (described in section 1.2) and their respective protective initiatives and efforts. EFS coordinates with cross-sector Federal partners as appropriate. For example, EFS works with the Transportation Systems Sector's highway motor carrier mode to provide insight to their efforts as well as identify and disseminate applicable resources to the school and higher education community.

1.2 CIKR Partners

Both within ED and under the NIPP, the role of OSDFS as the SSA is to provide guidance and information to the education community. Within ED, this focuses particularly on safe schools. Under the NIPP, the focus is on the protective and resilience efforts for education facilities. As EFS is a subsector within GFS, this subsector plan is attached as an annex to the GFS SSP.

OSDFS has a long history of multi-disciplinary partnerships with educational and security representatives at the State and local levels and from the private sector. For example, ED works with agencies, organizations, and representatives associated with school security and emergency management, such as Chief State School Offices, SEAs, LEAs, and campus and school safety and law enforcement groups. EFS utilizes and builds on the history OSDFS has working with a host of partners at the Federal, State, local, and tribal levels to build and enhance school and university security and infrastructure protection. These relationships inform EFS initiatives, work to create an understanding of school emergency management nationwide, create a mechanism for information sharing, and work to build capacity and resilience. ED and OSDFS have partnerships with a variety of Federal departments and entities for activities relevant to the work of EFS under the NIPP. These partnerships have grown over the years and serve as a model for State and local entities and partnerships.

In addition, EFS has built on existing relationships with Federal agencies and partners via participation in the NIPP. Examples of implementation activities through such partnerships are discussed in section 5.1. For its roles and responsibilities under the NIPP, OSDFS, as the SSA, works with the NIPP Program Management Office (PMO) on subsector activities and responsibilities, including communication products and outreach. EFS also participates in the Transportation Systems Sector highway motor carrier mode Government Coordinating Council (GCC), and works directly with DHS's Federal Protective Service (FPS), GFS' designated SSA. For example, FPS develops the GFS SSP and coordinates with OSDFS in the development and submission of the EFS subsector plan, annual reports, and a variety of NIPP-related activities and responsibilities.

Although ED and OSDFS currently maintain numerous partnerships, OSDFS participates in a number of DHS groups beyond the requirements put forth under the NIPP. OSDFS currently works with DHS on multiple inter-agency national planning and preparedness groups (e.g., the National Biosurveillance Integration Center, the Defense Readiness Group, the Incident Management Planning Team, etc.), as well as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recovery groups in support of Federal initiatives. EFS also works with DHS on specific infrastructure protection and resilience efforts to better inform the development of guidance tools and resources to the subsector. For example, OSDFS has a long-established partnership with the U.S. Secret Service, forming the Safe Schools Initiative (SSI), which serves the mutual goal of producing applicable school threat assessment tools and guidance. The SSI is designed to help school officials and their partners identify students who may pose a risk, and has produced several reports including two threat assessment reports that outline a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of targeted violence in schools; threat assessment trainings; tabletop exercise scenarios for use by local school threat assessment teams; and most recently, a bystander report. In addition, EFS has also been working with DHS through FEMA's National Integration Center Incident Management System Division to develop school-centered National Incident Management System (NIMS) implementation activities and guidance materials to not only help with the implementation of NIMS but to also facilitate the gap between school emergency management officials and traditional response personnel.

Additionally, more discreet examples of partnerships with DHS have yielded resources and tools for the subsector. For example, EFS worked with a variety of Federal partners in 2004, and again in 2007, to develop and revise the Crisis Planning Guide, and with FEMA to conduct a virtual Town Hall on school emergency management. Further, in 2008, EFS worked with DHS and other agencies to develop a vulnerability assessment guide for schools, and worked with the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to establish the Emergency Management for Higher Education (EMHE) discretionary grant program.

Another partnership example with FEMA was to assist schools and higher education institutions with NIMS implementation and identified those activities that address the unique role of educational facilities in a community, their needs, and their functions as response agents along the chain of command during an incident. These efforts resulted in the publication of a series of documents outlining those actions education facilities receiving Federal preparedness funds must take in order to (1) fulfill NIMS compliance requirements, (2) integrate NIMS into the educational setting, and (3) connect schools and campuses to their community partners. This information is made available to the entire subsector via posting on ED's Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance (TA) Center Web site (<http://rem.ed.gov>).

EFS Cross-Sector Partners

- HHS
 - Public, physical, and mental health; specifically, pandemic flu guidance in 2009
 - Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
- Guidance, information, and tools
- Division of Adolescent School Health (DASH) (The School Dismissal Monitoring System)
- EMHE Grant Program
 - PreK emergency management
- DHS
 - Commercial Facilities SSA for school- and university-related commercial facilities
 - Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste SSA for Research and Test Reactors
 - Chemical SSA for chemical research facilities
 - Transportation Security Administration (TSA) regarding school buses security

- Department of Defense Educational Activity (DoDEA) regarding DoD schools
- DOS regarding American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools overseas
- U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) for child nutrition programs

Other Federal Partners

ED and EFS work with other Federal entities individually and on joint efforts to promote preparedness within the subsector, including:

- DHS
 - National Cyber Security Division (NCSD)
- Federally sponsored cybersecurity tools and programs
 - FEMA
- Virtual Town Hall
- NIMS implementation activities for schools, higher education institutions
 - U.S. Secret Service
- Threat assessment supports and trainings
- U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ)
 - Community-Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program for training and information on school-related problem solving
 - National Institute of Justice (NIJ) School Safety Technology Working Group
- U.S. Department of Commerce
 - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and DHS to provide all schools in the United States with all-hazards emergency radios

U.S. Department of Education Offices

EFS utilizes a variety of offices within ED that address a variety of topics related to subsector protective efforts:

- Office of Innovation and Improvement
- Office of Non-Public Education
- Office of Management
- Office of Special Education and Rehabilitation Services
- Office of Planning, Evaluation, and Policy Development
- Office of Post-Secondary Education

State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial Governments

OSDFS also has well-established, ongoing relationships with educational and school security associations and organizations, school security chiefs, and other partners at all levels of government. As ED has long-standing relationships at the State, local, and tribal levels, OSDFS works with partners associated with emergency management on school and higher education campuses. For example, at the national and State levels, OSDFS maintains relationships with Chief State School Officers, SEAs, and the National Association of School Safety and Law Enforcement Officers. In addition, ED maintains relationships with local

partners such as LEAs, campus security officers and emergency managers, and chief law enforcement personnel from the Nation's 40 largest school districts. REMS discretionary grantees from FY 2003 through FY 2009 and EMHE grantees from FY 2008–2009 are another group of partners for EFS, providing representation at the local, tribal, and territorial levels.

CIKR Owners and Operators

- School districts
- Public and private preK–12 schools
- Public and private higher education institutions, including proprietary schools
- Educational organizations and associations

1.3 Subsector Goal

The 2009 NIPP was revised to include several changes, among them an all-hazards approach, and an emphasis on resilience in relation to critical infrastructure protection. These elements have not only always been central and inherent to the EFS risk management approach, reflected in the EFS vision and goal, but also in each of its numerous programs, training, tools, and initiatives as detailed throughout this plan.

Consistent with the all-hazards risk management infrastructure protection and resilience approach described in its vision, the goal remains as stated in the 2007 EFS SSP. EFS worked with its CIKR partners in 2009 to address the relevance of the 2007 CIKR goal for the subsector and determined it is still relevant and appropriate as originally stated.

Progress in Subsector Emergency Management

EFS has made significant and continuous progress in the area of emergency preparedness for schools and higher education and currently offers:

- *Multiple discretionary grant programs to support school and higher education emergency management plans, and to fund education facilities focusing on recovery efforts following a violent or traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted;*
- *Increased information on lessons learned and emergency management topical training for schools and universities; and*
- *Other tools and resources such as guides for enhancing emergency management for schools, supporting higher education, and selecting an appropriate risk assessment tool.*

Vision Statement

To allow for the unique characteristics of the subsector and its vulnerabilities in respect to a wide range of manmade incidents and natural disasters, EFS has identified all-hazards, comprehensive emergency management plans as the most important risk mitigation activity that can support school and higher education infrastructure protection and resilience. The EFS vision remains: “That all schools and higher education institutions are prepared to prevent-mitigate, respond to, and recover from all hazards, natural or manmade, by having a comprehensive, all-hazards plan based on the key principles of emergency management to enhance school safety, to minimize disruption, and to ensure continuity of the learning environment.”

The EFS goal facilitates implementation of CIKR protective efforts and enhancements. Specifically, this goal states that “all schools, DoD and American-sponsored overseas, preK–12, higher education institutions (including proprietary schools), have comprehensive emergency management plans to deal with all hazards (including cyber) and that address the four phases of emergency management—prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. These plans would be practiced and updated regularly; coordinated with appropriate State and local partners; developed in close collaboration with first responders and the community; and include a written plan for infectious disease, including a pandemic influenza outbreak, and a written food defense plan that includes the four phases of emergency management and is designed to safeguard the school’s food supply, including all food storage and preparation facilities and delivery areas within the school district. In addition, the plan should incorporate measures to address special needs students and staff.”

Federal justification for this goal is found in ESEA, which requires LEAs that receive SDFSCA State Grant funds to have a crisis management plan for responding to violent or traumatic incidents on school grounds. Toward that end, the REMS grant program and the State Grants Program are vehicles the subsector uses to implement this legislative requirement. In addition, LEAs can use funds from their State allocations for the purpose of developing emergency management plans. At the State level, some States mandate activities related to emergency management and emergency management plans, as discussed throughout this report.

EFS’ emergency management efforts support its vision statement and risk management approach and stem from partnerships and experience gained from years of working with Federal partners, SEAs, LEAs, school officials, school security representatives, administrators, and grantees.

The EFS vision and goal equally support all education facilities’ unique characteristics and diversity from region to region and locale to locale. For example, education facilities are widely distributed geographically, yet the subsector is relatively equally at risk for manmade and natural hazards across the spectrum. Furthermore, the vision and goal addresses the common trait that education facilities are frequently intended to be easily identifiable and accessible to the local community. The EFS vision and goal provides a protective effort focus for all education communities (e.g., preK–12 through higher education, public and private) to work with community partners to build, enhance, practice, and update customized, all-hazards emergency management plans.

1.4 Value Proposition

Recognizing that it is at risk for a broad range of hazards and understanding that education facilities are not traditional response agents, EFS has worked to encourage the subsector to take an infrastructure protection and resilience approach to emergency management, including cybersecurity. The SSA has implemented various protective programs and initiatives to help the subsector reduce potential risks, including support for site-specific emergency management plans that are coordinated with community partners and maintained, updated, and practiced. The value proposition is inherent to the primary protective effort—comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans, which by their design promote resilience for the subsector.

Central to the design of a comprehensive emergency management plan is establishing and fostering relationships with local partners that support response and resilience. For example, under the REMS and EMHE discretionary grant programs, grantees are to collaborate, communicate, and coordinate emergency management efforts with local community-based law enforcement, public safety or emergency management agencies, public and mental health agencies, and local government to review and strengthen their emergency management plans. These relationships foster resilience with increased protection and efficiency during an emergency, reducing risk to subsector assets and disruption to the learning environment.

The process for communicating the value of EFS protective measures is done via several avenues. EFS communicates with Federal and non-Federal CIKR partners via its dedicated emergency management Web site, technical assistance center Web site, listservs, Webinars, national meetings and conferences, emergency management products, collaborations, and initiatives.

Several events have demonstrated the impact of these relationships and the resulting efficiency of response and resultant resilience for the subsector. One example is the 2007 California wildfires, where partnerships and preparedness mitigated impact and injury for both the school and the community in the face of an entire county needing to close schools and contend with a natural disaster. With the plan having already been coordinated with local partners, injury and disruption to the learning environment was minimized.

Comprehensive emergency management implications for the subsector include increased all-hazards protection and enhanced resilience. EFS works to minimize cost and maximize benefit to the subsector via administering grant programs, guidance and information, tools, and resources to help streamline efforts and mitigate costs. Further, emergency management grant requirements and guidance reinforce the importance of relationships between the school and the community, where both cost and expertise can be leveraged with local partners.



2. Identify Assets, Systems, and Networks

2.1 Defining Information Parameters

EFS' framework to collect subsector information focuses on data that facilitates increased understanding of preK–12 and higher education emergency management and preparedness. Information includes specific assets related to human, physical and cyber, but focuses on EFS' primary asset, the human asset. Although EFS continues to collect categorical asset information for the subsector, such as demographic and programmatic information and statistics, EFS data collection focuses on movement toward the EFS goal: That all education facilities have comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans.⁵ This infrastructure information results in a blend of Federal, State, and local data sources, and is often a result of relationships at all levels of governance.

Federal data collection efforts supporting EFS include annual and situational updates to Federal and State databases and systems, data collection from partners, and OSDFS programming data collection. Such information includes schools and higher education institutions that have emergency management plans through the receipt of OSDFS emergency management grants. This information supports EFS planning activities as well as its efforts to support subsector emergency management programs throughout the four phases, before, during, and after emergency incidents.

Such subsector data are divided into categories based on the entity charged with collection and maintenance of the related data. Data collected by ED describing HEI and preK–12 school information include common identifiers such as grade level, public or nonpublic status, type of conferring institution, and enrollment and staffing, as well as geographic and contact information. When available, EFS reviews discreet analysis and related reports on K–12 schools. Such analysis is derived from the outcome of reports on climate (e.g., safety and crime), protective measures, building infrastructure and school-related physical assets, and cyber assets (business systems and safety, security, and support systems), as available.

The number of active ED information collection efforts is driven by congressional legislation and includes common identifiers. Data collected by ED's National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) is the primary source used to obtain ongoing and basic subsector data. NCES data collections provide the foundation for national school and postsecondary educational data for EFS and a host of other entities.

To inform subsector asset information and data collection, EFS utilizes NCES data for reporting and planning purposes, in addition to requests for information and subsector status updates.

⁵ It should be noted that although information collection falls under the EFS umbrella, EFS coordinates with DoDEA but defers to DoDEA authorities regarding emergency management planning and implementation. Similarly, EFS also defers to DOS authorities in relation to overseas schools and emergency preparedness.

Specifically, EFS turns to the following NCES data sources:

- Common Core of Data (CCD)
- Indicators of School Crime and Safety
- Private School Universe Survey (PSS)
- IPEDS

These NCES annual data collection programs collect fiscal and nonfiscal data about preK–12 public and nonpublic schools, public school districts, and SEAs in the United States, in addition to higher education. PreK–12 public school and LEA data describes schools and school districts, including descriptive information about students and staff. When applicable, CCD includes information on schools and districts offering public preK–12 programming efforts. Nonpublic school data is collected separately through the PSS. IPEDS is the primary, higher education institution data source (for more details on each NCES data sources, see appendix 3).

Subsector preparedness information is also gathered from other Federal CIKR partners (e.g., HS, CDC, and DHS) and State agencies (e.g., regarding the number of States with mandates regarding school emergency management, including plan content and risk assessment). However, EFS primarily relies on ED's data collection as described above. For information not obtainable at the Federal level, EFS utilizes its partnerships at the local level to glean necessary data from the appropriate sources. For example, EFS works with the historical OSDFS partnerships to collect descriptive data as well as to inform the subsector of pertinent risk information. Partnerships include those with Federal agencies, at the State level with SEAs and the State Safe School Centers, and at the local level with LEAs, and school law enforcement officials, as well as current and former REMS and EMHE grantees.

This subsector's information collection process does not include direct reporting of cross-sector assets such as school buses, stadiums, and arenas located on campus grounds; Department of Agriculture Child Nutrition Programs such as the National School Lunch and School Breakfast Programs; and hazardous materials associated with hospitals or research facilities, as these assets fall under different sectors and are therefore being addressed in their respective sector plans. Although these cross-sector assets fall under the primary authority of other sectors, EFS coordinates with the other SSAs to understand how these issues are addressed as they apply to schools or HEIs.

Infrastructure Data Warehouse

EFS will continue its coordination efforts with GFS to contribute and participate in, as applicable, DHS asset information systems, including those administered through the DHS Infrastructure Information Collection Division (IICD), and the related protective programs. EFS will coordinate with IICD on updates to EFS taxonomy information and to review the need for any subsector asset data identified as appropriate for inclusion in the Infrastructure Data Warehouse (IDW). If asset data is identified for inclusion, EFS will work with DHS to ensure that data is accurate, current, and secure.

2.1.1 Identifying Cyber Infrastructure

EFS' approach to identifying cyber assets, systems, and networks remains based on the primary usage and vulnerabilities relevant to the subsector. These include risks associated with emergency management data and capabilities (access control, warnings and alerts, communication systems) that are housed electronically, education institutions whose security and business continuity relies on a functioning information technology system, and the compromise of personal data (inclusive of health and financial information). Cyber considerations are part of comprehensive, infrastructure and resiliency plans. Therefore, identifying specific cyber infrastructure is often done at the facility level by owners and operators. Although not comprehensive, EFS reviews annual reporting data from grantees that can further identify this infrastructure for the subsector.

Interdependencies can occur within the subsector as school and higher education cyber systems are often part of district or State-level systems and therefore fall under the purview of the larger entities' protective efforts.

2.2 Collecting Infrastructure Information

EFS collects protective efforts and steady-state information on general subsector data, the number of schools that report having emergency management plans as available through NCES surveys and CIKR partners, the number of LEAs and IHEs that have received REMS and EMHE grants, and information on preK emergency management, as available. EFS has established and maintains Federal-level partnerships facilitating collection and analysis of asset data as well information sharing. During steady-state conditions, EFS works to strengthen relationships and considers joint functions through information awareness and information-sharing activities. Information is also collected on the number of grantees located in the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) eligible sites, as available, and school dismissal data in response to an incident such as the 2009 H1N1 outbreak. Recent partnerships in support of local education and public health officials during the 2009 H1N1 outbreak exemplify how EFS continually maintains relationships with related Federal, State, and local agencies in mutual support of protecting the subsector. At the onset of the outbreak in April 2009, EFS' Center for School Preparedness collaborated with the CDC to detect, collect, and report information on school dismissals related to H1N1, creating the School Dismissal Monitoring System. Since the initial outbreak, the system has been enhanced and now includes voluntary, direct reporting from local school and public health officials.

The National Center for Education Statistics

NCES is the primary Federal entity for collecting and analyzing data related to education in the United States. NCES is located within ED and the Institute of Education Sciences. Further, NCES is the primary data resource for school and higher education statistical information for the EFS SSA.

Much school data already exists in the public domain, including the number of school and, for each school, its type, name, and location, and whether it is a State, local, or private entity. For example, to gather basic preK–12 and higher education data, EFS uses data compiled by NCES to understand subsector characteristics, including information and research on such subjects as basic school preparedness, protection, asset tallying, location/contact information/demographics, and school cultural climate. Further, EFS works with ED's internal office of nonpublic education to coordinate nonpublic K–12 data to inform information requests and status updates for nonpublic education.

It should be noted that, given the decentralized educational system, information limitations, including the lack of regulatory requirements to provide ED with information systematically, inhibit the comprehensiveness of information gathered. However, an example of data collection governed by regulation in the subsector is IPEDS, through which NCES also collects information and statistical data on HEIs online via www.nces.ed.gov/ipeds. IPEDS collects annual data from every college, university, and technical and vocational institution that participates in the Federal student financial aid programs. The Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended, requires that such institutions report data on information such as enrollments, faculty and staff, graduation, and finances. These data are made available through the IPEDS Data Center.

To inform subsector asset information and data collection for higher education, EFS utilizes NCES data for reporting and planning purposes, in addition to requests for information and subsector status updates. IPEDS provides basic data needed to describe and analyze trends in postsecondary education in the United States, and reports on basic information. Congress, Federal agencies, State governments, education providers, professional associations, private businesses, media, and others rely on IPEDS data for this basic information on postsecondary institutions. However, postsecondary infrastructure protection and security information is obtained through CIKR partners and emergency management grantees.

State Mandates for School Emergency Management

By establishing, implementing, refining, and sustaining all-hazards emergency management plans with their community partners, LEAs and higher education facilities build capacity and resilience. These plans help the subsector prevent and mitigate, prepare for, respond to, and recover from all-hazard incidents. Furthermore, these same activities work to build the general state of preparedness and resilience, by facilitating response, and therefore hastening the restoration and recovery process.

To expand EFS' understanding of subsector emergency management, EFS now assesses State mandates of key school emergency management activities as one of many indicators measuring growth of school emergency management efforts nationwide. This was in part initiated following the 2007 U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) report titled, "Most School Districts Have Developed Emergency Management Plans, but Would Benefit from Additional Federal Guidance."⁶ This report found that the majority (32 of 51) of States and districts responding to the GAO surveys reported having State laws and policies that require schools to have emergency plans.

Following the 2007 GAO report, and in line with EFS' goal, EFS began a new information collection procedure for the subsector. This data collection procedure is scalable to grade level or timeframe and can be updated as often as needed, depending on other determining factors. To obtain this data, EFS established the following activities as core data points for review of State mandates in relation to school emergency management:

- Establishing a plan;
- Conducting drills; and
- Performing assessments in relation to school emergency management.

OSDFS compared the common data sets (establishing a plan and conducting drills) to demonstrate progress and gathered a novel set of data (performing assessments in relation to school emergency management). This additional data set helps to capture the States' expectations for LEAs and their schools in relation to emergency management, but also is used to demonstrate progress in terms of increased or more comprehensive expectations. Further, this data helps inform the SSA of one element of subsector progress toward the goal. For example, the following information obtained in early 2009 can provide data points for future efforts in relation to gathering information on State mandates and school emergency management.

Common State Mandates: School Emergency Management	
Mandates (e.g., legislation, statutes, rules, and regulations, and administrative code) for LEAs and schools to conduct the following activities	Number of States
Establish an emergency management plan	41
Perform assessments in relation to school emergency management	25
Conduct fire drills and emergency evacuation	46
Conduct additional exercises (e.g., reverse evacuation, lockdown, shelter-in-place, weather specific, disease, chemical, practice of the plan)	28

⁶ <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-609>.

The School Dismissal Monitoring System

In spring 2009, a new data collection procedure initiative was prompted by a national incident. During the beginning of the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, EFS and CDC collaborated to create the School Dismissal Monitoring System, available on the ED and CDC Web sites,⁷ to report on novel influenza A (H1N1) related school or school district dismissal in the United States. Although this is a voluntary data submission, EFS owners and operators may now report novel influenza A (H1N1) related school and district closures by downloading and filling out an online reporting form and submitting it online or via facsimile. During its development and planning, EFS worked collaboratively with partners to develop and maintain a process for collecting, sharing, and protecting these data in a manner that met the needs of the schools and that would also help ED understand the situation across the Nation.

Further, EFS utilizes its various information-sharing vehicles, such as the Information Sharing Network (ISN) and a host of listservs that span public and private K–12 through higher education CIKR partners, to obtain and share information from subsector owners and operators, inclusive of school and higher education emergency managers. EFS also communicates with higher education partners to obtain H1N1-related information for higher education.

Therefore, the current collection of EFS data falls across multiple sources from owners and operators to non-Federal CIKR partners to Federal entities. Going forward, EFS will continue to coordinate with partners at all levels as needed and available to obtain and understand subsector information during steady-state conditions and emerging data in the wake of an incident.

2.3 Verifying Infrastructure Information

To ensure the accuracy of infrastructure information, the EFS SSA relies on existing processes and structures established by reliable sources, and directly confirms data points with the originators of the information as available. EFS relies primarily on Federal- and State-level data for obtaining infrastructure information.

NCES, a primary data resource for EFS, has an established procedure for verifying data collected. For example, NCES' School Demographic Data System implemented a geographic information system to disseminate decennial census and administrative data on public schools and school districts.⁸ NCES started the process of geocoding U.S. schools by using the statistical data found in its CCD school file. After geocoding, a random sample of 10 percent of schools was verified by various means, including geocoding software and directly through school staff.

2.4 Updating Infrastructure Information

Currently, ED's NCES consistently updates school and higher education survey data on a regular basis, often annually. State mandates are updated continuously and are driven by legislative schedules at the State level. EFS collects State mandate data on a regular basis and compiles the data annually to help inform progress toward the goal. School dismissal monitoring information is provided daily by subsector owners and operators, and summarized daily and weekly for Federal and State partners; grantee data is updated annually and ongoing. EFS maintains close contact with partners to collect and retain relevant preK–12 public and private school and higher education school data, and monitors public information sources to help the EFS SSA remain as current as possible. EFS will notify DHS of updates to infrastructure information as appropriate.

⁷ <http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/pandemic/index.html>
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/schools/dismissal_form/.

⁸ This NCES mapping site makes publicly available national information about local educational agencies in the 50 States and the District of Columbia at <http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/sdds>.

EFS will continue to coordinate with CIKR partners and continually look for updated and additional, reliable data sources for subsector information as it relates to infrastructure assets. During both steady-state conditions and in the event of an incident, EFS will work with its partners to ensure information is accurate and reliable.

3. Assess Risks

3.1 Use of Risk Assessment in the Subsector

Risk assessment is central to the NIPP risk management framework, and is part of a comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plan, the focus of the EFS risk management approach. EFS realizes that the subsector remains at risk for a host of natural or manmade hazards. At this time, the SSA relies largely on the independent assessments of education facilities. Sector-wide assessments can be considered in the future, if and when they are needed or appropriate. Therefore, as OSDFS provides guidance and information to the education community, EFS provides guidance and information to the subsector in relation to risk assessment as a process that is integral to an all-hazards emergency management plan, the focus of EFS CIKR protective efforts and the subsector goal. Specifically, EFS and other partners, including DHS, developed a guide to vulnerability assessments for schools, as described in section 3.4. Through this guidance, EFS promotes risk assessment, inclusive of cyber considerations, for both grantees and nongrantees.

Many vulnerability assessments for schools exist and many address school preparedness using risk assessment. In addition, ED's emergency management discretionary grants encourage schools and IHEs to evaluate their risks and hazards as a first step in strengthening both district and individual school emergency management plans. LEAs and IHEs are urged to survey the district, campus, and surrounding community to determine potential risks and hazards in order to develop a comprehensive plan. The REMS and EMHE discretionary grant application guidelines urge LEAs and IHEs to work with local law enforcement and public safety agencies, public health partners, mental health organizations, and other government agencies when assessing these vulnerabilities and developing subsequent preparedness strategies.

With few exceptions in individual State mandates, risk assessments, inclusive of cybersecurity, are voluntary in the subsector. Although individual schools, districts, or higher education facilities may have State or local regulatory requirements to perform assessments, ED does not have an overall regulatory framework through which to mandate risk assessment in the subsector. Although ED does not have the regulatory authority to enforce risk assessment in the subsector, under ESEA, schools receiving Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (SDFSCA) State Grant funding are required to have a crisis management plan for responding to violent or traumatic incidents on school grounds (although plan content is not included in this legislation, risk assessment can be part of these plans). However, the support and guidance of an OSDFS emergency management grant provides the incentive and encouragement to the recipient owners and operators to perform risk assessments and subsequently inform emergency management efforts.

Further, EFS continues to coordinate with DHS' Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center (HITRAC) on the threat and risk environment for the subsector, including cyber. Cybersecurity considerations are included in ED's Vulnerability Assessment Guide and, as part of infrastructure protection and resiliency plans, are allowable activities under both of the SSA's protective programs, REMS and EMHE.

3.2 Screening Infrastructure

Screening in the subsector occurs in a couple of ways. First, through FY 2009, the REMS grant program used the UASI program to provide a level of screening for the subsector in terms of locations deemed at higher risk. Second, through the development of comprehensive plans, educational facilities are screening for threats and hazards for their individual facilities.

Further, through DHS' National Protection and Programs Directorate, Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), the SSA shares information with higher education partners regarding the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) that could potentially apply to colleges or universities. CFATS regulates the security at chemical facilities determined by DHS to be high risk. Facilities are identified as potentially "high-risk" chemical facilities if they possess one or more Chemicals of Interest (COI)⁹. The CFATS program covers both traditional chemical facilities (e.g., chemical manufacturers) and nontraditional chemical facilities (potentially including some higher education facilities). If a facility is in possession of a COI at or above the applicable Screening Threshold Quantity, that facility is required to complete and submit a Top-Screen to DHS. Upon review of the Top-Screen, DHS will either determine that the facility is not "high risk," and thus not regulated under CFATS, or will preliminarily place the facility in one of four high-risk tiers (Tier 1, 2, 3 or 4, with Tier 1 representing the highest risk facilities). Given the role of the SSA, EFS coordinates with DHS and shares information about the CFATS program with higher education CIKR partners.

3.3 Assessing Consequences

Assessing consequences involves measuring the range of loss or damage that can be expected from the human, economic, governance, or public confidence impact as a result of a terrorist attack or a natural or manmade disaster.

Consequences from an incident at one or more schools or higher education facilities may have significance locally for the education facility and for the surrounding community. In addition, incidents in the subsector could have a national impact. For example, the recent (2009) H1N1 outbreak served as an example that numerous, extended closures have the potential for serious economic impact not only locally, but nationally as well. Further, a consequence assessment for education facilities may involve cross-sector protective efforts that help mitigate the consequences from an incident. It could include the physical, cyber, and human assets mentioned by identifying protective efforts by other sectors, for example, Healthcare and Public Health (health and well-being, higher education emergency management), Transportation Systems (school transportation), Commercial Facilities (stadiums and arenas), and Information Technology Communications (information security).

In addition, a consequence assessment for schools should include the disruption of both the social and physical learning environment, including cyber, on the local educational system, and subsequent psychological impact on the school community and public confidence and morale. EFS has explored such consequences with DHS and has begun coordinating with cross-sector and non-Federal partners as well to understand and collaborate on efforts for mitigating consequences to cross-sector assets.

Under the CFATS regulation, a facility that possesses a threshold quantity of any COI regulated under CFATS completes an online Top-Screen questionnaire, allowing DHS to roughly estimate the consequences that could result from an incident at a facility. If DHS deems a higher education facility Top-Screen submission as high risk, the facility completes a Security Vulnerability Assessment, which provides DHS information to make a more detailed consequence and vulnerability assessment. EFS will continue to work with DHS on possible consequences for potential situations that could affect subsector-specific assets, systems, or networks, as well as activities.

⁹ Chemicals of Interest (COI) are listed in Appendix A of 6 CFR 27.

EFS has limited cyber CIKR dependencies and interdependencies, reducing but not eliminating the consequences of destruction, incapacitation, or exploitation of subsector cyber elements, such as those relating to personal data (including financial and health) and infrastructure and security data or control systems housed electronically.

3.4 Assessing Vulnerabilities

Within the general framework of the NIPP, risk is considered a function of consequence, vulnerability, and threat (CVT). Vulnerability assessments are considered part of a comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plan, and are the focus of the EFS goal for the subsector.

In the subsector, risk assessments occur at the facility level. EFS has worked with partners to conduct comprehensive vulnerability assessments—of school buildings and grounds, school cultures and climates, staff skills, and community resources—to help crisis response teams identify, analyze, and profile hazards to inform the development of appropriate policies and procedures. These assessments inform all-hazards emergency plans and activities to prevent and mitigate risk, supporting the EFS all-hazards risk management approach to subsector infrastructure protection appropriate for the educational environment.

Additionally, EFS supports this aspect of infrastructure and security planning at the school level through the creation and posting on the REMS TA Web site, a guide to assist with this process. This vulnerability assessment product, created with DHS and other CIKR partners, is available online and is designed to assist schools with the implementation of an effective vulnerability assessment process, which includes choosing an appropriate vulnerability assessment tool.

Given the uniqueness and variability in the subsector, and the numerous assessments available to choose from (a concern raised by constituents), many available assessments have a narrow focus or are so complex that they inhibit use by schools. Therefore, a universally applicable vulnerability assessment was not feasible for the subsector. In response to this need, and in place of a vulnerability assessment tool, EFS, along with other partners, developed an assessment guide to provide a streamlined and practical approach for assisting schools as they navigate through the assessment process and the available products. The guide, although not prescriptive, focuses on key elements to be considered in the assessment process and when selecting an assessment tool appropriate for the particular school environment. The guide is intended to be a companion piece to the 2003 and 2007 “Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities.” EFS worked in partnership with school and security specialists and with DHS to develop a guide focused on developing a set of general principles that apply to all schools as they attempt to assess consequences, vulnerabilities, and threats.

Cyber concerns are included as a potential risk in this guide. As stated, comprehensive, infrastructure protection and resiliency plans can include cybersecurity measures to mitigate risk to cyber infrastructure. For example, the guide encourages schools to consider computer networks as a potential technological risk within the physical environment of the education facility that could become compromised through attack, intrusion, or other breach of security.

The guide is designed to be consistent with the CVT approach to risk assessment and, subsequently, the core criteria in relation to CVT, as appropriate, for education facilities. The core criteria guidance for vulnerability assessments set out in the NIPP and reflected in the guide describe the desired attributes of vulnerability assessment methodologies and include identifying the vulnerabilities associated with physical, cyber, or human factors and physical proximity to hazards, an assessment of current measures in place, and an assessment of the likelihood of potential natural hazards that pose a threat to the particular school or institution. The “Guide to Vulnerability Assessments: Key Principles for Safe Schools” (2008) is available to the entire school and higher education community and the public at www.ed.gov/emergencyplan or <http://rems.ed.gov/index.cfm?event=resources>.

3.5 Assessing Threats

As EFS has no threat analysis capability, EFS works closely and regularly with DHS' HITRAC to obtain threat information and coordinated with HITRAC on this section of the 2010 SSP. Following this coordination, threat in the EFS subsector is addressed and understood in relation to that originally stated in the inaugural 2007 EFS SSP.

Generally speaking, threat to the subsector includes both manmade and natural hazards, weather-related events, public health hazards, and school violence. As in the first iteration of the EFS SSP, these same threats continue to pose risks to education facilities and their surrounding communities. Further, upon consultation with HITRAC, threats to specific EFS assets, such as cyber and cross-sector assets, remain similar to previous years. EFS communicates regularly with HITRAC on subsector threat and risk and will continue communication throughout this next triennial SSP process.

Following are examples of incidents, both manmade and natural, that continue to pose threats and impact subsector assets:

- Weather-related events (e.g., hurricanes, wildfires);
- Public health hazards (e.g., Methicillin-Resistant *Staphylococcus Aureus* (MRSA),¹⁰ food recall (e.g., beef), salmonella outbreaks (e.g. tomatoes, peanuts), H1N1); intentional adulteration of food; and
- School shootings (e.g., Virginia Tech); cybersecurity (e.g., computer system hacking, phishing exploits).

Although in terms of EFS infrastructure protection, less emphasis is placed on cyber assets than human and physical assets, it is nonetheless important, and threats to this asset are communicated with and coordinated through HITRAC. Higher education institutions often collect and store sensitive, personal student data and databases (social security numbers, health, financial, and educational). Similarly, education facilities with emergency management data housed electronically require cybersecurity efforts to maintain the integrity of their plans (i.e., emergency management plans, floor plans). EFS recognizes that disruptions to institutional data systems could impact the capacity to effectively perform essential business operations and could cause a temporary to long-term school closure. However, although a cyber attack on an education facility would not likely impose cascading effects for the Nation, it can have such effects on the campus community through the compromise of personal data, security systems, and research facilities that rely on cyber elements or of emergency management data housed electronically.

EFS does not have a formal threat analysis process but instead works with a variety of appropriate partners at the Federal and State levels to address threats in the subsector. For overall threats to the sector, EFS coordinates regularly with HITRAC to obtain such threat information. In addition, EFS maintains relationships with non-Federal partners to obtain threat information in the subsector, and has worked with both Federal and non-Federal partners in relation to threat in the subsector, providing training and information products to assist the subsector.

¹⁰ MRSA is a form of *Staphylococcus aureus*, a common bacterium that has developed resistance to several forms of antibiotics. Infections can be seen anywhere, but are mostly seen in settings where people have close contact, such as schools.

4. Prioritize Infrastructure

As a rule, EFS does not prioritize assets, as the primary asset for the subsector is the human element (students and staff), which cannot be prioritized. Instead, through FY 2009, EFS prioritization occurred within a subsector protective program via the DHS UASI program. The UASI program works to enhance regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas, and is intended to assist participating jurisdictions in developing integrated regional systems for prevention, protection, response, and recovery. Therefore, the parties responsible for prioritizing within the subsector for this program are DHS and EFS. In terms of prioritization process, through the UASI program, the prioritization is risk-based. UASI applies a risk-based formula that defines high urban threat areas as those with a high level of consequence, vulnerability, and threat potentials, based on factors such as the presence of international borders, population/population density, and location of CIKR.

The ultimate goal of this subsector is that all schools and higher education facilities have comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans, but those within UASI-eligible areas are, according to DHS, at a higher risk than others. Through FY 2009, REMS grantees whose districts fell within a DHS-designated UASI zone were subsequently awarded priority preference in the application review process. Further, this process included applicant status, in terms of whether or not the applicant was a new applicant and within a UASI zone, as both received eligibility for EFS' prioritization efforts in relation to REMS discretionary grants. Therefore, the process for prioritizing sector assets, systems, or networks, including those in the UASI program, considered both risk and grantee status.

The frequency of these prioritization efforts coincides with the annual grant process. OSDFS reviews this process during its annual REMS grant competition to determine applicability and use for the upcoming cohort. The REMS discretionary grant program is available to K–12 LEA applicants. These emergency management grants, though directly available to public school districts (LEAs) only, can also serve private schools in the grantee's district, as REMS grantees are required to provide equitable access to private schools per grant guidelines.

Therefore, EFS' prioritization has occurred through its REMS grants via the UASI program based on location rather than function, because all schools have similar functions (all are learning environments and occupied by students and staff). However, since every education facility faces some hazards, all are encouraged to take measures to reduce and mitigate risk from an all-hazards approach. Grantees and nongrantees not located within UASI zones have received the same protective program benefits as those within UASI zones. ED makes the guidance, information, core training, and resources available to all education facilities through a variety of training, materials, guides, and publications to assist all schools and universities in their preparedness and infrastructure protection and security efforts. Many of these resources are described in appendix 2.

EFS' approach for prioritizing cyber elements is encompassed within the all-hazards framework for the subsector's emergency management grants that relate to this prioritization, and is informed subsequently by the competitive preference afforded to those applicants that meet the criteria set forth in the REMS grant application. EFS considers a comprehensive, infrastructure protection and resiliency plan to include cybersecurity considerations, which is therefore an allowable activity

under the emergency management grants. Responsibilities for prioritization of cyber assets, systems, networks, or functions is addressed first via competitive preference points, and second via the grantee that applies the grant to their cybersecurity needs, as appropriate.

5. Develop and Implement Protective Programs and Resilience Strategies

5.1 Overview of Subsector Protective Programs and Resilience Strategies

EFS has been working to address CIKR protection and resilience through several key protective programs that focus on the human physical, and cyber elements of the subsector. Through use of the four-phase framework for emergency management, EFS protective programs are designed to prevent and mitigate potential threats and vulnerabilities, and work to increase resilience and minimize consequences. The EFS vision and goal reflect the central theme of all EFS protective programs and efforts: to support comprehensive emergency management plans that are coordinated and leveraged with local partners and include assessment as an integral part of the plan. Additional programs are also leveraged by the subsector in relation to infrastructure protection and security efforts. Following are brief descriptions of some of these programs.

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Programs and the Subsector

LEAs and their community partners, in concert with their local government, can participate in and benefit from a variety of Federal programs that help to build State and local emergency management capacity. DHS programs award funds, training, and equipment to States that in turn can disseminate to local governments. Depending on the level of integration and collaboration between LEAs and their local government, schools may benefit from these programs that are offered through their State and local governments. The integration of schools and local community partners can facilitate school emergency management capacity building by helping schools access effective practices, partnerships, and equipment in support of all-hazards emergency management plans. Further, integration and partnerships with community partners increases resilience for the subsector.

Some Federal programs can provide indirect support to the EFS subsector through the States. Following are several such programs that can provide indirect financial and technical support for school and higher education protective efforts.

The Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program

DHS' FEMA also has made grants available for equipment and training awards for first responders through the Commercial Equipment Direct Assistance Program (CEDAP). Although school districts are not eligible to receive these grants directly, they can sometimes benefit from them through partnering with their States. The FY 2009 pool of grantees was drawn from the FY 2008 pool. In FY 2008, 1,045 awards were given in 47 States; 79 percent of these awards were given to law enforcement agencies and the remainder were given to fire departments, emergency medical services, emergency management, and public safety agencies.¹¹

¹¹ Information on the DHS CEDAP is available at: <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/cedap/index.shtm>.

The Citizen Corps Program

The Citizen Corps Program (CCP) supports Citizen Corps Councils in efforts to engage citizens in personal preparedness, exercises, ongoing volunteer programs, and surge capacity response, in order to better prepare citizens to be fully aware, trained, and practiced on how to prevent, protect-mitigate, prepare for, and respond to all threats and hazards. This program provides funding on a formula basis to all 56 States and territories.¹² As some schools engage as community members of CCP, they can become indirect beneficiaries of some of these funds.

Homeland Security Grant Program

The DHS FY 2010 Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) provides funding to build State, local, and UASI-designated area emergency management capacity as well as local law enforcement terrorism prevention capabilities. With schools as integrated members of the State and local emergency management teams, there is opportunity for indirect support through partnerships and relationships with the following programs:

- The State Homeland Security Program enhances State, territorial and local capabilities through planning, equipment, training, and exercise activities.¹³
- The DHS UASI Nonprofit Security Grant Program (UASI-NSGP) provides funding to support target-hardening activities of nonprofit organizations that are deemed at high-risk for a potential terrorist attack and are located within one of the specific UASI-eligible urban areas.¹⁴ It is possible that nonpublic educational entities located within a UASI area may be eligible through their State Administrating Agencies.
- The HSGP grant programs indirectly help support EFS' approach to emergency management for schools in general and specifically support those located in UASI zones as they consider their heightened risk. Through the HSGP programs, schools can potentially leverage opportunities through their States to help address their preparedness needs.

Programs Designed and Supported by the SSA

Following years of building partnerships and working with partners, both prior to and throughout the NIPP process, EFS is poised to continue to administer and enhance its protective programs and resilience strategies aimed at building subsector all-hazards infrastructure protection and resilience capacity at the local level. The primary principles and tenets of EFS protective programming stem from the EFS risk management approach and other capacity building, serving to foster resilience throughout the sector. Further, these principles and tenets are also encapsulated in all its key protective initiatives. Additionally, the EFS principles are used as the foundation for its inter-agency collaborative initiatives.

Through emergency management grants, guidance, training, materials, tools, and technical assistance, the SSA assists the subsector in advancing toward its goal. There are a variety of subsector protective programs that support and complement each other.

Aligned with its vision and risk management approach, EFS programming efforts address the nontraditional role of school officials in emergency management, their collaborative role with traditional response officials and other partners, as well as the need for school- and higher education-centered all-hazards training, resources, and information. Each program, strategy, and initiative within the subsector is intended to help protect the human, physical, and cyber assets within the subsector; directly supports the EFS vision; and builds on EFS' key principles and tenets.

¹² DHS, "Secretary Napolitano Announces Grant Guidance for More than \$2.7 Billion in Fiscal Year 2010 Grant Programs," 12/8/09. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1260283102665.shtm.

¹³ DHS, "Secretary Napolitano Announces Grant Guidance for More than \$2.7 Billion in Fiscal Year 2010 Grant Programs," 12/8/09. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1260283102665.shtm.

¹⁴ "Urban Areas Security Initiative Nonprofit Security Grant Program, (UASI-NSGP)" Press Release, <http://www.fema.gov/government/grant/hsgp/index.shtm>.

EFS protective programs and resilience strategies are intended to help build the capacity of schools and universities to work with their partners throughout all stages of emergency management—preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an incident. Such programs foresee outcomes that result in mitigated risk, increased effective response, reduced long-term impacts, hastened recovery and restoration processes, and, inherently, enhanced resilience at the school building, campus, and district levels. As schools are often the hub of the community, these programs and efforts also emphasize community collaboration to further strengthen communication and coordination with the same partners that collaborate with the education entity on developing school emergency management plans, policies, and procedures. Following is a brief overview of the key EFS protective programs and resilience strategies building subsector emergency management capacity.

SSA Protective Programs: Discretionary Grants

Consistent with the NIPP's risk management approach, the SSA has several protective programs that support risk management for the subsector and align directly with the subsector goal. Two of the SSA's discretionary grant programs promote the NIPP tenets as well as the EFS vision; both the REMS and the EMHE competitive discretionary grant programs provide funds to work with local community partners to build emergency management. In addition to funds, grantees receive technical assistance and tailored K–12 and IHE emergency management training. To support grantee and nongranttee infrastructure protection and security efforts, and fulfill critical needs, EFS develops and makes available general and specific emergency management-related materials (e.g., tools, publications, resources, and guidance) on extant and emergent issues and initiatives. These efforts are further supported and informed through EFS collaborating, coordinating, and communicating activities with partners aimed at identifying and tailoring emergency management guidance, information, and tools to school and higher education settings. Each of these programming efforts work to contribute to mitigating risk, build capacity, and help move education facilities toward the subsector goal.

SSA Protective Programs: Training

Consistent with the NIPP partnership model, information sharing, and training elements, EFS efforts for the subsector include a variety of trainings provided online, with OSDfS staff, with Federal and non-Federal CIKR partners and emergency management specialists. EFS trainings for LEAs and IHEs alike support the vision and EFS emergency management tenets, and include risk assessments, mitigation strategies, partnership building, and continuity planning. Trainings for the K–12 district and school setting are two-tiered. The first focuses on key elements of comprehensive, all hazards (including cyber), emergency management planning (e.g., the four phases of emergency management, assessments, collaborations, and exercises); the second addresses more advanced topics, such as continuity of operations. The IHE trainings also include topics such as developing, reviewing, improving, and fully integrating campus-based all-hazards emergency management planning efforts within the framework of the four phases of emergency management. Both sets of training take into consideration current events, identified needs within the subsector, and lessons learned from both actual incidents and partnerships leveraged at the Federal, State, and local levels. Further, because the trainings are instrumental in assisting the subsectors emergency management capacity, both the K–12 and the IHE trainings are made available to grantees and nongrantees alike, including CIKR partners and larger representative groups, such as the State Safe School Center Directors.

SSA Protective Programs: Developing Security and Emergency Management-Related Materials

Consistent with both the NIPP's partnership and information-sharing models, EFS focuses on content development by creating security and emergency management materials for the subsector and information exchange by maintaining information-sharing mechanisms. To help build the knowledge base for school and higher education emergency management, EFS develops emergency management guides, tools, publications, resources, and guidance. These materials have focused on critical information on key subsector emergency management issues, such as addressing topics specific to higher education emergency management, providing guidance and information for schools on choosing a vulnerability assessment tool among the many

available, the importance of collaborations, and how to conduct exercises. Further, to raise awareness, EFS posts these materials to its emergency planning Web sites and disseminates documents via listservs and the information-sharing network. Listservs also facilitate the exchange of information with partners, with listservs created for current and past grantees, school law enforcement officials, and State School Safety Center directors.

SSA Protective Programs: Collaborating, Coordinating, and Communicating with Partners

With the NIPP partnership model as a framework in SSA efforts to assist the subsector build emergency management capacity and resilience, EFS collaborates, coordinates, and communicates with Federal and non-Federal partners to support the subsector in preventing-mitigating emergencies and preparing for, responding to, and recovering from incidents. These partnerships address the specific command and management roles of education facilities, and have resulted in the creation of the EMHE grant program, H1N1 guidance for schools, the provision of public alert radios to preK–12 schools, nonpublic schools and postsecondary schools, and serve to inform education officials on how to recognize students who may pose a risk to themselves or others as well as to help school officials better understand the role of students in recognizing threats or hazards to the school campus and community. Further, these partnerships have included collaborating with partners, based on their respective expertise, to understand the status of State-wide pandemic influenza planning, and to provide the subsector with guidance on NIMS implementation activities.

Additional Sector Initiatives and Extant Programs

Project School Emergency Response to Violence

Although the REMS and EMHE grant programs focus on all four stages of emergency management, Project SERV focuses specifically on recovery efforts following a significant traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted. Project SERV funds can be used for expenditures that are reasonable, necessary, and essential for education-related activities needed to restore the learning environment following a violent or traumatic event. Project SERV also supports activities that assist LEAs and IHEs in managing the practical problems created by the traumatic event. Traditionally, Project SERV funds have been provided directly to IHEs or school districts for allocation to specific schools. However, there are circumstances where funds have been provided to States or LEAs for district-wide services when the effects of an incident have been widespread or beyond the traditional boundaries of a particular school district.

Community Oriented Policing Services Program

A Federal program providing direct assistance to schools is DOJ's COPS program. This program provides funding for school safety efforts through a variety of programs and initiatives under the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. In 2009, \$16 million in grants was awarded to 128 local law enforcement agencies and municipalities to enhance school safety in 38 States. The grants were awarded under COPS' Secure Our Schools program, which provides funds to improve security in schools and on school grounds.¹⁵

Threat Assessment

Through guidance, information, and training, OSDFS continues to work with the U.S. Secret Service on the issue of threat assessment; together, they have developed two publically available guides for use by school personnel, law enforcement officials, and others with protective responsibilities in our Nation's schools to help in identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of targeted violence in schools and in providing ideas for creating safe school climates. In addition to these guides, OSDFS and the U.S. Secret Service have trained thousands of educators and law enforcement officials,

¹⁵ U.S. Department of Justice, "COPS Office Awards \$16 Million in School Safety Funds," Press Release, 10/01/09. Available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=2287>.

both nationally and internationally, to assist educators and school resource officers regarding students who may pose a threat of targeted school violence. The training, designed to tailor to the particular knowledge and expertise of the participants, is geared toward a multidisciplinary audience, with participants from both the education and law enforcement communities.

In addition to this training, in 2008, EFS worked on a study with the U.S. Secret Service to explore how students with prior knowledge of attacks (or bystanders) made decisions regarding what steps, if any, to take after learning about planned school violence.¹⁶

The School Dismissal Monitoring System

In an effort to provide guidance and information to the education community for the 2009 H1N1 influenza outbreak, and to help minimize disruption to the learning environment, ED worked with its Federal partners to develop and distribute guidance for schools and higher education institutions. To monitor the effects of H1N1 on schools, ED and CDC developed the CDC K–12 “School Dismissal Monitoring System,” a voluntary reporting system that includes daily, direct reporting of school dismissals from State and LEAs as well as daily, systematic searches and confirmations of media reports. The voluntary system is built on a nationwide Federal and State partnership and is supported by national nongovernmental education and public health organizations.

Guidance for School Closure and Child Nutrition Programs

During the 2009 H1N1 outbreak, USDA and ED worked to put together guidance on providing school meals to eligible children through school nutrition programs during an H1N1 outbreak.¹⁷ This guidance assists schools if they close (e.g., due to H1N1) for an extended period of time. Meals may be claimed either through the Summer Food Service Program or the National School Lunch Program’s Seamless Summer Option. USDA is providing added flexibility by using program waiver authority to waive the requirement of serving meals in a congregate setting to provide meals to children.¹⁸ In addition, USDA has authority to approve State Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) agency plans to provide SNAP benefits to households including children certified as eligible to receive free or reduced price school lunches who are enrolled in a school or school district that will be or has been closed for at least 5 consecutive days due to a pandemic emergency. This guidance can be accessed at: http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/Governance/Policy-Memos/2010/SP_05_SFSP_03-2010_os.pdf.

School Bus Security

As a result of information exchange and collaboration between EFS and DHS’ TSA Highway Motor Carrier Government Coordinating Council, EFS disseminates copies of the “School Transportation Security Awareness” DVD to participants at EFS emergency management training events. Additionally, EFS has been included in TSA’s development process of a school bus threat assessment tool. Further, EFS has assisted TSA in multidisciplinary and multiagency exercises, helping to identify stakeholder participants (e.g., education officials, school emergency managers, and school police).

Developing Non-Federal Protective Programs

EFS’ process for development of non-Federal protective programs is done in a variety of ways, often through partnerships. For example, ED recently worked with nongovernmental organizations to support schools and their response to H1N1. In 2009, ED worked with the business community (e.g., educational publishers, national companies in media and technology) to make

¹⁶ The May 2008 study titled, “Prior Knowledge of Potential School-Based Violence: Information Students Learn May Prevent A Targeted Attack,” (known as the Bystander Study) sought to identify what might be done to encourage more students to share information they learn about potential targeted school-based violence with one or more adults.

¹⁷ This guidance can be accessed at: http://www.fns.usda.gov/cnd/Governance/Policy-Memos/2009/SP_31-2009_os.pdf.

¹⁸ This information can be accessed at <http://www.fns.usda.gov/disasters/pandemic/default.htm>.

resources available to students, including a variety of high- and low-tech opportunities, to allow them to stay connected to their classrooms if they are at home sick or if their school is temporarily closed due to a public health concern, such as pandemic influenza. As part of this effort, ED developed continuity of learning guidance, mindful of the need to be applicable to a variety of schools and school settings. Additionally, in spring 2009, ED convened groups of representatives from education's major associations (preK through higher education)—teachers, principals, school administrators, school boards, colleges and universities, counselors, and, importantly, school nurses and parents—to discuss the 2009 H1N1 influenza, current guidance, and prevention and preparedness efforts, as well as resources and tools supporting the education communities.

EFS' process for development of and assistance with non-Federal protective programs evolves as a result of the grant process, nongrant training, emergency management training and materials available online, collaborations, and State requirements for emergency management efforts. For example, grant guidance and absolute priorities require emergency management grantees to establish, implement, and sustain their plans in close coordination with community partners. Further, as technical assistance, trainings, and emergency management materials are available online, nongrantees are also afforded the tools and information necessary to assist them in developing comprehensive infrastructure protection and resiliency plans that address all hazards. As a result of these SSA efforts, each facility can create its own protective program as it relates to infrastructure protection and security plans and procedures. The EFS SSA also involves sector partners in protective program development and implementation through collaborations. For example, collaboration has resulted in piloting new initiatives, trainings, and products with subsector specialists and owners and operators. Here, the SSA relies on the feedback of partners to enhance and augment development and delivery of subsector emergency management products (e.g., training modules, guides) for the subsector. Also, some State mandated emergency management efforts, for schools exist, as described in chapter 2. Such mandates can increase subsector emergency management capacity.

EFS' process to work with partners to develop and implement protective programs and to review protective program progress occurs through inter-agency and cross-sector collaborations, technical assistance, and grants. Federal and non-Federal collaborative efforts have and continue to occur in relation to infrastructure protection and security efforts across the subsector, as detailed in EFS annual reports and referenced throughout this subsector plan. Implementation and review happens through emergency management grants, grantees, and their community partners, the REMS TA Center, Federal and non-Federal CIKR partners, and the EFS SSA. The SSA and its CIKR partners (emergency management specialists, Federal partners) and the REMS TA Center work together to provide guidance and information, grants, trainings, and materials; the subsector works to establish, implement, and sustain its emergency management plans with community partners. It is through this reciprocal relationship that the subsector progresses toward its goal. Review of this dynamic exchange happens at the SSA level, where the SSA and the REMS TA Center continually review and assess protective programs to ensure they are working to address extant and emergent needs in the subsector. EFS reviews and incorporates, as appropriate, partner input into various products and trainings for the subsector. As part of this review process, EFS solicits feedback and reviews research programs from subsector owners and operators, and other Federal and non-Federal CIKR partners that help the SSA, to better understand subsector infrastructure concerns, challenges, resources, and security programs for all levels of education facilities.

Although EFS does not have a specific evaluative element to this process, it accounts for the number of education facilities with emergency management plans as a result of OSDFS grants, Federal data sources (e.g. GAO, NCES), and the number of States with mandates to better understand non-SSA emergency management efforts and implementation breadth and scope. Further, emergency management program efficacy indicators can be gleaned through ongoing information sharing with previous grantee cohorts.

Cyber Programs

Cyber elements of the subsector protection and resilience strategy are typically included as a natural part of any comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plan. Cyber is discussed as a potential risk in ED's vulnerability assessment guide (see chapter 3) for schools, and all education facilities are encouraged to include assessment of any such risks. Although EFS does

not have specific cybersecurity programs, education facilities are encouraged to include cyber components in their emergency management plans as appropriate. Further, through EFS' multiple information-sharing vehicles, it can provide the subsector with guidance and information relative to cybersecurity during both steady state and incidents, as available and appropriate. In addition, EFS can receive information on subsector cybersecurity efforts, programs, or needs. EFS has and will utilize applicable Federal data sources to share cyber infrastructure security and protective information with the subsector, such as the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) Web site (www.uscert.gov), a DHS-established resource that analyzes and disseminates threat information, works to reduce cyber vulnerabilities, and coordinates incident response. EFS can monitor and share with the subsector, as appropriate, US-CERT vulnerability information, security bulletins, and links to other information sources, including NCSD's Control Systems Security Program and Software Assurance Program. EFS can utilize its multiple information-sharing vehicles and partners to share relevant US-CERT information with the subsector.

Given the decentralized nature of U.S. education, cybersecurity occurs at State and local levels. The subsector participates as appropriate in cyber protective efforts and programs. Although ED does not systematically or comprehensively receive information on these activities, it does obtain some school cybersecurity-related data via voluntary information submitted from K-12 schools through NCES surveys. For example, beginning in 2001, the NCES surveys on Internet access asked whether public schools used any technologies or procedures to prevent student access to inappropriate material on the Internet, the types of technologies or procedures used, and whether such technologies were used on all computers with Internet access used by students. NCES found that as early as 2005, nearly 100 percent of public schools in the United States had access to the Internet, compared with 35 percent in 1994. Public schools have also made consistent progress in expanding Internet access in instructional rooms. Since Internet access is so prevalent, schools that are subject to the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) are required to put protective measures in place, such as restrictions on access to the Internet. Moreover, under CIPA,¹⁹ no school may receive discounts under the Federal Education rate (E-rate) program,²⁰ which provides discounted rates for services such as Internet access, unless it certifies that it is enforcing a policy of Internet safety that includes the use of filtering or blocking technology. Among schools using technologies or procedures to prevent student access to inappropriate material on the Internet in 2005, the NCES survey found that almost all survey participants used blocking or filtering software, and most used monitoring software. Although not comprehensive, such information can increase EFS' understanding of a portion of subsector cyber protective efforts.

5.2 Determining the Need for Protective Programs and Resilience Strategies

As evidenced historically and in recent events, it is clear that education facilities are at risk for a variety of manmade and natural threats and in need of comprehensive infrastructure protection and resilience planning. OSDfS seeks to provide programs, tools, guidance, and information to help the subsector increase infrastructure protection and enhance resilience. Although EFS does not have a formal process to identify gaps, it is in constant contact with K-12 and higher education emergency management grantees, subsector owners and operators, school security chiefs, State School Safety Centers, and Federal, State, and local partners that provide subsector emergency management information and partner with OSDfS on initiatives, products, and program augmentation and development.

Since the inaugural SSP, the SSA has utilized the 2007 GAO report (see chapter 2) and State data for school emergency management mandates, in addition to grantee data, to understand subsector protection needs. Although REMS grants are available to awarded public LEAs only, private schools may benefit through the equitable participation required in REMS application guidance. However, to supplement this avenue, the SSA, along with Federal partners, has now agreed on an information-sharing

¹⁹ More information about CIPA (Public Law 106-554) can be found at the Web site of the Schools and Libraries Division, Universal Service Administrative Company at <http://www.sl.universalservice.org/reference/CIPA.asp>.

²⁰ The E-rate program was established in 1996 to make telecommunications services, Internet access, and internal connections available to schools and libraries at discounted rates based on the income level of the students in their community and whether their location is urban or rural.

approach to include outreach to the majority of all U.S. nonpublic education schools regarding school emergency management. As this process unfolds and information is shared, it is expected that future iterations of the SSP and annual reports can provide an update on this school emergency management information-sharing effort.

An additional data source is NCES, whose surveys provide some information on school emergency management, such as the existence of a plan and whether it is exercised. Although voluntary and not comprehensive, these data also help inform the SSA about subsector preparedness. In addition, through Federal partnerships, EFS has begun to understand the state of preK emergency management, especially as it relates to pandemic planning. EFS is also in the process of obtaining another Federal data source to obtain information on Federal preK emergency management preparedness and plan content; EFS is exploring this avenue for potential partnerships and data source for status and identification of need in this element of the subsector.

As discretionary grants cannot address all education facilities, the SSA provides a wealth of guidance, information, tools, and other materials online for use by the entire subsector. As evidenced in the previously mentioned examples, subsector partners are involved in the development and implementation of protective programs, resilience strategies, and initiatives. When a gap is identified, OSDFS works with other ED offices and partners to address the need. A recent example is the joint creation of the EMHE grant program between ED and HHS to provide support to emergency management planning for higher education. Since the 2007 SSP, this has resulted in a variety of tools, resources, programs, initiatives, and partnerships, including a vulnerability assessment guide, a higher education emergency management guide, the EMHE grant program, a bystander study with the U.S. Secret Service, H1N1 guidance for schools, NIMS implementation activities for K–12 schools and higher education, preK partnerships, and an information-sharing approach to reach the majority of nonpublic schools.

5.3 Protective Program/Resilience Strategy Implementation

EFS subsector protective programs and resilience strategies are implemented and sustained through the SSA and the subsector owners and operators, and include grants, trainings, materials, guidance, and information. Although these resources originate with the SSA, implementation occurs at the local level. Further, in SSA emergency management grants, sustainability is a core component (absolute priority) for grantees. SSA grant programs are designed to facilitate sustainment of all-hazards emergency management plans at the school district or IHE level. To support this, EFS provides ongoing technical assistance, guidance and information, tools, and training for both grantees and nongrantees.

Further, EFS supports the recovery phase for LEAs and IHEs through its REMS, EMHE, and Project SERV programs. For example, for the subsector, a key to recovery includes restoring the learning environment. Therefore, as part of their comprehensive emergency management plans under the REMS and EMHE programs, LEAs and IHEs are required to develop plans designed to ensure that strategies are in place to facilitate recovery following an emergency. Although recovery involves restoration of infrastructure and continuity of learning, it also involves the psychological and emotional needs of students and staff. In the event of a significant traumatic event, LEAs and IHEs can receive funding under Project SERV to provide services designed to restore the learning environment, such as emotional triage (e.g., psychological first aid) and mental health interventions for students and staff.

In addition, EFS coordinates its subsector CIKR protective efforts with existing DHS and other CIKR partner actions. For example, REMS and EMHE grants must be coordinated with State and local homeland security plans. In addition, through FY 2009, OSDFS utilized the UASI program to prioritize within the REMS discretionary grant program, and shares information with the subsector, as appropriate, from DHS programs (e.g., US-CERT). Further, EFS shares additional emergency management information with the subsector as a result of coordination and collaboration with other Federal partners, as described throughout this plan.

5.4 Monitoring Program Implementation

Two of the key EFS protective programs for the subsector are its emergency management discretionary grants: REMS and EMHE. REMS and EMHE grant programs demonstrate merit for continued support through reporting requirements under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).

GPRA is a statute that requires all Federal agencies to manage their activities with attention to the consequences of those activities. Each agency is to state clearly what it intends to accomplish, identify the resources required, and periodically report its progress to the U.S. Congress. The GPRA is intended to contribute to improvements in accountability for the expenditure of public funds; enhance congressional decisionmaking through more objective information on the effectiveness of Federal programs; and promote a new government focus on results, service delivery, and customer satisfaction. ED has developed GPRA measures for the both the REMS and EMHE grants. The GPRA measure identified for these grants constitutes the way in which ED will measure the success of this initiative. REMS grantees are required to collect and report data on this performance measure. ED subsequently aggregates the data and uses the information in developing future budget proposals.²¹

The subsector communicates implementation success through sharing lessons learned (<http://rem.ed.gov>), publishing results from individual grants to illustrate how education facilities are making progress toward program objectives and highlighting promising practices on its dedicated emergency management Web sites (www.ed.gov/emergencyplan; <http://rem.ed.gov>), and communicating with partners and owners and operators through listservs, conferences, meetings, and trainings.

Further, grant monitoring also results in continuous improvement and updates to protective programs and resilience strategies. For example, REMS and EMHE grant guidance is continually updated to reflect emerging emergency management needs and issues affecting the subsector. EFS' numerous CIKR partnerships help inform these changes. For example, since its inception in 2003, the REMS grant program has augmented its application requirements to include several additional requirements, including development of infectious disease planning, a food defense plan, and support for NIMS.

Although EFS does not have a formal process to monitor technological developments that could improve or modify protective programs and resiliency strategies, it does share emergency management-related information with the subsector through conferences where technology information and initiatives are addressed. Finally, EFS obtains information from CIKR partners to help understand needs and use of technology as it relates to emergency management for the subsector.

²¹ 2009 REMS and 2008 EMHE applications can be accessed at <http://www.ed.gov/programs/dvpemergencyresponse/applicant.html> and <http://www.ed.gov/programs/emergencyhighed/applicant.html>.



6. Measure Effectiveness

6.1 Risk Mitigation Activities

DHS defines a Risk Mitigation Activity (RMA) as a program, tool, or initiative that directly or indirectly reduces risk in the sector, including providing for the sector's resilience. RMAs for EFS were identified as being the most important activity for mitigating risk in the subsector and increasing its resilience.

Subsector risk mitigation programs and activities are key as they help build the capacity and subsequent resilience of schools, universities, and ultimately their surrounding communities to address the human, physical, and cyber elements throughout all stages—preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an incident. Such programs help to mitigate risk and reduce long-term impacts.

EFS has identified seven key RMAs that support the subsector goal and align with DHS criteria for having the highest potential impact and making the largest contribution to mitigating risk to the subsector. These activities represent EFS-administered programs as well as those efforts carried out in coordination with partners, including information sharing and owner/operator activities. Activities are aimed at further advancing school and higher education infrastructure protection and resilience throughout the subsector and supporting the goal that all education facilities have a comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plan.

Although some of the RMAs are programs, they have also been identified as key activities for inclusion in measuring effectiveness and progress for the subsector. The key RMAs for the subsector are: administering the REMS and EMHE discretionary grant programs; sponsoring REMS and EMHE grantee trainings; collaborating, coordinating, and communicating with partners to identify and tailor emergency management tools to school and higher education settings; developing and making available emergency management-related materials (e.g., tools, publications, resources, and guidance) on current issues and initiatives; and establishing, implementing, and sustaining all-hazards emergency management plans by the subsector. EFS supports these activities by administering grants, sponsoring training, providing technical assistance, and developing a variety of security and emergency management products and publications with CIKR partners. Owners and operators support this activity by establishing, implementing, and sustaining all-hazards emergency management plans.

6.2 Process for Measuring Effectiveness

EFS employs outcome-based metrics to measure the benefits to the subsector resulting from its protective programs, training and technical assistance, and development of emergency management products and publications. The metric for each RMA is designed to measure progress toward EFS' goal: that all education facilities have comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans. Such progress is measured by ongoing growth relative to breadth and scope of protective programs (grants, training, products, and collaboration on development of emergency management products). For example, the number of

districts and IHEs that are discretionary grant recipients provide some information on the number of education facilities with all-hazards emergency management plans. These data provide a snapshot of subsector emergency management planning and can inform decisions regarding where it needs to go. Further, as these data are limited, EFS continually looks to supplement this information with additional data sources to provide information on subsector emergency management implementation and status. Although not comprehensive, EFS currently draws on a variety of sources for this information.

Although specific cyber metrics would be inappropriate given the limited role of cyber assets in the subsector, all EFS key RMAs are all-hazards oriented, and inherently include cyber. EFS' vision, key RMAs, and evaluation efforts are triangulated and assist in the achievement of its vision, reflect the EFS risk management approach, and support DHS measurement efforts. EFS focuses its RMA efforts on increasing supports and knowledge throughout the subsector to facilitate school and higher education officials work with community partners in building and refining customized all-hazards emergency management plans. Furthermore, EFS key RMAs account for the nontraditional roles between the subsector and their partners in emergency management and response.

6.2.1 Process for Measuring Sector Progress

The EFS process for identifying and tracking the progress indicators occurs on multiple levels. In 2009, EFS established a metrics progress team to collaborate between owners and operators and the SSA on metrics development for the subsector. Through this partnership, metrics were identified that related to the status of emergency management plans within the subsector.

EFS engaged this team to define the most relevant progress indicators to demonstrate that EFS is making progress toward its vision and goals and supporting its diverse membership. EFS was able to create a comprehensive and varied team of State and local representatives from the preK–12 and higher education settings alike. The team also validated existing measurement efforts of discretionary grants, training opportunities, and development and dissemination of critical school- and higher education-centered resources and tools. More important, the team created a process for capturing data illustrating the growth nationwide on behalf of owners and operators to build capacity at the school building and campus level. The team subsequently identified publicly available data sources and a process for further collection specific to the EFS measurement process.

EFS has the capacity to collect and verify much of the information relevant to the metrics outlined for the subsector, as the SSA and ED in general are involved in some of the protective activity or initiate the activity itself. Although owners and operators provide the SSA with some information, it is generally the SSA or ED that collects the data, in addition to other Federal agencies and entities. Information reported to DHS is vetted through the SSA.

The subsector's progress toward its goal is measured in terms of the measured collective benefits of the key RMAs. Specific benefits of measured growth may be categorized as follows:

- Discretionary grant programming benefits are measured based on breadth and scope of direct support.
- Training initiatives' benefits are also measured based on breadth and scope, including the number of training modules created and made available each year.
- Benefits of school- and higher education-centered resources and tools are measured based on the number available and the breadth and scope of availability.
- Effects of EFS owners and operators putting forth the EFS vision are illustrated through assessment of State mandates and available Federal data.

As subsector awareness and capacity increases, progress indicators will evolve. For example, with the EMHE grant now in its second year, the 2010 Subsector Annual Report (SAR) can have data to compare to its baseline presented in 2009. Concurrently, EFS will work to expand reviews of State mandates to capture additional complementary data. This approach can serve to capture and illustrate potential and realized benefits to the subsector.

6.2.2 Information Collection and Verification

EFS collects metrics and data information from a variety of reliable public sources, including other Federal and State agencies and entities (e.g., GAO reports, NCES, State data sources), in addition to SSA data collection and analyses, such as the REMS TA Center analyses of grantee plans as they relate to the subsector goal. Therefore, Federal, State, and SSA processes will provide for the verification of subsector data. Information and data for each metric is collected by the SSA and understood in relation to the EFS goal for measuring progress. Typically, this information is not sensitive or proprietary; however, EFS will work to protect, as appropriate, any such data acquired for the metrics process. Although subsector data are gathered throughout the year in a variety of forms from a variety of sources, EFS generally reports on these data to DHS on an annual basis within the SAR, the metrics portal, and in response to discreet data calls requested by DHS. Although the NIPP reporting process does not align with other SSA reporting responsibilities, when it becomes available, these data are reflected in the annual SARs and triennial SSP iterations.

6.2.3 Reporting

Per guidance from DHS, the EFS SSA will provide DHS with subsector progress indicator results through the annual reporting process and the metrics portal. NIPP metrics can be used to understand requirements and implementation in relation to subsector emergency management plan status, some of which will derive from State legislative requirements, Federal data sources, and grantee data. Metrics data will be shared with CIKR partners via the ISN. Although sharing metrics data with the subsector at large is not a current SSA practice, EFS will consider sharing these data as appropriate with a wider subsector audience in the future.

6.3 Using Metrics for Continuous Improvement

The EFS process for measuring progress is achieved by ongoing growth relative to protective programs (grants, training, products, and collaboration on development of emergency management products). Progress indicators are shared externally with DHS and are used internally to inform continuous improvement. For example, EFS utilizes descriptive and output data and analysis of technical assistance requests and training reviews and feedback to inform new products, trainings, resources, guidance, and information. In this way, metrics can support owner/operator and partner communication, and also support adjustments to the subsector's risk management guidance and information to address subsector needs or issues that arise.

Metrics data can be used to measure subsector progress toward the goal of all education facilities having comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans. For example, each data source can be used as a source for future analysis. Understanding that building school emergency management capacity is an evolving process, this key RMA is also appropriate for measuring subsector progress toward the goal, and has a high potential for growth over time. Further, although not comprehensive, EFS can review a variety of reliable data sources that address various elements of the subsector and its goal, potentially adding to this initial metric identified by EFS and its partners.

Insufficient progress toward the goal has been addressed on multiple fronts. For example, along with its Federal partner HHS, EFS created the EMHE grant program to expand its protective programs to higher education, and has since created a section on its REMS TA Center Web site specifically for this program. EFS has also expanded its partnerships to all elements of the subsector, including nonpublic education and preK. In addition, EFS continues to provide the entire subsector with emergency management materials via its dedicated emergency management Web sites (<http://rem.ed.gov>; www.ed.gov/emergencyplan). The Web sites offer guidance and information for preK (such as a link to the Sesame Street Project for family preparedness) through higher education (publications and links to higher education emergency management publications and the EMHE grant) in relation to preparedness in general and for specific hazards and threats, such as H1N1, food safety, etc. According to its history and in the spirit of the NIPP, EFS will continue to work with both Federal and non-Federal partners to address subsector infrastructure protection and security efforts, emerging issues, and progress toward the EFS goal. Every effort will

be made to increase emergency management planning awareness and access for the subsector at large through the provision of subsector-specific guidance, tools, training, resources, and materials via the dedicated Web sites.

A challenge to outcome-based metrics is the nature of discretionary grants (limited funding, competitive processes) that make up a significant portion of subsector protective programs; the voluntary data submission on the part of subsector owners and operators (e.g., participation in the school dismissal monitoring system, GAO reports, NCES surveys, data calls from the SSA to partners); and the regulatory gaps that limit ED's authority over subsector emergency management. The SSA will continue to make efforts to leverage resources, partnerships, and expertise in order to maintain and expand its assistance to the subsector in infrastructure protection.

7. CIKR Protection Research & Development

7.1 Overview of Subsector R&D

In 2007, in its inaugural EFS SSP, EFS, following consultation with research and development (R&D) researchers designated to assist sectors in SSP development, established that a formal R&D plan did not exist for the subsector. Since then, EFS has worked to determine whether a formal R&D plan, inclusive of cybersecurity needs and priorities, is appropriate or possible for the subsector. Although EFS does not currently utilize a coordinated subsector R&D plan, it continues to explore applicable R&D opportunities and leverage extant R&D activities that support its vision and goal. EFS also continues to participate in activities and initiatives to help inform potential R&D initiatives, including established partnerships under the NIPP as well as with other Federal agencies and CIKR partners. Although technology continues to evolve in relation to emergency management, EFS has not identified any technologies that fit schools universally or that appropriately address DHS guidance.

To date, EFS has demonstrated progress in subsector CIKR R&D through increased knowledge of how technologies are incorporated into subsector infrastructure protection and security efforts, and the identification of categories of technologies that are currently in use by subsector owners and operators.

Technology relates to the subsector goal as it continues to be used by schools and higher education facilities to support emergency management efforts. Specifically, EFS is aware that some schools utilize online systems, primarily for emergency management, that increase their ability to collaborate with first responders before, during, and after emergency situations; other educational institutions utilize technology in relation to protection and prevention, entry and access portals, cybersecurity, housing of emergency management plans, and critical information storage related to emergency management. Such technology can include cybersecurity as it relates to the protection of personal data, security systems, or critical information. However, as with many emergency management systems useful in a school or higher education setting, although generally applicable to many educational settings, the cost, functionality, and capacity of each of these systems vary and do not universally account for the uniqueness and diversity of the subsector.

7.2 Subsector R&D Requirements

Given the uniqueness of the subsector, there is great variety in the need for and use of technology to implement the EFS risk management framework in relation to protective efforts; any one technology supporting infrastructure protection and security efforts at a particular location may be inappropriate or otherwise not feasible or practical for another. Therefore, subsector R&D requirements can continue to be understood in terms of their general purpose in emergency management, and within categories of technologies for specific use under the umbrella of emergency management, such as detection and sensor systems; protection and prevention; entry and access; response, recovery and reconstitution; systems design; and human and social issues.

Currently, there is no formal process to identify technology requirements, but the SSA has identified subsector technology usage, including cybersecurity technology, from subsector owners and operators that can offer greater insights into potential R&D issues applicable to schools. Specifically, EFS has worked to identify the most common uses of technology in the subsector for emergency management purposes. EFS found that schools most commonly use technology tools in the prevention-mitigation and preparedness phases of emergency management, with surveillance being the most common along with access control, information security, and interoperable communications.

Informally, the SSA and CIKR partners utilize several mechanisms to address technology in the subsector. One example is the REMS grants. Grant application guidance encourages a portion of the monies awarded to go toward technology. Through grantee cohort listservs, information exchanges often include discussions of technology usage and lessons learned. Although not comprehensive or formal, such communication illustrates the need for, usage, and challenges involved in subsector technology in relation to infrastructure protection and security (such as emergency notification systems or crisis communications technology). In addition, the REMS TA Center regularly compiles voluntary information from grantees regarding emergency management plans for trends and practices. The SSA will review these reports on an annual basis and identify technology requirements from these owners and operators.

EFS shares information and other emergency management-related technology, including technology requirements, in use by the subsector with owners and operators, CIKR partners, and emergency management grantees. One mechanism for sharing subsector emergency management-related information is through conferences, meetings, and trainings. For example, at the 2008 OSDFS National Meeting on Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse and Violence Prevention in Higher Education, an overview was provided of ongoing and emerging technology programs that have potential to support postsecondary institutions in relation to emergency management. In addition, at the 2009 OSDFS National Conference, OSDFS hosted a session on “Leveraging Technology and Community Collaboration to Assist with School Preparedness,” to share technology and facility-related information and initiatives and provide participants with information applicable to school emergency management. In this session, participants learned how to use technology in emergency management planning to track their hazards and vulnerabilities, resources, and actual facilities data. Working collaboratively with local community partners and sharing these data can increase resilience by building or enhancing relationships and facilitating response with community partners.

Further, OSDFS participates in the NIJ’s Technology Working Group (TWG), which identifies technology needs and operational requirements for school security technologies. Discussions and work from this group are used to inform the research, development, test, and evaluation process within the Office of Science and Technology at NIJ. EFS continues to participate in this group to learn of existing and emerging school security technologies that could be applicable across the sector. Through its relationship with DHS IP and related R&D work, in addition to the annual reporting process, EFS communicates the subsector’s technology requirements to DHS.

7.3 Subsector R&D Plan

As stated in section 7.1, there currently is no formal R&D plan for the subsector. However, as appropriate, EFS leverages potentially beneficial initiatives that respond to technology requirements for emergency management in support of the subsector goal. To remain active in, aware of, and open to R&D activities and initiatives that may be fitting for the subsector, EFS participates in a Federal R&D working group, the Infrastructure Capstone Program, and other Federal initiatives to learn about other R&D initiatives and to consider potential relevance and application to the subsector. For example, EFS continues to work closely with the GFS SSA representatives to leverage potential R&D possibilities. Also, through ongoing participation in NIJ’s TWG, the SSA can remain aware of additional Federal initiatives that may be relevant or applicable to the subsector.

Cybersecurity is an important part of comprehensive infrastructure protection and resilience planning for the subsector, especially, but not exclusively, for HEIs. Cybersecurity efforts are allowable activities under the REMS and EMHE grants however,

cyber initiatives separate from those included within an all-hazards, comprehensive emergency management plans would be inappropriate for the subsector, given cyber's role among assets for EFS.

With ongoing input from Federal and non-Federal CIKR partners both directly and through TA Center reports, the SSA can begin to understand technology requirements as themes, trends, and categories of emergency management-related technologies in the subsector. However, any summary would not likely carry a universal application across the subsector. Rather, it would allow for the variety of technology requirements in terms of trends or themes fitting for the subsector, and incorporate the general categories of emergency management-related technology in use within or applicable to the subsector. Any technologies identified by the SSA would reflect the criteria of both addressing school and higher education emergency management and general education facility applicability. Nonetheless, given the nature and mission of schools and higher education institutions, the use of technologies needs to be considered in light of the sensitivities required to maintain a positive and healthy learning environment.

7.4 R&D Management Processes

The SSA is responsible for addressing R&D for the subsector, and responds by identifying technology requirements, trends, usage, and applicability to the subsector as described. Through partners, the SSA can monitor and stay abreast of technology developments for possible applicability to subsector emergency management. As such, the SSA will continue to monitor R&D efforts and initiatives by its various CIKR partners, assess their feasibility for the subsector, and explore and leverage those that may be of benefit. Further, EFS will continue to collaborate with Federal and non-Federal partners to understand ongoing R&D and technology requirements and usage and, as appropriate, make the information available to the subsector.



8. Managing and Coordinating SSA Responsibilities

8.1 Program Management Approach

EFS CIKR protection activities, management functions and management approach, and NIPP-related responsibilities (e.g., reporting, implementation, and monitoring) are embedded within OSDFS, the subsector's existing SSA office, and its programming.

As a separate PMO is unnecessary for this subsector, ED has been staffing and managing NIPP-related responsibilities by assigning various responsibilities to extant OSDFS staff. As CIKR protection needs and NIPP requirements change and evolve, the SSA will remain flexible to address the changing need and will continue to assess the effectiveness and suitability of this management approach for coordinating SSA responsibilities.

8.2 Processes and Responsibilities

8.2.1 SSP Maintenance and Update

EFS plans to update this subsector-specific plan on a triennial basis per DHS reporting guidance and schedules. In between SSP iterations, EFS will prepare annual reports and maintain and update the SSP, including conducting reviews with CIKR partners. Further, EFS will work to address subsector CIKR activities as detailed throughout this document and subsector annual reports. The SSA and its partners review and update the SSP through a collaborative process involving all sector partners that together provide a broad representation of each element of the subsector, from preK through higher education, utilize a review and adjudication process that ensures consistency in tone, style, and content, and complies with NIPP PMO guidance and internal ED requirements. The process used by the SSA to conduct triennial, annual, and as-needed reviews and updates to the SSP involves CIKR partners in small, specific subsections of the broader group of partners for as-needed updates or reviews, as appropriate, and utilizes the full group of partners for annual and triennial reviews, reports, and plan updates.

8.2.2 SSP Implementation Milestones

EFS has identified milestones in relation to the overall subsector goal that are subject to review by subsector CIKR partners. Implementation milestones are tracked by the SSA via the key RMAs. Key RMAs have been vetted with the broad group of EFS partners and with a subset of the overall group that is focused on metrics, and demonstrate the subsector's progress in developing and managing CIKR protection programs and related activities.

Key RMAs for EFS support the EFS risk management approach as they support implementation of the goal. With the goal that all education facilities have a comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plan, EFS has developed key indicators that

can be used to measure progress toward the goal and subsequently, provide more broad implementation milestones as it relates to progress in developing and managing subsector protective programs and resiliency strategies.

Implementation milestones for this subsector encompass the overall efforts and processes involved to provide REMS grants to LEAs and EMHE grants to IHEs, trainings to subsector constituents, collaboration with partners, and development of emergency management-related materials. These efforts also include CIKR partners at all levels—Federal, State, and local—as all contribute to such implementation milestones. In relation to the risk management framework, these implementation efforts are based on reaching the EFS goal. They include ongoing progress in identifying assets, systems, and networks; assessing risks; prioritizing infrastructure; implementing protective programs and resilience strategies; and measuring effectiveness as detailed throughout this report. Therefore, both DHS’ risk management framework and EFS’ risk management approach are addressed in the implementation process set forth by the subsector.

8.2.3 Resources and Budgets

As schools are decentralized and governed at State and local levels, responsibility for managing resources is not an SSA activity. However, the SSA does provide protective programs in the form of discretionary grants, and, as the Federal agency administering these grants, the SSA is fiscally responsible as it relates to administration of protective programs. In this way, the SSA is responsible for managing resources relative to CIKR protection activities. This grant process will continue as the yearly Federal budget appropriations process allows. However, protective programs involve a host of partners, including Federal and non-Federal partners, that share this role.

The process used to develop subsector CIKR resources involves the annual budget request process. ED requests funding for safe school initiatives every year, of which a certain amount of funding is used to fund protective programming discretionary grants. The subsector’s risk mitigation activities are informed by the protective programs already in existence (REMS, EMHE). The SSA tracks and manages the budget designated for protective programming as part of the OSDFS mission; therefore, these responsibilities are embedded within OSDFS. The process for developing subsector-specific investment priorities is the annual budget request process outlined above.

8.2.4 Training and Education

Training is a key component of SSA CIKR protection activities, and serves to expand emergency management awareness and capacity to the subsector at large through online trainings and training modules, and related emergency management materials for preK through higher education. Further, training is a primary vehicle for SSA outreach and awareness to the subsector, inclusive of its online resources. To help increase the knowledge base for school and higher education infrastructure protection and security efforts, the SSA develops emergency management tools, publications, resources, and guidance. Examples of recent publications include an “Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education,” a “Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments,” and “NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Institutions of Higher Education,” each of which addresses critical information on key subsector emergency management topics. Further, to raise awareness, EFS posts these materials to Web sites and disseminates documents via listservs and the ISN. Listservs also facilitate the exchange of information between key school and higher education officials (e.g., current and former grantees, school law enforcement officials, State school safety center directors). Further, the SSA sponsors multiple training for discretionary grantees (see chapter 5). Training focuses on key elements of comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management planning (e.g., the four phases of emergency management, assessments, grant administration, collaborations, exercises, lessons learned from incidents), and the second training addresses more advanced topics, such as continuity of operations.

Often a tabletop exercise is integrated into the training module to provide hands-on experience in managing and responding to an incident. For EMHE grantees, the SSA provides support to them for developing, reviewing, improving, and fully integrating campus-based all-hazards emergency planning efforts within the framework of the four phases of emergency management.

The inaugural training for the first cohort of EMHE grantees included the four phases of emergency management as they pertain to higher education emergency management, lessons learned from K–12 emergency management, and information sharing on the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act. Subsequent trainings include information on stadium security, pandemic influenza planning, and crisis communication and the media, and social media as it pertains to risk communication, as well as training on how to develop threat assessment teams.

Further, EFS continues to coordinate with the U.S. Secret Service to conduct threat assessments (see chapter 5) regarding students who may pose a threat of targeted school violence. This training is geared toward a multidisciplinary audience, with participants from both the education and law enforcement communities, and has occurred both nationally and internationally and at both the school and higher education levels.

8.3 Implementing the Partnership Model

Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) describes sector coordinating mechanisms that “identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection of CIKR; and facilitate the sharing of information about physical and cyber threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, potential protective measures, and best practices.”

The NIPP sector partnership model includes Sector Coordinating Councils (SCCs) to allow the SSAs to collaborate and share information with the private entities that broadly represent each sector. However, since EFS owners and operators represent a mix of public and private entities and GFS does not have an SCC, EFS has developed a modified SCC model. The ISN has been in existence since EFS’ inception in 2006 and constitutes the formal subsector partnership model. The ISN includes broadly representative groups and associations, as well as school and higher education security specialists. This group includes State, regional, and local government entities and organizations from across the country that represent each element of the subsector. This formal structure maintains both compliance with SSP guidance and the spirit of HSPD-7, and is the mechanism utilized to develop sector-specific CIKR priorities, in addition to the Federal process described above. Further, the EFS SSA participates in the GFS GCC. Informal information sharing mechanisms continue to exist and serve as a vehicle for partnerships with the SSA in relation to subsector infrastructure protection and security efforts and reporting. EFS’ relationship to the Critical Information Protection Advisory Council is through its parent sector, GFS.

Further, EFS does not have international partners in relation to participation in subsector emergency management activities or an information sharing structure. EFS’ understanding of international school emergency management occurs through its relationship with DoDEA and DOS as it relates to overseas schools sponsored by DOS. As indicated in chapter 1, EFS defers to these Federal partners in relation to these assets.

8.4 Information Sharing and Protection

In addition to the ISN noted above, the subsector collaborates with partners and facilitates communication via listservs among current and previous grantees, among school security officers, and among State education officials responsible for school safety. Such communication enhances situational awareness and information sharing as it relates to subsector emergency management. Although this information-sharing mechanism is limited to those groups specified above, the SSA can communicate with the entire education community through its emergency management Web sites, which are designed to provide critical preparedness and protective measures information to the subsector via Web postings during steady-state conditions as well as incidents, such as H1N1 mitigation guidance for schools. Further, EFS uses the ISN and other Federal and non-Federal partners for subsector CIKR information sharing as needed, and for review and input during the annual reporting and SSP update and review processes. The SSA information-sharing partners consist of representatives from Federal preK, public and private K–12, higher education, and education associations, as well as school security chiefs and State school safety center directors, Federal partners, and K–12 school and higher education emergency management subject matter experts. As this group is made up of

a mix of public and private owners and operators, EFS can learn about owner/operator concerns, needs, and lessons learned to provide greater insight into the subsector as it relates to emergency management. Subsector information sharing occurs via listservs, Web postings, trainings, conferences, and meetings. EFS will continue to review this approach and determine its effectiveness for an information-sharing vehicle that meets the needs of the subsector emergency managers and the broader group of owners and operators.

EFS also engages Federal cross-sector partners to obtain and update cross-sector asset information and protective efforts, including threat information, as the SSA coordinates regularly with HITRAC to share subsector threat, vulnerability, and consequence information. The SSA and HITRAC follow information protection rules as they relates to sensitive or classified information. Typically, if there is such information, DHS' HITRAC maintains and stores the information. Although information is generally circular (both top down and bottom up) regarding CIKR activities, it is anticipated that all information sent to CIKR partners is public in nature. To the extent that nonpublic information may need to be transmitted to partners, EFS will work with those partners so that the sensitivity of the information is clearly articulated and acknowledged.

List of Acronyms and Abbreviations

CCD	Common Core of Data
CDC	Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
CFATS	Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards
CIKR	Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources
CIPA	Children’s Internet Protection Act
CIPAC	Critical Information Protection Advisory Council
COMPS	Community-Oriented Policing Services
CVT	Consequence, Vulnerability, Threat
DASH	Division of Adolescent School Health
DHS	Department of Homeland Security
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDEA	Department of Defense Education Activity
DOJ	Department of Justice
DOS	Department of State
ED	Department of Education
EFS	Education Facilities Subsector
EMHE	Emergency Management for Higher Education
FEMA	Federal Emergency Management Agency
FPS	Federal Protective Service
FY	Fiscal Year
GAO	Government Accountability Office
GFS	Government Facilities Sector
GIS	Geographical Information System
HEA	Higher Education Act
HHS	Department of Health and Human Services

HITRAC	Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis Center
HSPD	Homeland Security Presidential Directive
IDW	Infrastructure Data Warehouse
IHE	Institutions of Higher Education
IICD	Infrastructure Information Collection Division
IP	Office of Infrastructure Protection
IPEDS	Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems
ISN	Information-Sharing Network
K-12	Kindergarten through 12th Grade
LEA	Local Educational Agency
NCES	National Center for Education Statistics
NCSD	National Cyber Security Division
NIJ	National Institute of Justice
NIMS	National Incident Management System
NIPP	National Infrastructure Protection Plan
NOAA	National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration
OII	Office of Innovation and Improvement
OM	Office of Management
ONPE	Office of Non-Public Education
OSDFS	Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools
PMO	Program Management Office
PreK	Prekindergarten
Project SERV	Project School Emergency Response to Violence
PSS	Private School Universe Study
R&D	Research and Development
REMS	Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools
RMA	Risk Mitigation Activity
SAR	Sector Annual Report
SCC	Sector Coordinating Council
SDFSCA	Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act
SEA	State Education Agency
SSA	Sector-Specific Agency
SSI	Safe Schools Initiative
SSP	Sector-Specific Plan
TA	Technical Assistance

TSA	Transportation Security Administration
TWG	Technology Working Group
UASI	Urban Areas Security Initiative
US-CERT	United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team



Appendix 1: Authorities

Authorities (governing laws, rules, regulations, or orders) applicable to the protection of EFS assets, systems, networks, and functions within the subsector are as follows:

Crisis Management Plans: Public K–12 Local Educational Agencies Receiving Title IV Funds

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (20 U.S.C. 7101 et seq.): Title IV of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, as amended; Section 4002 states that the purpose of the legislation is to support programs that prevent violence in and around schools; prevent the illegal use of alcohol, tobacco, and drugs; involve parents and communities; and are coordinated with related Federal, State, school, and community efforts and resources to foster a safe and drug-free learning environment that supports student academic achievement through the provision of Federal assistance to:

- States for grants to local educational agencies and consortia of such agencies to establish, operate, and improve local programs of school drug and violence prevention and early intervention;
- States for grants to, and contracts with, community-based organizations and public and private entities for programs of drug and violence prevention and early intervention, including community-wide drug and violence prevention planning and organizing activities;
- States for development, training, technical assistance, and coordination activities; and
- Public and private entities to provide technical assistance; conduct training, demonstrations, and evaluation; and to provide supplementary services and community-wide drug and violence prevention planning and organizing activities for the prevention of drug use and violence among students and youth.

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (20 U.S.C. 7114(d)(7)(D)): Section 4114(d)(7)(D) requires that each local education agency submit, as part of its application for funding under the State Grants Program, an assurance that the applicant has, or the schools to be served have, a crisis management plan for responding to violent or traumatic incidents on school grounds.

School Emergency Response to Violence (Project SERV) Program

Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act (20 U.S.C. 7131): In FY 2008 and in several previous fiscal years, Congress appropriated funds for Project SERV under section 4121 of the SDFSCA for local educational agencies and to institutions of higher education in which the learning environment was disrupted due to a violent or traumatic incident. The funds are to remain available until expended. Project SERV funds help to provide education-related services to restore a safe environment conducive to learning.

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems

Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (20 U.S.C. 1094 (a)(17)): Section 487(a)(17) of the Higher Education Act (HEA), as amended (20 U.S.C. 1094(a)(17)), requires that institutional participants in the Federal student financial assistance programs authorized under Title IV of the HEA must “complete surveys conducted as part of the Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (IPEDS) in a timely manner and to the satisfaction of the Secretary [of Education]...”

Appendix 2: Emergency Management: Protective Programs, Tools, Resources, and Sample Activities

To help build the knowledge base for school and higher education management, EFS develops emergency management guides, tools, publications, resources, and guidance. These materials have focused on critical information on key subsector emergency management issues, such as addressing topics specific to higher education emergency management, providing guidance and information for schools as they choose a vulnerability assessment tool among the many available, and the importance of collaborations and how to conduct exercises. Further, to raise awareness, EFS posts these materials to ED Web sites and disseminates documents via listservs and the information-sharing network. Listservs also facilitate the exchange of information, with listservs created for current and past grantees, school law enforcement officials, and State School Safety Center directors.

Education Facilities Subsector Protective Programs

The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Discretionary Grant Program

The REMS competitive discretionary grant program provides funds to LEAs to create, strengthen, and improve comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans. The grant funds LEA projects designed to improve and strengthen emergency management plans at the district and school-building levels by addressing the four phases of emergency management: prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery. In addition to addressing the four phases of emergency management, plans must include (1) training for school personnel in emergency management procedures; (2) coordination with local law enforcement, public safety or emergency management, public health, mental health agencies, and local government; (3) a plan to sustain the local partnership after the period of Federal assistance; (4) a plan for communicating school emergency management policies and reunification procedures to parents and guardians; and (5) a written plan for improving LEA capacity to sustain the emergency management process through ongoing training of personnel and the continual review of policies and procedures. The program also requires implementation of NIMS. All these activities support all-hazards, comprehensive emergency management plans and reflect the EFS's goal.

Through participation in the REMS discretionary grant program, awardees are to maintain and refine comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management plans; collaborate with community partners; customize plans and supporting activities (training, exercises) using site-based assessments; address infectious disease, including a potential pandemic influenza; develop a food defense plan; and integrate the needs of students and staff with disabilities and special needs.

With individual awards ranging from less than \$100,000 to more than \$1 million, REMS grants have been used by school districts to improve and support comprehensive, all-hazards emergency management planning with community partners. Funds have been used, for example, to establish an alert system to inform caregivers of closings and other school-related emergencies and to conduct drills and exercises.

To continually expand the number of individual school districts receiving REMS grants, there is a competitive preference priority for LEA applicants that have not previously received a grant under the REMS program. And even those school districts that have received multiple REMS grants are continuing to make advances and provide lessons learned on key approaches for improving, enhancing, and sustaining their emergency management plans, thereby increasing their resilience to all hazards.

In addition, many of the LEAs that received REMS funding represent the 25 largest school districts, meaning a significant number of schools, students, and staff can benefit from services provided under the REMS grant program. Further, since REMS LEAs are required to provide equitable participation of private school children, their teachers, and other educational personnel in private schools located in the areas served by the grant recipient, this program can have cascading positive effects on additional members of the subsector.

The grant program spans up to 24 months and crosses over two fiscal years and two academic years, extending opportunities for knowledge acquisition and transfer of knowledge to constituents. Since the grant requires awardees to participate in community partnership-building efforts, there is potential for developing long-lasting partnerships that could continue far beyond the 24-month grant period. In all, through the REMS discretionary grant program, each year the cumulative number of school districts receiving direct emergency management plan support increases. Consequently, even more school districts have received school emergency management planning support, once again adding to the cumulative total number of school districts that have been provided support, tools, and training on comprehensive school emergency management planning. Another REMS grant competition is currently underway for FY 2010. Between 2003 and 2009, 717 grants totaling more than \$201 million have been awarded under this program.

The grants are housed within ED's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, which supports efforts to create safe schools, respond to crises, prevent drug and alcohol abuse, ensure the health and well being of students, and teach students good citizenship and character. The office also coordinates ED's efforts in these areas with other Federal agencies, including HHS and the Department of Agriculture.

Emergency Management for Higher Education Discretionary Grant Program

In 2008, OSDFS, in collaboration with its Federal partner HHS' Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), developed a new discretionary grant program to assist IHEs in their emergency management planning efforts. The EMHE grant program is the primary program of OSDFS supporting infrastructure protection for higher education facilities. The EMHE discretionary grant program is the first of its kind administered by EFS for the specific purpose of emergency management at IHEs. Although ED has been assisting K–12 LEAs in emergency management through the REMS discretionary grant program for more than six years, no such program was available to higher education until 2008. In FY 2008, 17 EMHE grants were awarded.

In summer 2009, OSDFS announced the EMHE grant recipients for FY 2009, awarding a total of 26 grants totaling over \$11.3 million. The list of FY 2009 EMHE grantees is available at: <http://www.ed.gov/programs/emergencyhighered/09awards.html>. Specifically, the EMHE grant program provides funding to IHEs to develop, or review and improve, and fully integrate all-hazards, campus-based emergency management planning efforts. EMHE grantees must also agree to coordinate emergency plans with all campus offices and departments, as well as with local and State emergency management efforts; develop a written plan that incorporates medical, mental health, communication, and transportation needs to include those with disabilities, special needs, and other circumstances (such as cultural, language, location relative to campus, etc.) into emergency protocols; develop or update a written plan that prepares the campus for a possible infectious disease outbreak, such as pandemic influenza; and develop or enhance a written plan for preventing violence by assessing and addressing the mental health needs of students who may be at risk of causing harm to themselves or others. Since the establishment of this discretionary grant program in FY 2008, the EMHE program has awarded approximately \$18.4 million in grants to 43 IHEs, many of which support a large number of

students in their emergency management efforts. ED and SAMHSA are currently developing application materials for a FY 2010 EMHE competition, with an expected release in spring 2010.

In FY 2008, an absolute priority was given to applications using the four phases of emergency management to develop, or review and improve, and fully integrate a campus-wide, all-hazards emergency management plan; train campus staff, faculty, and students in emergency management procedures; ensure coordination of planning and communication across all relevant components, offices, and departments of the campus; coordinate with local and State government emergency management; develop a written plan with emergency protocols that include medical, mental health, communication, and transportation of persons with disabilities or other unique needs; develop or update a written plan for infectious disease outbreaks; and develop or enhance a written plan for preventing violence on campus by assessing and addressing the mental health needs of students who may be at risk of causing campus violence by harming themselves or others. All these are consistent with and directly support the EFS vision and goal.

EFS works on a number of fronts to encourage emergency management grantees to coordinate and collaborate with State and local partners. For example, EMHE grantees' projects must be coordinated with their State homeland security plan. To ensure that emergency services are coordinated and to avoid duplication of effort within States and localities, applicants must include in their applications an assurance that the grantee will coordinate with and follow the requirements of the State or local homeland security plan for emergency services and initiatives. Additionally, the application process requires applicants to establish partnership agreements detailing the roles and responsibilities of two key partners. One partner agreement must detail coordination with, and participation of, a representative of the appropriate level of State or local government for the locality in which the IHE to be served by the project is located (e.g., the mayor, city manager, or county executive). The second partner agreement must detail coordination with, and participation of, a representative from a State or local emergency management coordinating body (e.g., the head of the local emergency planning council that would be involved in coordinating a large-scale emergency response effort in the campus community). EMHE grantees are also required to provide a signed partner agreement with a representative from their State or local emergency manager coordinating body in order to be eligible to receive a grant.

Grantees must also agree to support the implementation of NIMS. In addition, during trainings, EFS not only highlights the importance of collaboration and coordination with partners, but also provides resources to educate participants on emergency management issues, including NIMS and the Incident Command System.

Project SERV—School Emergency Response to Violence

Although the REMS and EMHE grant programs focus on all four stages of emergency management, another ED program called Project SERV focus on recovery efforts following a violent or traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted. Project SERV funds can be used for expenditures that are reasonable, necessary, and essential for education-related activities needed to restore the learning environment following a violent or traumatic event.

Project SERV also supports activities that assist LEAs and institutions of higher education in managing the practical problems created by the traumatic event. ED has established a two-tier process for reviewing requests for Project SERV funding. Under the first tier (Immediate Services), ED provides emergency, short-term assistance to affected school districts or institutions of higher education. Under the second tier (Extended Services), ED assists schools and institutions of higher education in addressing the long-term recovery efforts that may be needed following a significant, traumatic event. Generally, Immediate Services grants may provide a maximum of \$50,000 over a project period of up to six months; however this amount may be increased or decreased based on need. Extended Services grants may provide a maximum of \$250,000 (this amount can be exceeded in special circumstances) over a period of up to 18 months to help maintain safety and security in an affected school and to help students, teachers, school staff, and family members recover from the traumatic event.

Traditionally, Project SERV funds have been provided directly to institutions of higher education or school districts for allocation to specific schools. However, there are circumstances where funds have been provided to States or LEAs for district-wide

services when the effects of an incident have been widespread or beyond the traditional boundaries of a particular school district. For example, following the terrorist events of September 11, 2001, Project SERV grants were awarded to several States to provide services to multiple school districts that were impacted. In these situations, States and LEAs are required to provide equitable services to private schools that fall within this extended area. Since FY 2001, OSDFS has awarded over 70 grants under Project SERV, including grants to four States following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, as well as to New York City and Washington, D.C., following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Since its inception, the Project SERV grant program has awarded more than \$26.3 million.

U.S. Department of Education's Emergency Management Web Sites

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (www.ed.gov/emergencyplan)

As schools and communities across the United States develop plans for responding to potential emergency situations, ED maintains a Web resource to help. It is designed to be a one-stop shop that provides school leaders with the information they need to plan for any emergency, including natural disasters, violent incidents, terrorist acts, or pandemic preparations. Included are links to three examples of school emergency response plans (Fairfax County Public Schools, Fairfax, VA; Montgomery County Public Schools, Rockville, MD; and the North Carolina Critical Incident Response Kit Project). This information can be found at www.ed.gov/emergencyplan. All of the tools described below can be found at this emergency planning Web site. For more information about what families and communities can do to be ready for an emergency, the site also contains a link to the DHS Ready Web site at www.ready.gov.

REMS Technical Assistance Center Web site (<http://rem.ed.gov>)

The REMS TA Center's primary goal is to support schools and school districts in emergency management, including the development and implementation of comprehensive emergency and crisis response plans. Established by the OSDFS in October 2004, the REMS TA Center supports REMS grantees in managing and implementing their grants and in sustaining their efforts over time. Nongrant LEAs and schools may also receive support to improve and strengthen their emergency management plans.

The Center disseminates information about emergency management to help school districts learn more about developing, implementing, and evaluating crisis plans. In addition, the Center helps the OSDFS coordinate technical assistance meetings, manage a listserv for sharing emergency management planning information, and respond to direct requests for technical assistance. The REMS Technical Assistance Center can also be accessed at 1-866-540-REMS.

Resources and Planning Tools for Emergency Management

Action Guide for Emergency Management at Institutions of Higher Education

The Action Guide, which was released in January 2009, offers higher education institutions a useful resource in the field of emergency management. Produced by the OSDFS, in collaboration with the REMS TA Center, the guide is intended to serve as a resource for all types of IHEs. It aims to offer support to community colleges, two- and four-year colleges and universities, graduate schools, and research institutions associated with higher education entities, both public and private, in their emergency management planning efforts. Depending on need and experience, the information provided in the Action Guide can help personnel from higher education institutions and their partners better understand the field of emergency management within a higher education context, develop and implement an institution's emergency management plan, and serve as a reference and resource to improve an institution's existing plans. The Action Guide is not meant to serve as a prescriptive document; rather, it is intended to provide a number of resources and references to facilitate the emergency management planning process.

for institutions at all levels of knowledge and development. This guide can be accessed from the REMS TA Center Web site at <http://rems.ed.gov>.

Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities (OSDFS)

ED developed this guide to provide schools and their communities with a general introduction to crisis management as it applies to schools and basic guidelines for developing school crisis management plans. The guide outlines the four phases of crisis planning (prevention-mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) and provides checklists of the critical issues encountered in each phase. The guide also provides information on specific elements of crisis management, including leadership, communication, and the Incident Command System (ICS). This guide can be accessed at www.ed.gov/emergencyplan and from the REMS TA Center Web site at <http://rems.ed.gov>.

Practical Information on Crisis Planning Brochure (OSDFS)

This companion brochure to the full Crisis Planning Guide offers general information and guidelines on how to be prepared for a crisis. The brochure provides guidelines for each of the four phases of emergency management. Both the Crisis Planning Guide and the brochures are available for download, or a free copy can be ordered through the OSDFS Web site at www.ed.gov/emergencyplan.

Guide to School Vulnerability Assessments (ED, DHS)

This guide is intended to be a companion piece to Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities, originally published by ED in 2003 as a guide for schools and districts to prepare for a variety of crises. This new guide, published by ED in 2008, emphasizes a valuable part of emergency management planning—ongoing vulnerability assessment—and is intended to assist schools with the implementation of an effective vulnerability assessment process, including how to choose an appropriate vulnerability assessment tool. This guide is not intended to be prescriptive or to give step-by-step instructions for conducting assessments; rather, it is intended to describe the key elements to be considered when selecting an assessment tool appropriate for school environments and provide guidance for conducting an assessment that will inform school emergency management activities. This guide can be accessed from the REMS TA Center Web site at <http://rems.ed.gov>.

Pandemic Preparedness Information (ED, CDC)

Currently, the ED Web site (www.ed.gov) links to several resources for schools, colleges, and universities to assist in their efforts to prepare for a potential influenza outbreak. Checklists developed by CDC and ED can assist preschools through higher education facilities in developing and improving plans to prepare for and respond to an influenza pandemic. These checklists are available to the public online at www.pandemicflu.gov/plan/tab5.html. ED will continue to provide guidance to schools to assist with disseminating health information, planning for staff and student absences, and maintaining a learning environment during a pandemic outbreak.

At the onset of the H1N1 outbreak in April 2009, OSDFS' Center for School Preparedness joined together with CDC to detect, collect, and report information on school dismissals resulting from the virus transmission within the local community. Since the initial outbreak, the school dismissal Monitoring System has been enhanced and now includes voluntary, direct reporting from local school and public health officials. The School Dismissal Monitoring System can be found at http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/schools/dismissal_form/.

NIMS Guidance: NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Higher Education Institutions

As recipients of Federal preparedness funding through the ED's REMS and EMHE discretionary grant program, LEAs and IHes are required to fulfill the NIMS implementation activities in close coordination with members of their local government and

emergency response communities. Additionally, it is recommended that all education facilities review and implement these activities as they are key steps to take in advance of an emergency, and may also formalize many activities already being conducted by the facility.²²

NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Higher Education Institutions presents a set of key school and campus emergency management activities that will enhance the relationship between schools and campuses, their respective local governments, and their community partners as they communicate, collaborate, and coordinate on these NIMS activities. The following NIMS implementation activities were provided to 2007-2008 REMS and 2008 EMHE grantees. These activities are required for education facilities receiving Federal preparedness funds:

1. Adopt NIMS at the school and campus community level.
2. Institutionalize ICS for managing all emergency incidents and pre-planned school and campus events.
3. Coordinate and support the development and use of integrated Multi-agency Coordination Systems.
4. Establish the Public Information System within the ICS framework.
5. Establish NIMS strategy and timeline for full implementation.
6. Develop and implement a system to coordinate and leverage Federal preparedness funding to implement NIMS.
7. Update emergency management plans to incorporate NIMS and reflect National Response Framework.
8. Participate in and promote mutual aid agreements.
9. Key school and campus personnel complete NIMS training.
10. Incorporate NIMS and ICS into all emergency management training and exercises.
11. Participate in an all-hazard exercise program based on NIMS that involves first responders from multiple disciplines and jurisdictions.
12. Incorporate corrective actions into preparedness and response plans and procedures.
13. Maintain an inventory of organizational response assets-equipment, resources, and supplies.
14. To the extent permissible by law, ensure that relevant national standards and guidance to achieve equipment, communication, and data interoperability are incorporated into acquisition programs.
15. Apply standardized and consistent terminology for school and campus incidents, including the establishment of plain English communication standards across the public safety sector.

OSDFS, in close consultation with the Department of Homeland Security, has created the following online tools to support subsector emergency management efforts with community partners to implement NIMS:

- NIMS Implementation Activities Checklist for Schools and Higher Education – allows tracking of progress toward implementation. Accessible at http://rems.ed.gov/docs/NIMS_ImplementationActivitiesChecklist.pdf.
- Interactive Activity-by-Activity Descriptions of NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Higher Education – includes specific NIMS activity information. Accessible at http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=NIMS_activities.
- NIMS Training for Key Educational Personnel summary document– provides a summary of training recommendations and requirements for NIMS. Accessible at http://rems.ed.gov/docs/NIMS_KeyPersonnelTraining.pdf.

²² NIMS Implementation guidance for 2009-2010 REMS and 2009-2010 EMHE grantees is currently being reviewed and expanded. The 2010 list should be reflected in the EFS 2010 Sector Annual Report.

- NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Higher Education – provides a full text version of all implementation guidance and resources. Accessible at http://rems.ed.gov/docs/NIMS_ComprehensiveGuidanceActivities.pdf.
- Frequently Asked Questions about NIMS Implementation Activities for Schools and Higher Education. Accessible at <http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=FAQNIMS>.
- Resources Supporting School and Higher Education Implementation of NIMS – provides links to additional NIMS and NIMS-related resources. Accessible at http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=NIMS_resources.

National Child Traumatic Stress Network

Established by Congress in 2000, the National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN) is a collaboration of academic and community-based service centers whose mission is to raise the standard of care and increase access to services for traumatized children and their families across the United States. NCTSN serves as a national resource for developing and disseminating evidence-based interventions, trauma-informed services, and public and professional education. The National Center for Child Traumatic Stress (NCCTS) coordinates collaborative activity, oversees resource development, and coordinates national training and education for NCTSN. Housed jointly at the University of California, Los Angeles Neuropsychiatric Institute and the Duke University Medical Center, NCCTS works closely with the Network’s funder, SAMHSA. NCTSN resources can be found at http://www.nctsn.org/nccts/nav.do?pid=abt_nccts.

Tools and Initiatives

The Safe School Initiative—A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates and Final Report and Findings of the Safe School Initiative: Implications for the Prevention of School Attacks in the United States (“Threat Assessment”) (OSDFS, DOJ, U.S. Secret Service)

Development of “Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates” and “Safe School and Threat Assessment Experience: Scenarios Exploring The Findings Of The Safe School Initiative” (Interactive CD-ROM). ED worked with the U.S. Secret Service to develop a guide for educators with practical advice on differentiating between persons making idle threats and those posing actual threats and an interactive CD-ROM. The findings, guide, and CD-ROM are based on extensive research on school-based attacks. The guide may be accessed at http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=publications_General. In addition to these guides, OSDFS and the U.S. Secret Service have trained thousands of educators and law enforcement officials nationally and internationally to assist educators and school resource officers regarding students who may pose a threat of targeted school violence.

Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center Publications

The REMS TA Center produces publications for the emergency management community. Specifically, the REMS TA Center regularly publishes Lessons Learned from actual emergencies. Lessons Learned is a series of publications that are brief recountings of actual school emergencies and crises. All publications support an all-hazards approach to collaborative school emergency management that is guided by the four phases (prevention - mitigation, preparedness, response, and recovery) and integrates the needs of people with disabilities.

The National Clearinghouse for Education Facilities: Disaster Preparedness for Schools

ED sponsors the National Clearinghouse for Education Facilities (NCEF). NCEF provides information on planning, designing, funding, building, improving, and maintaining safe, healthy, high-performance schools. NCEF’s Web site (www.edfacilities.org) provides information and links to books, periodicals, and electronic media related to protecting schools and their occupants from vandalism, violence, and natural disasters. The Safe School Facilities section also contains

a downloadable Safe School Facilities Checklist for assessing the safety and security of school buildings and grounds at www.edfacilities.org/checklist/checklist.cfm.

Campus Public Safety: Weapons of Mass Destruction Terrorism Protective Measures (DHS Office for Domestic Preparedness)

Bomb Threat Assessment Guide, OSDFS, DOJ Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives (ATF)

In October 2003, ED joined with ATF to assist school districts, administrators, and emergency responders by releasing an interactive CD-ROM on responding to bomb threats. The CD-ROM, “Bomb Threat Response: An Interactive Planning Tool for Schools,” includes staff training presentations and implementation resources. OSDFS disseminated a copy of the guide to every public school in 2003. The ATF also distributed the CD-ROM to State and local law enforcement and public safety agencies. In addition to the CD-ROM, a Web site has been established (www.threatplan.org) to receive current requests for the CD-ROM and to provide online support regarding the CD-ROM and additional information.

Examples of OSDFS Emergency Management Activities

In recent years, ED has been involved in several activities aimed at supporting and helping schools and higher education institutions with various aspects of emergency management. Examples of some of these activities include:

- **School Emergency Management Online Courses.** ED has developed a series of online courses on school emergency management for grantee and nongrantees. There are five courses in the series, including a brief introduction to the four phases of school emergency management, and a course on each of the four phases of emergency management—Prevention-Mitigation, Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. In addition to defining and describing the four phases of emergency management, the courses provide guidelines, checklists, and specific action items for school officials to consider, and case study scenarios on emergency incidents at schools. These courses are accessible online at: http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=online_courses.
- **EMHE trainings for grantees.** These trainings occur twice during each grant cohort. Topics include general emergency management (e.g., an introduction to the four phases of emergency management) and emergency management topics specific to higher education. The most recent training for EMHE grantees occurred in December 2009.
- **Emergency Management for Schools training materials.** Training materials from 2006 to 2009 are accessible at http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=training_archives#videoConference.
- **Emergency Planning for Students with Special Needs and Disabilities Webinar.** This Webinar is available at http://rems.ed.gov/index.php?page=training_webinars_past.
- **Tips for Helping Students Recovering from Traumatic Events.** This brochure provides practical information for parents and students who are coping with the aftermath of a natural disaster, as well as teachers, coaches, school administrators and others who are helping those affected. The brochure is accessible at <http://www2.ed.gov/parents/academic/help/recovering/index.html>.
- **Meeting and communicating regularly with chief law enforcement officials from the Nation’s largest school districts.** The chiefs help provide ED with a better understanding of the problems they face regarding school crime and safety and to discuss possible solutions.
- **Meeting and communicating regularly with School Safety Center directors from across the country.** Following September 11, 2001, approximately 20 States developed school safety resource centers to provide support, training, and information to schools in their State on issues of school preparedness and safety. The Center directors routinely provide ED with valuable information regarding emerging issues related to school safety in their respective States.

Appendix 3: Key Data Sources from the National Center for Education Statistics

- **The Common Core of Data (CCD):** CCD is one of NCES's most comprehensive data programs and annually collects fiscal and nonfiscal data about all public schools, local education agencies, and State education agencies in the United States. The data are supplied by State education agency officials and include information that describes K–12, and sometimes PreK; schools and school districts, including name, locale, and academic grades served; as well descriptive information about students and staff, including demographics.²³
- **Private School Universe Survey (PSS):** Similar to the CCD, the PSS generates biennial data on private schools, students, and teachers. The NCES operating definition of private schools encompasses private schools that are not supported primarily by public funds, provide classroom instruction for one or more of grades K–12 or comparable ungraded levels, and has one or more teachers. Organizations or institutions that provide support for home schooling without offering classroom instruction for students are not included. Common and applicable data collected also includes name, locale, and academic grades served, as well descriptive information about students and staff, including demographics.²⁴
- **Integrated Postsecondary Education Data Systems (IPEDS):** IPEDS is a system of interrelated surveys conducted annually by NCES. IPEDS collects data on postsecondary education in the United States in seven areas: institutional characteristics, institutional prices, enrollment, student financial aid, degrees and certificates conferred, student persistence and success, and institutional human and fiscal resources. The completion of all IPEDS surveys is mandatory for institutions that participate in or are applicants for participation in any Federal student financial aid program (such as Pell grants and federal student loans) authorized by Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965, as amended (20 USC 1094, Section 487(a)(17) and 34 CFR 668.14(b)(19)). More than 6,700 institutions complete IPEDS surveys each year. These include research universities, State colleges and universities, private religious and liberal arts colleges, for-profit institutions, community and technical colleges, non-degree-granting institutions such as beauty colleges, and others.²⁵
- **The Digest of Education Statistics:** This annual report provides a compilation of statistical information covering the broad field of education from prekindergarten through graduate school. Data from these reports are used to create annual reports, such as the “Characteristics of the 100 Largest Public Elementary and Secondary School Districts in the United States,” which captures data describing a significant portion of students and staff in public schools.²⁶
- **Indicators of School Crime and Safety:** A joint effort by the Bureau of Justice Statistics and National Center for Education Statistics, this annual report examines crime occurring in school as well as on the way to and from school. It provides

²³ <http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/>.

²⁴ <http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/>.

²⁵ <http://nces.ed.gov/IPEDS/about/>.

²⁶ <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/>.

the most current detailed statistical information to inform the Nation on the nature of crime in schools. The report includes data on crime at school from the perspectives of students, teachers, principals, and the general population from an array of sources, including the National Crime Victimization Survey, the School Crime Supplement to the National Crime Victimization Survey, the Youth Risk Behavior Survey, the School Survey on Crime and Safety, and the School and Staffing Survey.²⁷

²⁷ <http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2008/>.





Department of
Education



Homeland
Security



RESOURCES¹

School districts can also use the following to help determine the type of supplies to include in “go-kits” for both administrators and individual classrooms:

American Red Cross: Recommended Emergency Supplies for Schools. The American Red Cross Web site contains information on how and where to store emergency supplies and how much to stockpile. It also includes recommended supply lists for individual kits, classrooms, and an entire school.
<http://www.redcross.org/disaster/masters/supply.html>

Practical Information on Crisis Planning for Schools and Communities. This guide, developed by the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, offers useful information for schools assembling emergency supplies and classroom kits (see pages 6-25 to 6-27).
<http://www.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/emergencyplan/crisisplanning.pdf>

HELPFUL HINTS

FOR SCHOOL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT

EMERGENCY “GO-KITS”

The Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) encourages schools to consider emergency management in the context of its four phases: mitigation and prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery. The preparedness phase involves developing policies and protocols for multiple hazards, establishing an Incident Command System (ICS), conducting training and exercises, and ensuring necessary resources are available should an emergency occur in school.

One suggested activity for enhancing school preparedness is the creation of emergency supply kits – or, emergency “go-kits.” “Go-kits” are portable and should contain a stockpile of essential emergency supplies. “Go-kits” often come in the form of backpacks or buckets that can be easily carried out of a school in case of an emergency. They are stored in a secure, readily accessible location so that they can be retrieved when an emergency requires evacuation. It is important that several “go-kits” be located throughout the building. Administrators, teachers, and critical members of the school-based ICS team (e.g., nurses, building engineers) may have a “go-kit” with supplies needed to carry out their assigned

responsibilities. When preparing “go-kits,” schools should consider the specific characteristics of the school, such as, its population, climate, facilities, and resources. The school’s emergency plan also should include procedures for designating which staff are responsible for replenishing the “go-kits.”

Some schools find it beneficial to have two major types of “go-kits”: 1) for administrators and 2) for teachers in each individual classroom. Examples of items to be included in each type of kit follow.



RESOURCES (cont.)

FEMA: Are You Ready?

This publication, developed by the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA), offers advice for families and individuals on creating kits for home and work. The information can help schools with preparedness activities and also offers guidance for choosing, storing, and maintaining items.

http://www.fema.gov/areyouready/assemble_disaster_supplies_kit.shtml

READYAmerica Supply

Checklists. The checklists, prepared by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, can be found at www.Ready.gov. The site suggests supplies for basic needs such as food, clean air, and first aid, and checklists for portable kits and for people with special needs. http://www.Ready.gov/america/supply_checklists.

¹ All hyperlinks and URLs included in this publication were accessed on July 21, 2006.



"GO-KIT" CONTENTS

ADMINISTRATION "GO-KIT" SUPPLIES

Clipboard with lists of:

- All students
 - Students with special needs and description of needs (i.e. medical issues, prescription medicines, dietary needs), marked confidential
 - School personnel
 - School emergency procedures
 - Key contact information for the district crisis team
- Parent-student reunification plan
- Whistle
- Hat or brightly colored vest for visibility and leadership identification
- Battery-operated flashlight and batteries
- Utility turn-off procedures
- Emergency communication device
- First-aid kit with instructions

CLASSROOM "GO-KIT" SUPPLIES

Clipboard with lists of:

- All classroom students
 - Students with special needs and description of needs (i.e. medical issues, prescription medicines, dietary needs), marked confidential
 - Classroom personnel
 - School emergency procedures
- Whistle
- Hat or vest for teacher identification
- First-aid kit with instructions
- Pens and paper
- Age-appropriate student activities (such as playing cards, checkers, inflatable ball, etc.)

The Emergency Response and Crisis Management (ERCM) Technical Assistance (TA) Center was established in October 2004 by the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS). The center supports schools and school districts in developing and implementing comprehensive emergency and crisis response plans by providing technical assistance via trainings, publications and individualized responses to requests. *Helpful Hints* provides a quick overview of school emergency preparedness topics that are frequently the subject of inquiries. For additional information about emergency "Go-kits" or any other emergency management-related topic, please visit the ERCM TA Center at www.ercm.org or call 1-888-991-3726.

For information about the Emergency Response and Crisis Management grant program, contact Tara Hill (tara.hill@ed.gov), Michelle Sinkgraven (michelle.sinkgraven@ed.gov), or Sara Strizzi (sara.strizzi@ed.gov).

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
Practical Information on Crisis Planning

A GUIDE FOR SCHOOLS AND COMMUNITIES



**PRACTICAL INFORMATION ON
CRISIS PLANNING:
A GUIDE FOR SCHOOLS AND
COMMUNITIES**

JANUARY 2007



**THE OFFICE OF SAFE AND DRUG-FREE SCHOOLS
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION**

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Introduction



“Knowing how to respond quickly and efficiently in a crisis is critical to ensuring the safety of our schools and students. The midst of a crisis is not the time to start figuring out who ought to do what. At that moment, everyone involved – from top to bottom – should know the drill and know each other.”

--Margaret Spellings

.....

Families trust schools to keep their children safe during the day. Thanks to the efforts of millions of teachers, principals, and staff across America, the majority of schools remain safe havens for our nation's youth. The unfortunate reality is, however, that school districts in this country may be touched either directly or indirectly by a crisis of some kind at any time.

Natural disasters such as floods, earthquakes, fires, and tornadoes can strike a community with little or no warning. An influenza pandemic, or other infectious disease, can spread from person-to-person causing serious illness across the country, or around the globe, in a very short time. School shootings, threatened or actual, are extremely rare but are horrific and chilling when they occur. The harrowing events of September 11 and subsequent anthrax scares have ushered in a new age of terrorism. Communities across the country are struggling to understand and avert acts of terror.

Children and youth rely on and find great comfort in the adults who protect them. Teachers and staff must know how to help their students through a crisis and return them home safely. Knowing what to do when faced with a crisis can be the difference between calm and chaos, between courage and fear, between life and death. There are thousands of fires in schools every year, yet there is minimal damage to life and property because staff and students are prepared. This preparedness needs to be extended to all risks schools face. Schools and districts need to be ready to handle crises, large and small, to keep our children and staff out of harm's way and ready to learn and teach.

The time to plan is now. If you do not have a crisis plan in place, develop one. If you do have a plan in place, review, update and practice that plan regularly.

..... Children and youth rely on and find great comfort in the adults who protect them.

WHY THIS GUIDE?

Taking action now can save lives, prevent injury, and minimize property damage in the moments of a crisis. The importance of reviewing and revising school and district plans cannot be underscored enough, and *Practical Information on Crisis Planning: A Guide for Schools and Communities* is designed to help you navigate this process. The Guide is intended to give schools, districts, and communities the critical concepts and components of good crisis planning, stimulate thinking about the crisis preparedness process, and provide examples of promising practices.

This document does not provide a cookbook approach to crisis preparedness. Each community has its own history, culture, and way of doing business. Schools and districts are at risk for different types of crises and have their own definitions of what constitutes a crisis. Crisis plans need to be customized to communities, districts, and schools to meet the unique needs of local residents and students. Crisis plans also need to address state and local school safety laws.

Experts recommend against cutting and pasting plans from other schools and districts. Other plans can serve as useful models, but what is effective for a large inner-city school district where the population is concentrated may be ineffective for a rural community where schools and first responders are far apart.

AN IMPORTANT NOTE ON RESEARCH

The research on what works in school-based crisis planning is in its infancy. While a growing body of research and literature is available on crisis management for schools, there is little hard evidence to quantify best practices. Fortunately, major crises, especially catastrophic events, are rare in our nation's schools. Few cases can be formally evaluated. Much of the information in this Guide draws heavily on what we know about crisis management in many settings. These promising practices could effectively be adapted and applied to school settings.

Furthermore, the Department conducted extensive interviews with individuals who have experienced crisis in a school first hand. We also benefited from input by the multidisciplinary expert panel (see Appendix B) and many other experts in the field. While not a large-scale impact study, these interviews provide community and educational leaders with the most current practical information on crisis management.

WHAT IS A CRISIS?

Crises range in scope and intensity from incidents that directly or indirectly affect a single student to ones that impact the entire community. Crises can happen before, during, or after school and on or off school campuses. The definition of a crisis varies with the unique needs, resources, and assets of a school and community. Staff and students may be severely affected by an incident in another city or state. The events of Columbine and September 11 left the entire nation feeling vulnerable.

The underpinnings for this Guide can be found in the definition for crisis: “An unstable or crucial time or state of affairs in which a decisive change is impending, especially one with the distinct possibility of a highly undesirable outcome (Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary, 1987).” Additionally, Webster notes that “crisis” comes from the Greek word meaning “decision” (Webster’s Ninth Collegiate Dictionary, 1987). In essence, a crisis is a situation where schools could be faced with inadequate information, not enough time, and insufficient resources, but in which leaders must make one or many crucial decisions.

All districts and schools need a crisis team. One of the key functions of this team is to identify the types of crises that may occur in the district and schools and define what events would activate the plan. The team may consider many factors such as the school’s ability to handle a situation with internal resources and its experience in responding to past events.



PAGE 6-2
Defining Crisis

Plans need to address a range of events and hazards caused both by both nature and by people, such as:

- ▶ Natural disasters (earthquake, tornado, hurricane, flood)
- ▶ Severe weather
- ▶ Fires
- ▶ Chemical or hazardous material spills
- ▶ Bus crashes
- ▶ School shootings
- ▶ Bomb threats
- ▶ Medical emergencies
- ▶ Student or staff deaths (suicide, homicide, unintentional, or natural)
- ▶ Acts of terror or war
- ▶ Outbreaks of disease or infections

THE SEQUENCE OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

The results of extensive interviews and a review of the crisis literature reveal that experts employ four phases of crisis management:

- ▶ **Mitigation/Prevention** addresses what

schools and districts can do to reduce or eliminate risk to life and property.

- ▶ **Preparedness** focuses on the process of planning for the worst-case scenario.
- ▶ **Response** is devoted to the steps to take during a crisis.
- ▶ **Recovery** deals with how to restore the learning and teaching environment after a crisis.

Crisis management is a continuous process in which all phases of the plan are being reviewed and revised (see Exhibit 1.1). Good plans are never finished. They can always be updated based on experience, research, and changing vulnerabilities. Districts and schools may be in various stages of planning. This Guide provides the resources needed to start the planning process and is a tool used to review and improve existing plans.






Exhibit 1.1 Cycle of Crisis Planning



TAKE ACTION!

KEY PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE CRISIS PLANNING

Crisis planning may seem overwhelming. It takes time and effort, but it is manageable. Sections 2 through 5 provide practical tips on how to develop your plans. These principles are crucial to the planning process.

- ▶ **Effective crisis planning begins with leadership at the top.** Every governor, mayor, legislator, superintendent, and principal should work together to make school crisis planning a priority. Top leadership helps set the policy agenda, secures funds, and brings the necessary people together across agencies. Other leadership also needs to be identified—the teacher who is well loved in her school, the county’s favorite school resource officer, or the caring school nurse. Leaders at the grassroots level will help your school community accept and inform the planning process.
- ▶ **Crisis plans should not be developed in a vacuum.** They are a natural extension of ongoing school and community efforts to create safe learning environments. Good planning can enhance all school functions. Needs assessments and other data should feed into a crisis plan. Crisis plans should address incidents that could occur inside

Crisis plans are living documents. They need to be reviewed and revised regularly. . . .

school buildings, on school grounds, and in the community. Coordination will avoid duplication and mixed messages, as well as reduce burden on planners.

- ▶ **School and districts should open the channels of communication well before a crisis.** Relationships need to be built in advance so that emergency responders are familiar with your school. Cultivate a relationship with city emergency managers, public works officials, and health and mental health professionals now, and do not overlook local media. It is important that they understand how the district and schools will respond in a crisis.
- ▶ **Crisis plans should be developed in partnership with other community groups, including law enforcement, fire safety officials, emergency medical services, as well as health and mental health professionals.** Do not reinvent the wheel. These groups know what to do in an emergency and can be helpful in the development of your plan. Get their help to develop a coordinated plan of response.
- ▶ **A common vocabulary is necessary.** It is critical that school staff and emergency responders know each other's terminology. Work with emergency responders to develop

.....

a common vocabulary. The words used to give directions for evacuation, lockdown, and other actions should be clear and not hazard specific. The Federal Emergency Management Agency recommends using plain language to announce the need for action, for example, “evacuate” rather than “code blue.” Many districts note that with plain language everyone in the school building including new staff, substitute teachers, and visitors will know what type of response is called for.


However, some districts have found it useful to use—but streamline—codes. Rather than a code for each type of incident they use only one code for each type of response. With either approach, it is critical that terms and/or codes are used consistently across the district.

- ▶ **Schools should tailor district crisis plans to meet individual school needs.** In fact, a plan should not be one document. It should be a series of documents targeted to various audiences. For example, a school could use detailed response guides for planners, flipcharts for teachers, a crisis response toolbox for administrators, and wallet cards containing evacuation routes for bus drivers. Plans should be age appropriate. Elementary school children will behave much differently in a crisis than high school students.
- ▶ **Plan for the diverse needs of children and staff.** Our review of crisis plans found

that few schools addressed children or staff with physical, sensory, motor, developmental, or mental challenges. Special attention is also needed for children with limited English proficiency. Outreach documents for families may be needed in several languages.

- ▶ **Include all types of schools where appropriate.** Be sure to include alternative, charter, and private schools in the planning process, as well as others who are involved with children before and after school.
- ▶ **Provide teachers and staff with ready access to the plan so they can understand its components and act on them.** People who have experienced a crisis often report that they go on “autopilot” during an incident. They need to know what to do in advance not only to get them through an incident but also to help alleviate panic and anxiety.
- ▶ **Training and practice are essential for the successful implementation of crisis plans.** Most students and staff know what to do in case of a fire because the law requires them to participate in routine fire drills, but would they know what to do in a different crisis? Many districts now require evacuation and lockdown drills in addition to state-mandated fire drills. Drills also allow your school to evaluate what works and what needs to be improved.

Mitigation & Prevention



Although schools have no control over some of the hazards that may impact them, such as earthquakes or plane crashes, they can take actions to minimize or mitigate the impact of such incidents. Schools in earthquake-prone areas can mitigate the impact of a possible earthquake by securing book-cases and training students and staff what to do during tremors.

Schools cannot always control fights, bomb threats, and school shootings. However, they can take actions to reduce the likelihood of such events. Schools may institute policies, implement violence prevention programs, and take other steps to improve the culture and climate of their campuses.

School safety and emergency management experts often use the terms prevention and mitigation differently. Crises experts encourage schools to consider the full range of what they can do to avoid crises (when possible), or lessen their impact. Assessing and addressing the safety and integrity of *facilities* (window seals, HVAC systems, building structure), *security* (functioning locks, controlled access to the school), and the *culture and climate of schools* through policy and curricula are all important for preventing and mitigating possible future crises.

Mitigation and prevention require taking inventory of the dangers in a school and community and identifying what to do to prevent and reduce injury and property damage. For example:

- ▶ Establishing access control procedures and providing IDs for students and staff might prevent a dangerous intruder from coming onto school grounds.
- ▶ Conducting hurricane drills can reduce injury to students and staff because they will know what to do to avoid harm. Also, schools in hurricane-prone areas can address structural weaknesses in their buildings.
- ▶ Planning responses to and training for incidents involving hazardous materials is important for schools near highways.

There are resources in every community that can help with this process. Firefighters, police, public works staff, facilities managers, and the district's insurance representative, for example, can help conduct a hazard assessment. That information will be very useful in identifying problems that need to be addressed in the preparedness process. Rely on emergency responders, public health agencies, and school nurses to develop plans for and provide training in medical triage and first aid.

MITIGATION

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has done considerable work to help states and communities in the area of mitigation planning. It notes that *the goal of mitigation is to decrease the need for response as opposed to simply increasing response capability.*

[Mitigation is] any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life and property from a hazard event. Mitigation [...] encourages long-term reduction of hazard vulnerability (FEMA, 2002).

Mitigating emergencies is also important from a legal standpoint. If a school, district, or state does not take all necessary actions in good faith to create safe schools, it could be vulnerable to a suit for negligence. It is important to make certain that the physical plant is up to local codes as well as federal and state laws.

Mitigating or preventing a crisis involves both the district and the community. Contact the regional or state emergency management office to help get started and connect to efforts that are under way locally. A list of resources for state emergency management agencies is in Appendix A.



PAGE 6-3
FEMA Resources

PREVENTION

Creating a safe and orderly learning environment should not be new to any school and district. Identifying students (or in some cases staff) who may pose a danger to themselves or to others is sometimes called “threat assessment.” The U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service recently released a guide, *Threat Assessments in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates* that may be useful in working through the threat assessment process. The results of a threat assessment may guide prevention efforts, which may help avoid a crisis.

Many schools have curricula and programs aimed at preventing children and youth from initiating harmful behaviors. Social problem-solving or life skills programs, anti-bullying programs, and school-wide discipline efforts are common across the nation as a means of helping reduce violent behavior. The staff in charge of prevention in a school (counselors, teachers, health professionals, administrators) should be part of the crisis planning team. Information on effective and promising prevention programs is on the Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools Web site.

ACTION STEPS

Know the school building. Assess potential hazards on campus. Conduct regular safety audits of the physical plant. Be sure to include driveways, parking lots, playgrounds, outside structures, and fencing. A safety audit should be part of normal operations. This information should feed into mitigation planning.

Know the community. Mitigation requires assessment of local threats. Work with the local emergency management director to assess surrounding hazards. This includes the identification and assessment of the probability of natural disasters (tornadoes, hurricanes, earthquakes) and industrial and chemical accidents (water contamination or fuel spills). Locate major transportation routes and installations. For example, is the school on a flight path or near an airport? Is it near a railroad track that trains use to transport hazardous materials? Also address the potential hazards related to terrorism.

Schools and districts should be active partners in community-wide risk assessment and mitigation planning. To help agencies work together, they may want to develop a memorandum of understanding (MOU), that outlines each agency's responsibility.

Bring together regional, local, and school leaders, among others. Given that mitigation/prevention are community activities, leadership and support of mitigation and prevention activities are necessary to ensure that the right people are at the planning table. Again, leadership begins at the top. Schools and districts will face an uphill battle if state and local governments are not supportive of their mitigation efforts.



PAGE 6-7 Terrorism,
6-9 Volunteers



PAGE 6-5
Leadership

Make regular school safety and security efforts part of mitigation/prevention practices. Consult the comprehensive school safety plan and its needs assessment activities to identify what types of incidents are common in the school.



Establish clear lines of communication. Because mitigation and prevention planning requires agencies and organizations to work together and share information, communication among stakeholders is critical. In addition to communications within the planning team, outside communications with families and the larger community are important to convey a visible message that schools and local governments are working together to ensure public safety. Press releases from the governor and chief state school officer that discuss the importance of crisis planning can help open the channels of communication with the public.

Preparedness



Crises have the potential to affect every student and staff member in a school building. Despite everyone's best efforts at crisis prevention, it is a certainty that crises will occur in schools. Good planning will facilitate a rapid, coordinated, effective response when a crisis occurs. Being well prepared involves an investment of time and resources—but the potential to reduce injury and save lives is well worth the effort.

Every school needs a crisis plan that is tailored to its unique characteristics. Within a school district, however, it is necessary for all plans to have certain commonalities.

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Also, it is impractical for all schools to work individually with emergency responders and other local agencies, although school staff should meet the people who will respond to a crisis before one happens. It is important to find the right balance and to assign district and school roles early.



PAGE 6-13
Preparedness

Set a realistic timetable for the preparation process. While it is reasonable to feel a sense of urgency about the need to be prepared for a crisis, a complete, comprehensive crisis plan cannot be developed overnight. Take the time needed for collecting essential information, developing the plan, and involving the appropriate people.



ACTION STEPS



Start by identifying who should be involved in developing the crisis plan. Include training and drills. Delegating responsibilities and breaking the process down into manageable steps will help planners develop the plan.

Identify and involve stakeholders. Identify the stakeholders to be involved in developing the crisis management plan (the people who are concerned about the safety of the school and the people who will call assist when a crisis occurs). Ask stakeholders to provide feedback on sections of the plan that pertain to them. For instance, ask families to comment on procedures for communicating with them during a crisis.

During this process, create working relationships with emergency responders. It is important to learn how these organizations function and how you will work with each other during a crisis. Take time to learn the vocabulary, command structure, and culture of these groups. Some districts have found it useful to sign MOUs with these agencies that specify expectations, including roles and responsibilities.

It is essential to work with city and county emergency planners. You need to know the kinds of support municipalities can provide during a crisis, as well as any plans the city has for schools during a crisis. For example, city and county planners may plan to use schools as an emergency shelter, a supply depot, or even a morgue. Reviewing this information in advance will help you quickly integrate resources. Participating in local emergency planning gives school and district administrators



insight into all the problems they might face in the event of a community-wide crisis and will help school efforts.

Consider existing efforts. Before jumping in to develop your crisis plan, investigate existing plans (such as those of the district and local government). How do other agencies' plans integrate with the school's? Are there conflicts? Does the comprehensive school safety plan include a crisis plan? What information from the district's crisis plan can be used in the school's crisis plan?

If the school recently completed a crisis plan, efforts may be limited to revising the plan in response to environmental, staff, and student changes:

- ▶ Has the building been renovated or is it currently under renovation?
- ▶ Is the list of staff current?
- ▶ Have there been changes in the student population? Have other hazards revealed themselves?

Determine what crises the plan will address.

Before assigning roles and responsibilities or collecting the supplies that the school will need during a crisis, define what is a crisis for your school based on vulnerabilities, needs, and assets.

Describe the types of crises the plan addresses, including local hazards and problems identified from safety audits, evaluations, and assessments conducted during the mitigation/prevention phase (see Section 2). Consider inci-

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dents that may occur during community use of the school facility and prepare for incidents that occur while students are off-site (e.g., during a field trip).

Define roles and responsibilities. How will the school operate during a crisis? Define what should happen, when, and at whose direction—that is, create an organizational system. This should involve many of the school staff—important tasks will be neglected if one person is responsible for more than one function. School staff should be assigned to the following roles:

- ▶ School commander
- ▶ Liaison to emergency responders
- ▶ Student caregivers
- ▶ Security officers
- ▶ Medical staff
- ▶ Spokesperson

During the planning process, both individuals and backups should be assigned to fill these roles.

If the district has not already appointed a public information officer, or PIO, it should do so right away. Some large school districts have staff dedicated solely to this function. Many smaller districts use the superintendent, school security officers, or a school principal as their PIO.

Work with law enforcement officers and emergency responders to identify crises that require an outside agency to manage the scene (fire, bomb threat, hostage situations). Learn what roles these outsiders will play, what responsibilities they will take on, and how they will interact with school staff. Especially important is determining who will communicate with families and the community during an incident.



PAGE 6-19
ICS

Many schools and emergency responders use the Incident Command System, or ICS, to manage incidents. ICS provides a structured way for delegating responsibilities among school officials and all emergency responders during crisis response. An ICS and/or other management plan needs to be created with all emergency responders and school officials before a crisis occurs.

Develop methods for communicating with the staff, students, families, and the media. Address how the school will communicate with all of the individuals who are directly or indirectly involved in the crisis. One of the first steps in planning for communication is to develop a mechanism to notify students and staff that an incident is occurring and to instruct them on what to do. It is critical that schools and emergency responders use the same definitions for the same terms. Don't create more confusion because terms do not mean the same to everyone involved in responding to a crisis.

It is important to determine how to convey information to staff and students by using codes for evacuation and lockdown, or simply by stating the facts. FEMA recommends simply using plain language rather than codes. If students are evacuated from the school building, will staff use cell phones, radios, intercoms, or runners to get information to the staff supervising them? Be sure to discuss the safest means of communication with law enforcement and emergency responders. For example, some electronic devices can trigger bombs.

Plan how to communicate with families, community members, and the media. Consider writing template letters and press releases in advance so staff will not have to compose them during the confusion and chaos of the event. It's easier to tweak smaller changes than to begin from scratch.

Often the media can be very helpful in providing information to families and others in the community. Be sure to work with local media before a crisis occurs to help them understand school needs during an incident.

Obtain necessary equipment and supplies. Provide staff with the necessary equipment to respond to a crisis. Consider whether there are enough master keys for emergency responders so that they have complete access to the school. Get the phones or radios necessary for communication. Ask for contact information for families. Maintain a cache of first aid supplies. What about food and water for students and staff during the incident?

Prepare response kits for secretaries, nurses, and teachers so they have easy access to the supplies. For example, a nurse's kit might include student and emergency medicines ("anaphylaxis kits," which may require physician's orders, for use in breathing emergencies such as severe, sudden allergic reactions), as well as first aid supplies. A teacher's kit might include a crisis management reference guide, as well as an updated student roster.

Prepare for immediate response. When a crisis occurs, quickly determine whether students and staff need to be evacuated from the building, returned to the building, or locked down in the building. Plan action steps for each of these scenarios.

Evacuation requires all students and staff to leave the building. While evacuating to the school's field makes



PAGE 6-22
The Media



PAGE 6-24
Products




sense for a fire drill that only lasts a few minutes, it may not be an appropriate location for a longer period of time. The evacuation plan should include backup buildings to serve as emergency shelters, such as nearby community centers, religious institutions, businesses, or other schools. Agreements for using these spaces should be negotiated or reconfirmed prior to the beginning of each school year. Evacuation plans should include contingencies for weather conditions such as rain, snow, and extreme cold and heat. While most students will be able to walk to a nearby community center, students with disabilities may have more restricted mobility. Your plan should include transportation options for these students.

If an incident occurs while students are outside, you will need to return them to the building quickly. This is a *reverse evacuation*. Once staff and students are safely in the building, you may find the situation calls for a lockdown.

Lockdowns are called for when a crisis occurs outside of the school and an evacuation would be dangerous. A lockdown may also be called for when there is a crisis inside and movement within the school will put students in jeopardy. All exterior doors are locked and students and staff stay in their classrooms. Windows may need to be covered. Exhibit 3.1 illustrates the steps in determining which action is most appropriate for each situation.

Exhibit 3.1 Lockdown, Evacuation, or Relocation Decisions



* “Offsite” means off the school campus but in vicinity.
“Remote” means a location further from the school than offsite location.
** Be sure to prepare primary and secondary evacuation routes in advance.

Adapted from the San Diego school district.

Shelter-in-place is used when there is not time to evacuate or when it may be harmful to leave the building. Shelter-in-place is commonly used during hazardous material spills. Students and staff are held in the building and windows and doors are sealed. There can be limited movement within the building.

Create maps and facilities information. In a crisis, emergency responders need to know the location of everything in a school. Create site maps that include information about classrooms, hallways, and stairwells, the location of utility shut-offs, and potential staging sites. Emergency responders need copies of this information in advance. During a crisis designate locations—staging sites—for emergency responders to organize, for medical personnel to treat the injured, for the public information officer to brief the media, and for families to be reunited with their children. Student reunification sites should be as far away from the media staging area as possible. Law enforcement will help determine the plans needed to facilitate access of emergency responders and to restrict access of well-wishers and the curious.

Develop accountability and student release procedures. As soon as a crisis is recognized, account for all students, staff, and visitors. Emergency responders treat a situation very differently when people are missing. For example, when a bomb threat occurs, the stakes are substantially higher if firefighters do not know whether students are in the school when they are trying to locate and disarm a bomb.

Be sure to inform families of release procedures before a crisis occurs. In many crises, families have flocked to schools wanting to collect their children immediately. A method should be in place for tracking student release and ensuring that students are only released to authorized individuals.

Practice. Preparedness includes emergency drills and crisis exercises for staff, students, and emergency responders. Many schools have found tabletop exercises very useful in practicing and testing the procedures specified in their crisis plan. Tabletop exercises involve school staff and emergency responders sitting around a table discussing the steps they would take to respond to a crisis. Often, training and drills identify issues that need to be addressed in the crisis plan and problems with plans for communication and response. Teachers also need training in how to manage students during a crisis, especially those experiencing panic reactions. Careful consideration of these issues will improve your crisis plan and better prepare you to respond to an actual crisis.

Address liability issues. Consideration of liability issues is necessary before crisis planning can be completed and may protect you and your staff from a lawsuit. Situations where there is a foreseeable danger can hold liability if the school does not make every reasonable effort to intervene or remediate the situation. A careful assessment of the hazards faced by the school is critical.



PAGE 6-32
Student Release



PAGE 6-35 Preparing to Respond,
6-37 Staff Training, 6-40 Tabletop
Exercises

Response



A crisis is the time *to follow the crisis plan*, not to make a plan from scratch. This section summarizes some of the major recommendations gathered from experienced practitioners and other experts about points to remember when called on to implement your crisis plan.



ACTION STEPS

Expect to be surprised. Regardless of how much time and effort was spent on crisis planning, the members of the crisis team should know that there will always be an element of surprise and accompanying confusion when a school is confronted with a crisis.

Assess the situation and choose the appropriate response. Following the plan requires a very quick but careful assessment of the situation. Determine whether a crisis exists and if so, the type of crisis, the location, and the magnitude. Because the team has practiced the plan, leaders are ready to make these decisions. After basic protective steps are in place, more information can be gathered to adjust later responses.

Respond within seconds. When a crisis actually happens, make the basic decisions about what type of action is needed and respond within seconds. An immediate, appropriate response depends on a plan with clearly articulated roles and responsibilities, as well as training and practice. With proper training, district and school staff and students will respond appropriately within seconds.

Notify appropriate emergency responders and the school crisis response team. One common mistake is to delay calling emergency responders, such as the police or fire departments. In the midst of a crisis, people often believe that the situation can be handled in-house. It is better to have emergency responders on the scene as soon as possible, even if the incident has been resolved by the time they arrive, than to delay calling and risk further injury and damage. For instance,

..... One common mistake is to delay calling emergency responders.

it is better to have emergency responders arrive at a school to find a fire put out than to arrive too late to prevent loss of life or serious property damage.

Notifying a district's or school's crisis team allows them to begin the necessary measures to protect the safety of all persons involved. Unless informed otherwise by the incident commander, school crisis team members should proceed with their responsibilities.

Evacuate or lock down the school as appropriate.

This step is crucial and should be one of the first decisions made, regardless of the order in which initial decisions are implemented.

Triage injuries and provide emergency first aid to those who need it. The plan should assign emergency medical services personnel and school staff with relevant qualifications to determine who needs emergency first aid. Designate a location for EMS to treat the seriously injured on the scene.

Keep supplies nearby and organized at all times. If you move to another location, remember to take your supplies with you. Monitor the amount of supplies and replace them as needed.

Trust leadership. Trust the internal crisis team members and external emergency responders who have been trained to deal with crises. Trust will help calm the situation and minimize the chaos that may occur during a crisis.

During a crisis, leaders need to project a calm, confident, and serious attitude to assure people of the seriousness of the situation and the wisdom of the directions being given. This leadership style will help all involved to respond in a similarly calm and confident manner, as well as helping to mitigate the reactions of anyone who might deny that a crisis has occurred.

In certain situations it may be necessary to yield leadership to others in the plan's designated command structure. In some jurisdictions laws state the protocol for the command structure. This structure may vary from state to state and even from community to community within state. For instance, in a fire, the expertise of firefighters should lead the way, with others filling designated roles such as manager of family-student reunification.

Communicate accurate and appropriate information.

During a crisis, districts and schools will communicate with the school community as well as the community at large. Use the channels of communication identified in the plan. For instance, all information released to the media and public should be funneled through a single public information officer or appointed spokesperson. This will maximize the likelihood of presenting consistent and accurate information to the public.

The crisis team should communicate regularly with staff who are managing students. A school's most important responsibility, the safety of the students entrusted to the school by their families, cannot be fulfilled during a crisis without timely and accurate information to those caring for students.

At a minimum, families need to know that a crisis has occurred and that all possible steps are being taken to see to the safety of their children. Additional details about assembly and shelter procedures may also be

provided, as determined by the plan or those managing the crisis. At some point, families will also need to know when and where their children will be released.

Activate the student release system. Always keep in mind that the earliest possible safe release of students is a desired goal. Often student release will be accomplished before complete resolution of a crisis.

Allow for flexibility in implementing the crisis plan. It is impossible for any crisis plan, no matter how complete, to address every situation that may arise during a crisis. With proper training and practice, emergency responders and staff will be able to respond appropriately and to adapt the school crisis plans to the situation.

Documentation. Write down every action taken during the response. This will provide a record of appropriate implementation of the crisis plan. Also necessary is recording damage for insurance purposes and tracking financial expenditures related to the incident. Keep all original notes and records. These are legal documents.

Recovery



The goal of recovery is to return to learning and restore the infrastructure of the school as quickly as possible. Focus on students and the physical plant, and to take as much time as needed for recovery. School staff can be trained to deal with the emotional impact of the crisis, as well as to initially assess the emotional needs of students, staff, and responders. One of the major goals of recovery is to provide a caring and supportive school environment.



ACTION STEPS

Plan for recovery in the preparedness phase.

Determine the roles and responsibilities of staff and others who will assist in recovery during the planning phase. District-level counselors may want to train school staff to assess the emotional needs of students and colleagues to determine intervention needs. Experience shows that after a crisis many unsolicited offers of assistance from outside the school community are made. During planning, you may want to review the credentials of service providers and certify those that will be used during recovery.

Assemble the Crisis Intervention Team. A Crisis Intervention Team, or CIT, is composed of individuals at either the district or school level involved in recovery. A review of the literature shows that there are different models for organizing a CIT. In one model, there is a centralized CIT at the district level, which serves all schools in that district. In another model, the district trains school-based CITs. Even when crisis intervention teams exist within individual schools, it may be necessary for the superintendent to allocate additional resources on an as-needed basis.

Service providers in the community may want to assist after a crisis. With prior planning, those with appropriate skills and certifications may be tapped to assist in recovery. This will help district and school personnel coordinate activities of the community service providers and see that district procedures and intervention goals are followed.



..... One of the major goals of recovery is to provide a caring and supportive school environment.

Return to the “business of learning” as quickly as possible. Experts agree that the first order of business following a crisis is to return students to learning as quickly as possible. This may involve helping students and families cope with separations from one another with the reopening of school after a crisis.

Schools and districts need to keep students, families, and the media informed. Be clear about what steps have been taken to attend to student safety. Let families and other community members know what support services the school and district are providing or what other community resources are available. Messages to students should be age appropriate. It may be necessary to translate letters and other forms of communication into languages other than English depending on the composition of the communities feeding the affected school(s). Be sure to consider cultural differences when preparing these materials.

Focus on the building, as well as people, during recovery. Following a crisis, buildings and their grounds may need repairing or repainting/relandscaping. Conduct safety audits and determine the parts of the building that can be used and plan for repairing those that are damaged.

Provide assessment of emotional needs of staff, students, families, and responders. Assess the emotional needs of all students and staff, and determine those who need intervention by a school counselor, social worker, school psychologist, or other mental health professional. Arrange for appropriate interven-

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tions by school or community-based service providers. In addition, available services need to be identified for families, who may want to seek treatment for their children or themselves. Appropriate group intervention may be beneficial to students and staff experiencing less severe reactions to the crisis. Group interventions should be age appropriate.

Provide stress management during class time.

Trauma experts emphasize the need to create a caring, warm, and trusting environment for students following a crisis. Allow students to talk about what they felt and experienced during the traumatic event. Younger children who may not be able to fully express their feelings verbally will benefit from participating in creative activities, including drawing, painting, or writing stories. Young adolescents benefit from group discussions in which they are encouraged to talk about their feelings, as well as from writing plays or stories about their experiences. Engage older adolescents in group discussions, and address any issues of guilt (“I could have taken some action to change the outcome of the crisis”).

Conduct daily debriefings for staff, responders, and others assisting in recovery. Mental health workers who have provided services after crises stress the importance of ensuring that those who are providing “psychological first aid” are supported with daily critical incident stress debriefings. Debriefings help staff cope with their own feelings of vulnerability.

..... Allow students to talk about what they felt and experienced during the traumatic event.

Take as much time as needed for recovery. An individual recovers from a crisis at his or her own pace. Recovery is not linear. After a crisis, healing is a process filled with ups and downs. Depending on the traumatic event and the individual, recovery may take months or even years.

Remember anniversaries of crises. Many occasions will remind staff, students, and families about crises. The anniversary of crises will stimulate memories and feelings about the incident. In addition, other occasions may remind the school community about the crises, including holidays, returning to school after vacations and other breaks, as well as events or occasions that seemingly do not have a connection with the incident. This underscores the notion that recovery may take a longer time than anticipated.

Staff members need to be sensitive to their own as well as the students' reactions in such situations and provide support when necessary. School crisis planning guides suggest holding appropriate memorial services or other activities, such as planting a tree in memory of victims of the crises. Trauma experts discourage memorials for suicide victims to avoid glorification and sensationalization of these deaths.

Evaluate. Evaluating recovery efforts will help prepare for the next crisis. Use several methods to evaluate recovery efforts. Conduct brief interviews with emergency responders, families, teachers, students, and staff. Focus groups may also be helpful in obtaining candid information about recovery efforts. The following are examples of questions to ask:

- ▶ Which classroom-based interventions proved most successful and why?
- ▶ Which assessment and referral strategies were the most successful and why?
- ▶ What were the most positive aspects of staff debriefings and why?
- ▶ Which recovery strategies would you change and why?
- ▶ Do other professionals need to be tapped to help with future crises?
- ▶ What additional training is necessary to enable the school community and the community at large to prepare for future crises?
- ▶ What additional equipment is needed to support recovery efforts?
- ▶ What other planning actions will facilitate future recovery efforts?

CLOSING THE LOOP



At the beginning of this Guide, we discussed the cyclical nature of crisis planning. Recovery may seem like an end, but it is also the beginning. You must close the loop on the circle. A critical step in crisis planning is to evaluate each incident. What worked? What didn't? How could you improve operations? Take what you have learned and start at the beginning. Update and strengthen the plan so that in a crisis, no child is left behind.

..... Closer Looks



This section provides information on specific aspects of crisis management, and is intended for key planners who need more detailed guidance to help them implement the crisis management process. As part of these “closer looks” at crisis planning and management, examples have been included that illustrate how actual school districts have implemented crisis planning. Selection of these examples does not constitute an endorsement of any school district’s crisis plan by the U.S. Department of Education. Given the vast differences in the ways educational systems and emergency responders are organized across the nation, crisis planning at the local level should address individual community needs.

DEFINING WHAT CONSTITUTES A CRISIS

Those familiar with crises describe them as sudden, unexpected, overwhelming incidents. However, within the crisis planning field, there is no consensus on what constitutes a crisis, emergency, or disaster. Often, these terms are used interchangeably. Below are some ways crisis management planners have defined the terms. We hope these will help you craft your own definition based on local needs, vulnerabilities to certain conditions, and assets.

The State of Florida. Emergency: A dangerous event that does not result in a request for state or federal assistance (Florida Department of Education, 2002).

Olathe Unified School District #233 (Kansas). People Crisis: An event dealing with people and their physical or emotional well-being that impacts the school population (Olathe Unified School District, 2002).

FEMA. Emergency: An emergency is any unplanned event that can cause deaths or significant injuries to employees, customers or the public; or that can shut down your business, disrupt operations, cause physical or environmental damage, or threaten the facility's financial standing or public image (FEMA, 1993).

The National Association of School Nurses. Emergency and Disaster: [A]n emergency is an unexpected event that is usually managed by existing resources and capabilities. A disaster is any incident that results in multiple human casualties or disruption of essential public health services or any incident that requires an increased level of response beyond the routine operating procedures, including increased personnel, equipment, or supply requirements (Doyle and Loyacono, 2002).

FEMA RESOURCES

FEMA recently has released a series of “how-to” guides for state and local planners on mitigating disasters that may be useful in learning about and understanding mitigation practices:

- ▶ *Understanding Your Risks: Identifying Hazards and Estimating Losses.* This guide provides step-by-step instructions on assessing risk.
- ▶ *Getting Started: Building Support for Mitigation Planning.* This guide provides a general overview of emergency management, takes the reader through the stages of mitigation planning, and gives practical examples on conducting a community assessment, building a planning team, and engaging the public in planning.
- ▶ *Integrating Manmade Hazards into Mitigation Planning.* This guide was developed in the wake of the September 11 attacks. The guide addresses such incidents as technological hazards and acts of terrorism.
- ▶ *Are You Ready? An In-depth Guide to Citizen Preparedness.* This guide provides detailed information in layperson’s terms on what to do in specific disasters and what to do to survive one.

These documents can be downloaded from
<http://www.fema.gov>.

Some of FEMA’s online courses will also be helpful for

school and district staff. *Basic Incident Command System* provides an introduction to the concepts and principles of ICS including how ICS functions and the activities it is responsible for during incidents. *Exercise Design* teaches how to develop tabletop exercises and drills to test the plan. The course addresses the communications, logistics, and administrative structure needed to support these activities. These courses can be downloaded at <http://training.fema.gov/emiweb>.

Students may appreciate the *FEMA for Kids* Web site <http://www.FEMA.gov/kids>. Materials on the Web site are designed to make crises less scary to children by helping them feel prepared. The Disaster Action Kid program even provides certificates to students who complete a series of online activities.

LEADERSHIP

Leadership is the key to crisis preparedness. An organized management structure will be needed to respond to any crisis—and this structure begins with strong leadership.

Major Elements

- ▶ **Leadership should start at the top.** An effective crisis plan requires strong leadership from state, district, school, and community leaders. Leadership should start at the state level and continue down to the district and school levels. In selecting team members, remember natural leaders at the grassroots level.
- ▶ **Districts should be at the forefront in the creation of crisis plans for all of their schools.** Schools should then tailor plans to fit their needs.

At the school level, the principal serves as a leader. He or she should do the following:

- ▶ **Identify stakeholders who need to be involved in crisis planning,** such as community groups, emergency responders, families, and staff. Cultivate relationships with these groups.
- ▶ **Establish a crisis planning team.**
- ▶ **Secure commitment to crisis planning** within the school and the larger community.
- ▶ **Create an incident management structure.** The structure should provide a comprehensive organizational structure designed for all types

of emergencies. It is based on the premise that every crisis has certain major elements requiring clear lines of command and control.

- ▶ **Know available resources.** This activity includes identifying and becoming familiar with resources in the school such as staff members certified in cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR); in the community, including everyone from emergency responders to counselors; and, in organizations such as the parent-teacher association.
- ▶ **Set up time to train and practice** with staff, students, and emergency responders. Training is multifaceted and can include drills, in-service events, tabletop exercises, and written materials. Also include time to review and evaluate the plan.

In times of crisis, the principal serves as the manager and a leader. This does not always equate with being the person in charge of the entire crisis response; see the closer look on ICS for more details. During a crisis, a principal should perform the following tasks:

- ▶ Respond within seconds and lead with a serious, calm, confident style.
- ▶ Implement the crisis plan.
- ▶ Yield authority, when appropriate, to others in the plan's designated command structure.
- ▶ Facilitate collaboration among school staff and emergency responders.
- ▶ Remain open to suggestions and information that may be critical in adjusting the response.



TERRORISM


Thorough crisis planning will carry the school and district a long way in responding to a terrorist incident. While the risk of a terrorist attack on a school is much lower than the risk of being impacted by many local hazards, it is very important to be prepared. As with other incidents, a terrorist attack may result in the following:

- ▶ Damage beyond school boundaries (as with a hurricane),
- ▶ Victims who are contaminated (as with a hazardous materials spill),
- ▶ A crime scene to protect (as with arson), or
- ▶ Widespread fear and panic (as with a school shooting).

The response will need to involve securing student and staff safety and supporting long-term recovery, just as with any other incident.

As the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Advisory System signals increased threat, additional protective measures are needed. Several districts have incorporated the DHS system into their crisis planning. The Red Cross has also issued some general guidance on how schools may adapt these codes. It is useful to consult with local emergency management offices and state or county emergency terrorism task forces. Each state also has a Department of Homeland Security liaison. Check with the Governor's office to identify the contact.

The sample school advisory system is a useful tool to adapt and incorporate into crisis planning. As the risk of attack increases, consider action items under both current and lower threat levels. It is important to assess local conditions and implement actions accordingly.



Sample School Advisory System

Risk	Suggested Actions
SEVERE <i>(Red)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Follow local and/or federal government instructions (listen to radio/TV) ▶ Activate crisis plan ▶ Restrict school access to essential personnel ▶ Cancel outside activities and field trips ▶ Provide mental health services to anxious students and staff
HIGH <i>(Orange)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Assign staff to monitor entrances at all times ▶ Assess facility security measures ▶ Update parents on preparedness efforts ▶ Update media on preparedness efforts ▶ Address student fears concerning possible terrorist attacks ▶ Place school and district crisis response teams on standby alert status
ELEVATED <i>(Yellow)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Inspect school buildings and grounds for suspicious activities ▶ Assess increased risk with public safety officials ▶ Review crisis response plans with school staff ▶ Test alternative communication capabilities
GUARDED <i>(Blue)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Review and upgrade security measures ▶ Review emergency communication plan ▶ Inventory, test, and repair communication equipment ▶ Inventory and restock emergency supplies ▶ Conduct crisis training and drills
LOW <i>(Green)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▶ Assess and update crisis plans and procedures ▶ Discuss updates to school and local crisis plans with emergency responders ▶ Review duties and responsibilities of crisis team members ▶ Provide CPR and first aid training for staff ▶ Conduct 100 % visitor ID check

VOLUNTEERS

Volunteers can be a vital resource for planning. Recent federal initiatives have focused on training civilians for emergency preparedness.

The USA Freedom Corps created the Citizens Corps to funnel the energy and concern of volunteers into initiatives that prepare local communities to prevent and respond effectively to the threats of terrorism, crime, or any other kind of disaster. Citizen Corps is coordinated nationally by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). In this capacity, DHS works closely with other federal entities, state and local governments, first responders and emergency managers, the volunteer community, and the White House Office of the USA Freedom Corps. One of these nationwide initiatives is the Community Emergency Response Team (CERT), a training program that prepares citizens in neighborhoods, the workplace, and schools to take a more active role in emergency management planning and to prepare themselves and others for disasters.

CERT efforts include developing community action plans, assessing possible threats, and identifying local resources. As you explore neighborhood resources to assist in mitigation, planning, response, and recovery, be sure to check whether a CERT is active in the area. Additionally, knowing this national support structure may provide the impetus needed for organizing volunteers who may surface at various points of the crisis planning and management cycle.

COMMUNICATION

Clear lines of communication are crucial to a successful response to a crisis. During the planning process, it will be important to establish effective lines of communication among and within the state, district, school, and community groups. When creating a crisis plan, there are several communication needs that should be addressed.

Communication is essential before crises occur:

- ▶ **Use common terminology across a district.** Terminology should be the same across schools in a district. In most districts, there is a great deal of mobility from one school to another, for both staff and students. The term or code for evacuation in one school, for example, should be the same as the term or code for evacuation in another school in the district. The use of plain language is advised.
- ▶ **Identify several modes of communication for both internal and external communication.** Keep in mind that in times of crisis, computers, intercoms, telephones, and even cell phones may not work or may be dangerous to use. Plan for several methods of communication in a crisis.
- ▶ **Make sure that schools have adequate supplies of communication gear and that the appropriate individuals have access to it.** One school's crisis plan, for example, calls for the principal to immediately grab a backpack containing a cell phone and a

walkie-talkie. Communication gear is of no use if no one can access it.

- ▶ **Verify that school communication devices are compatible with emergency responder devices.** A cell phone or two-way radio is of no use if it cannot be used with the emergency responder's phone or radio. Also, check to see that the school's communication devices do not interfere with the emergency responder's equipment.
- ▶ **Create communication plans to notify families that a crisis has occurred at their child's school.** These pathways should include several modes of communication, including notices sent home and phone trees, so the pathways can be tailored to fit the needs of a particular crisis. For example, it may be appropriate in some crises to send a notice home, while other crises require immediate parental notification. Use these pathways throughout the planning process to encourage parental input and support.
- ▶ **Establish communication pathways with the community.** This may be in the form of a phone or e-mail tree, a community liaison, or media briefings. It is crucial to keep the community informed before, during, and after a crisis.
- ▶ **Designate a PIO** to deal with families, the community and the media. The designation of one individual will help all parties stay informed with identical information.

Good communication during a crisis is also crucial. Below are some key points to keep in mind:

- ▶ **Keep staff who are managing the students informed.** Regardless of the amount of training staff members have received, there is going to be chaos and fear. Communication mitigates those reactions and helps regain a sense of calm and control.
- ▶ **Notify families of action being taken.** Understand that parents are going to want immediate access to their children. Safely begin reunification procedures as soon as possible. Keep families informed as much as possible, especially in the case of delayed reunification.

Communication often stops after a crisis subsides. However, during the recovery phase, keeping staff and community informed remains critical.

PREPAREDNESS

There is a great deal of variation in what districts do to prepare for crises. Different districts have different needs and face different hazards. For example, Olathe Unified School District in Kansas is likely to face a tornado, unlike San Diego City Public Schools in California. Also, San Diego serves far more students than Olathe. In contrast, the Boyertown Area School District in Pennsylvania must address the hazards posed by its proximity to a nuclear power plant. Volusia County, Florida, is unique for its tests of whether staff and students follow proper procedures during a mock crisis situation. Despite their different needs, all four districts have undertaken comprehensive preparedness efforts.

Olathe Unified School District, Kansas

“The question is not if an emergency happens, but when it happens, how prepared are we to handle a situation,” says the assistant superintendent for general administration for the Olathe School District. Olathe’s crisis plan has been in existence since 1993. Every school building is required to have its own all-hazard crisis plans, which are also housed in the district office. Building principals review and update their plans yearly to make sure they are in compliance. Plans are continuously used by school buildings and are considered part of the daily routine.

The district has two teams that have specific responsibilities needed to respond to crisis situations. The district crisis management team is responsible for coordination of all aspects of a crisis from the district level. The building crisis management team assesses the

situation to determine whether the building crisis plan should be set into motion. The district has also established drills and procedures for each building in the district. Training and drills are seen as essential components of the crisis plans. The district requires five types of drills over the school year: fire, tornado, severe weather, code red (lockdown), and bus evacuation. Other drills are left up to the schools' discretion.

San Diego City Public Schools, California

San Diego has implemented a four-pronged approach for the development and maintenance of its schools' safety plans and meeting safety needs of students, staff, and the community:

- 1 Revise emergency procedures and develop a quick reference guide.
- 2 Create and distribute an emergency response box to every school and child development center in the district.
- 3 Conduct ongoing crisis response planning and training with the San Diego Police Department, San Diego School Police Services, public safety, and district personnel.
- 4 Implement safe school plans.

State law has required school safety plans since 1997. School police services coordinates the annual review of safe school plans for all schools and child development centers in the district. Plans must be reviewed and approved by the school site prior to submission to school police services. The school board ultimately signs

off on all plans. The district can be fined by the state for any school that does not submit a plan.

Boyertown Area School District, Pennsylvania

Boyertown Area School District is only a few miles from the Limerick Nuclear Generating Plant. Any school within 10 miles of a nuclear power plant has special needs for crisis plans. Many Pennsylvania school districts have found the Philadelphia Electric Company—Limerick’s owner—very helpful in developing evacuation plans. Boyertown has developed an All Hazards Plan, which provides information on various emergency procedures, including those for accidents, bomb threats, evacuation, explosion, fire, hazardous materials, natural disasters, radiological emergencies, security situations, casualties, and crisis intervention. The All Hazards Plan goes to district administrators and school principals who in turn develop site plans. School staff are given a staff emergency procedures folder to use in the event of an emergency. The district uses a color-coded system to facilitate response and communication. One feature of the All Hazards Plan is the checklist that appears at the beginning of each section. These checklists enable the person in charge during an emergency to know exactly what to do, whom to call, and how to react. Changes are made to the plan as the district experiences emergencies or conducts routine drills. In addition to the routine drills, every two years school buildings must conduct a radiological drill with the help of emergency management staff.

Volusia County Schools, Florida

“Overall, [Volusia County Schools] feel comfortable that staff and students are prepared for an emergency,” says the district director of student assignments. The district

has implemented a security certification process for all schools for the past four years. Schools must be in compliance with all 57 security standards which are divided into six categories:

- 1 training and implementation,
- 2 violence prevention,
- 3 emergencies and disasters,
- 4 student and staff protection,
- 5 physical plant, and
- 6 community involvement.

In addition to a copy of the standards and requirements for certification, schools have access to a workbook that outlines where they should be. A team of district, school, and law enforcement administrators conducts compliance monitoring and certification every third year. To confirm that staff and students are aware of procedures during a crisis situation, schools are evaluated on their response to a crisis scenario. In order to pass, schools must demonstrate that staff and students follow proper procedures and are aware of steps they must take when a situation arises. District staff annually spot-check schools on identified standards. Schools found out of compliance receive unannounced spot-checks within a year after the initial review.

COMMUNITY COLLABORATION

Crisis planning experts recommend that school districts collaborate with community emergency responders in developing their crisis plans. They note that emergency responders have substantial training in this area, unlike most school system staff. In some states, laws mandate collaboration among schools, school districts and emergency responders in developing their crisis plans. For example, the Georgia General Assembly wrote the following:

“School safety plans of public schools shall be prepared with input from students enrolled in that school, parents or legal guardians of such students, teachers in that school, other school employees and school district employees and local law enforcement, fire service, public safety and emergency management agencies.”

Maine, Nevada, and Rhode Island are among the states requiring law enforcement, firefighters, and local emergency services officials be included in the planning process.

Here are examples of how two school districts have worked with community agencies to develop their crisis plans.

Bibb County School District, Georgia

School district staff in Bibb County, Georgia, through the school police, have worked extensively with county and community agencies to develop a comprehensive crisis management plan. After their district-wide crisis team (whose members included campus police, school social workers, school psychologists, teachers from all education levels, families, and students) had developed a draft crisis management plan, they worked with local

police, sheriff, EMS, Red Cross, county health and mental health agencies, and family and children's services to determine how they would interact in a crisis and what services each agency would provide.

District staff have also participated in the community-wide emergency preparedness initiative. This effort to address major incidents was convened by the sheriff who recognized that the county emergency management agency has plans to deal with floods and hurricanes, but is not prepared for a weapons of mass destruction incident. All community agencies were asked to bring copies of their crisis plans and a list of the resources they could lend to manage such an incident. This group has been meeting every two weeks and has conducted a number of tabletop exercises.

Hanover Public Schools, Virginia

Hanover Public Schools' crisis plans developed out of a partnership with the Hanover County Sheriff's Department. Plans have been in existence for the past eight years. The district's plan consists of intervention, crisis response, and critical incident procedures. An important component of the district's plan is its community collaboration. "The district has made every effort to include a broad cross section of the community constituency in the development of crisis plans," says the district's executive director of support services. The district has an interagency agreement that is both written and verbal with a compendium of agencies to aid in communication and to help coordinate services between the agencies and individual schools or the entire school district. In addition, each school must have a community representative on the school safety committee and on the school safety audit committee.

INCIDENT COMMAND SYSTEM

Response to all crises requires a clear chain of command between all responders. The ICS is based on the premise that every crisis has certain major elements requiring clear lines of command and control.

FEMA is a good source of information on the ICS. FEMA has developed a self-study course that anyone can take. The description of the ICS below borrows from that course and from FEMA's multihazard training for schools—a program also offered by many state emergency management agencies.

Before developing school and district ICS teams, work with emergency responders to learn how they will respond to different types of crises. Learn which types of crises will result in fire and police departments leading the response. Learn how they will direct their personnel and interface with outsiders. Let these agencies know who at the school will be their liaison during an incident. Designate two backup liaison officers in case the primary liaison is off site when the incident occurs.

Although emergency responders may be managing the incident, there is still much for school staff to do, including managing the care of students and the supplies and staffing needs of the situation. While the ICS calls for school staff to serve in all of the critical functions, be prepared for the incident commander to designate outside personnel to manage these responsibilities. According to FEMA, the critical functions are as follows:

- **Incident commander.** This person manages the entire incident and will very often be an emergency responder rather than a school administrator.

- ▶ **Public information officer.** This person is responsible for releasing information to families, community members, and the media during a crisis. The media can be a tremendous help in getting information to families and community members.
- ▶ **Safety officer.** This person is responsible for the safety of the scene and the individuals at the scene. His or her role might include determining whether students have been evacuated far enough from the school. Often this role will be filled by an emergency responder.
- ▶ **Liaison officer.** This person is responsible for coordinating with all of the agencies that have responded to the crisis. It is critical that this person be a good communicator and able to convey important information both to responders about the situation or the school facility and to school staff about necessary actions.
- ▶ **Operations officer.** This person manages student and staff care during a crisis. This includes physical (food and water), medical (CPR and first aid), and mental needs (psychological services), as well as student release.
- ▶ **Planning and intelligence officer.** This person is responsible for documenting the event, analyzing what has transpired thus far, and planning for possible further action.
- ▶ **Logistics officer.** This person manages the supply and staffing needs of the situation. The logistics officer focuses on acquiring

the supplies needed to assist the emergency responders. The logistics officer's school staff logistics responsibilities will include long-term needs (beyond the first four hours) for things like food, water, and bathroom facilities, as well as transportation (if students need to be bused off campus). The logistics officer is also responsible for locating and assigning staff to fill various tasks for emergency situations. This could include finding staff to carry messages from the operations officer to those staff members directly managing students.

THE MEDIA

Though there are not many certainties in school crises, it is guaranteed that the media will be at the scene. Instead of being overwhelmed and threatened by the media, be prepared to work with them. The media can be a valuable asset during a crisis. In the event of a catastrophic event, the media may be your only outlet for communicating with families. However, as with all crisis planning, it is important to be proactive, not reactive. If members of the media feel that they are not getting a story, they will seek one out.

- ▶ **Work with local media before a crisis occurs to make sure they understand your needs during an incident.** The media can even help report on preparedness efforts—families and community members will appreciate knowing about a plan for dealing with the situation should a crisis arise.
- ▶ **Designate one representative within your crisis team to deal with the media.** This should be the PIO. The PIO may be the principal or another team member designated by the principal or the head of the response team. There also may be media specialists at the district level. Investigate this and make sure that the school-level representative immediately contacts the district-level media representative in the event of a crisis.
- ▶ **Emphasize that only the designated representative will give information to the media.** In order to be proactive, only one PIO/spokesperson should speak with the media, even if there is nothing yet available

to share. It is helpful for the representative to introduce him or herself as the spokesperson and say, “We don’t have/aren’t able to release any information yet but we will keep you updated as soon as we are able. We would really appreciate your cooperation with staying in the media staging area. I will be making all announcements from this area and will keep you informed.”

- ▶ **Designate a predetermined site for the media to congregate in event of a school crisis.** If it is not possible to use the predetermined site that is away from students and staff, the principal or head of the command chain should designate an alternate site.
- ▶ **Prepare staff to deal with the media trying to get live coverage pictures and interviews.** Media personnel will often try to get on campus and interview staff and students. Make it clear to staff that they should direct media people to the media area and to the school spokesperson or PIO.
- ▶ **Arrange for a joint press conference with emergency responders or choose one media representative to disseminate information to all other media outlets.** This will give you some control over the content, flow, and timing of information that is released.
- ▶ **Work with state and local emergency management agencies to have the Federal Aviation Administration restrict air space over your site.** This will prevent helicopters flying over your school at a time of chaos. Media helicopters can be very frightening to children.

PRODUCTS

A three-ring binder detailing every aspect of response, complete with floor plans, facilities information, and roles and responsibilities is not the only product you'll need to be able to respond to a crisis. Teachers should have abbreviated guides, principals should have crisis response boxes, and emergency responders should have floor plans and facilities information. Some school districts have found the following products useful.

Teacher Quick Reference Guides

The director of school safety in Bulloch County, Georgia, discovered that teachers found having copies of the district's safety plan inadequate for crisis response. Using the master plan, they were unable to quickly identify their roles and responsibilities in a crisis. Teachers recommended that the district develop something they could hold in their hands and quickly flip through.

Staff at one high school, including teachers, nurses, and media center staff, were drafted to develop such a tool. Their *Quick Guide* was piloted by all teachers at that school for one year. Overall, teachers were happy with the guide but did report some bugs. Over the summer the district-level team worked to refine the guide to address the bugs and make sure the guide contained all key information from the district-level plan. The guide is a spiral-bound notebook with plastic insert pages. The pages contain district- and school-specific information. General district procedures are on the front pages and school-specific information, such as evacuation locations for fire drills, are on the back pages. The title of each incident is at the bottom of the page so staff can quickly flip to the procedures for the situation at hand.

The *Quick Guide* has been designed to be a dynamic document that can be updated every year. Now all faculty members, from teachers to cafeteria workers, have a copy of the guide and only principals and members of school safety team have the big book.

Crisis Boxes

The California Safe Schools Task Force realized school administrators should have crisis boxes so that they will immediately have the information essential for effective management of a critical incident. They created a monograph that can be found at <http://www.cde.ca.gov/ls/ss/cp/documents/crisisrespbox.pdf>. The monograph contains tips on how to organize the information that should be in the crisis response box, recommendations for who should get copies of the box, and details of what should be in the box and why. Recommended contents include such items as:

- ▶ Incident Command System (ICS) key responders' phone numbers
- ▶ Student attendance rosters
- ▶ Student disposition forms and emergency data cards
- ▶ List of students with special needs
- ▶ Teacher/employee roster
- ▶ Staff roster
- ▶ Keys

- ▶ Aerial photos of campus
- ▶ Maps of the surrounding neighborhood
- ▶ Campus layout
- ▶ Evacuation sites
- ▶ Designated command post and staging areas
- ▶ Fire alarm turn-off procedures
- ▶ Sprinkler systems turn-off procedures
- ▶ Utility shutoff valves
- ▶ Gas line and utility line layout

The guide also reminds schools of the importance of having first aid supplies easily accessible from multiple locations.

Teacher Crisis Bags

Many experts recommend that each classroom be equipped with a crisis bag. These can take the form of backpacks, tote bags, or even five gallon buckets. The contents should include the following:

- ▶ Current class roster
- ▶ Copy of emergency procedures
- ▶ First aid supplies
- ▶ Flashlight and extra batteries

- ▶ Activities for students
- ▶ Paper and pens
- ▶ Clipboard

Store teacher crisis bags in easily accessible locations.

Family Reunification Plans

Staff in Bibb County School District, Georgia, have put a lot of effort into developing the family reunification procedures that are in the district crisis plan. They have worked with the Red Cross to set up evacuation/reunification sites around the county. Not only does every school have two evacuation kits that include student rosters and emergency notification/contact cards, but the district has a system-wide reunification kit. This kit includes drafts of notices that can be faxed to local media outlets with information necessary to let families know both that an evacuation has occurred and where they can collect their children. Bibb County's crisis preparations included discussions with the media on how media outlets could help distribute information in the event of a crisis. The Chief of Bibb County School Police noted that the media has been very cooperative in developing these protocols.

School Site Information

When a crisis occurs, emergency responders will immediately need a great deal of information about your school campus. They will need to know the members of your crisis response team, how various sites can be accessed, and the location of utility shutoff valves. Many schools share this information with local police and

rescue agencies during the crisis planning process. Some schools give these agencies copies of floor plans that indicate shutoff information. Some school districts compile site information for all schools on a CD-ROM and distribute copies to responders; other schools post this information on a secure Web site that responders can access from laptops at the scene. The following are two examples of how this information can be assembled.

Maryland Virtual Emergency Response System, or MVERS. MVERS was developed in partnership with the Maryland State Police, Maryland Institute for Emergency Medical Services Systems, and the Maryland Emergency Management Agency. This system can be used to prepare an electronic plan that allows quick and easy access to information in order to expedite a response to a critical situation. MVERS utilizes digital floor plans with specific icons that link the viewer to photographs, panoramic pictures, or spreadsheets containing essential data. The images can include instructions for disconnecting utilities, gaining access to a certain area, and locations of potential hazards. The combination of floor plans and associated information provides a virtual tour of the structure's interior and exterior, allowing responders to understand the building layout prior to entering. Schools can also load contact information into MVERS. The Virtual Emergency Response System Construction Kit will provide the user with a description of the MVERS, an appendix of resources, and shareware for completing the plan. The MVERS team estimates it takes about 60 hours to collect and load all information to create the digital floor plan for each school. The bulk of this time will be spent taking and editing pictures of the buildings.

Charlotte-Mecklenburg, North Carolina Police

Virtual Tour. After a recent incident where there were communication glitches between school staff and police, the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department realized it needed to better prepare for school crises. An officer was detailed to create *Virtual Tours* for each school. The *Virtual Tour* is a combination of the school plan and the police plan. School resource officers, or SROs, develop basic crisis plans around the plans their school has already developed. The SROs identify on-scene and off-scene command posts and initial road blocks. They also collect information on crucial players at the school and district (maintenance supervisors), bell schedules, aerial photographs of the school and surrounding community, and extensive photos of the school campus.

For each school, a master Web page contains a picture of the school and links to the crisis plan, the *Virtual Tour*, and aerial photos of the school and surrounding neighborhood. The tour allows emergency responders to move around the school building from the safety of a laptop as they prepare to respond to the crisis. The *Virtual Tour* opens with a map of the school. Users can zoom in on a door or window, click on a door and go through, walk down a hallway, look left, right, up and down, and turn around. Each screen includes an orientation map that shows where you are on the site map. The program also flags potential hazards, such as closets, windows in unusual spaces, and crawl spaces. This information is loaded on police laptops and computers and updated monthly. This material is stored on a private Web site and cannot be accessed by the public.

CONSIDERATIONS OF SPECIAL NEEDS STAFF AND STUDENTS

Be sure to give special consideration to the unique needs of staff and students with disabilities when developing the crisis plan. Evacuation and relocation procedures will need to address mental, physical, motor, developmental, and sensory limitations. For example, individuals who use wheelchairs or other auxiliary aids will not be able to traverse the front steps of a building without substantial assistance.

The following issues should be addressed:

- ▶ In some cases, individuals with disabilities may have limited mobility. In an evacuation there may not be enough time to move mobility impaired students and staff to traditional shelters. It is important to identify alternative, accessible, safe shelter locations and to communicate these locations to emergency responders.
- ▶ Individuals with hearing disabilities may not be able to communicate verbally, to read lips, or to hear fire alarms or other emergency signals. Consider providing basic sign language training to designated school staff.
- ▶ Visual impairments might impede reading signs or traversing unfamiliar or altered terrain—consider whether debris might obstruct the evacuation of such staff and students and necessitate alternative shelter locations.
- ▶ Debris may obstruct the evacuation of individuals with mobility impairments. Be sure

to assign sufficient staff to assist these individuals during a crisis or consider identifying alternative shelter locations.

- ▶ Are staff trained to assist students with developmental disabilities? These students may become upset if routine patterns of activity are disrupted.
- ▶ Do any students or staff have special needs for medicines, power supplies, or medical devices that are not likely to be available in emergency shelters? Consider what alternative arrangements can be made to provide these necessities.

In addition to addressing these concerns, find out whether specific crises will require additional considerations for hazards, such as fire, severe weather, or earthquake. For example, mobility impairments might prevent some staff or students from being able to bend over to assume the protective position recommended during tornadoes. Also, during a fire, elevators will be unavailable to transport wheelchairs. As noted earlier, it is critical to identify safe and appropriate shelter areas inside school buildings that can be reached quickly and accommodate individuals with disabilities.

STUDENT RELEASE

Student release is a crucial part of crisis planning. In all school crisis planning, the safety of the students is the main priority. During a crisis, traditional student release procedures are frequently unsafe or otherwise inoperable. Accordingly, a comprehensive crisis plan needs to include certain procedures:

- ▶ **Update student rosters.** Rosters should be updated at a minimum of twice a year; some districts recommend updating rosters weekly.
- ▶ **Distribute updated rosters.** All teachers need updated rosters of all their classes. This information should be stored in their classroom so that a substitute teacher could easily find it. A copy of all rosters should also be placed in the crisis response box, as well as with the principal and any other stakeholder as advisable. It is critical to know which students are present during a crisis.
- ▶ **Create student emergency cards.** At the beginning of the school year, make sure the school has an emergency card for each student containing contact information on parents/guardians, as well as several other adults who can be contacted if the parent or guardian is not available. The card should also indicate whether the student is permitted to leave campus with any of the adults listed on the card, if necessary. Some districts recommend authorizing one or more parents of children at your child's school to pick up your child. The card should also include all pertinent medical information, such as

allergies, medications, and doctor contact information. These cards should be stored in the front office, both in hard copy and electronically, if possible.

- ▶ **Create student release forms to be used in times of crisis and store them with crisis response materials.** Create a back-up plan if forms are not available.
- ▶ **Designate student release areas, as well as back-up options.** These areas should be predetermined and communicated to families. If necessary, changes should be communicated through the designated channels.
- ▶ **Assign roles for staff.** For example, a staff member is needed to take the emergency cards from the office to the release area, while several staff members are needed to deal with families and sign out students. These roles should be assigned before a crisis occurs. If roles change, the principal or designated leader should assign new roles.
- ▶ **Create student release procedures.** These procedures should create a flexible, yet simple, system for the release of students. Families will want immediate access to their children; emotions will be running high. Create a system that considers this, and train staff to expect it. Procedures should require proof of identity; if necessary, wait until such proof can be ascertained. It is important not to release a student to a noncustodial guardian if custody is an issue for the family. Do not release students to people not listed on student emergency cards. A well-intentioned

friend may offer to take a child home; however, school staff must be certain that students are only released to the appropriate people so students' families will know where they are.

- ▶ **Arrange for transportation for students who are not taken home by a parent or guardian.** Also arrange for shelter and provisions, if necessary.
- ▶ **Use all communication outlets to keep families, the media, and community informed during and after the crisis.** Signal the end of the crisis as well.

PREPARING STUDENTS, STAFF, AND STAKEHOLDERS TO RESPOND

Experts have noted that when a crisis occurs, individuals involved tend to go on autopilot. Therefore, when a crisis occurs staff immediately need to know how to react. They need to know, for example, the signals for crisis, the protocol for lockdown and evacuation, how to dismiss students, and what to do if staff or students need help. They should know these things ahead of time. There will not be a time during the crisis to think about what to do next. Chances of responding appropriately in a crisis will be much greater if all players have practiced the basic steps they will need to take. Training and drills are crucial.

In the San Diego, California, school district, staff feel that practice and training should constitute the majority of the crisis planning process. In their “formula for success,” practice accounts for 50 percent of the process, training for 30 percent, and planning 20 percent. While the percentages are flexible, training and drills are essential. Key components to facilitate training, and thus a successful reaction, are as follows:

- ▶ **Provide regular, comprehensive trainings for teachers and staff.** At least once a year, provide crisis response training for teachers and staff. Also provide make-up trainings for those unable to attend the regular training session. Go through the crisis plan and procedures in order to familiarize all school personnel with it. Periodically remind staff of signals and codes.

- ▶ **Visit evacuation sites with staff and stakeholders.** Show involved parties not only where evacuation sites are but also where specific areas, such as student reunification areas, media areas, and triage areas will be.
- ▶ **Give all staff, stakeholders, and families literature corresponding to the crisis plan.** While all staff should have a copy of the crisis plan, it will also be helpful to provide them with pamphlets reminding them of key principles. Families and community members should also receive literature summarizing crisis procedures and information pertaining to them. Provide each classroom with a copy of the crisis plan and any relevant materials, supplies, and equipment.
- ▶ **Require a specific number of crisis drills every year.** Most states require fire drills; the same should be true of crisis drills. This need not be an extra burden; work with state and district laws for possible options. In Arizona, for example, schools are permitted to use some of the mandated fire drills for crisis drills. Also, speak with students about the importance of drills and explain that while they are serious, students should not be frightened.
- ▶ **Conduct tabletop exercises and scenario-based drills regularly.** While actual drills and training are essential, it is also helpful to have group brainstorming activities that can be done informally around a table. These can be held with stakeholders, staff, community members, and first responders. Students can be involved as well.

STAFF TRAINING

School staff need to be trained in how to respond in a crisis.

Bulloch County School District, Georgia

In Bulloch County School District, Georgia, school district staff were able to illustrate to the school board the need for training by using data from a faculty survey showing teachers felt they lacked the skills to consistently and adequately respond in a crisis. The district now uses a train-the-trainer model to provide important skills to all school staff.

District staff now conduct trainings every month. Each school sends a delegate from its crisis response team or safety committee. Often the delegate is an assistant principal or lead teacher, but some training sessions focus on the needs of specific groups, such as front office personnel, custodians, and cafeteria workers. Training sessions have addressed topics from intruders to large assemblies.

Generally the first hour of each training session is an explanation/demonstration for the delegates. During the second hour, the delegates work in groups to devise ways to present this information to the staff at their schools. All school staff members are expected to receive training from their delegates within a month of the district-wide training.

For the bomb threat training, a representative from the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, or GEMA, conducts an assessment at each school to identify common issues. The GEMA officer then conducts the training and covers the following issues:

- ▶ What form the secretaries should complete when a bomb threat is called in,
- ▶ How the secretaries can keep the caller on the phone as long as possible,
- ▶ How to alert school staff and law enforcement based on their conversation with a perpetrator,
- ▶ Who is in charge of the situation (law enforcement versus fire chief), and
- ▶ How the building will be screened when emergency responders arrive.

The training also addresses how school staff should be notified of the bomb threat, including those schools without intercoms. In addition, staff learn that if the caller reports that a bomb is in the gym, for example, it might not be necessary to evacuate the entire school. During the month following the training, each school will be required to conduct a bomb threat drill. These drills will range from law enforcement responding as though there really was a bomb in the building to a staff-only tabletop exercise.

Every spring all school principals and safety representatives evaluate that year's training to identify areas where more training is needed.

Hudson School District, New Hampshire

The Hudson School District teamed with the New Hampshire Office of Emergency Management (NHOEM) to train district staff in emergency planning. The district then teamed with local police and fire officials to conduct tabletop exercises, individual school drills, and a town-wide mock drill.

The comprehensive town-wide drill began at a local elementary school when an intruder entered the school. The school and local response agencies were faced with a number of issues including that the intruder had a weapon and had taken a hostage. During the drill, the ICS was activated at both the school and the Superintendent's Office. The town-wide drill was evaluated by NHOEM and local experts. The experience helped the district better prepare to manage emergencies. The district also gained valuable experience in interfacing with local emergency responders.

TABLETOP EXERCISES

Tabletop exercises are “informal and stress-free exercises intended to facilitate the testing, evaluation and practicing of a school facility’s crisis response plan and promote group problem solving.” (Fairfax County, Virginia).

While drills and training are essential, it is also helpful to have group brainstorming activities that can be conducted informally. For this reason, many districts are adopting tabletop exercises. Fairfax County, Virginia, has had great success with these exercises. In Fairfax, the exercises consist of complete written scenarios and “injects”—additional pieces of information or circumstances that can be injected to alter the scenario. These injects range from “suspicious person with firearm behind school” to “electrical service to cafeteria interrupted.” Injects include a list of possible responses to assist the facilitator.

The exercise begins with the reading of the scenario; scenarios are often tweaked to fit a particular school.

A facilitator then distributes injects to individual participants. Participants may handle the inject and implement an action individually or seek more information and coordination from other group members.

Discussion ensues.

In Fairfax, the objectives include the following:

- ▶ Test the ability of school personnel to identify, allocate, and utilize resources within their school during a critical incident.
- ▶ Assess the ability of school personnel to implement their critical incident plan.

The director of safety and security for Fairfax County Public Schools commented:

“We believe that the best type of training is experience. Fortunately, most of our schools do not have frequent critical events that require these kinds of responses. Therefore, many of our personnel do not have the opportunity to experience the harsh realities of having to manage these issues. The tabletop exercise allows us to provide an environment that can reasonably simulate the topics and some elements of the stress that are inherent in critical events. We have provided tabletop exercises to all 234 of our schools over the past two years. We now have a rotating schedule that provides an exercise facilitated by our office to all high schools and middle schools every other year, and to each elementary school every three years.”

FAMILIES

Many facets of school safety planning impact families. Much of the literature on school safety planning provides guidelines for communicating with families and advice for families on how to deal with their children after a crisis. Additionally, verbatim statements from families of children attending school near the World Trade Center on September 11 provide insight into crisis planning. The following sections address the school's role in communicating with families both before and immediately following a school crisis and what families can do to facilitate their children's recovery.

Communicating Information to Families Before a Crisis

Families will appreciate information on crisis preparations. It is especially useful to explain family members' roles before an incident occurs. Some school districts send families letters describing the school's expectations for their response. Other school districts have found it useful to work with local media to disseminate this information.

School and district staff and emergency responders need to be able to do their jobs. Families need to know that they should rely on media outlets for information during an incident, rather than telephoning schools. It is very important that families understand that during a crisis, school phones will be needed to manage the situation. Families should also know that they should wait for instructions on student release rather than rushing to the school. It is helpful to explain to families that emergency responders need the area clear to do their job. Also explain that only after emergency responders

determine that a safe student release is possible will families be reunited with their children. It is also useful to remind families that in many situations, their children will be safer in the school building than outside or in a car, particularly in cases of severe weather.

Communicating Information to Families During a Crisis

Communicating with families. It is important to have a mechanism for communicating with families in the event of a crisis. The mode of communication could be a telephone voice recording with information about welfare of the children, evacuation sites, or information about releasing students. Arrangements could be made with TV and radio stations to release such information. In the case of an extended crisis, such as the sniper attacks on the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, a school official may want to write a letter to families each day of the crisis to update them on safety measures devoted to the safety of their children. Schools should be sensitive to the communities they draw upon and enlist volunteers to help communicate with families who do not speak English. It is important to acknowledge cultural differences in responding to crises.

Contact information for students. Schools need contact information from families, including numbers where they can be reached during the day. In addition, each child should have several alternative contacts, such as a relative or family friend who would be able to pick up the child in the event of an emergency. One of the backup adults should live outside of the immediate area, if possible.

Guidelines for Families in Dealing with Their Children After a Crisis

Remain calm. It is important to remain calm in the aftermath of a crisis. Children are greatly influenced by their family's sense of well-being, and anything that families can do to reassure students will be helpful. At the same time, families need to be compassionate listeners when their children speak of the crisis.

Attend to children's reactions. Be alert to children's emotional needs. Individuals recover from crisis at their own pace. Many children will benefit from mental health services regardless of whether they were directly or indirectly involved in the incident.

Return children to normal routine as quickly as possible. Families should adhere to the schedule of the school, and if the school remains open immediately after the aftermath of a crisis, it is important to let children return to school. Adhering to a typical routine will help children in the recovery process.

Refer the Media to the PIO. Undoubtedly, the media will try to interview families and children during or after a crisis. Families can make a very positive contribution to the school by referring the media to the PIO.

Attend community meetings. Families will receive invaluable information and support by attending community or school meetings. Community meetings often provide information to help dispel rumors and establish mechanisms of communication with parents, the media, and other affected parties.

The following statement, made by a parent of a child in a school near the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, emphasizes the points made earlier.

“Children’s reactions are reflections of their parents. Too many parents expose children to their every emotion: fear, anxiety, anger, worry, etc. The fact is that children want parents to be heroes. If parents can be strong, this will benefit their recovery.”

MODELS OF CRISIS INTERVENTION FOR STUDENTS

There are many approaches to crisis intervention for students. Most experts agree that school- or classroom-based stress management needs to be conducted for all students and that those with more severe reactions need to be referred for evaluation and possibly counseling.

Who provides interventions? Teachers, school counselors, and social workers, as well as community service providers may be involved in conducting interventions following a crisis. Families may also use school personnel as a resource for seeking outside counseling. During the planning phase, districts should identify service providers in the community that have the skills and appropriate credentials and develop a list of referrals.

What are the types of interventions? The following bullets briefly describe several approaches:

- ▶ **Group crisis intervention, or GCI,** a school-based intervention, is often defined as “psychological first aid.” GCI is an efficient and cost-effective way of helping students cope in the aftermath of a crisis. Basically, GCI is offered to homogeneous groups of students (class membership) and involves guided group discussions in a supportive environment. The agenda for GCI includes an introduction and sessions on providing facts, dispelling rumors, sharing stories, sharing reactions, providing empowerment, and offering a closing. Students with severe reactions to the crisis should receive more intensive interventions (Brock et al., 2002).

- ▶ **Acute traumatic stress management** for educators, another school-based intervention, offers a “road map” for educators to deal with the aftermath of a crisis. ATSM takes a practical approach to dealing with the psychological consequences of a traumatic event. The goal is to stimulate adaptive coping mechanisms and to stabilize more severe reactions among students. ATSM has 10 stages:

- 1 Assess for danger/safety for self and others.
- 2 Consider the mechanism for injury.
- 3 Evaluate the level of responsiveness.
- 4 Address medical needs.
- 5 Observe and identify.
- 6 Connect with the individual.
- 7 Ground the individual.
- 8 Provide support.
- 9 Normalize the response.
- 10 Prepare for the future.

- ▶ **Individual counseling.** Students who experience severe symptoms after a crisis may need individual counseling. It is important for these individuals to be referred for further evaluation by a mental health professional. There are many forms of individual

counseling depending on the age of the child and presenting symptoms. Some of the approaches to individual counseling include play therapy, art therapy, talking therapy, drug therapy, and a combination of therapies. Cognitive-behavioral therapy, among others, has shown to be an effective therapeutic intervention in the literature. Dr. Robert Pynoos, Director of Trauma Psychiatry at the University of California at Los Angeles, developed an interview guide for working with students who have been traumatized. The interview guide contains the following sections:

- 1 Triage questions
- 2 Individual's reaction to the event/traumatic reminders
- 3 Life changes/changes in behavior
- 4 Grief responses
- 5 Problem solving/taking constructive action, affirmation
- 6 Affirmation and reinforcement of student's strengths and assets

Appendix A

Resources



This resource list provides the reader with examples of the types of programs that exist in crisis planning. This information is current as of Fall 2006. Selection of these programs does not indicate an endorsement by the Department of Education. The Department is interested in identifying other crisis planning Web sites. Please contact emergencyplan@ed.gov if you have information regarding other practical resources.

References

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<http://www.atism.org>

<http://www.traumatic-stress.org>

<http://www.aaets.org>

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Crisis management manual.

<http://www.sopriswest.com>

Poland, S. & McCormick, J.S. (1999). *Coping with crisis:*

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schools. New York: Guilford Press. <http://www.guilford.com>

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<http://www.safer-schools.com/>

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Washington, D.C.: Author.

<http://www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/osdfs/resources.html>

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Springfield, Mass.: Merriam-Webster, Inc.

Wong, M., Kelly, J. & Stephens, R.D. (2001). *Jane's school safety handbook*. Alexandria, Va.: Jane's Information Group.

<http://catalog.janes.com/>

Helpful Web Resources

For more information on grants from the Department of Education to strengthen and improve emergency response plans, as well as to help fund education-related efforts in the immediate aftermath of a violent crisis, please see <http://www.ed.gov/emergencyplan>

American Red Cross

<http://www.redcross.org>

Public Health Training Network

Centers for Disease Control

<http://www2a.cdc.gov/phtn/>

Crisis Management Toolkit

Department of Defense Education Activity

<http://dodea.edu/instruction/crisis/>

Fairfax County (VA) Public Schools

<http://www.fcps.k12.va.us/>

Federal Emergency Management Agency

<http://www.fema.gov>

Montgomery County (MD) Public Schools

<http://mcps.k12.md.us/info/emergency/preparedness/index.cfm>

National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities

<http://www.edfacilities.org/>

NEA Crisis Response Team

National Education Association

<http://www.nea.org/crisis/b1home.html#response>

North Carolina Public Schools

<http://www.ncpublicschools.org>

Emergency Response and Crisis Management Technical Assistance Center

<http://www.ercm.org>

Helpful Web Resources (Cont.)

Ready Campaign

<http://www.ready.gov>

Emergency Planning

Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools

U.S. Department of Education

<http://www.ed.gov/emergencyplan/>

*Communication in a Crisis: Risk Communication Guidelines for
Public Officials, 2002*

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration

<http://www.riskcommunication.samhsa.gov/index.htm>

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

<http://www.dhs.gov>

State Emergency Management Offices¹

Alabama Emergency Management Agency

5898 County Road 41

P.O. Drawer 2160

Clanton, AL 35046-2160

Phone: 205-280-2238

Phone: 205-280-2200

Fax: 205-280-2495

<http://www.ema.alabama.gov>

Alaska Division of Emergency Services

P.O. Box 5750

Fort Richardson, AK 99505-5750

Phone: 907-428-7000

Fax: 907-428-7009

<http://www.ak-prepared.com/>

School Preparedness Page:

<http://www.akprepared.com/training/toppage1.htm>

Arizona Department of Emergency and Military Affairs

5636 East McDowell Road

Phoenix, AZ 85008

Phone: 602-244-0504

Fax: 602-231-6356

<http://www.azdema.gov>

Arkansas Department of Emergency Management

P.O. Box 758

Conway, AR 72033

Phone: 501-730-9750

Fax: 501-730-9754

<http://www.adem.state.ar.us/>

¹ Please contact local emergency management offices prior to contacting state offices.

State Emergency Management Offices (Cont.)

California Governor's Office of Emergency Services
Information and Public Affairs Office
3650 Schriever Avenue
Mather, CA 95655
Phone: 916-845-8510
Fax: 916-845-8511
<http://www.oes.ca.gov/>

Colorado Office of Emergency Management
Division of Local Government
Department of Local Affairs
9195 East Mineral Avenue
Suite 200
Centennial, CO 80112
Phone: 720-852-6600
Fax: 720-852-6750
<http://www.dola.state.co.us/oem/>

Connecticut Office of Emergency Management
Military Department
360 Broad Street
Hartford, CT 06105
Phone: 860-566-3180
Fax: 860-247-0664
<http://www.ct.gov/demhs>
(Connecticut Emergency Management officials recommend
contacting the State Department of Education.)

Delaware Emergency Management Agency
165 Brick Store Landing Road
Smyrna, DE 19977
Phone: 302-659-3362
Phone: 877-729-3362 (in-state only)
Fax: 302-659-6855
<http://www.state.de.us/dema/>

District of Columbia Emergency Management Agency
2720 Martin Luther King Jr. Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20009
Phone: 202-727-6161
Fax: 202-673-2290
<http://dcema.dc.gov>

Florida Division of Emergency Management
2555 Shumard Oak Blvd.
Tallahassee, FL 32399-2100
Phone: 850-413-9969
Fax: 850-488-1016
<http://www.floridadisaster.org>

Georgia Office of Homeland Security
P.O. Box 18055
Atlanta, GA 30316-0055
Phone: 404-635-7000
Fax: 404-635-7205
<http://www.gema.state.ga.us>

Training, Education & Information Branch
Hawaii State Civil Defense
3949 Diamond Head Road
Honolulu, HI 96816-4495
Phone: 808-733-4300
Phone: 808-734-4246
Fax: 808-733-4287
<http://www.scd.state.hi.us>

Emergency Planning
Idaho Bureau of Homeland Security
4040 Guard Street, Bldg. 600
Boise, ID 83705-5004
Phone: 208-422-3040
Fax: 208-422-3044
<http://www.bhs.idaho.gov>

State Emergency Management Offices (Cont.)

Illinois Emergency Management Agency
2200 South Dirksen Parkway
Springfield, IL 62703
Phone: 217-782-2700
Fax: 217-524-7967
<http://www.state.il.us/iema>

State Planning Branch
Indiana Department of Homeland Security
302 West Washington Street
Room E-208 A
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2767
Phone: 317-233-6116
Phone: 317-232-3986
Fax: 317-232-3895
<http://www.in.gov/dhs/>

Iowa Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Department of Defense
7105 N.W. 70th Avenue
Camp Dodge, Building W-4
Johnston, IA 50131
Phone: 515-725-3231
Fax: 515-725-3260
<http://www.iowahomelandsecurity.org>

Training Section
Kansas Division of Emergency Management
2800 S.W. Topeka Boulevard
Topeka, KS 66611-1287
Phone: 785-274-1409
Fax: 785-274-1426
<http://www.kansas.gov/kdem>

Kentucky Community Crisis Response Board
1121 Louisville Road, Suite 2
Frankfort, KY 40601-3460
Phone: 502-607-5781
<http://www.kccrb.ky.gov>

Or

Kentucky Emergency Management
EOC Building
100 Minuteman Parkway Bldg. 100
Frankfort, KY 40601-6168
Phone: 502-607-1600 or 800-255-2587
Fax: 502-607-1614
<http://kyem.ky.gov>

Louisiana Homeland Security and Emergency Preparedness
7667 Independence Blvd.
Baton Rouge, LA 70806
Phone: 225-925-7500
Fax: 225-925-7501
<http://www.lope.state.la.us>

Maine Emergency Management Agency
State Office Building, Station 72
Augusta, ME 04333
Phone: 207-624-4400
Fax: 207-287-3178
<http://www.maine.gov/mema/>

State Emergency Management Offices (Cont.)

Maryland Emergency Management Agency
Public Information Officer
Camp Fretterd Military Reservation
5401 Rue Saint Lo Drive
Reisterstown, MD 21136
Phone: 410-517-3631
Toll-Free: 877-636-2872
Fax: 410-517-3610
<http://www.mass.gov/mema>

Massachusetts Emergency Management Agency
400 Worcester Road
Framingham, MA 01702-5399
Phone: 508-820-2000
Fax: 508-820-2030
<http://www.state.ma.us/mema>

Michigan Division of Emergency Management
4000 Collins Road
P.O. Box 30636
Lansing, MI 48909-8136
Phone: 517-333-5042
Fax: 517-333-4987 FAX
<http://www.michigan.gov/emd>

Minnesota Homeland Security and Emergency Management
Department of Public Safety
Suite 223
444 Cedar Street
St. Paul, MN 55101-6223
Phone: 651-201-7400
Fax: 651-296-0459
<http://www.hsem.state.mn.us>

Mississippi Emergency Management Agency

P.O. Box 5644

Pearl, MS 39208

Phone: 601-933-MEMA or 800-222-6362 (Toll-free)

Fax: 601-933-6800

<http://www.msema.org/index.htm>

(MEMA recommends contacting the State Department of
Education, Division of School Safety)

Missouri Emergency Management Agency

P.O. Box 116

2302 Militia Drive

Jefferson City, MO 65102

Phone: 573-526-9100

24-hour Duty Officer: 573-751-2748

Fax: 573-634-7966

<http://sema.dps.mo.gov>

Montana Division of Disaster & Emergency Services

1900 Williams Street

Helena, MT 59604-4789

Phone: 406-841-3911

Fax: 406-444-3965

<http://dma.mt.gov/des>

Nebraska Emergency Management Agency

1300 Military Road

Lincoln, NE 68508-1090

Phone: 877-297-2368

Fax: 402-471-7433

<http://www.nema.ne.gov>

State Emergency Management Offices (Cont.)

Nevada Division of Emergency Management
2525 South Carson Street
Carson City, NV 89711
Phone: 775-687-4240
Fax: 775-687-6788
<http://www.dem.state.nv.us/>

New Hampshire Division of Safety
Bureau of Emergency Management
State Office Park South
107 Pleasant Street
Concord, NH 03301
Phone: 603-271-2231
Fax: 603-225-7341
<http://www.nhoem.state.nh.us/>

New Jersey Office of Emergency Management
P.O. Box 7068
West Trenton, NJ 08628-0068
Phone: 609 538-6050 Monday-Friday
Phone: 609-882-2000 ext 6311 (24/7)
Fax: 609-538-0345
<http://www.state.nj.us/njoem>

New Mexico Department of Public Safety
Office of Emergency Services & Security
P.O. Box 1628
Santa Fe, NM 87504
Phone: 505-476-9600
Fax: 505-476-9695
<http://www.dps.nm.org/emergency/index.htm>

Planning Department
New York State Emergency Management Office
1220 Washington Avenue
Building 22, Suite 101
Albany, NY 12226-2251
Phone: 518-292-2200
Fax: 518-322-4978
<http://www.semo.state.ny.us/>

Support Services Branch
North Carolina Division of Emergency Management
116 West Jones Street
Raleigh, NC 27603
Phone: 919-733-3867
Fax: 919-733-5406
<http://www.dem.dcc.state.nc.us/>

North Dakota Department of Emergency Services
P.O. Box 5511
Bismarck, ND 58506-5511
Phone: 701-328-8100
Fax: 701-328-8181
<http://www.nd.gov/des/>

Ohio Emergency Management Agency
2855 W. Dublin Granville Road
Columbus, OH 43235-2206
Phone: 614-889-7150
Fax: 614-889-7183
<http://www.state.oh.us/odps/division/ema/>

Oklahoma Department of Emergency Management
2401 N. Lincoln Boulevard, Suite C51
Oklahoma City, OK 73105
Phone: 405-521-2481
Fax: 405-521-4053
<http://www.ok.gov/OEM/>

State Emergency Management Offices (Cont.)

Oregon Emergency Management
Department of State Police
P.O. Box 14370
Salem, OR 97309
Phone: 503-378-2911
Fax: 503-588-1378
<http://egov.oregon.gov/OOHS/OEM/>

Pennsylvania Emergency Management Agency
2605 Interstate Drive
Harrisburg, PA 17110
Phone: 717-651-2007
Fax: 717-651-2040
<http://www.pema.state.pa.us/>

Rhode Island Emergency Management Agency
645 New London Ave
Cranston, RI 02920-3003
Phone: 401-946-9996
Fax: 401- 944-1891
<http://www.riema.ri.gov>

South Carolina Emergency Management Division
2779 Fish Hatchery Road
West Columbia, SC 29172
Phone: 803-737-8500
Fax: 803-737-8570
<http://www.scemd.org>

South Dakota Office of Emergency Management
118 West Capitol Ave
Pierre, SD 57501
Phone: 605-773-3231
Phone: 605-773-6426
Fax: 605-773-3580
<http://www.oem.sd.gov>

Tennessee Emergency Management Agency
3041 Sidco Drive
Nashville, TN 37204-1502
Phone: 615-741-0001
Fax: 615-242-9635
<http://www.tnema.org>

Texas Division of Emergency Management
5805 N. Lamar Boulevard
Austin, TX 78752
Phone: 512-424-2138
Fax: 512 424-2444 or 7160
<http://www.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/pages/index.htm>

Utah Division of Emergency Services and Homeland Security
Room 1110, State Office Building
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-1710
Phone: 801-538-3400
Fax: 801-538-3770
<http://www.dhls.utah.gov>

Vermont Emergency Management Agency
Department of Public Safety
Waterbury State Complex
103 South Main Street
Waterbury, VT 05671-2101
Phone: 802-244-8721
Fax: 802-244-8655
<http://www.dps.state.vt.us/vem/>

Virginia Department of Emergency Management
10501 Trade Court
Richmond, VA 23236-3713
Phone: 804-897-6500 or after hours 804-674-2400 to have
an on-call representative paged
Fax: 804-897-6506
<http://www.vdem.state.va.us>

State Emergency Management Offices (Cont.)

Washington Military Department
Emergency Management Division
Building 20, M/S: TA-20
Camp Murray, WA 98430-5122
Phone: 253-512-7000
Fax: 253-512-7200
<http://www.emd.wa.gov/>

West Virginia Division of Homeland Security and
Emergency Management
Building 1, Room EB-80
State Capital Complex
1900 Kanawha Boulevard, East
Charleston, WV 25305-0360
Phone: 304-558-5380
(Toll-free) 866-723-3982
Fax: 304-344-4538
<http://www.wvdhsem.gov>

Wisconsin Emergency Management
2400 Wright Street
P.O. Box 7865
Madison, WI 53707-7865
Phone: 608-242-3232
Fax: 608-242-3247
<http://emergencymanagement.wi.gov/>

Wyoming Office of Homeland Security
122 West 25th Street
Herschler Building, 1st floor East
Cheyenne, WY 82002
Phone: 307-777-4663
Fax: 307-635-6017
<http://wyohomelandsecurity.state.wy.us/>

Puerto Rico Emergency Management Agency

P.O. Box 966597

San Juan, PR 00906-6597

Phone: 787 724-0124

Fax: 787-725-4244

Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management - VITEMA

2-C Contant, A-Q Building

Virgin Islands 00820

Phone: 304-774-2244

Fax: 304-774-1491

Safe School Centers

National School Safety Center
141 Duesenberg Drive, Suite 11
Westlake Village, CA 91362
Phone: 805-373-9977
Fax: 805-373-9277
<http://www.schoolsafety.us>

Colorado Center for the Study and Prevention of Violence
University of Colorado
1877 Broadway, Suite 601
Boulder, CO 80302
Phone: 303-492-1032
Fax: 303-443-3297
<http://www.colorado.edu/cspv/>

Connecticut Governor's Prevention Partnership
30 Arbor Street
Hartford, CT 06106
Phone: 860-523-8042 ext. 28
Fax: 860-236-9412
<http://www.preventionworksct.org>

Florida Office of Safe Schools
Florida Department of Education
325 W. Gaines Street, Room 501
Tallahassee, FL 32399-0400
Phone: 850-245-0668
Fax: 850-245-9978
<http://www.firn.edu/doe/besss/safehome.htm>

Indiana School Safety Specialist Academy
Indiana Department of Education
Room 229, State House
Indianapolis, IN 46204-2798
Phone: 317-234-0326
Fax: 317-232-9140
<http://www.doe.state.in.us/issaa>

Kentucky Center for School Safety
Eastern Kentucky University
105 Stratton Building
521 Lancaster Avenue
Richmond, KY 40475
Phone: 1-877-805-4277 (Toll-free)
Fax: 859-622-8001
<http://www.kysafeschools.org>

Mississippi Department of Education
Division of School Safety
359 North West Street, Ste. 168
Jackson, MS 39179
Phone: 601-359-1335
Fax: 601-359-3235
<http://www.healthyschoolsms.org>

Missouri Center for Safe Schools
Univ. of MO. - Kansas City - School of Education.
5301 Holmes Road
Kansas City, MO 64110
Phone: 816-235-1042
Fax: 816-235-6184
<http://education.umkc.edu/safe-school/>

Montana Safe Schools Center
The University of Montana
Missoula, MT 59812-6376
Phone: 406-243-5344
Fax: 406-243-2197
<http://www.montanasafeschools.org>

Nebraska School Safety Office
Nebraska Department of Education
301 Centennial Mall South
Lincoln, NE 68509-4987
Phone: 402-471-1925
Fax: 402-471-8127
<http://www.nde.state.ne.us/safety>

Safe School Centers (Cont.)

New York State Center for School Safety
175 Rt. 32 N.
New Paltz, NY 12561
Phone: 845-255-8989
Fax: 845-255-3836
<http://www.mhric.org/scss>

North Carolina Center for the Prevention of School Violence
1801 Mail Service Center
Raleigh, NC 27699-1801
Phone: 800-299-6054
Fax: 919-715-1208

Ohio Safe Schools Center
University of Cincinnati
P.O. Box 210105
Cincinnati, OH 45221-0105
Phone: 800-788-7254 x2
Fax: 513-556-0782
<http://www.ebasedprevention.org>

University of Oregon
Institute on Violence and Destructive Behavior
1265 University of Oregon
Eugene, OR 97403-1265
Phone: 541-346-3592
Fax: 541-346-2594
<http://darkwing.uoregon.edu/~ivdb/>

Pennsylvania Center for Safe Schools
275 Grandview Avenue
Camp Hill, PA 17011
Phone: 717-763-1661
Fax: 717-763-2083
<http://www.safeschools.info>

..... Effective crisis planning begins with leadership at the top.

South Carolina Center for Safe Schools
South Carolina Department of Education
1429 Senate Street
Columbia, SC 29201
Phone: 803-734-8101
Fax: 803-734-4458
http://ed.sc.gov/agency/offices/ssys/safe_schools/sccss/

Tennessee School Safety Center
5th Floor, Andrew Johnson Tower
Nashville, TN 37243
Phone: 615-741-3248
Fax: 615-532-6638
<http://www.state.tn.us/education/learningsupport/index.html>

Texas School Safety Center
Texas State University
350 N. Guadalupe
Suite 140, PMB 164
San Marcos, TX 78666
Phone: 877-245-8082
Fax: 512-245-9033
<http://www.txssc.txstate.edu/txssc.htm>

Virginia Center for School Safety
Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services
202 North 9th Street
Richmond, VA 23219
Phone: 804-371-6506
Fax: 804-692-0948
<http://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/vcss/>

Crisis plans are living documents. They need to be reviewed and revised regularly.

Washington State
Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction
P. O. Box 47200
Olympia, WA 98504
Phone: 360-725-6044
FAX: 360-664-3575
<http://www.k12.wa.us/Safetycenter/>

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION



VERMONT SCHOOL CRISIS GUIDE



2008

Prepared By:

Vermont School Crisis Planning Team

***Vermont School Crisis Planning Team
Chittenden East Supervisory Union
211 Bridge Street
Richmond, VT 05477***

To: Vermont Superintendents, School Administrators and Emergency Responders
From: Stephen M. Earley, Chair, Vermont School Crisis Planning Team
Date: October 2008

This updated School Crisis Guide reflects current work of the Vermont School Crisis Planning Team (VSCPT) since the last publication in 2004. Much has happened in Vermont schools, and in schools throughout the country, to warrant the production of a second edition of the Crisis Guide. School leaders and emergency responders have learned a great deal from planning, simulating and responding to real-life school emergencies over the past four years. The Crisis Team has incorporated this new learning within the updated Crisis Guide.

The Crisis Guide contains new incident response forms for severe weather, infectious disease, power outages and other hazards that schools need to address in their safety plans. It includes information and an appendix full of useful assessments, ideas and references that the Crisis Team believes will make school response plans more focused, easier to implement and effective. The guidelines are meant to bring school leaders and emergency responders together to plan for school emergencies. In reviewing the past four years, one fact is obvious, school emergencies will happen. The question is, will your school and community be prepared to minimize property damage, reduce injuries and hopefully save lives. This work is too important to ignore.

The Vermont School Crisis Planning Team's work was crucial prior to and following the school shooting in Essex Town. Understanding that "It Can Happen Here", school and community leaders have developed a renewed interest in creating school safety plans and carrying out school and community response exercises. An important outcome is that Vermont Homeland Security (VHS) and Vermont Emergency Management (VEM) provided a grant to fund the initial work of regional facilitators who have assisted school administrators and emergency responders to create School Public Safety Committees.

This fall VHS and VEM have provided additional grant funding to continue facilitator support and expand resources to schools and communities. We express appreciation to Lieutenant Governor Brian Dubie, Captain Chris Reinfurt of Vermont Homeland Security, Vermont Emergency Management Director Barbara Farr, and Chittenden East Superintendent James Massingham for their efforts and support in making this grant possible.

We encourage you to remain vigilant as you plan and prepare for emergencies, and hope you never experience a major school or community crisis.

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The Vermont School Crisis Guide 2008

To All School Leaders and Emergency Service Providers:

The 2008 Vermont School Crisis Guide has been revised to improve its use by School Crisis Teams and Public Safety Committees. There are several new incident forms on **Severe Weather, Infectious Disease, Power Outages** and advice on assessments, laws and practices. The Guide is organized by roles so users can quickly locate their responsibilities in a crisis. The Crisis Guide pages can be used to document pertinent information (time, witnesses) immediately after an emergency situation, essential in constructing an incident report. The full Guide can be downloaded from the Vermont Department of Education web site at:

http://education.vermont.gov/new/pdfdoc/resources/model_crisis_guide_04.pdf

and individual incident response forms can be downloaded from the Vermont Emergency Management web site at:

<http://www.dps.state.vt.us/vem/schoolcrisis/index.html>

School leaders can modify its contents to conform to local situations and resources. A three-ring binder with alphabetized tabs and has been distributed to every school principal and superintendent. A Vermont School Safety Review Check List is also available at:

http://education.vermont.gov/new/html/pgm_safeschools/pubs.html#safety_checklist

on the Vermont Department of Education web site.

Our goal is to provide school and community leaders with the most effective planning and response strategies for dealing with emergency and/or crisis situations. These resources conform to the requirements of 16 V.S.A., Chapter 33, and Rule 4102 of the Vermont State Board of Education Manual of Rules and Practices. You will find the statutory requirements in this guide.

The School Crisis Team and Public Safety Committee

The School Crisis Team is made up of individuals within the school staff, such as the principal, nurse, school resource officer, guidance counselor, teacher(s), custodian, etc. The Public Safety Committee consists of some members of the School Crisis Team plus representatives from law enforcement, fire, rescue, Local/Regional Emergency Planning Commission(s), and the newly established Community Emergency Response Team (authorized as part of the federal Homeland Security network). Both entities are created to assist the principal in planning for and responding to school crises.

The School Crisis Team should work with the principal and the Public Safety Committee to plan monthly emergency drills that are required under current Vermont law. 16 V.S.A., section 1481 states:

“The principal or person in charge of a public or independent school or educational institution shall drill the pupils so that they may be able to leave the school building or perform other procedures described in the school's emergency preparedness plan, or both in the shortest possible time and without panic or confusion.”

The Public Safety Committee should establish in advance an incident command system that identifies the principal as the primary incident commander. Emergency response personnel assume that role later. When it is determined that a crime has been committed, the law enforcement commander will take charge. If a fire or a hazardous materials situation develops, the fire chief will become the incident commander.

During a major crisis the principal and emergency service providers form what is called a “unified incident command system”, with all key leaders sharing in the decision-making process.

The most effective Public Safety Committees meet on a monthly basis to plan and conduct periodic tabletop and functional emergency exercises. The principal is the communications and planning liaison between the Public Safety Committee and the School Crisis Team.

Using the Vermont School Crisis Guide 2008

The Vermont School Crisis Guide 2008 is intended for use by school administrators and emergency service providers for planning purposes and when responding to crisis situations. The Vermont School Crisis Planning Team encourages school leaders and local emergency service providers to work together to create locally customized print materials for insertion into a three-ring binder. To further expand communications between school leaders and emergency service providers, the locally customized Crisis Guide may be uploaded to the school or community web site and shared through secure password access.

Since the information contained in the Crisis Guide is general in nature, each school or district should tailor procedures to fit local needs and capabilities. Schools should use the Crisis Guide as a framework to implement local school policy and administrative procedures, which are based on a comprehensive school emergency operations plan. For effective utilization of this resource, use the Crisis Guide at staff in-service trainings, review procedures at the beginning of each school year and practice different aspects of the Clear the Halls, Secure the Building, Shelter in Place and/or Evacuation/Relocation exercises with students and staff during monthly emergency drills.

Knowing who to call, logging local emergency phone numbers in your customized Crisis Guide, and pre-programming them in the school's phone system can save time, property, and, possibly, lives.

The Crisis Guide is intended to be a practical outline for action in a variety of emergencies. It will be most effective when:

- ◆ school policies are aligned with crisis procedures and adopted by the School Board;
- ◆ companion administrative procedures are routinely rehearsed and followed;
- ◆ prior planning and coordination occurs between school leaders and local emergency service providers; and
- ◆ a clear chain of command and effective communication systems are developed and followed.

Your customized Crisis Guide will serve as the School Emergency Preparedness Plan as outlined in Vermont law and the Vermont Department of Education Rule 4102.

Simplified Emergency Commands

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and Homeland Security recommend that schools use the simplified emergency commands listed below, and detailed in the Crisis Guide, to conduct emergency drills and responding to a major crisis:

“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Shelter in Place”
“Evacuate the Building”

The Vermont School Crisis Planning Team recommends that a simple Crisis Command Placard be prominently placed in all teaching spaces that direct teachers, staff, and students about how to respond to each of the simplified emergency commands listed above. A sample placard is included In the guide.

Crisis Management

There are four phases of emergency management; *prevention, preparedness, response and recovery*. Schools should address each phase in their planning. The U.S. Department of Education Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools produces many helpful pamphlets and resources for schools and communities. Contact the web site at: <http://www.ed.gov/emergencyplan>
A short description is contained here, and more detailed information can be found in the guide appendix.

Prevention

The goal of mitigation and prevention is to decrease the need for response as opposed to simply increasing response capability. Identifying local hazards and determining major problems in your school can help you plan for readiness.

Preparedness

Good planning will facilitate a rapid, coordinated, effective response when a crisis occurs. Developing procedures for communicating with faculty and staff, providing information on the location of utility shutoffs and equipment, accounting for students and practicing procedures will help diminish injury and confusion.

Response

Proper crisis response is critical in an emergency. A tested safety plan with preparations in place will keep students safe. Determining the appropriate response to the incident, effectively handling information and carrying out practiced procedures lessens panic and confusion.

Recovery

The goal of recovery is to return to learning and restore the infrastructure as quickly as possible. Special programs on intervention, counseling and debriefing will help students and staff learn from an incident and return to schooling.

Crises are unexpected, often unpredictable and take many forms. No school and community can be fully prepared for everything that may happen, but some simple measures are helpful in any crisis situation:

- ◆ Think of everyone's safety first;
- ◆ Use common sense and follow crisis training procedures;
- ◆ Act quickly and calmly; and
- ◆ Remain factual and unemotional when communicating with students, the community, and media.

When the School Crisis Team responds to an incident they should make decisions about the following categories based on school crisis policies, procedures, and factual information known at the time:

- ◆ Type of school response outlined in the Crisis Guide;
- ◆ Staff and substitute teacher coverage enabling the School Crisis Team to carry out proscribed duties;
- ◆ Notification of students, staff, parents, and community members;
- ◆ Crowd control;
- ◆ Type of student and staff support needed;
- ◆ Wrecker service to remove cars that are blocking entry or exit of emergency vehicles;
- ◆ Media and other communications coordination;
- ◆ Level of parent involvement and type of community information meetings to be scheduled;
- ◆ Involvement of supervisory union/district School Crisis Team members;
- ◆ Time and place for follow-up progress meeting(s) and need for victim assistance services;
- ◆ Assess and debrief crisis response.

There may be instances when time-sensitive decisions have to be made quickly by the principal or designee, thus bypassing involvement of the School Crisis Team or Public Safety Committee. During a crisis situation, Public Safety Committee members may (in their role as first responders) work from a predetermined emergency operations center, also referred to as incident command.

Emergency Equipment

Some schools have placed emergency response resource equipment in every classroom. This equipment often includes a fluorescent vest or brightly colored hat to be worn by school staff during an emergency. Many schools have purchased a multitude of cell phones or portable radios to enhance on-site emergency communications. Other key equipment might include a backpack for each teacher that contains a medical kit, garbage bags to help keep students warm and dry, decks of playing cards, and a current student attendance roster.

Student Restraint Resources

There may be times when it is appropriate for school staff to utilize pre-established student restraint procedures when a student perpetrates a violent incident, and school staff members want to prevent the student from further injuring themselves and others. The Vermont Department of Education BEST Initiative has trained many school staff members from around the state to deal with situations involving conflict and physical aggression. The BEST project was developed to respond to the near unanimous concern of school leaders, parents, students, and legislators that issues of safety, school climate, and discipline were significantly limiting the academic and social success of many of our students. BEST has been successful helping educators and school administrators from throughout the state to both prevent and respond to student behavioral challenges.

Other School Crisis Resources

The Crisis Guide is intended for use in conjunction with the following resources:

- ◆ Classroom Crisis Command Placard
- ◆ School Bomb Search PowerPoint (www.vtvsba.org)

The Vermont School Boards Association Web site also provides access to U.S. Secret Service School Threat Assessment resources. You'll be able to review the research findings compiled by a Secret Service psychologist who analyzed major crises involving student violence in schools over the past 30 years. The PowerPoint slides reinforce the importance of creating trusting relationships and open communication between students, staff, and parents.

There are Crisis Training DVD's produced to help the Public Safety Committee and/or School Crisis Team conduct and debrief table top emergency exercises. There is a limited supply of additional training DVDs available upon request by law enforcement agencies and fire departments. Contact the Vermont Department of Education, Safe and Healthy Schools Division for more information.

Crisis Prevention

Finally, to quote an old athletic cliché, "the best defense is a good offense!" In the context of maintaining safe schools, this means building a positive school culture which places a premium on creating a safe, civil, and respectful learning environment. This philosophy is always more productive than reacting to out-of-control students. With this concept in mind, many schools have established student conferencing and peer support systems to assist students and staff to address volatile situations before they escalate into crisis mode.

A large body of research continues to demonstrate the importance of programs that help students increase their personal developmental assets, i.e. empowerment for learning, strong self-concept, home, and community support, etc. Routine interaction with at least one positive role model who provides unconditional support for every child is a much more effective strategy than dealing with the effects of negative student behavior that may lead to school violence. Students, who feel disconnected from their school, peer group, and society, often perpetrate incidents of school violence.

A number of school and community resources are available through regional "New Directions" grants and Child Protection Teams. The U.S. Justice Department COPS program provides funds for communities to employ school resource officers.

In closing, we commend you for taking the time to update and practice how your school will respond to emergency and crisis situations. We wish you the best of luck and hope none of the identified crises ever occur in your school or community!

—The Vermont School Crisis Planning Team

2008 Vermont School Crisis Planning Team

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Resources

The 2000 School Bomb Search Training. You will find this video resource included on the School Crisis Training DVD.

The 2004 School Crisis Training. A DVD distributed to all school principals and superintendents. it was filmed at Essex Union High School. The DVD was filmed and produced by the Regional Education Television Network, Colchester, Vermont.

The 2006 Vermont School Crisis Planning and Response Resources. This DVD covers the response effort and interviews after the Essex school shooting. The DVD was filmed and produced by the Regional Education Television Network, Colchester, Vermont.

In Appreciation

Captain Chris Reinfurt – Vermont State Police and Homeland Security
Barbara Farr-Vermont Emergency Management
Win Goodrich – Vermont School Boards Association
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ALLERGIC REACTION

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

Many students and staff are allergic to certain foods or food additives or may develop a dangerous reaction to prescription medicine or other chemicals/substances. Consistent with school board policy and the Family Educational Rights to Privacy Act (FERPA), school administration, in conjunction with the school nurse, should provide every staff person who routinely interacts with students or staff known to have food or other allergic reactions, with an Emergency Care Plan that includes student/staff names, parent/guardian/relative names, phone numbers and allergic symptoms as well as appropriate first aid measures.

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Check for a medical alert tag		
		Contact the school nurse immediately		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Check for Medical Alert Tag/Emergency Care Plan information for individual		
		Direct someone else to call 911 if needed, and inform the principal		
		Monitor and maintain ABC's (Airway—Breathing—Circulation) as needed		
		Administer Epinephrine (dosage as prescribed by physician) as appropriate		
		Administer oral Diphenhydramine (dosage as prescribed by physician) as appropriate		
		Administer oral steroid (dosage as prescribed by physician) as appropriate		
		Continue to observe student or staff member		
		Transport to emergency room with EMS for further treatment, if necessary		
		Notify physician		
		Tell parents to carefully watch child for next 24 hours and contact physician at first sign of any delayed allergic reaction		
		Complete an incident report and file in principal's office		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact parent(s)/guardian(s)/designated family member		

ASSAULT/FIGHTING

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”**

DATE / /

Violence or threat of physical harm to students, staff, administrators or other persons not involving a dangerous weapon or firearm

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Inform police of your observation and be prepared to make a written statement.		
		Check for injuries and if confirmed, call 911		
		Use appropriate de-escalation strategies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ remain emotionally neutral; ✓ quickly analyze situation to decide response, especially if police need to be called; ✓ if warranted, and trained staff are available, restrain combatants; ✓ seek additional trained support staff for backup; ✓ remove other students and secure the scene. 		
		Get names and addresses of any witnesses and report to law enforcement and principal or designee		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Notify SRO		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Approach in a calm manner and direct combatants to stop fighting		
		Separate combatants to a safe area, if possible		
		Verify extent of assault or fight and notify law enforcement		
		Attempt to determine who has been injured, and the extent of injuries. Notify the school nurse and request additional medical help as needed		
		Direct the clearing of the classroom or halls in the immediate vicinity or request all of the hallways be cleared		
		Direct preparation of a phone list identifying names of students and parents who need to be notified		
		Contact superintendent		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Work with communication coordinator if a press release is needed after consulting with police		
		Conduct investigation and follow school discipline policies and administrative procedures, which may include anger management or other appropriate counseling		
		Determine consequence for the offender(s). This could include: suspension, in-school punishment, criminal charge, group conferences, restorative justice methods, and referral to community justice center		
		Debrief with school crisis team and staff		
		Complete an incident report and file		

ASSAULT/FIGHTING (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Approach in a calm manner and direct combatants to stop fighting		
		Escort combatants to the office, keeping them isolated from other students		
		Convene school crisis team, depending on the situation and decide what additional resources and support will be needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee with notifying parents of victims		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assess extent of injuries, administer first aid and seek further medical support as needed		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Superintendent or designee handles press		
		Prepare a written statement, if the situation warrants it, for staff to read to students at school and send to parents/guardians describing the facts known at the time and procedures for accessing support as needed		
		Contact media with predetermined message that has been approved by principal or designee after communication with the police		

BIOTERRORISM

“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Evacuate the Building”

DATE / /

A possible bioterrorist event might include the discovery of a suspicious unknown substance (e.g. anthrax, gas, mist, etc.). A bioterrorist event differs from other crises. The level of fear and anxiety is greatly increased due to uncertainty in determining whether an attack has occurred, identifying the boundaries and scope of the attack, and the possibility of contagion. Unlike other events, when it is clear to the public that the immediate danger of an event has passed, the “end” of a bioterrorist attack may become apparent only after a period of time during which no new cases are documented. A bioterrorist event must involve new strategies and extend beyond traditional mental and clinical interventions.

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		DO NOT TOUCH the substance; cover and ISOLATE the substance immediately		
		Inform anyone who has touched a substance or package containing the substance to WASH their hands immediately		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Isolate people who have come in contact with the substance		
		Shut down the ventilation system immediately		
		Evacuate the immediate area		
		Initiate the “Secure the Building” plan and do not dismiss students until directed to do so by health authorities		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call police who will access the HAZMAT Hotline		911
		Evacuate non-contaminated students and staff after conferring with emergency responders		
		Isolate any people who have come in contact with the substance		
		Initiate the “Secure the Building” plan		
		Call Superintendent		
		Delegate roles		
		Call district office of Vermont Department of Health		
		Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
		ISOLATE and REDIRECT students discovered in a hallway, bathroom, wing, etc.		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal as designated		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal and set up debriefs as needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal as designated		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal as designated		
v	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Forward phones to secondary answering site		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Shut down the ventilation system immediately		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Superintendent or designee handles press		

BOMB THREAT

“Evacuate the Building”

DATE / /

Receipt of an oral or written threat of a bomb, or discovery of a suspicious device or note.

BOMB THREAT BY PHONE

v	TIME	Phone call receiver	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Record exactly what the caller says using the police bomb threat call card		
		If bomb threat card is not available ask the caller: Time bomb set to detonate? _____ Where it's located? _____ Is it visible or hidden? _____ What it looks like? _____ Type of bomb? _____ Why placed in school or on grounds? _____ How it got in school? _____		
		Note caller accent, age, sex, noise, mental state, etc.		
		Write down perpetrator's <i>Caller ID</i> number		
		Activate *57 Call Tracing (note time of call)		
		Notify the principal or designee as soon as possible		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Avoid putting fingerprints on written note		
		Preserve for police if written on door, wall, etc.		
		Notify the principal or designee as soon as possible		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact police and fire department using regular phone numbers so as not to trigger scanners		
		Contact superintendent		
		Quickly convene the school crisis team. Use the information gathered to decide how the school should respond		
		Decide whether or not to evacuate the building. If you evacuate establish the relocation area for the students and staff members. Determine transportation needs. Follow procedures and communicate to staff and students.		
		In advance of relocation have pre-assigned staff check for suspicious devices at relocation site if time allows.		
		Make arrangement for providing food for students and staff if they remain at relocation site through lunch		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Set up Incident Command Post at pre-designated site where school leaders can stage with emergency providers		
		Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
		Activate pre-trained bomb search team(s) to conduct the building sweep according to administrative procedures after consultation with police		
		If suspicious device is found, don't touch it. Notify the appropriate police agency		
		Keep an informal time and procedure log of crisis response		

BOMB THREAT (CONTINUED)

		Work with counseling coordinator to initiate grief-counseling plan determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Debrief with school crisis team and public safety committee		
		Complete incident report and file in the principal's office		
v	TIME	TEACHERS AND STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		While evacuating the building, scan work area for any suspicious items that could be an explosive device		
		Take attendance in evacuation area and immediately report missing students to the backup team leader		
		Report suspicious objects to principal once evacuation procedures are complete		
		Do not touch or attempt to move any suspicious device		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Plan to assist students who are affected by the incident and also deal with anxious parents or friends		
		Initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Evacuate students in nurse's office and give to a teacher		
		Grab first aid kit and report to Incident Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries that may arise		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Turn off school utilities, weather permitting, and secure designated area for suspicious device		
		Wear identifying vests and work with law enforcement to keep incoming and outgoing travel lanes clear for emergency vehicles, and prevent unauthorized people from entering school grounds		
		Do not touch or attempt to move a suspicious device		
		Report findings to principal or designee as soon as possible		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with Law Enforcement and the Superintendent		

Classroom Crisis Commands

2008

Clear the Halls – Go to closest room supervised by an adult. Close door (lock if possible). Students and staff remain away from doors and windows. Turn off lights and shut curtains/blinds on doors and windows (if available). Use classroom intercom or phone only for emergencies.

Secure the School – Same as “Clear the Halls”. Go to closest room supervised by an adult. Close door (lock if possible). Students and staff remain away from doors and windows. Turn off lights and shut curtains/blinds on doors and windows (if available). Designated staff secure outside doors. Students outdoors move away from building. Use classroom intercom or phone only for emergencies.

Evacuate the Building – (*Insert classroom exit directions here.*) In an orderly fashion, exit the building with class roster. Teacher takes attendance with assigned students. Move to the _____ Relocation Site when directed.

* The Vermont School Crisis Team recommends that both “Clear” and “Secure” directives be treated as imminent threats to individual safety. Always follow the recommended procedures and await specific directives once an assessment is made.

Clear the Halls

Clear the Halls means all students and staff exit the hallways until directed to do otherwise by the Principal or designee. Students should go to the nearest room where there is adult supervision. Remain quiet and away from internal and external windows and doors. Shut off lights and close shades if available. Only use classroom telephone/intercom only for emergencies. Students and staff should not exit the building.

Secure the School

Secure the School means all students and staff remain in their assigned workspace/classroom or immediately move to a designated area as directed by the Principal. Use of *Secure the School* procedure should occur when an emergency situation exists somewhere within the school or in the immediate area outside the school, where the presence of students and staff would place them in danger.

Shelter in Place

Shelter in Place means that dangers (hazmat) may exist outside the building. Faculty, students and staff should seek shelter inside the building, close all windows and doors and immediately turn off all air handling equipment.

Evacuate the Building

Evacuation means that all students, staff, and visitors exit the building(s) and move quietly and quickly to designated safe areas at least 300' away from the school (Ensure evacuation areas are accessible during winter months).

Use of Classroom Crisis Commands

Vermont School Safety Teams use the classroom crisis commands for a variety of reasons. For instance, if a student or adult is injured, a "Clear the Halls" command will allow EMTs direct access to the injured party and save precious time. Injuries, illnesses, biological releases or incidents outside of the school may require immediate action.

Once a command is given, everyone should follow the recommended guideline. Consistency is important in an emergency. Once an assessment is made of the incident, School Administrators may announce that classroom instruction may continue, but the halls must remain clear until further notice. This allows mitigation without interrupting classroom instruction. Vermont schools are to be commended for their resourcefulness in addressing challenges, however immediate compliance with the basic command is paramount for student and adult safety.

The Vermont School Crisis Team
September 2008

Crisis Codes

The school should establish and practice drills using a crisis code system to communicate when to Evacuate or when to remain in classrooms during a crisis requiring the Clear the Halls or Secure the School modes. The school may also use a code for other emergencies such as when a student is missing or an intruder is on school grounds. Suggested codes:

Clear the Halls
Secure the School
Evacuate the Building
Shelter in Place

Crisis Example	School Response
Bomb Threat	Evacuate the Building: -Leave internal doors open -Scan for unusual objects -Evacuate [may require moving students/staff to Relocation Site(s)]
Fire/Explosion	Evacuate the Building: -Shut all windows/doors -Evacuate [may require moving students and staff to Relocation Site(s)]
Hazardous Materials	Clear the Halls, Secure the School, Evacuate the Building, Shelter in Place: -Evacuate [may require moving students/staff to Relocation Site(s)]
Hostage/Intruder/ Student Threats	Clear the Halls, Secure the School, Evacuate the Building, Shelter in Place: -Students and staff in proximity of disturbance may be directed to remain in Clear the Halls or Secure Building mode while other parts of the building may be Evacuated
Missing Student(s)	Contact the Office with Information
Natural Disasters	Clear the Halls, Secure the School, Shelter in Place or Evacuate the Building: -Evacuate [may require moving students/staff to Relocation Site(s)]
Weapons	Clear the Halls, Secure the School, Shelter in Place or Evacuate the Building: -Students and staff in proximity of disturbance may be directed to remain in the Secure the Building mode while other parts of the building may be directed to Evacuate

Clear the Halls

Clear the Halls means all students and staff exit the hallways until directed to do otherwise by the Principal or designee. Students should go to the nearest room where there is adult supervision. Remain away from internal and external windows and doors. Shut off lights and close shades if available. Only use classroom telephone/intercom only for emergencies. Students and staff should not exit the building.

Secure the School

Secure the School means all students and staff remain in their assigned workspace/classroom or immediately move to a designated area as directed by the Principal. Use of Secure the School procedure should occur when an emergency situation exists somewhere within the school or in the immediate area outside the school, where the presence of students and staff would place them in danger.

Secure the School Procedure

1. Principal or designee, after consulting with the School Crisis Team and/or Public Safety Committee, whenever possible, gives the directive for partial or entire school *Secure the School* command.
2. Staff should lock all hallway and exterior doors; however, no doors should be barricaded or locked in a manner that would prevent rapid evacuation.
3. Designated staff members or administrator(s) should remain near exterior doors to allow entry by law enforcement officers.
4. During a gun incident, instruct students to "Drop to the Ground" or "Run into the Building Quickly."
5. During an incident involving a hostage or weapons, staff should direct students to move to an alternate secure area away from the perpetrator(s).
6. Teachers, staff, visitors, and students remain quiet in secured area of the building, on the floor, away from windows and doors, and with all lights turned off.
7. Remain in "*Secure the School*" mode until the Principal, designee or law enforcement commander gives the "all clear" command.

Shelter in Place

Shelter in Place means all students, staff and visitors remain within the building and await further instructions the Principal/Incident Commander.

Evacuate the Building

Evacuation means that all students, staff, and visitors exit the building(s) and move to designated safe areas at least 300' away from the school (Ensure evacuation areas are accessible during winter months).

Evacuation Procedures

- ◆ Principal, or designee, after consulting with the Crisis Team and/or Public Safety Committee, whenever possible, gives the directive to evacuate students and staff, indicating whether primary or alternate evacuation routes should be used.
- ◆ Close but do not lock windows and doors.
- ◆ All students and staff travel to designated evacuation areas away from building(s). (Ensure evacuation routes and designated areas do not place students and staff in vicinity where emergency service vehicles enter the school complex.)
- ◆ Teachers take attendance and report any missing students to the Backup Team Leader.
- ◆ When possible, use cell phones, two-way radios or predetermined runner system to maintain effective communication.
- ◆ If decision is to move students and staff to Relocation Site(s), the Principal or designee shall contact the Relocation Site(s) and Transportation Coordinators to activate student and staff relocation procedure.
- ◆ If harsh weather or other emergencies exist, and the local bus company does not have capacity to move all students and staff quickly, the Principal or designee and the School Bus Coordinator shall call the regional commercial bus service for additional transportation support.
- ◆ Communication Coordinator may contact media with predetermined message that has been coordinated with law enforcement and school administrators.

Relocation Site(s)

Relocation means moving students, staff, and visitors from evacuation areas to the Relocation Site(s). The Site(s) might be large community buildings (e.g. churches, town hall, and fire station). Students and staff may be bused or walk to predetermined Relocation Site(s). Your school plan should identify how parents should communicate with and pick up their children from the Relocation Site(s).

Information Center

Information Center means a place where family members of students and staff can obtain updated information relating to an incident at school. Local school procedures should identify contact phone numbers and the location of the Relocation Site(s).

DEATH OF STUDENT

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

The death of a student or staff member on school grounds or while traveling to or from the school.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Avoid disturbing the scene		
		Contact 911		
		Notify the Principal/Designee		
		Notify school nurse and school counselor(s)		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact superintendent		
		Convene school crisis team		
		Ensure family of deceased is notified through pre-established method; alert counselors and nurse at schools where any siblings are enrolled		
		Hold a faculty meeting as soon as possible to communicate next steps to staff		
		Permit students to leave school only with parental permission. Carefully track attendance. Consult with police officials involved with the death investigation in case they need to identify witnesses		
		Assess instructional and support needs. Call in substitute teachers as needed		
		Keep time and procedures log of crisis response activities		
		Make home visits to affected families with counselors or crisis team members		
		Hold community support meeting(s) if appropriate		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Debrief with school crisis team and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Meet and arrange for notification of teachers and staff as soon as possible if school is in session		
		Use telephone chain if school is not in session		
		Determine and notify additional support as needed after consultation with principal or designee		
		Provide ongoing support for students, faculty, and staff		
		Discuss how teachers can deal with crisis in the classroom		
		Hold ongoing “working team” meetings		
		Assign school counselors and other team members to visit the classes of those involved in incident		
		Provide a formal debriefing opportunity for the School Crisis Team members		

DEATH OF STUDENT (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Gather records of students involved in the incident and prevent unauthorized access		
		Determine extent and nature of counseling services needed and coordinate support systems		
		Determine and notify additional support as needed after consultation with principal or designee		
		Request teachers refer names of at-risk students to you		
		Establish format to monitor at-risk students and include parent/guardian referrals		
		Establish long-range plans for at-risk students		
		Inform student records staff to update deceased student file		
		Plan long-term response and follow-up counseling		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Continue informal support for affected students and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist police department with investigation		
		Work closely with counselor to ID at-risk students		
v	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call main office and bus company		
		Forward phones to secondary answering site		
		Direct transport of students to secondary site		
		Contact secondary site staff		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to appropriately clean the affected area, if needed, after cleared to do so by investigators		
v	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assemble all students at a predetermined site at least 300 feet from the school		
		Determine order of students to load into buses and/or direct students and staff who are walking		
v	TIME	INFORMATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		

DEMONSTRATION/RIOT

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”**

DATE / /

An event where a group of people threaten to disrupt school activities, cause personal or property damages.

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Obtain as much information as possible about the size of the group		
		Assess the type of action engaged in (e.g. blocking traffic, yelling at passersby)		
		Notify principal or designee as soon as possible		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Keep students and staff at a safe distance from the demonstration		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Determine whether to ask demonstrators to disperse		
		Convene the school crisis team if deemed appropriate		
		Decide whether or not to contact law enforcement		
		“Clear the Halls,” or “Secure the Building” depending on the circumstances		
		Request students who are in bathrooms or halls to join closest class		
		Contact superintendent		
		Inform media or assign task to Communication Coordinator, if deemed appropriate		
		Keep an informal time and procedures log of crisis response activities		
		Debrief school crisis team and staff		
		Complete and file an incident report		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Decide what additional resources and support will be needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee with notifying parents as appropriate		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to treat injuries and help EMS as needed		
		Assess the degree of injuries and report back to principal or designee		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Wear identifying vest if directed by principal or designee, and assist police with traffic control		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		

Dated: 6/20/07

Emergency Phone Numbers

Superintendent	Work # Cell# Pager #	Mental Health	
Principal	Work # Cell # Pager #	Phone Company	
Police Emergency #	911	Power Company	
Police Local Phone #			
Fire	911	Gas Company	
Ambulance/EMS	911	Oil Company	
Hazardous Materials	911	Wrecker Service	
Vermont Emergency Management Office	1-800-347-0488	Radio Station	
Poison Center	1-800-222-1222	Weather Station	
Vermont Health Department	1-800-640-4374	Bus Coordinator	
Child Abuse Reporting	1-800-649-5285	Commercial Bus Co.	
American Red Cross	1-800-660-9130	School Hotline/Voicemail	
Relocation Ctr. # 1 () Name Address:	Contact 1.1: Phone # Cell # Pager # Contact 1.2: Phone # Cell # Pager #	Relocation Ctr. # 2 () Name Address:	Contact 2.1: Phone # Cell # Pager # Contact 2.2: Phone # Cell # Pager #
Relocation Ctr. # 3 () Name Address:	Contact 3.1: Phone # Cell # Pager # Contact 3.2: Phone # Cell # Pager #	Relocation Ctr. # 4 () Name Address:	Contact 4.1: Phone # Cell # Pager # Contact 4.2: Phone # Cell # Pager #

EXPLOSION

“Evacuate the Building”

DATE / /

Whoever observes open flames, smells or sees smoke or experiences excessive heat or is aware of an explosion, should immediately notify the office, and activate the nearby fire alarm.

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call 911		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Pull the fire alarm - call 911		
		Evacuate the area/building and use the fire extinguisher if appropriate		
		Notify the principal/designee		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Pull fire alarm and call 911		
		Evacuate the building		
		Set up Command Post at pre-designated site		
		Insure accountability of all students and staff		
		Gather information from witnesses regarding the location of explosion		
		Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site		
		Meet with Fire Department at Command Post and pass on information regarding accountability of staff and students, and the location of the explosion		
		Notify superintendent		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal with evacuation		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Set up debriefs as needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Evacuate students in nurse's office and hand off to a teacher		
		Grab first aid kit and report to Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries		
		Set up casualty collection site, if necessary		
		Triage injured for additional medical attention		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Help with evacuation and securing of affected area		
v	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call bus company if necessary		
		Forward phones to secondary answering site		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		IF SAFE, go to alarm panel to determine location of explosion		
		Communicate location of fire to principal or designee		
		Stay with principal or designee to assist Fire Department with layout of school		

EXPLOSION (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assemble all students at a predetermined site at least 300 feet from the school		
		Determine order of students to load into the buses		
		Direct transport of students to secondary site		
		Contact secondary site personnel		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		

FIRE

“Evacuate the Building”

DATE / /

Whoever observes open flames, smells or sees smoke, or experiences excessive heat radiating from an adjoining wall, ceiling, or floor should immediately notify the office and activate the nearby fire alarm.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call 911		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Pull the fire alarm and call 911		
		Evacuate the area/building and use fire extinguisher if appropriate		
		Notify the principal/designee		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Pull fire alarm and call 911		
		Evacuate the building		
		Set up Command Post at pre-designated site		
		Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
		Gather information from staff regarding location of fire		
		Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site		
		Meet with Fire Department at Command Post and pass on information regarding accountability of staff and students, location of fire		
		Notify superintendent		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee with evacuation in role as designated		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After an event, set up debriefs as needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Evacuate students in nurse's office and hand off to a teacher		
		Collect First Aid Kit and report to Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries		
		Set up casualty collection site, if necessary		
		Triage injured for additional medical attention		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Help with evacuation and securing of affected area		
v	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call bus company if needed		
		Forward phones to secondary answering site		
		Direct transport of students to secondary site		
		Contact secondary site personnel		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		IF SAFE, go to alarm panel to determine the location of the fire.		
		Communicate location of fire to principal		
		Stay with principal or designee to assist Fire Department with layout of school		

FIRE (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Determine order of students to load into the buses		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		

FLOODING

“Clear the Halls”
 “Secure the School”
 “Evacuate the School”
 “Relocate”

DATE / /

Severe weather can often strike unpredictably. One effect of severe weather can result in localized flooding that could prevent access to the school or getting students home safely. Accordingly, appropriate emergency procedures must be developed and ready to be initiated in the event such weather strikes or is anticipated. Schools should use tone-alert or weather radios, or other such media sources, to receive notice of any such weather.

TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
✓ TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
	Obtain an advance warning of a flooding event from the National Weather Service or local radio stations, police or emergency providers; notify administration.		
	Call local emergency management director for updates		
	Keep Emergency Alert System (EAS) or other radio on for updates		
✓ TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
	Turn on EAS radio or other radio or media source		
	Check with local highway manager or public works commissioner to find out what roads are open and passable.		
	Notify the school's transportation provider of the potential need of buses		
	Decide whether to remain in school, conduct early closing, or evacuate or relocate if necessary.		
	Notify Superintendent and remain in contact w/ Central Office		
	If necessary, set up Command Post		
	Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
	Gather information from all sources on actual or potential flooding in the area.		
	If evacuation to a relocation site is considered, notify the relocation site manager to prepare for the student population and the possibility of an extended occupation		
	Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site. If needed call upon school Public Safety Committee		
	Meet at Command Post and receive information regarding staff and students and status of the potential for flooding		
	Ensure contact with emergency responders, transportation providers, emergency managers and public works commissioner		
	If the decision is to relocate the students, implement the media plan for alerting parents and guardians		
	Implement the school recovery plan and crisis counseling as needed		
	Set up debriefs as needed after the event		
✓ TIME	SCHOOL SAFETY TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
	Prepare to handle a large volume of telephone calls from parents or guardians		

		Monitor local radio stations for updates–EAS stations. Gather information from all resources		
		In the case of relocation, coordinate the responsibilities of school staff with the response procedure		
		Help prepare a pre-designated area for student pick up by parents/legal guardians or buses		
✓	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		Gather student attendance from faculty and staff for administration		
		Assemble all materials for an office on the move or portable office		
		Report to school command post with administration		
✓	TIME	FACULTY AND STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		Insure the accountability of all students to main office		
		Retrieve “go-bag” and keep on hand during the exercise		
		Account for students who are missing/out of the class		
		If relocating, supervise students and remain with them until they are released to parents or you are relieved from duty		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		Assist principal or designee during evacuation		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		Remove students in nurse’s office and hand off to a teacher		
		Collect First Aid Kit and report to Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries that may have occurred		
		Set up casualty collection site, if necessary		
		Assist EMS as needed		
		Document status of patients and maintain log		
✓	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		After consultation with principal and superintendent, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send home to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support.		

HAZMAT (Hazardous Material)

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Evacuate the Building”
“Shelter in Place”**

DATE 1 / 20 / 09

Whoever observes or suspects an uncontrolled or unexpected release of a hazardous material that could cause harm or death to humans or damage to the environment should first protect the people in the immediate area and then notify the office and call 911.

TIME		NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
✓	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
	Avoid contamination and warn others of the same concern.		
	Evacuate affected area and, if possible, isolate those who have been potentially exposed to a safe and secure area.		
	Notify the principal/designee to call 911 if necessary		
	As soon as possible, decide whether to evacuate the entire school or shelter in place. Outside Hazmat releases call for “Shelter”; inside releases call for “Evacuation”.		
	Shut down the air circulation system if Sheltering in Place.		
	Do not use the fire alarm to evacuate students. Predetermined exits may lead to a hazmat exposure.		
✓	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
	Evacuate affected area and if possible, isolate those who have been potentially exposed to a safe and secure area.		
	Shut down air circulation system.		
	Gather information from staff or witness regarding location of spill, extent and the name of the chemical.		
	Decide to evacuate or shelter in place.		
	Gather the school safety team.		
	Meet First Responders at the Incident Command Post. Upon their arrival, pass on staff and student information and the nature and location of the spill.		
	Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
	Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site		
	Notify superintendent		
✓	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
	Assist Principal or designee as needed		
✓	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
	Assist principal with evacuation in role as designated		
	Set up counseling support as needed		
✓	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
	Transfer responsibility of students in nurse’s office if appropriate		
	Collect Emergency “Go Bag” and report to Principal or designee		
	Prepare to set up triage and treat injuries		
	Assist in setting up a decontamination site with Fire and HAZMAT Officials as needed		

HAZMAT (CONTINUED)

✓	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist Principal or designee as needed and help secure the affected area		
✓	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call bus company if needed		
		If evacuating the school, forward phones to secondary answering site		
✓	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Determine location and extent of spill if possible.		
		Shut down the air circulation system for the building		
		Communicate location of spill to Principal		
		If release of substance is internal, provide MSDS sheets for Principal and responders.		
		Be available to assist Emergency Responders with layout of school		
✓	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assemble all students at a predetermined site at least 300 feet from the school unless an alternate, safe location is available.		
		Determine order of students to load into the buses		
		Direct transport of students to secondary site		
		Contact secondary site personnel		
✓	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with Incident Command, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support as needed (medical, emotional, and follow up care).		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with the Incident Command before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		
✓	TIME	FACULTY AND STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		Insure the accountability of all students to main office		
		Retrieve "go-bag" and keep on hand during the exercise		
		Account for students who are missing/out of the class		
		If relocating, supervise students and remain with them until they are released to parents or you are relieved from duty		

HOSTAGE

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Evacuate the Building”**

DATE / /

Any situation when a student, staff member or school visitor is forcibly taken against their will and used as a negotiation tool by an individual or group of people. This may include situations where a person barricades him or herself in a building or vehicle and threatens suicide. Law enforcement officials should always handle a hostage situation.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Do not intervene in the hostage/barricade situation		
		Notify principal or designee who will call 911		
		Inform police of your observation		
		IF TAKEN HOSTAGE, follow instructions of hostage taker		
		Remain calm and do not panic		
		Reassure students if they are present that everything will be okay		
		Treat the hostage taker with respect and act as normal as possible		
		Ask permission to speak and do not argue or make suggestions		
		Don't intervene; allow law enforcement to negotiate		
		Obtain good description of hostage(s) takers		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Yield team leader authority to law enforcement commander who directs procedure for securing the building or evacuation		
		Activate school crisis team and decide plan of action		
		Direct preparation of a phone list identifying names of students, staff, and parents who need to be notified		
		Contact superintendent		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Keep an informal time and procedure log of response activities		
		Complete an incident report and file		
		Debrief school crisis team and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Convene school crisis team at the school or relocation site, and decide what additional resources and support will be needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee with notifying parents of victims		
		Be prepared to deal with friends or relatives of the person(s) taken hostage		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to treat injuries and help EMS as needed		

HOSTAGE (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Superintendent or designee handles press		
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		
v	TIME	STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Direct students in bathrooms or halls to join closest class and then report to assigned teacher as soon as it is safe		
		Inform the main office, as soon as appropriate, about unassigned students under their supervision		
		Lock all hallway and exterior doors, if safe to do so; however, no doors should be barricaded or locked in a manner that would prevent rapid evacuation		
		If the fire alarm is activated, staff should direct students to use alternate evacuation routes away from the hostage incident		
		Staff, students and visitors remain quiet in designated secured area, on the floor, away from windows and doors, and with all lights turned off		
		Remain in "Clear the Halls" or "Secure the Building" mode until the Principal and/or Law Enforcement Commander gives the "all clear" command		
		If evacuation occurs, teachers take attendance in evacuation area and immediately report missing students to the backup team leader		

INFECTIOUS DISEASE

*Refer Pandemic Questions to the Vermont Department of Health or the Vermont Department of Education for further guidance

"Direction from Principal"

DATE 9 / 20 / 07

Vermont law requires that health care providers report diseases of public health importance, which includes an unexpected pattern of cases, suspected cases, deaths or increased incidence of any illness of major public health concern. School officials should report any suspected disease outbreaks among students or staff even if a specific cause has not been identified. Sudden increased absences can be a surveillance indicator, and should be reported to the Health Department.

✓	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
✓	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Notify the school nurse		
		Notify the principal		
		Obtain as much information as possible, including the student's name, date of birth, parent contact information, home telephone number, and the child's health care provider		
✓	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Upon receiving notification from a parent/guardian, or other source, that a student has been diagnosed with or is suspected to have an infectious disease: notify the school nurse		
		In collaboration with the school nurse and public health officials, provide information to parents/guardians and staff as appropriate		
		Maintain exclusion guidelines as appropriate		
		Work with the Health Department as needed to identify close contacts of ill student for possible intervention measures such as antibiotics to prevent disease (e.g. meningococcal disease, pertussis)		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to assist students and staff that might be directly or indirectly affected by the incident		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact the Vermont Health Department as soon as possible. Call the local district office (phone #), or the central office in Burlington (863-7240 or 1-800-640-4374) *(for urgent situations these numbers are available 24/7 365)		
		Work with staff to identify close contacts of ill student for possible intervention measures such as antibiotics to prevent disease spread (e.g., meningococcal disease, pertussis).		
		Determine immunization status of students and staff (e.g., measles).		

INFECTIOUS DISEASE (CONTINUED)

		Increase surveillance at the school for other ill students/staff, refer them for medical evaluation and notify Health Department		
		Provide guidance to students and staff on general disease prevention (e.g. hand hygiene)		
		Continue to monitor absences for illness spread and report findings as appropriate to the Health Department		
		Provide information to parents/guardians and staff as appropriate. The Health Department will usually provide this information as appropriate under FERPA guidelines and will work with the school to distribute it in a timely manner.		
√	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to appropriately clean areas affected after direction from the Health Department		
√	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to evacuate if needed		
√	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		

INFLUENZA

"Direction from Principal"

DATE 9 / 20 / 07

Vermont law requires that health care providers report diseases of public health importance, which includes an unexpected pattern of cases, suspected cases, deaths or increased incidence of any illness of major public health concern. School officials should report any suspected disease outbreaks among students or staff even if a specific cause has not been identified. Sudden increased absences can be a surveillance indicator, and should be reported to the Health Department.

✓	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
✓	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Notify the school nurse		
		Notify the principal		
		Notify Supervisory Union / Superintendent		
		Obtain as much information as possible, including the student's name, date of birth, parent contact information, home telephone number, and the child's health care provider		
		Track aggregate student health data (general statistics)		
		School Closure Considerations at ____% of absence		
✓	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Upon receiving notification from a parent/guardian, or other source, that a student has been diagnosed with or is suspected to have a influenza: notify the school nurse		
		In collaboration with the school nurse and public health officials, provide information to parents/guardians and staff as appropriate		
		Maintain exclusion guidelines as appropriate		
		List Exclusion guidelines (closure of neighboring schools, students return no sooner than 1 week after symptoms are gone, extra curricular activities canceled, etc.)		
		Work with the Health Department as needed for possible intervention measures		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to assist students and staff that might be directly or indirectly affected by the incident		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact the Vermont Health Department as soon as possible. Call the local district office (phone #), or the central office in Burlington (863-7240 or 1-800-640-4374).		
		Work with staff to identify close contacts of ill student for possible intervention.		
		Determine immunization status of students and staff (e.g., Flu Shots).		

INFLUENZA (CONTINUED)

		Increase surveillance at the school for other ill students/staff, refer them for medical evaluation and notify Health Department		
		Provide guidance to students and staff on general disease prevention (e.g. hand hygiene, cough etiquette)		
		Continue to monitor absences for illness spread and report findings as appropriate to the Health Department		
		Provide information to parents/guardians and staff as appropriate. The Health Department will usually provide this information and will work with the school to distribute it in a timely manner		
√	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to appropriately clean areas affected after direction from the Health Department		
√	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to evacuate / close school / shelter in place as needed		
√	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with Vermont Department of Health & Law Enforcement agency in charge, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		

INTRUDER

"Clear the Halls"
"Secure the School"

DATE / /

Unauthorized person in school building or on school property				
v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Ask unauthorized visitor to identify himself/herself and report to office		
		Contact the principal or designee if visitor is uncooperative		
		Do not intervene if person is acting hostile or threatening		
		Notify principal or designee who will call 911		
		Inform School Resource Officer (if you have one)		
		Inform law enforcement of your observation		
		Remain calm and do not panic		
		Write down intruder's physical description, type and color of automobile, registration plate number and any other identifiable information. Report to principal or designee if intruder leaves before law enforcement arrives		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Ask intruder about purpose for being in school		
		Ask intruder to leave if no legitimate reason is found for his or her presence in the school		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Asks intruder about purpose for being in school		
		Asks intruder to leave if no legitimate reason is found for his or her presence in the school		
		Contact law enforcement if intruder remains uncooperative		
		Contact School Resource Officer (if you have one)		
		Announce to staff to "Secure the Building" if intruder is outside the school		
		Direct staff to "Clear the Halls" or Evacuate depending on the circumstances, if intruder is inside the school		
		Activate school crisis team and decide plan of action		
		Contact superintendent		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Keep an informal time and procedure log of response activities		
		Complete an incident report and file in principal's office		
		Debrief with school crisis team and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Coordinate law enforcement measures with responding police officers		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Convene school crisis team and decide what additional resources and support will be needed		

INTRUDER (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee to support students and/or staff, if needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to treat injuries		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		When communicating with the media, always coordinate with law enforcement before disseminating a consistent and predetermined statement		
v	TIME	STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Direct students who are in bathrooms or halls to join closest class and have them stay away from doors and windows if the command from the principal or designee is given to "Clear the Halls", or Evacuate the School"		
		Do not lock or barricade doors that would prevent rapid evacuation		
		Inform the main office about students' locations when the command to "Clear the Halls" or "Secure the Building" has been given		
		Ask students and visitors to remain quiet in designated secured area, away from windows and doors, and with all lights turned off		
		Remain in "Clear the Halls" or "Secure the Building" mode until the principal, designee or law enforcement commander or designee gives the "all clear" command		
		Take attendance in evacuation area and immediately report missing students to the backup team leader		

KIDNAPPING

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”**

DATE / /

Kidnapping means the unauthorized removal of a student from school property without consent either from school officials and /or parent(s)/ guar dian(s). In many instances this violation of school rules and state law is perpetrated by a parent or relative involved in a domestic dispute.

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Verify child is missing and then contact principal or designee		
		Gather facts about abduction, description of abductor and any vehicle involved		
		Inform police of your observation and be prepared to write a notarized statement		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call 911 -Police may interview student's friends -School staff provides support for students being interviewed -Follow school policy and procedure on confidentiality		
		Contact parents(s)/guardians(s) and check student file for any restraining orders or other background information		
		Convene school crisis team and decide on response plan		
		Contact superintendent		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Complete an incident report and file in principal's office		
		Debrief with school crisis team and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Convene school crisis team and decide what additional resources and support will be needed		
		Provide victim assistance services		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee with notifying parents of victims		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

Legal Requirements for Crisis Response

16 V.S.A. CHAPTER 33. FIRE AND EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS DRILLS AND SAFETY PATROLS

Sec. 1481: Fire and Emergency Preparedness Drills

Sec. 1482: Safety Patrols

Sec. 1483: Chapter Printed in Manuals or Handbooks

§ 1481 Fire and Emergency Preparedness Drills

Statute Text

The principal or person in charge of a public or independent school or educational institution, other than a university or college, shall drill the pupils so that they may be able to leave the school building or perform other procedures described in the school's emergency preparedness plan, or both in the shortest possible time and without panic or confusion.

A drill shall be held at least once in each month during the school year and a record of the date and time of such drill together with the time consumed in completing the procedure, shall be kept in the official school register, and such register shall be open at all times for inspection by representatives from the department of labor and industry or the department of education.

A school district, independent school, or educational institution whose administrative personnel neglect to comply with the provisions of this section shall be fined not more than \$500.00.

§ 1482: Safety Patrols

Statute Text

a) In the exercise of authorized control and supervision over pupils attending schools and other educational institutions in this state, both public and independent, the board of school directors or other directing authority of any such school or institution may organize and supervise school safety patrols and the appointment, with the permission of parents, of pupils as members thereof, for the purpose of influencing and encouraging other pupils to refrain from crossing public highways at points other than at regular crossings, and for the purpose of directing pupils not to cross highways at times when the presence of traffic would render such crossing unsafe.

Such board of school directors or other directing authority shall obtain and keep in force adequate accident insurance to protect pupils acting as safety patrols during the performance of their services.

The commissioner of public safety shall, upon the request of a board of school directors or other directing authority of any public or independent educational institution, assign an officer or officers of the state police to assist such school authorities in the organization and supervision of school safety patrols, advise and make recommendations concerning the elimination of traffic hazards endangering the safety of school children, and otherwise assist in promoting safety education in the schools of the state. Within the appropriation of his department, the commissioner of public safety shall furnish such equipment, material, and supplies as he may deem necessary for the proper functioning of the school

Media Communications Guidelines

- ◆ Establish administrative procedures that mandate all staff, students, and school personnel to direct news media questions to the designated Communication Coordinator during a school crisis.
- ◆ Consult with the Incident Commander (Principal, Law Enforcement Commander, or Fire Chief) or designee prior to communicating with media.
- ◆ The media is not allowed inside the school unless authorized by the Principal or designee.
- ◆ Be honest with media personnel. If the answer to a question is not known tell the reporter that you will get back to them as soon as possible.
- ◆ Don't provide information "off the record". Do not say "no comment" nor use jargon.
- ◆ Student confidentiality must be maintained at all times.
- ◆ Use a tone-alert radio to warn of impending natural disasters.
- ◆ List key names, phone numbers and information for radio, television, and newspaper contacts in the table below.

[illegible]

Media Communications Plan

(Complete Prior to School Crisis Press Conference)

- 1) In one brief paragraph state the key point or objective of the press conference.

- 2) List the three facts or statistics you would like the public to remember after hearing the story.
 - a)
 - b)
 - c)

- 3) Identify the main audience or population segments that you would like this message to reach.

Primary Audience:

Secondary Audience:

- 4) What is the one message the audience needs to take away from this report/interview?

- 5) Who in your school district will serve as the sole point of contact for the media?

Name: Phone #:

Dates & Time Available:

(Media Communication Plan contributed by Robert Howard, Center for Disease Control)

Media Press Release

_____ Public School

At _____ (time) on _____ (date) the following accident (incident) occurred:

(If students have been relocated due to school facility emergency)

All students and staff have been evacuated from the school and relocated to the following sites:

Site _____ Grade Level _____ Phone _____

Site _____ Grade Level _____ Phone _____

Site _____ Grade Level _____ Phone _____

At this time we have:

(A) No confirmation of injuries or damage:

-or-

(B) Confirmed the following injuries or damage. (Do not identify student/staff by name; merely state the number of students involved and/or any property damage that has occurred).

The prognosis for those involved is (Good) (Fair) (Critical).

The school district is responding in the following manner:

At the current time the incident is being investigated by local authorities and is considered to be a criminal investigation. The school district does not wish to take any action that may interfere with a pending criminal investigation. Therefore information will not be released without the prior approval of local authorities.

We will keep you updated as we learn additional information.

We ask the general public to avoid traveling in this area unless it is absolutely necessary.

We ask that only parents of children in the school contact us with questions at:

Telephone _____

For ongoing information updates check the school Web page at: www._____

Thank you for your cooperation.

School Media Contact: _____

(Courtesy of the Oklahoma State School Boards Association)

MISSING STUDENT

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

Student(s) unaccounted for at school, on school property, or while traveling to and from school.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		ACTIVATE MISSING STUDENT CODE		
		Notify the principal/designee		
		Principal calls 911, if necessary		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact parents/guardian to report student absence/status		
		Inform staff once missing person is located		
		Complete incident report for filing in office		
v	TIME	STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Notify principal of any suspicious student absence or unknown person in the building		
		Be on the lookout for missing student and immediately report new information to the principal		
		Refer all requests for release of individual students to the office prior to their departure from school		
		Require a written student release note from parent/guardian		
		Report observations of unknown or unauthorized persons to principal. Make note of appearance, vehicle type and color, registration plate number, etc.		
		Insist on identification if unknown person arrives at school asking to pick up student; direct unknown person to office for approval		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist Principal or designee in search for missing student		
v	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

Bus and/or automobile collision involving students and staff traveling to and from school and during field trips.

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call 911 and inform police about details		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Check for injuries and if confirmed, call 911		
		Inform police about details		
v	TIME	PROCEDURES FOR BUS DRIVER or SCHOOL-SPONSORED DRIVER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Secure vehicle, position flares at a safe distance from crash scene and display other appropriate warning devices		
		Call or direct someone to call 911		
		Administer first aid by utilizing trained staff from the immediate vicinity		
		Ensure children remain in vehicle if safe from fire or other road hazards; if danger exists, move passengers to a safe place away from the scene of the collision		
		Direct responsible person to flag down oncoming motorists for additional assistance		
		Get names and addresses of any witnesses and report to law enforcement and principal or designee		
		Notify principal or designee		
		Make no statements to bystanders or media		
		Fill out three-part school bus seating chart form for EMS, police and administration if available		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Direct staff to “Clear the Halls” if motor vehicle crash takes place within sight of school, in order to minimize the trauma to students		
		Report to scene of crash (if it is away from school grounds), unless it is not safe to do so		
		Verify crash report with law enforcement and attempt to determine who has been injured, extent of injuries and hospital where victims have been taken		
		Direct preparation of a phone list identifying names of students, staff, and parents who need to be notified		
		Contact parent(s), guardian(s), or other close relative(s) of crash victims		
		Contact superintendent		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		Complete an incident and bus injury report and file (see pg. 43)		
		Work with bus driver to complete bus seating & injury charts		

<i>MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH</i> (CONTINUED)				
		Debrief with school crisis team and staff after consultation with police agency		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist Principal or designee with incident		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Convene school crisis team and decide what additional resources and support will be needed		
		Assist Principal or designee at scene of crash, if needed		
		Coordinate assistance with members of School Crisis Team or Public Safety Committee		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist Principal or designee with notifying parents of victims		
		Assist students and staff who are obviously affected by incident		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Check with Principal or designee before reporting to scene of crash		
		Bring first aid kit to crash scene		
		Bring cell phone to maintain communications		
		Be prepared to treat injuries and help EMS as needed		
		Assess the degree of injuries and report back to principal or designee		
		Follow procedures set forth by school policy		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH - SCHOOL BUS REPORT FORM

BUS DRIVER _____ (Co: _____) BUS# (____)

(Tel.: _____) ROUTE# (____)

(Fax: _____) Entry/Exit Door →

1	A	B	C	A I S L E E X I T D O O R	D	E	F	1
2	A	B	C		D	E	F	2
3	A	B	C		D	E	F	3
4	A	B	C		D	E	F	4
5	A	B	C		D	E	F	5
6	A	B	C		D	E	F	6
7	A	B	C		D	E	F	7
8	A	B	C		D	E	F	8
9	A	B	C		D	E	F	9
10	A	B	C		D	E	F	10
11	A	B	C		D	E	F	11
12	A	B	C		D	E	F	12
13	A	B	C		D	E	F	13

INJURY CODES:

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Fatal | 2. Incapacitating Injury |
| 3. Non-incapacitating Injury | 4. Potential Injury |
| 5. No injury | 6. Unknown |

MOTOR VEHICLE CRASH - BUS REPORT FORM (CONTINUED)

No.	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	INJURY REPORTED	CODE
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INJURY CODES:

- | | |
|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1. Fatal | 2. Incapacitating Injury |
| 3. Non-incapacitating Injury | 4. Potential Injury |
| 5. No injury | 6. Unknown |

MULTIPLE CASUALTY INCIDENT (MCI)			DATE 03 /18 /08	
Multiple casualty incidents are traumatic and require immediate action and coordination with emergency responders				
WITNESS/REPORT BY				
✓	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Notify principal/designee, Contact 911		
		<u>Address specific crisis causal event</u> as described in Vermont School Crisis Guide (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc) and follow protocol		
		Mobilize school MCI team (school nurse & trained staff)		
		Secure the scene. No one, including school MCI team, enters until casualty site is determined safe by the Incident Commander		
		Triage* site to be designated by the Incident Commander or designee		
		If student death(s) occur, see "Death of Student" protocol		
✓	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc.)		
		If student death(s) occur, see "Death of Student" protocol		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc.)		
		Secure the scene, allowing no entry until deemed safe by Incident Commander or designee		
		Direct EMS to triage site		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc)		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Collect "Jump Bag", medical supplies, medications		
		Join school MCI team at designated triage site		
		Triage victims		
		Direct school MCI team utilizing MCI triage principles		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL MCI TEAM** (see page two)	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Wait until casualty site is designated safe before conducting triage		
		Assemble at triage site		
		Assist MCI team leader (school nurse) with primary and subsequent triage (i.e., logging student names, triage designation & location, attaching triage tags, providing first aid, etc.)		

		Provide First Aid if possible		
		Provide regular updates to Incident Commander		
		Advise EMS of "Red" tagged victims first		
		Transition care of victims to EMS		
		Assist EMS as requested		
√	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc)		
√	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc)		
√	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc)		
√	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc)		
√	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		As indicated by causal event (Fire, Explosion, HAZMAT, Intruder, Infectious Disease, etc)		

***Triage:**

Triage is a special process of sorting victims of a multiple casualty incident by the severity of injury, to determine the need for emergency care and transportation. It is an objective framework that helps to assure that care of the injured is prioritized rationally, not emotionally. Triage is extremely important to maximize the numbers of lives saved. If triage principles are not applied, morbidity and mortality increase.

Presently there are no national standard guidelines established for triage. Recommended triage protocols include (1) METTAG (triage tagging system), (2) START (Simple Triage and Rapid Transportation) triage systems, and (3) JumpSTART, a recently developed and widely accepted method of pediatric triage.

Treatment priorities in triage are defined as:

- **BLACK – lowest priority:** Deceased or live patients with obvious fatal and non-resuscitatable injuries/illness (who will die anyway whether they receive medical attention or not).
- **RED – first priority:** Severely injured patients, requiring immediate care and transport (who will survive only if they receive timely medical attention).
- **YELLOW – second priority:** Patients with injuries that are determined not to be immediately life threatening (those who will survive anyway, whether they receive immediate medical attention or not).
- **GREEN – third priority:** Patients with minor injuries that do not require immediate stabilization (also those who will survive anyway, whether they receive immediate medical attention or not).

****School Multiple Casualty Incident (MCI) team:**

The purpose of a school MCI team is to provide triage and first aid between the times a multiple casualty incident occurs and EMS arrives on the scene. Depending upon the event and the school's location, this "between time" could be minutes or hours. Members of the school's MCI team should be volunteers, and not classroom teachers or administrators who have other, specific responsibilities during a crisis. The teams need not be large: two or more members, depending upon the size of the school. They should be certified in first aid and be knowledgeable of triage principles.

The actual assessment and priority determination portion of triage is performed by the school's MCI team leader, *who has been specifically trained in triage principles*. The school nurse,

Multiple Casualty Incident

with professional nursing assessment knowledge and credentials as an RN, is the recommended school MCI team leader. In the absence of a full-time school nurse, an LPN or EMT, who is full-time staff, would be an acceptable alternative.

If the MCI team leader is not present to act as team leader, or if there is no adequately trained medical professional available to lead the team, then triage should not be performed. In that case, first aid may be administered and those providing such aid would be protected under Vermont's Good Samaritan Law (Title 12, Chapter 23 ;SS 519:) which states "...a person who provides reasonable assistance...[to someone in grave danger] shall not be liable in civil damages unless his actions constitute gross negligence..."

The school MCI team leader performs the assessments, and assigns victim triage designations. The remaining school MCI members assist with organization, documentation, transportation, communication and first aid as directed by the team leader. Triage and care of patients is transferred to EMS as soon as it arrives and members of the school's MCI team then operate under EMS direction.

NATURAL DISASTER

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Evacuate the Building”**

DATE / /

A flood, hurricane, tornado, or earthquake will often strike without warning; appropriate emergency procedures must be initiated immediately. School should use tone-alert radio to receive advance notice of any natural disasters.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Obtain an advance warning of an event from National Weather Service; notify administration		
		If there is no warning of an event, move students and staff inside to an appropriate safe shelter		
		Keep Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio on for updates		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Turn on EAS radio		
		Decide whether to evacuate		
		Set up Command Post at pre-designated site		
		Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
		Gather information from staff regarding building integrity and potential hazards (i.e. rising flood waters, high winds that may cut power, etc.)		
		Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site; if needed call upon school Public Safety Committee		
		Meet at Command Post and receive information regarding staff and students, location of the disaster, building damage, flooding, etc.		
		Notify Superintendent		
		Make contact with emergency responders via 911 for instructions		
		Set up debriefs as needed after the event		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Prepare to handle a large volume of telephone calls from parents or guardians		
		Monitor local radio stations for updates –EAS stations		
		Help prepare a pre-designated area for student pick up by parents/legal guardians or buses		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee during evacuation		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Remove students in nurse's office and hand off to a teacher		
		Collect First Aid Kit and report to Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries that may have occurred		
		Set up casualty collection site, if necessary		
		Document status of patients and maintain log		

NATURAL DISASTER (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

POWER OUTAGE

“Clear the Halls”
 “Secure the School”
 “Shelter in Place”
 “Evacuate the School”

DATE 9 / 20 / 07

The possibility of a power outage in our schools is very real. Accordingly, appropriate emergency procedures must be developed and ready to be initiated immediately in the event of such an occurrence.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
✓	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Obtain as much information as possible regarding the magnitude of the power outage (building level, neighborhood-wide, local, regional, etc.)		
		If possible, discover the cause of the power outage (equipment failure, downed power lines, weather related, etc.)		
		If necessary conduct a “Clear The Hall” crisis command action to ascertain student safety and cause of power outage		
✓	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		If possible, turn on radio or other media source to determine the cause and extent of outage.		
		Determine if phone connection is still working. Use walkie-talkies if necessary. Contact emergency response officials if necessary.		
		Notify Superintendent and maintenance supervisor and remain in contact with Central Office. Contact power or utility company if possible.		
		Decide whether to remain in school, conduct early closing, or evacuate if necessary. Consider heating, cooling, food preparation, and other health related issues.		
		Contact utility company and emergency response authorities.		
		Ensure safety of all students and staff. Ensure emergency lighting is working properly. Move students to lit or appropriate central area if necessary. Coordinate move to ensure safety.		
		Gather information from staff regarding building integrity and potential hazards		
		Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site. If needed, call the school Public Safety Committee		
		Contact emergency responders at 911 for instructions.		
		Set up debriefs as needed after the event		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL SAFETY TEAM	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Prepare to handle a large volume of telephone calls from parents or guardians (assuming phones are working).		
		Monitor local radio stations for updates—EAS stations. Notify local media outlets if early release is utilized.		
		Help prepare a pre-designated area for student pick up by parents/legal guardians or buses		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Assist principal or designee during situation. Counsel students as necessary. Assist with contacting parents as necessary.		

✓	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Remove students in nurse's office and return them to a teacher		
		Collect First Aid Kit and report to Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries that may have occurred		
		Document status of patients and maintain log		
✓	TIME	MAINTENANCE SUPERVISOR	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Start generator backup if available		
		Report to principal of power status		

CODE E7 - R

PROCEDURES FOR BOMB THREATS

Anticipating a Bomb Threat

1. **Line of authority.** The Principal of the _____ School is designated as the person in charge of administering this policy. If the Principal so decides, he/she may designate a named administrator to serve in his/her stead or absence. Wherever "Principal" appears in this policy, it refers either to the Principal or the designated administrator.
2. **Coordination of school and public safety agencies.** The Principal shall establish and maintain ongoing communication and coordination among school staff and public safety authorities for purposes of planning for, training for, and responding to any bomb threat. For this purpose, the Principal shall establish a bomb threat response team to consist of the Principal, the Superintendent, and persons representing teachers, custodians, office staff, transportation providers, and parents. The Principal shall request participation on this team by persons representing local law enforcement and fire/rescue agencies. The Principal shall convene this group to:
 - A. review this policy and any associated protocols prior to the first student attendance day each school year;
 - B. coordinate and oversee response efforts whenever a bomb threat has been made;
 - C. review implementation of this policy after any bomb threat is resolved.
3. **Training**
 - A. Telephone answerers. The Principal shall ensure that all staff whose regular duties include answering incoming telephone calls are trained in the protocol to be used when confronted by a telephone bomb threat.
 - B. All staff. The Principal shall see that all staff are trained regarding their duties in the event of a bomb threat, including proper evacuation procedures, assuring the safety of students and staff, noting the absence of any students, conducting quick but complete visual scans of their workplace, and attendant reporting responsibilities.
 - C. Any staff participating in a search. The Principal shall ensure that staff volunteering to participate in a search for explosive devices are first trained by appropriate public safety personnel regarding the voluntary nature of their participation, the potential danger, and the proper sequence and technique involved.
 - D. Students. The Principal shall ensure that all students are instructed about proper conduct during a bomb threat, the potential criminal and civil penalties, as well as school discipline associated with making a bomb threat, and the disruption and costs to the educational process stemming from a bomb threat.
4. **Drills.** The Principal shall incorporate school bomb threat drills within the monthly emergency drill process conducted in accordance with state law and shall periodically review the effectiveness of procedure with the school crisis team following a bomb threat.
5. **Pre-arranged signal.** The Principal shall establish a signal for announcing a bomb threat and inform staff what it is.
6. **Precautions:**
 - A. Telephone service options. The Principal shall see that at least main office telephone service includes caller ID or other call-tracing capacity and that each phone station is supplied with a FBI bomb threat note card.
 - B. Locked areas. School personnel with access to lockable work spaces shall lock them when not in use.
 - C. Trash. The Principal shall direct school personnel not to permit the accumulation of trash, boxes, and other articles inside or next to the school building.

- D. **Parking.** The Principal shall, to the extent possible, ensure that parking spaces are not located close to the school building. There shall be stringent enforcement of parking restrictions relative to fire lanes, loading docks and handicapped parking spaces.
 - E. **Labeling building areas.** The Principal shall ensure that different areas of the building are assigned specific labels, to be posted in plain sight, both internally and externally, and to be communicated to school and public safety authorities.
 - F. **Evacuation gathering places.** The Principal shall designate safe locations where all students and staff shall go if an evacuation of the school is ordered.
 - G. **Relocation site(s).** The Principal shall designate specific relocation sites for students and staff to walk or be transported to when immediate return to the school is not possible following evacuation.
7. **Substitutes.** The Principal shall ensure that substitute personnel are aware of this policy and the obligations of staff during a bomb threat.

Reacting to a Bomb Threat

- 1. **Upon receiving threat.** All personnel who answer telephone calls from outside sources shall be provided with a FBI bomb threat note card, to be placed within easy reach of their telephone, on which is printed information to ask for and information to listen for in the event a caller makes a bomb threat. Whoever receives the call shall attempt to transfer it to the Principal, or failing that, ask the caller as many of the questions on the bomb threat note card as he/she can, carefully noting all wording and other information.
- 2. **Notification**
 - A. To the Principal. A person receiving a bomb threat by telephone or other means, or who finds a suspicious device on school property, shall inform the Principal immediately.
 - B. By the Principal. Upon learning of the bomb threat, the Principal shall alert local law enforcement and the Superintendent.
- 3. **Assessment.** Upon learning of the bomb threat, the Principal, in consultation with local law enforcement personnel and the Superintendent, if time permits, shall:
 - A. Evaluate the credibility of the threat;
 - B. Decide whether to direct a search of the building; and
 - C. If so, decide whether the search should be conducted while the building is occupied or after it has been evacuated.

In so doing, the Principal shall resolve all doubts in favor of finding the threat credible and a search necessary prior to or following a school evacuation.
- 4. **Activating the team.** After deciding which course of action to follow, the Principal shall, after consultation with the Superintendent and the chair of the Public Safety Committee, activate the bomb threat search team.
- 5. **Evacuation**
 - A. To what extent. The Principal, in consultation with the Superintendent and the chair of the Public Safety Committee, shall decide on the extent to which the building will be evacuated. The decision shall be either:
 - i. To assemble all building occupants in one location, such as the gymnasium;
 - ii. To evacuate just a portion of the building;
 - iii. To evacuate the entire building to a particular site or sites no less than 300' from the building; or
 - iv. To dismiss students and/or staff for the duration of the day.
 - B. **Signaling.** If the Principal decides the building should be evacuated, he/she shall inform the staff immediately.

- C. Adjusting evacuation route. The Principal shall direct personnel to adjust their usual evacuation route to avoid any suspected location of an explosive device.
- D. Staff obligations. In the event of an evacuation, staff shall:
 - i. Visually scan their workplace and any other common areas they have been assigned for any thing or person out of the ordinary. If there is such an object, staff should not touch it but should report its location to the Principal.
 - ii. Leave internal doors unlocked and open.
 - iii. Make sure any students in their charge, including those with disabilities, are guided to safety, and remain with them until otherwise directed; and
 - iv. Evacuate the school with their attendance book, taking attendance once the evacuation is accomplished and report the absence of any students normally in their charge to the Principal.
- E. Student conduct. All students shall assist staff by obeying all directions and maintaining an orderly and quiet demeanor.
- F. Utilities
 - i. Fuel. The Principal shall direct appropriate personnel to turn off gas and other fuel lines.
 - ii. Electricity. The Principal shall decide whether electric power to the building should be turned off, and if so, direct it to be done.
 - iii. Telephones. [Insert here standard response to leave service intact, to shut down service, or to decide response during the threat.]
- G. Transportation and traffic. The Principal shall make sure a safe and efficient traffic pattern is in place to enable students to depart without impeding access and parking for public safety vehicles.

6. **Search**

- A. To what extent. The Principal, in consultation with the Public Safety Committee, shall decide on the extent to which the building will be searched. The decision shall be to either:
 - i. Not conduct a search;
 - ii. Search specific portions of the building; or
 - iii. Search the entire building and grounds.
- B. Nature of search. The Principal, in consultation with the Public Safety Committee, shall decide whether a search will be conducted overtly, covertly, or by means of a special team.
- C. Method. A search shall be conducted in accordance with techniques and training provided by public safety personnel. Toward that end, the Principal shall arrange with public safety officials for the periodic training of search personnel.
- D. Participants
 - i. STAFF. Each staff member shall, upon request, conduct a visual scan of his/her workplace, noting any thing or person out of the ordinary, and shall report any findings to the Principal.
 - ii. STUDENTS. Under no circumstances will a student be permitted to participate in a search.
 - iii. VOLUNTEERS. No school personnel may be required, beyond what is provided in this policy, to participate in a search for an explosive device. Any school personnel volunteering to participate in a search for an explosive device shall first be trained with respect to the dangers involved, precautions to observe, and the techniques to follow.
- E. Object found. If any suspicious object is actually discovered, no school personnel shall touch it. Instead, the individual discovering the object shall report it immediately to the Principal, who shall immediately report it to the public safety official in charge.
- F. Explosion. If there is an explosion, the Principal shall yield to the authority and protocols of public safety authorities.

After a Bomb Threat

1. **Investigation.** The Principal, and all other school personnel, shall cooperate with law enforcement personnel involved in investigating a bomb threat. School personnel shall not conduct any investigation independently but rather in conjunction with law enforcement.
2. **Discipline.** Any student involved in the making of a bomb threat, in addition to any penalty imposed by law, shall be subject to disciplinary action by the school, up to and including expulsion subject to the school's student discipline policy.
3. **Civil liability.** The _____ School District reserves the right to bring suit against anyone responsible for a bomb threat and to seek restitution and other damages permitted by law.
4. **Lost time.** Any school time lost as a result of a bomb threat shall be made up on days and at times determined by the School Board.
5. **Counseling.** The Principal, in consultation with appropriate guidance and other personnel, shall assess the effect of the bomb threat on students as a whole and on any individual students who come to his/her attention, to determine if and what type of counseling would be appropriate.
6. **Evaluation.** Within one week following the conclusion of the school's response to a bomb threat, the Principal shall convene the Public Safety Committee to evaluate how well the school responded, how consistent its response was with policy, how consistent its response was with its implementation procedures, and whether any changes to the provisions of this policy or administration procedures are recommended as a result.

1. **About the policy.** All school handbooks, those for faculty, staff, parents and students, shall contain the following provision:

The _____ School District has adopted a comprehensive policy on what to do in the event of a bomb threat. You may obtain a copy of the complete policy by requesting one from the Principal's office (or download from the school Web site).

While we intend to respect the legitimate privacy interests of all persons, it is lawful for school authorities, within constitutional boundaries, to conduct reasonable examination of personal property on school grounds, including but not limited to lockers, desks, backpacks, book bags, and automobiles. In the event of a bomb threat, school administrators may have to search such items in order to assure the safety and protection of people and property.

Inform all members of the school community that any academic time lost as a result of a bomb threat will be rescheduled, either on a weekend, vacation day or following what would otherwise be the end of the school year.

In addition, under state law, the making of a bomb threat is a very serious criminal offense, punishable for even a first offense by as much as 2 years in prison and a \$5,000 fine. The making of such a threat may also lead to civil liability.

Communicating with the Public


2. About a bomb threat.

- A. Parents. In the event of a bomb threat, the Principal shall ensure that notice is provided all parents of students within _____ (hours/days). If school is dismissed as a result of a bomb threat, the Principal shall implement general school procedures for notification of parents.
- B. Media. Any school personnel approached about a bomb threat by a representative of the media shall refer that representative to the Principal or their designee. The Principal may provide the media representative with a formal statement regarding the status of the threat. If approached during the threat, the Principal shall ask the representative to wait for a time when circumstances legitimately permit the official to take a few moments to speak with him/her. Any statement given shall be calm and informative without divulging personally identifiable information about students and shall emphasize the efforts made or under way to protect the safety of students and staff.


Public Safety Committee

The Public Safety Committee is staffed with members that include the School Crisis Team as well as emergency service providers from the town/region. Both entities are created to assist the principal or designee in planning for and responding to school crises. There may be instances when time-sensitive decisions have to be made quickly by the principal or designee, thus bypassing involvement of the School Crisis Team or Public Safety Committee. During a crisis situation, Public Safety Committee members may (in their duties as first responders) work from a predetermined Incident Command Center.

Public Safety Committee	Team Member Name	Phone # or Extension
Law Enforcement /School Resource Officer Integrates school and law enforcement training and response plans. Works with the School Crisis Team to carry out the response and secure the incident scene by keeping parents and community members away from the school. Assumes role of Incident Commander once school is evacuated and it is ascertained that a criminal act has occurred. Directs wrecker service to remove any vehicles impeding entering or exiting emergency service vehicles.		Phone: <hr/> Email:
Fire Chief Integrates school fire and <u>Hazardous Material Response</u> plans. Works with the School Crisis Team in responding to the crisis. Remains on standby at the perimeter of scene unless a fire or <u>Hazardous Material</u> emergency develops, at which time the Fire Chief or designee becomes the Incident Commander.		Phone: <hr/> Email:
Emergency Medical Squad Chief During planning it helps to identify school and community members who have CPR and other emergency medical skills. Works with the School Nurse to coordinate the delivery of medical treatment during a crisis.		Phone: <hr/> Email:
Department of Health–School Health Liaison Works directly with the Principal, Law Enforcement Commander, and Fire Chief, and is the liaison between Vermont Emergency Management, Homeland Security, and the Center for Disease Control during a major crisis involving <u>Bio-Terrorism</u> or related communicable disease incident.		Phone: <hr/> Email:



SCHOOL PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE



RELOCATION

“Evacuation”

DATE / /

When possible, prior to evacuating a facility, focus on whether or not you need to go to a relocation site. In case of a bomb threat situation, strive to have the relocation site searched for explosive devices in advance

	TIME	WHO MAKES DECISION TO RELOCATE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Emergencies requiring immediate response, i.e., fire alarm/evacuation do not require concurrence before action. The decision <i>to relocate</i> should be made in consultation with the superintendent or designee, or in the absence of both, the building principal and school safety team.”		
√	TIME	PRIORITY DECISIONS	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Decide on best location and route to relocate students and staff		
		Notify relocation site manager to open the facility		
		Make sure accessibility is easily gained to relocation site		
		Make sure appropriate equipment is at the relocation site or being provided by school staff or Red Cross		
		If relocation is to last for an extended period of time, activate system to provide nourishment.		
√	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Should an event occur that the principal determines warrants <i>relocation</i> to another site or should the principal be directed by an Incident Commander to evacuate and <i>relocation becomes necessary</i> , the principal should notify the superintendent or the superintendent’s designee if time permits. Make decision to relocate students and staff		
		Acquire permission to utilize relocation site and notify relocation manager and transportation services		
		Notify superintendent		
		Call school safety team into service		
		Determine the best means to get students and staff to site		
		Make sure safety measures are taken		
		Delegate roles for movement of students to site		
		Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
		Use alert system for notifying parents and guardians of the relocation		
√	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist with evacuation and relocation as directed by principal or designee		

√	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to deal with students that are disturbed by incident and/or movement		
		Implement the mental health plan as needed		
√	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Collect First Aid Kit and student medications and report to relocation site		
		Be prepared to treat injured or those needing medication		
		Set up casualty collection site, if necessary		
		Triage injured for additional medical attention if necessary		
		Assist EMS as needed		
√	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call transportation provider and prepare mobile office		

√	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Once notified of relocation, open building, call in support staff, make preparations for large population needs and prepare for the possibility for expented stay		
		Work with law enforcement to insure security of the building and coordinate traffic control		
		Assign facilitators for interior of relocation site		
		Assign personnel to specific areas like First Aid Station, Information Desk, Equipment room, etc.		
		Work with principal or designee to determine order of students to unload and load on buses		
		Staff telephones for communication		
		If contacted by media, refer to Communication coordinator		
√	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with Incident Commander or designee in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students.		
		Decide if notice of incident is needed to be sent home to parent(s) or guardian(s)		
		Before communicating with the media, always strive to coordinate a consistent and predetermined statement with Incident Commander or designee		
√	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		If safe, make sure to secure building before leaving		
✓	TIME	FACULTY AND STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
		Insure the accountability of all students to main office		
		Retrieve "go-bag" and keep on hand during the exercise		
		Account for students who are missing/out of the class		
		If relocating, supervise students and remain with them until they are released to parents or you are relieved from duty		

Relocating students may expose them to greater danger than sheltering in place. School administrators know that the duty of care is greater with younger students and relocation can be carried out swiftly; whereas relocating hundreds of high school students with cars on campus can congest relocation routes and hamper response measures.

SCHOOL CRISIS PREVENTION & RESPONSE MODEL POLICY

Policy

It is the policy of the _____ School District to maintain a safe, orderly, civil, and positive learning environment, and to be prepared, in so far as possible, to prevent and respond to unexpected crises quickly and appropriately. While the very unexpected nature of a crisis may make preparation difficult, the Board believes that staff and students should be ready to respond quickly and appropriately to emergency situations.

Definition

Examples of school crises include but are not limited to fire, bus accidents, nuclear disaster, criminal acts, civil disturbances, disease epidemic, physical injury, death, presence of intruders on school premises, hazardous materials spills, weather related emergencies, natural disasters, bomb threats, terrorist activities, or other emergencies.

Administrative Responsibilities

To help prevent the occurrence of some individually caused crises, the Superintendent shall research and share information about educational programs and practices designed to create and sustain a safe learning environment.

The Superintendent is directed to create a school crisis prevention and response plan and administrative procedures that identify how the students and staff shall respond to emergency situations, and the role that local emergency service providers shall play in crisis preparedness and incident management. This shall include the establishment of a school crisis team and consultation and cooperation with law enforcement, the fire department, and rescue squads to create a community public safety committee.

The school crisis plan and procedures shall be aligned with and follow the recommended practices outlined in the Vermont School Crisis Guide and related resources.

Generally, the Principal or his/her designee will organize and oversee the planning and operation of the crisis team and will serve as the incident commander, according to the crisis plan and emergency procedures. The plan shall be reviewed annually and routinely practiced during regular drills.

Fire and emergency preparedness drills shall be conducted and recorded by the Principal in accord with the requirements of Section 1481 of Title 16 of the Vermont Statutes Annotated. At a minimum, the pupils shall be drilled at least once a month during the school year so that they may leave the school building in the shortest possible time and without panic or confusion. In addition, pupils shall be drilled at sufficient intervals on other procedures described in the school's emergency preparation plan. A record of each drill together with the time consumed in completing the procedure, shall be kept in the official school register, and such register shall be open at all times for inspection by representatives from the Department of Labor and Industry and the Department of Education.

Following a major incident, the crisis team and/or the public safety committee shall debrief and review the effectiveness of the crisis response and present a report and any recommendations for crisis plan updates to the superintendent.

Staff Responsibilities

The staff shall follow all guidelines outlined in the crisis plan and staff handbook when practicing routine drills and when responding to actually emergency situations.

Student Responsibilities

Students shall follow all guidelines outlined in the crisis plan and student handbook when practicing routine drills and when responding to actually emergency situations.

Students who cause school crises will be held accountable in accordance with the school discipline policy and state/federal law. Incidents that disrupt the education process or endanger the safety of other students and staff shall be referred to law enforcement for possible criminal charges or to pursue civil litigation.

Lost instructional time resulting from response to a school crisis or emergency situation shall be made up at the discretion of the School Board.

Date Warned:

Date Adopted:

Legal Reference(s): 16 V.S.A. § Chapter 33 (Fire and Emergency Preparedness Drills)
 16 V.S.A. §1161a (a) (4) (Discipline)
 13 V.S.A. § 1604 (Possession of explosive devices)
 13 V.S.A. §1612 (Placing a hoax device)
 13 V.S.A. §1753 (False alarms and reports)
 Rule 4102 - Vermont State Board of Education Manual of Rules and Procedures
 2004 School Crisis Guide

Cross Reference: Risk Management (E4)
 Student Conduct and Discipline (F1)
 Search and Seizure (F3)
 Weapons (F21)

School Crisis Team

The School Crisis Team is made up of individuals within the school staff while the Public Safety Committee members include this internal team as well as emergency service providers from the town/region. Both entities are created to assist the principal or designee in planning for and responding to school crises. There may be instances when time-sensitive decisions have to be made quickly by the principal or designee, thus bypassing involvement of the School Crisis Team or Public Safety Committee.

School Crisis Team	Team Member Name	Phone # or Extension
Principal (Team Leader) Responsible for all planning meetings. Coordinates the broad and specific functions of the team during a crisis. (Principal passes team leader role to fire chief during a fire/hazardous material incident and law enforcement commander following criminal act.)		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Designee (Backup Team Leader) Will assist or substitute for the Principal. Oversees reporting of any missing students or staff to the Principal during a drill or crisis.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Communication Coordinator The sole contact person for all media and staff to communicate the nature of the crisis and keep the community informed about the school's response. The Superintendent may assume this role, but if not, the communication coordinator shall discuss the message to be conveyed with key school administrators in advance. Always coordinate message with law enforcement or fire commander prior to release of public information.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Custodian/Maintenance Staff Head custodian or maintenance director works with the school crisis team using blueprints and an advance video tape/DVD of the school to identify specific sections of the building. Custodian/Maintenance staff members, wearing fluorescent vests, work with law enforcement to keep incoming and outgoing travel lanes clear for emergency vehicles and to prevent unauthorized people from entering school grounds.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Information Site Manager Provides information to parents when they call pre-designated cell/land line phone number(s). Works directly with the Communications Coordinator, or in a small school, roles may be combined.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Relocation Site Manager Coordinates logistics at relocation site(s) and works directly with the Information Site Manager.		Phone: _____ Email: _____

School Crisis Team	Team Member Name	Phone # or Extension
School Counselor Coordinates the scheduling of support meetings and counseling sessions, and organizes other grief management resources.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
School Nurse Coordinates advance procedures with EMS, doctors and hospital emergency room staff. Prepares inventory of students and staff who have CPR and other emergency medical training. Remains the medical point person during a crisis.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Staff Notification Coordinator Responsible for activating the telephone call tree to notify school crisis team members and other school staff about the crisis. Becomes the staff communication liaison during a crisis. Works with the Principal or designee and office secretary in advance to establish an internal classroom telephone/intercom communications procedure for use during crisis.		Phone: _____ Email: _____
Teachers and Staff Provide supervision of students and assist other staff as needed. Manage student communication via cell phones per local school board policy. Report any missing/injured students to the Backup Team Leader/Nurse.		Phone: _____ Email: _____

SERIOUS INJURY/ILLNESS

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Notify principal or designee who will call 911		
		Send someone to contact the nurse		
		Maintain open airway and administer CPR, if necessary		
		Immobilize victim if there is a potential for head, neck or back injury. Do not move victim unless immediate emergency situation dictates		
		Control bleeding by applying direct pressure and elevation		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Maintain open airway and administer CPR, if necessary		
		Immobilize victim if there is a potential for head, neck or back injury. Do not move victim unless immediate emergency situation dictates		
		Control bleeding by applying direct pressure and elevation		
		Treat for shock		
		Check for medical alert tags		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Contact parents		
		Contact superintendent		
		Work with counseling resources to initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
		File incident report		
		Debrief school crisis team and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist Principal or designee as needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Coordinate grief-counseling if needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Collect first aid kit and proceed immediately to victim(s)		
		Coordinate first aid until emergency medical services arrive		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.

SERIOUS INJURY/ILLNESS (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	INFORMATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

SEVERE WEATHER

“Clear the Halls”
 “Secure the School”
 “Shelter in Place”
 “Evacuate the School”

DATE 9 / 20 / 07

Severe weather can often strike unpredictably. Accordingly, appropriate emergency procedures must be developed and ready to be initiated immediately in the event such weather strikes or is anticipated. Schools should use tone-alert or weather radios, or other such media sources, to receive notice of any such weather.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT #
✓	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Obtain an advance warning of an event from the National Weather Service; notify administration		
		If there is no warning of an event, move students and staff inside to an appropriate safe shelter		
		Keep Emergency Alert System (EAS) or other radio on for updates		
✓	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Turn on EAS radio or other radio or media source		
		Decide whether to remain in school, conduct early closing, or evacuate if necessary.		
		Notify Superintendent and remain in contact w/ Central Office		
		If necessary, set up Command Post		
		Ensure accountability of all students and staff		
		Gather information from staff regarding building integrity and potential hazards (i.e. freezing temperatures, ice accumulations, rising flood waters, high winds that may cut power, etc.)		
		Delegate roles for transport of students to secondary site. If needed call upon school Public Safety Committee		
		Meet at Command Post and receive information regarding staff and students, location of the disaster, building damage, flooding, etc.		
		Make contact with emergency responders via 911 for instructions		
		Set up debriefings as needed after the event		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL SAFETY TEAM	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Prepare to handle a large volume of telephone calls from parents or guardians		
		Monitor local radio stations for updates–EAS stations		
		Help prepare a pre-designated area for student pick up by parents/legal guardians or buses		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Assist principal or designee during evacuation		
✓	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		Remove students in nurse's office and hand off to a teacher		
		Collect First Aid Kit and report to Command Post		
		Be prepared to treat injuries that may have occurred		
		Set up casualty collection site, if necessary		
		Document status of patients and maintain log		

✓	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	ACTION TAKEN BY	ACTION
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send home to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support.		

STUDENT THREAT

**“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Evacuate the Building”**

DATE / /

Oral, written, or physical threat against other students or staff.				
	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to write statement for administration and/or police		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Separate students in conflict or isolate threatening student(s) from others		
		Do not threaten student with police action or use humor to de-escalate situation		
		Call 911, if appropriate		
		If necessary, activate school crisis team		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Direct staff to “Clear the Halls” or “Secure the Building” if the crisis threatens the safety of students and staff,		
		Interview threatening student and victim to acquire background information to determine if the threat is manageable with school resources,		
		Contact parents		
		If reasonable suspicion that a weapon exists, implement search and seizure procedures to confiscate		
		Determine if alcohol or other drugs are involved		
		Implement school discipline policy		
		Contact superintendent		
		Notify law enforcement if dictated by school policy or appropriate for circumstances		
		Coordinate grief-counseling plan		
		Complete incident report and file		
		Debrief school crisis team and staff		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee as needed		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to counsel those effected by the incident		
v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to render aid if necessary		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist Principal or designee with investigation of the incident		

STUDENT THREAT (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	MAIN OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee in maintaining a log of pertinent information relating to the incident		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	INFORMATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

SUICIDE ATTEMPT

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

When a student or staff member attempts to take his/her life, either at school or in the community.

	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Student, faculty, and staff		
		Contact the Principal who will call 911		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Take the threat seriously		
		Secure the scene for police investigation		
		Communicate incident to the principal and/or designee		
		Do NOT leave the student/faculty/staff member alone		
		Call 911		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Convene school crisis team		
		Inform superintendent		
		Notify parent or guardian and offer assistance for appropriate medical and psychological care, referrals and emergency services		
		On a 'need to know' basis, inform faculty/staff/students, including homeroom teacher, coaches, and others who have regular contact with the individual, while maintaining confidentiality		
		Prepare and send letter home to parents as appropriate, while maintaining confidentiality		
		Debrief school crisis team and faculty/staff		
		If there is suspected abuse of the individual, notify SRS (if a student) and/or police, in accordance with state law and school policy		
		Complete incident report		
		Prepare or update prevention protocols in case others attempt or complete suicide		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Hold an immediate team meeting and institute immediate referral for assessment and treatment		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		If others are aware of the threat or attempt, reassure them that action is being taken		
		Notify parents of any students of concern		
		Complete an assessment to determine risk level, using an approved screening tool		
		Meet with referring staff/faculty and/or student		
		Contact the local mental health emergency service screeners and request screening		

SUICIDE ATTEMPT (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Make an immediate assessment and take any immediate action necessary to provide medical care		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Secure area and prevent non-essential people from accessing the scene or witnessing a traumatic event		
v	TIME	OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Initiate incident report, following school policy		
		Gather student/staff contact information		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Secure area and prevent non-essential people from accessing the scene or witnessing a traumatic event		
v	TIME	RELOCATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	INFORMATION SITE MANAGER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
v	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		

SUICIDE COMMITTED

“Clear the Halls”

DATE / /

v	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Student, family, faculty, staff or other		
v	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Confirm the death and verify details		
		Offer emotional support to school community to facilitate recovery		
		Prevent further suicides		
v	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Confirm the death		
		Verify details with the family and offer assistance, appropriate support, and referrals. Honor the family’s wishes if possible		
		Inform superintendent		
		Convene school crisis team		
		Inform faculty/staff of the death. If school is not in session, contact faculty/staff via phone tree		
		Open the school to provide school/community support		
		Complete incident report		
		Prepare and send letter home to parents/guardians		
		Allow faculty/staff/students to attend the funeral		
v	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Hold an immediate team meeting to plan for notifying students/faculty/staff of the death and to provide emotional support		
		Plan schedules and activities for the school day and week		
		Identify those particularly affected, such as relatives, friends, classmates, teammates, those with a history of suicide ideation, depression and/or substance abuse		
		Help create a Support Center in the building		
		Provide safety measures and special services for students, faculty, and staff		
		Ensure faculty and staff attend the funeral to offer support to students		
		Meet with parents, guardians, and families of those at increased risk		
		Reassure and provide a sense of security, a way to remember the deceased and resume routine as appropriate to facilitate recovery		
		Prepare or update prevention strategies and protocol in case others attempt or complete suicide		
v	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Make home visits to affected families to offer support and referrals		
		Provide outside psychological support—contact local mental health agency or providers		

SUICIDE COMMITTED (CONTINUED)

v	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Make an immediate assessment and take any immediate action necessary to provide life support measures, such as CPR, if appropriate		
		Coordinate home visits to affected families with school counselor		
		Follow up with continued counseling for those who need it		
v	TIME	SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Secure area and prevent non-essential people from accessing or witnessing the scene, if suicide occurs at school		
		Coordinate home visits to affected families with the nurse and school counselor		
v	TIME	OFFICE SECRETARY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Keep an informal time and procedures log of crisis response activities		
		Permit students to leave school only with parental permission and carefully track attendance		
		Provide substitutes for faculty and staff if they need to go home		
v	TIME	CUSTODIAN/MAINTENANCE STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Secure area and prevent non-essential people from accessing or witnessing the scene, if suicide occurs at school		
		Assist in setting up a Support Center		
v	TIME	COMMUNICATIONS COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with law enforcement agency in charge of the scene, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts and procedures for accessing support		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		
		Prepare faculty and staff by offering accurate and verified information regarding the death. Provide written statement for all to read to classes and make crisis hotline numbers available		

WEAPONS

“Clear the Halls”
“Secure the School”
“Shelter in Place”
“Evacuate the Building”

DATE / /

A dangerous or deadly weapon as defined by state and federal law includes, but is not limited to a gun, knife, metal knuckles, straight razor, noxious or irritating or poisonous gas, poison, other items used with the intent to harm, threaten or harass students, staff, parents or school visitors

√	TIME	WITNESS/REPORTED BY	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
√	TIME	PRIORITY PROCEDURES	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Call 911		
		Take safety measures to protect yourself and others		
		Stay calm and avoid confrontation if possible		
		Obtain good description of individual and the type of weapon he/she has		
		Notify the principal or designee as soon as possible		
		Inform police of your observation and be prepared to write a statement		
√	TIME	PRINCIPAL OR DESIGNEE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Direct students and staff to “Clear the Halls,” “Secure the Building,” or “Evacuate the School”		
		Attend to the safety of students and staff at all times		
		Meet with law enforcement upon arrival		
		Convene school crisis team and decide how the school will respond		
		Assess situation in regard to location of person with weapon and potential for injuries		
		Contact superintendent		
		Contact parent(s) or guardian(s) as appropriate		
		Issue a press release or assign this task to the Communication Coordinator as deemed appropriate		
		Complete an incident report and file		
		Debrief with school crisis team and staff		
√	TIME	SCHOOL CRISIS TEAM	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Convene school crisis team at the school and decide what additional resources and support will be needed		
		Provide victim assistance services as necessary		

WEAPONS (CONTINUED)

√	TIME	SCHOOL COUNSELOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Assist principal or designee with notifying parents		
		Work with the counseling coordinator to initiate grief-counseling plan as determined by need and severity of the situation		
√	TIME	SCHOOL NURSE	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Be prepared to treat injuries and assist EMS as needed		
		Assess the degree of injuries and report back to principal or designee		
		Establish triage area in safe location		
√	TIME	COMMUNICATION COORDINATOR	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		After consultation with Law Enforcement, prepare a written statement for staff to read to students and send to parent(s)/guardian(s) describing the known facts		
		Refer all media questions to law enforcement officials		
√	TIME	FACULTY AND STAFF	NAME OF CONTACT	CONTACT NO.
		Direct students who are in bathrooms or halls to join closest class and to inform the office about their location		
		Lock all hallway and exterior doors; however, no doors should be barricaded or locked in a manner that would prevent rapid evacuation		
		Ask teachers, staff, visitors and students to remain quiet in designated area, on the floor away from windows and doors, and with all lights turned off		
		Remain in "Secure the Building" mode until the principal or law enforcement commander gives the "all clear" command		
		During a gun incident, instruct students to "drop to the floor/ground" and remain out of view		
		If the fire alarm sounds, evacuate the building following the directions of the principal. Be prepared to use alternate evacuation routes away from the incident.		

**September 2011
Participant Guide**

G367 Emergency Planning for Campus Executives




FEMA



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Introduction



Introduction Objectives


- Illustrate the importance of planning and coordination.
- State the purpose of the seminar.



1


This seminar is intended as an introduction and overview of Emergency Planning given the short time frame. There are many resources that can provide further information, such as FEMA's course L363 Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Higher Education.

If you are interested in more information about the L363 Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Higher Education course, contact the Emergency Management Institute (EMI) at 301-447-1000 or 800-238-3358 for more details.




Introductions

- Tell the class:
 - Your name
 - Your school and role
 - Your Emergency Planning experience




2

Introduce yourself and provide a brief summary of your experience.




Emergency Management and Preparedness for Colleges and Universities video—Module 1: Fictional Disaster segment

Video Credit: Global Community College, Inc./ Craig Zachlod, Ed.D., C.E.M.
in partnership with ASCIP and CCCCO




Discuss campus-based emergency scenario.

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Seminar Goal

Provide executives of institutions of higher education (IHEs) with insights into multi-hazard emergency planning and their role in protecting lives, property, and operations.




5

Obtain insights into multi-hazard emergency planning and your role in protecting lives, property, and operations.

 **FEMA**

Seminar Objectives



- Provide insight into the benefits of having a well-developed campus Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).
- Address the role of senior campus officials during an incident and at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC).
- Support emergency planning efforts and be energized about helping campuses become better prepared.

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By the end of this course, you should be able to:

- Provide insight into the benefits of having a well-developed campus Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)
- Address your role as senior campus official during an incident and at the Emergency Operations Center (EOC)
- Support emergency planning efforts and be energized about helping your campus become better prepared

FEMA	
Seminar Agenda	
Topics	
Topic 1: Introduction	
Topic 2: Emergency Management: What Is It? Why Do It?	
Topic 3: Executive-level Support	
Topic 4: Developing Your Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)	
Topic 5: Evaluating Your EOP	
Topic 6: Responding Using ICS	
Topic 7: Emergency Operations Center (EOC)	
Topic 8: Engaging Your Campus	

Review the seminar agenda.

FEMA	
Seminar Materials	
Course Materials include:	
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Participant Guide• Handouts	


Course Materials include:

- Participant Guide
- Handouts

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Emergency Management: What Is It? Why Do It? Objectives

- Summarize comprehensive emergency management and its components.
- Explain the benefits of emergency planning.




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The purpose of this topic is to set the context—comprehensive emergency management—for the rest of the course in comprehensive emergency management and to ensure a foundation level of knowledge.

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Five Phases of Emergency Management

- Prevention
- Preparedness
- Response
- Recovery
- Mitigation




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A comprehensive Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) is based on the five phases of emergency management:

- Prevention
- Preparedness
- Response
- Recovery
- Mitigation

All phases are highly interconnected; that is, each phase influences the other four phases. The cycle as a whole is an ongoing process, just as the Plan is a dynamic document that requires continual updating.

Note: For the purposes of this seminar, we are using the five phases of emergency management. However, sometimes there are four phases and sometimes there are as many as six phases, depending on the source. There is no particular order, as each phase is interconnected with the others.



Prevention is the action colleges and universities take to decrease the likelihood that an event or crisis will occur.

Prevention activities may include the following:

Review existing campus and community data.

Obtain such data as:


- Previous community vulnerability assessments
- Facility assessments
- Recent community- and campus-specific crime data (by working with your Local Emergency Manager to get list of local risks)
- Weather- or natural-hazard-related data, such as flood, tornado, hurricane, or earthquake probabilities

Assess facilities and grounds.

- This involves the selection and use of a tool to assess campus vulnerabilities.
- See Handout 1.1 for an example of the type of tool to use to assess vulnerabilities.

Assess culture and climate.

- Prevention of violence, accidents, and harm in colleges and universities is enhanced by nurturing a healthy campus community
- The challenge is to foster healthy societal relationships among students and to support the students in feeling connected to the institution and the surrounding community
- In addition to supporting the learning environment, healthy relationships and connectedness are key hazard-prevention factors in that they make violence less likely to occur
- High rates of alcohol or other drug use, for example, can bring a host of problems to a campus environment, including an increased likelihood of violence, accidents, or even poisoning or overdose




In the **Preparedness** Phase, IHEs design strategies, processes, and protocols to prepare the college or university for potential emergencies.

Preparedness activities may include:

- Using an Incident Command System (ICS) for organizing personnel and resources to respond in the event of an emergency
- Developing all-hazard policies, procedures, and protocols with input from such key community partners as law enforcement, medical services, public health, fire services, and mental health
- Collaborating with community partners to establish mutual aid agreements that will establish formal interdisciplinary, intergovernmental, and interagency relationships among all the community partners and campus departments
- Negotiating contracts or partnerships that will provide the campus with resources (e.g., food, transportation, medical services, and volunteers) needed during an emergency
- Assigning training and exercising personnel to manage each ICS function and defining lines of succession in the Emergency Plan as to who is in charge when key leaders are not available. Keep in mind that it is very likely that campus resources will integrate into a community's ICS structure
- Developing plans for business and academic continuation. A Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP) or a Business Continuity Plan (BCP) ensures that the campus can recover and continue critical functions (e.g., housing, research, classes, data and voice infrastructure, facilities, administration)
- Developing plans to reunite students, staff, and faculty with their families
- Defining protocols and procedures for each type of response strategy, e.g., shelter-in-place, lockdown (if and where appropriate), or evacuation

- Establishing an emergency notification system using multiple modes of communication to alert persons on or off campus that an emergency is approaching or has occurred
- Working with the media in the community and campus public relations office to develop a campus emergency communication plan that may include drafting template messages for communicating with the media, students, faculty, staff, community, and families prior to, during, and after an emergency. The campus public information officer (PIO) often coordinates these tasks
- Coordinating campus emergency operations plans with those of State and local agencies to avoid unnecessary duplication
- Outlining schedules and plans for marketing emergency procedures and training staff, faculty, and students about the Emergency Plan procedures
- Working with campus and community mental health professionals to establish a behavioral threat assessment process that involves mental health professionals in evaluating persons who are at risk of causing harm to themselves or others
- Ensuring that a process is in place for complying with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) in handling information about a student or staff member




The **Response** Phase involves taking action to contain and resolve an emergency effectively. Responses to emergencies are enhanced by thorough and effective collaboration and planning during the Prevention-Mitigation and Preparedness Phases.

During the Response Phase, campus officials activate the EOP. Responses to emergencies vary greatly depending on the severity, magnitude, duration, and intensity of the event. This is the phase of emergency management covered most fully by the media.

Effective response requires informed decision-making and identification of clear lines of decision authority.

Response activities may include:

- Activating Incident Command System (ICS)
- Communicating with first responders and other community partners (as articulated in Memorandums of Understanding [MOUs] or other formal agreements) to make informed decisions and deploy resources
- Activating an Emergency Operation Center (EOC)
- Activating communication plans using multiple modalities (e.g., e-mail, text message, and phone)
- Determining and executing the appropriate response strategy
- Accounting for students, faculty, and staff
- Completing an after-action report as a tool for modifying and improving the EOP



The **Recovery** Phase establishes procedures, resources, and policies to assist an institution and its members to return to functioning after an emergency.

Recovery is an ongoing process. The type and breadth of recovery activities will vary based on the nature and scope of the emergency. However, the goal of the Recovery Phase is to restore the learning environment.

Planning for Recovery begins in the Preparedness Phase and requires support from campus leaders to ensure that decisions contribute to implementation and resolution of all four components of recovery. All decisions should be made in conjunction with local, and perhaps State, officials and partners.

Recovery includes:

Physical and Structural Recovery. Depending on the scope of the emergency, a key step to recovery can be the creation of a Damage Assessment Team (DAT).

- This team would likely consist of campus personnel (e.g., safety and security, facility management, risk management, budget office, transportation, food services, technology services, etc.) and community partners.
- This assessment will evaluate physical and structural damage, assess the availability of housing, transportation, and food services, and determine the degree to which equipment (e.g., computers, lab equipment) is functional. The major goal of the assessment is to determine the extent of the effects of the incident on campus and community physical assets and to identify newly created vulnerabilities.
- Data from the assessment results will facilitate decision-making about repairs and timelines for resuming learning activities.

Business Recovery. IHEs can restore administrative and business function by activating the COOP and BCP Plans.

- The Plans also should identify who has the responsibility to cancel or postpone classes or to use alternate locations.
- Additionally, a Succession Plan should be in place for each function identified in the COOP and BCP Plans, as well as strategies for accepting donations for goods and services following the emergency.

For additional information on COOP planning, you can review EMI's COOP courses:


1. IS-546 Continuity of Operations (COOP) Awareness Course
2. IS-547 Introduction to Continuity of Operations (COOP)

Restoration of the Academic Learning Environment. Restoring the learning environment may involve housing students and conducting classes in offsite locations, implementing online learning, and implementing temporary procedures regarding assignments, grading, attendance, and tuition and housing payments.

- As campus administrators, you must make swift decisions about changes to class schedules and academic calendars, and to graduation requirements.
- Moreover, it is important to communicate the decisions and next steps to the media, faculty, staff, students, and families in an expedient fashion.
- Establishing such communication venues as a website or call center to manage inquiries will facilitate the communication process.

Psychological and Emotional Recovery. It is critical to identify the mental health resources in collaboration with partners to promote psychological and emotional recovery.

- Through this collaboration, students, faculty, and staff will have the opportunity to receive short- and long-term mental health services on and off campus, or obtain referrals for longer-term counseling.
- As part of the Preparedness Plan, campus mental health personnel may want to establish a pre-screening and approval process for mental health personnel who could help during and after an emergency.
- In addition to providing mental health services for students, it is important to offer such services to workers who may be cleaning and restoring the physical and structural facilities; faculty; and staff involved in the recovery effort; as well as public safety, medical, and mental health professionals.



Mitigation is the action colleges and universities take to eliminate or reduce the loss of life and property damage related to an event or crisis, particularly in regard to events or crises that cannot be prevented.

Planning for Hazard Mitigation

Mitigation of community risks is probably beyond the control of IHE officials. However, IHE emergency planning teams should work closely with the local Emergency Manager and responders to determine:

- What hazards have been identified in the community
- What steps the community is taking to mitigate community-wide risks
- How IHE officials can help

Mitigating IHE-related Hazards

Experts in emergency management and response, risk management, structural engineering, and psychological tragedy response can suggest ways to mitigate hazards at the IHE.

After IHE officials have the necessary information about existing hazards and mitigation possibilities, they can analyze the data, including identifying the costs of mitigation and steps to be taken.


Many nonstructural hazards on a campus can be mitigated easily and inexpensively.

Prioritizing Mitigation Activities

The results of a hazard analysis can leave IHE administrators feeling overwhelmed by all the hazards they have found.

To determine which potential risks to address with available financial resources, you should prioritize mitigation activities according to:


1. The risk to life safety
2. The number of people exposed to the hazard
3. The cost to mitigate (including time, money, and other resources)
4. The probability that the hazard will occur



Q&A Activity: What Are the Benefits of Emergency Management?

Purpose: Determine the benefits of emergency management


Time: 5 minutes



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Q&A Activity: What Are the Benefits of Emergency Management?

Purpose: Determine the benefits of emergency management



Executive-level Support Objectives


- Discuss the need for executive-level support.
- Discuss the roles of executives in the planning process.
- Discuss the risks of not supporting EM planning.



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Executive-level Support Objectives:

- Discuss the need for executive-level support.
- Discuss the roles of executives in the planning process.
- Discuss the risks of not supporting EM planning.




Roles of Executives in the Planning Process

- Establish policy
- Ensure emergency planning meetings are conducted
- Ensure emergency training is taken
- Authorize official statement and release of information
- Authorize funding above existing levels when required
- Provide necessary personnel and resources

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The roles of executives in the planning process include the following:


- Establish policy in support of emergency planning
- Ensure emergency planning meetings are conducted for all employees
- Ensure emergency training is completed taken by all emergency response employees
- Through the PIO, authorize official statement and release of information to the media and other University constituent groups
- Authorize funding above existing levels when required
- Provide necessary personnel and resources



Q&A Activity: How to Support Your Campus

Purpose: Discuss the need for executive-level support during the emergency management process


Time: 5 minutes



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Q&A Activity: How to Support Your Campus


Purpose: Discuss the need for executive-level support during the emergency management process



Q&A Activity: What Reputation Means to You

Purpose: Discuss the risks of not supporting emergency management planning

Time: 5 minutes




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Q&A Activity: What Reputation Means to You

Purpose: Discuss the risks of not supporting emergency management planning


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Developing Your Emergency Operations Plan (EOP)

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Developing Your Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) Objectives

- Identify the value of having an EOP.
- Analyze the unique needs of higher education emergency planning.
- Describe the Federal requirements and mandates for emergency planning.
- Describe the key characteristics of an EOP.
- Describe the emergency planning process.




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The purpose of this topic is to give you information about a multi-hazard Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).

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Value of Having an EOP


- Continuity of instruction and research
- Maintaining control of your campus
- Identifying training
- Being prepared
- Protecting the reputation
- Protecting property and lives
- Reducing loss and damages



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The value of having an EOP includes:

- Continuity of instruction and research
- Maintaining control of your campus
- Identifying what training needs to be completed
- Being prepared for a variety of emergencies
- Protecting the reputation of the institution
- Protecting property and student, faculty, and staff lives
- Reducing possible loss and damages




The needs of higher education emergency planning are unique, and every campus is different.

IHEs have many challenges in practicing Emergency Management that are related to the distinctive structure and environment of higher education, including:


- They have disparate geographic areas to cover—areas that sometimes resemble small towns with the full extent of services in their vicinity (i.e., medical centers, sports complexes, residential centers, businesses).
- Campus population changes from day to day, semester to semester, and year to year.
- They operate complex enterprises in addition to their academic programs. Hospitals, research and development facilities, performing arts venues, athletic complexes, agriculture centers, residential complexes, food services, and transportation systems all present a unique set of circumstances that must be considered when designing Emergency Management Plans. These structural and environmental characteristics pose challenges for access control, monitoring movements, defining boundaries for facilities and grounds, standardizing procedures and decision-making processes, and prioritizing resource allocations.
- IHE governance is highly varied, complex, and often widely dispersed. Decentralized organizational structures and academic departments may be located in different buildings and have differing decision-making methods.
- Most IHEs have open access and often are geographically integrated into the surrounding community. Autonomy is encouraged and fostered for both students and faculty; at any one time, students, faculty, and staff are dispersed around the campus in classrooms, common areas, cafeterias, offices, residence halls, and numerous other facilities.
- The population served by IHEs is distinct. Most students are over 18 years of age—the age of majority in most states—and therefore are considered adults capable of making decisions on their own. This can present challenges and opportunities. It creates the need for a different set of roles and responsibilities for students during an emergency event (especially compared to the K–12 population of mostly minors).

- Another characteristic of IHEs is that they do not operate on typical 8 a.m. to 5 p.m. business-hour schedules. A college campus is alive and engaged in activity almost around the clock. From the opening of food service operations and recreation facilities in the early morning to evening activities and late-night studying in the library, the campus is constantly in motion. Unlike secondary education, many college campuses include residential facilities in which students live throughout the year.
- Even when classes are not in session, these facilities are home to many out-of-state, international, and married students. These additional factors impact how an IHE plans, responds to, and recovers from a campus emergency.



Now let's review mandates, regulations, statutes, and legal precedents at local, State, and Federal levels (Education Opportunity Act, NIMS compliance for grants):

- Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD-5)
 - Management of Domestic Incidents (HSPD-5) was issued by President George Bush in February 2003 in response to the September 11, 2001 attacks. It called for the use of a National Incident Management System (NIMS), identified steps for improved coordination of Federal, State, local, and private-sector responses to incidents, and described the ways these agencies should prepare for such a response.
- ICS Mandates
 - NIMS requires the use of ICS for all domestic responses. NIMS also requires that all levels of government, including Territories and Tribal Organizations, adopt ICS as a condition of receiving Federal preparedness funding.
 - This requirement also applies to all colleges and universities receiving Federal emergency preparedness funding, including U.S. Department of Education Emergency Management for Higher Education (EMHE) grants.
- Financial ramifications of not planning include possible ineligibility for Federal grants, including grants such as Emergency Management for Higher Education (Department of Education)




Management of Domestic Incidents: (HSPD-5) and National Preparedness (HSPD-8) combined require that State and local jurisdictions must:

- Use ICS to manage all incidents, including recurring and/or planned special events

- Integrate all response agencies and entities into a single seamless system, from the Incident Command Post, through Department Emergency Operations Centers (DEOCs) and local Emergency Operations Centers (EOCs), through the State EOC to the regional- and national-level entities
- Develop and implement a public information system
- Identify and type all resources according to established standards
- Ensure that all personnel are trained properly for the job(s) they perform
- Ensure communications interoperability and redundancy

Consider each of these requirements as you develop or revise your campus's EOP.



One of the major activities in the Preparedness phase is the development of an Emergency Operations Plan (EOP).


The four steps of the emergency planning process are:

1. Identify Hazards and Conduct Risk Assessment.
2. Develop the EOP.
3. Adopt, Implement, Test, and Train to the EOP.
4. Maintain and Update the EOP.

Testing and maintaining the Plan is a continual process.

For more information about the emergency planning process see *Comprehensive Preparedness Guide (CPG) 101: Developing and Maintaining State, Territorial, Tribal, and Local Government Emergency Plans* at:

http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/npd/CPG_101_V2.pdf



Key EOP Characteristics

- **Your EOP should:**
 - Be comprehensive
 - Establish responsibility consistent with NIMS
 - Reflect an all-hazards approach to emergency management
 - Be risk-based
 - Demonstrate collaboration with community partners
 - Address the five phases of emergency management
 - Show alignment with Federal, State, and local Emergency Management Plans and guidelines


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Your EOP should:

- Be comprehensive; cover all aspects of emergency prevention, preparedness, and response; and address mitigation concerns
- Establish responsibility consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS) and Comprehensive Preparedness Guides CPG 101 and CPG 301


- Reflect an all-hazards approach to emergency management
- Be risk-based and include hazard-specific information based on the hazard analysis
- Demonstrate collaboration with community partners
- Address the five phases of emergency management
- Show alignment with Federal, State, and local Emergency Management Plans and guidelines

CPG 101 and CPG 301 are the documents used by the emergency planning community to develop EOPs. CPG 101 provides general guidelines and CPG 301 provides recommendations for planning for access and functional needs populations.



Remember


- There is no standard, "one-size-fits all" EOP
- Only campus personnel can run campus operations
- Need to partner with community



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
Keep in mind that there is no standard plan—no one-size-fits-all—including:

- Importance of partnering with community—remember, you can call on community to help with fire, police situations, but campus personnel can actually run campus operations



Remember that the planning process is ongoing. The process does not stop once the Plan is published.


Planning teams should establish a process for review and revising the EOP. It is suggested that the EOP be reviewed at least once annually. CPG 101 requires that no part of the Plan go for more than two years without being reviewed and/or revised.



Because every group here is at a different point in the development of its EOP, it is difficult to provide specific ideas for revising the Plan. In the previous units we have been talking about the planning process; in the lessons of this unit we have talked about what should be included in your Plan; and in the list on the slide we have provided some possible triggers.


Use this information to revise your current EOPs.

Evaluating Your EOP




Evaluating Your EOP Objectives

- Discuss the importance of training, exercising, and evaluating as they relate to the EOP.
- Describe the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) program.



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The purpose of this topic is to assist you with developing and implementing a strategy for training and testing the EOP.



Benefits of Training, Exercising, and Evaluating Your EOP

- Validates training and practice
- Assesses preparedness; identifies areas for improvement
- Aims to help entities gain objective assessments
- Is the most effective means of:
 - Assessing and validating
 - Clarifying roles and responsibilities
 - Improving interagency coordination and communications
 - Identifying gaps in resources
 - Measuring performance
 - Identifying opportunities for improvement

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The benefits of training, exercising, and evaluating the EOP:

- Allows personnel, from first responders to senior officials, to validate training and practice strategic and tactical prevention, protection, response, and recovery capabilities in a risk-reduced environment

- Acts as the primary tool for assessing preparedness and identifying areas for improvement, while demonstrating community resolve to prepare for major incidents
- Aims to help entities within the community gain objective assessments of their capabilities so that gaps, deficiencies, and vulnerabilities are addressed prior to a real incident

Well-designed and well-executed exercises are the most effective means of:


- Assessing and validating policies, plans, procedures, training, equipment, assumptions, and interagency agreements
- Clarifying roles and responsibilities
- Improving interagency coordination and communications
- Identifying gaps in resources
- Measuring performance
- Identifying opportunities for improvement



Lessons Learned

Beloit College and Rock County Mass Casualty Exercise video—Beloit College segment


Time: 8 minutes 15 seconds



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Beloit College and Rock County Mass Casualty Exercise video Beloit College segment.

This describes lessons learned from a testing the EOP using a full-scale exercise.



Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP)

- Provides common exercise policy and program guidance
- Includes consistent terminology
- Provides tools to help exercise managers plan, conduct, and evaluate exercises
- Reflects lessons learned and best practices


https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx

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Let's examine the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP). It:


- Provides common exercise policy and program guidance that constitutes a national standard for exercises
- Includes consistent terminology that can be used by all exercise planners, regardless of the nature and composition of their sponsoring agency or organization
- Provides tools to help exercise managers plan, conduct, and evaluate exercises to improve overall preparedness via the HSEEP Policy and Guidance. See the following link for more information:
https://hseep.dhs.gov/pages/1001_HSEEP7.aspx
- Reflects lessons learned and best practices from existing exercise programs and can be adapted to the full spectrum of hazardous scenarios and incidents (e.g., natural disasters, terrorism, technological disasters)

Responding Using ICS

 **FEMA**


Responding Using ICS Objectives

- Describe the Incident Command System (ICS).
- Describe the benefits of ICS for incident management.
- Discuss the incident management roles.
- Identify campuses' levels of ICS preparedness.



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The purpose of this topic is to review Incident Command System (ICS) concepts.

 **FEMA**

What is ICS?


- The Incident Command System
 - Is based on proven incident management practices
 - Defines incident response organizational concepts and structures
 - Consists of procedures for managing personnel, facilities, equipment, and communications
 - Is used throughout the lifecycle of an incident
 - Can be used for non-threatening events such as graduation, football games, or concerts

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
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Group Discussion: Why Do We Need ICS?

Discuss the need for ICS.



ICS is an effective method for organizing a response.

- The Incident Command System is the result of decades of lessons learned in the organization and management of emergency incidents.
 - ICS has been tested in more than 30 years of emergency and non-emergency applications, by all levels of government and in the private sector.
- ICS helps to ensure:
 - The use of Common Terminology, enabling diverse incident management and support entities to work together
 - The safety of responders, students, faculty, workers, and others
 - The achievement of response objectives
 - The efficient use of resources




ICS Organizational Structure

- Differs from day-to-day structures and positions
- Unique ICS positions designed to avoid confusion during incident response
- Rank may change during an incident
- Has your institution involved all levels of the hierarchy in the discussion about roles and training?

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The ICS Organizational Structure is unique and easy to understand. There is no correlation between the ICS organization and the administrative structure of any single agency or jurisdiction. This is deliberate, because confusion over different position titles and organizational structures has been a significant stumbling block to effective incident management in the past.

For example, someone who serves as a Chief every day may not hold that title when deployed under an ICS structure or the Dean of Students may become the PIO.




Incident Commander

- The most qualified person is designated as the Incident Commander.
 - Independent of rank
- Incident Commander is the only position in ICS that is always staffed during the incident.
- At an incident, the higher-ranking person may assume command, maintain command as is, or transfer command to a third party.

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All incident responses begin by establishing command.

Rank, grade, and seniority are not the factors used to select the Incident Commander. The Incident Commander is always a highly qualified individual trained to lead the incident response. For example, the University President may not automatically be the Incident Commander.



The Incident Commander has overall responsibility for managing the incident by objectives, planning strategies, and implementing tactics. The Incident Commander is the only position that is always staffed in ICS applications. On small incidents and events, one person, the Incident Commander, may accomplish all of the Incident Management Functions (Command, Operations, Planning, Logistics, and Finance/Administration). The Incident Commander is responsible for all ICS management functions until he or she delegates the function.


The Incident Commander:

- Provides overall leadership for incident response
- Ensures incident safety
- Takes policy direction from the Executive/Senior Official (e.g., Principal, Superintendent)
- Delegates authority to others
- Establishes incident objectives

The Incident Commander will size up the incident and assess resource needs. If the incident is complex and/or long-term, more staff may be needed. In addition, a Deputy Incident Commander may be assigned. If a Deputy is assigned, he or she must be fully qualified to assume the Incident Commander's position.

A Deputy Incident Commander may be designated to:

- Perform specific tasks as requested by the Incident Commander
- Perform the Incident Command function in a relief capacity
- Represent an assisting agency that shares jurisdiction



Incident Management Roles

Executive Official's Role:	Incident Commander Role:
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Provides the following to the Incident Commander:<ul style="list-style-type: none">– Policy– Mission– Direction– Authority• Location: EOC	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Manages the incident at the scene• Keeps Executive Official(s) informed on all important matters pertaining to the incident• Location: On-scene

To maintain Unity of Command and safety of responders, the Chain of Command must ***NOT*** be bypassed.

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The Executive Policy Group (University President, Provost, Chancellor, Dean, VP of Student Affairs, etc.) is responsible for the managing the incident. Along with this responsibility, by virtue of their positions, these individuals have the authority to make decisions, commit resources, obligate funds, and command the resources necessary to protect the students, faculty, staff, and facilities.

Having the responsibility does not mean that the Executive/Senior Official assumes a command role over the on-scene incident operation. Rather, the Executive/Senior Official:

- Provides policy guidance on priorities and objectives based on situational needs and the Emergency Operations Plan
- Oversees resource coordination and support to the on-scene command from an Operations Center

The Incident Commander is the primary person in charge at the incident. In addition to managing the incident scene, he or she must keep the Executive/Senior Officials informed and up to date on all important matters pertaining to the incident.


The ICS hierarchy of command must be maintained, and not even Executives and Senior Officials can bypass the system.



Are You Prepared to Respond Using ICS?

A jurisdiction's preparedness plans, policies, and regulations must:

- Comply with NIMS, including ICS
- Cover all hazards and be based on risk assessments
- Include delegations of authority
- Include up-to-date information
- Include contact information



Distribute **Handout 1-2** after discussion.

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Preparedness plans may take many forms, but the most common include:


- School or local Emergency Operations Plans (EOPs) which may be supplemented with Standard Operating Guidelines (SOGs) and Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that reflect the EOP
- School, jurisdictional, or agency policies

Note: EOPs are developed at the Federal, State, and local levels to provide a uniform response to all hazards that a community may face. EOPs written after October 2005 must be consistent with the National Incident Management System (NIMS).

A campus's preparedness plans, policies, and regulations must:


- Comply with NIMS, including ICS
- Cover all hazards and be based on risk assessments
- Include delegations of authority and lines of succession (as appropriate)
- Include up-to-date information about resources available for assignment during a response
- Include contact information for school administrators and response personnel

Emergency Operations Center (EOC)



Emergency Operations Center Objectives


- Describe the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and its role.
- Identify the components of an effective EOC.
- Identify the benefits of an effective EOC.
- Recognize the ICS and EOC principles when presented with an incident scenario.



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Emergency Operations Center Objectives

- Describe the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) and its role.
- Identify the components of an effective EOC.
- Identify the benefits of an effective EOC.
- Recognize the ICS and EOC principles when presented with an incident scenario.



Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

- An EOC is:
 - NOT a part of the ICS structure
 - Part of a larger system of Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) that is integral to domestic response as required by NIMS
 - A physical location
 - Staffed with personnel trained for and authorized to represent their agency/discipline
 - Equipped with mechanisms for communicating with the incident site and obtaining resources and potential resources
 - Managed through protocols
 - Applicable at different levels of government

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Previously, we discussed the incident management roles. The Executive Policy Group has the authority to make decisions, commit resources, obligate funds, and command the resources necessary to protect the students, faculty, staff, and facilities.

The Executive Policy Group may convene at an EOC. The EOC is not a part of the ICS structure; rather, it is activated to support the on-scene response during an escalating incident by relieving the Incident Commander of the burden of external coordination and securing additional resources.


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Multi-Agency Coordination (MAC) is a system, not a facility. Entities that may comprise a multi-agency system include dispatch, on-scene command, resource coordination centers, Emergency Operations Centers, and coordination entities in groups.

As part of the overall MAC system, the EOC provides a central location where government at any level can provide interagency coordination and executive decision-making in support of the incident response.




An EOC is used:

- In varying ways within all levels of government and the private sector
- To provide coordination, executive decision-making, and support during emergencies

An EOC does **not**:

- Command the on-scene level of the incident



The criteria for an effective EOC. FEMA Recommendations for EOCs include:

- Facility size — 50 sq. ft. per person
- Location — low-risk site
- Power/fuel — adequate to operate at full power 24 hours a day for 14 days

The time it takes to set up an EOC should be 15 minutes or less.

Some EOC layout considerations include:


- Facilitate centralized coordination and efficient exchange of information
- Organize group work areas by Standard Emergency Management (SEMS) function
- Adapt to available space

Guides for EOC staff might include:

- Setting up the EOC
- Communications Plan — phones, radios
- Message-handling protocol
- Forms — types and usage
- Resource lists


The EOC must contain the following spaces/rooms to provide adequate working room:

1. Day-to-day office space
2. Meeting/lead agency/executive room
3. Communications Room for radio/telephone and support equipment
4. Operations room for emergency coordination
5. Restrooms
6. Mechanical/electrical switch room
7. Kitchen/break area
8. Storage area for maps, procedures, publications, supplies, etc.



A self-assessment of the state of the EOC by asking the following:

- Do you have a facility that can be activated rapidly?
- What condition is your EOC in?
- Are you ready to activate your EOC in 10–15 minutes in the event of an incident?




An effective EOC:

- Helps establish a common operating picture (COP) which facilitates collaborative planning and assists everyone in achieving situational awareness
- Facilitates long-term operations
- Improves continuity

- Provides ready access to all available information
- Simplifies information analysis and verification
- Promotes resource identification and assignment


A single EOC facility functions more efficiently than multiple EOCs. With a single location, officials can meet, make decisions, and coordinate activities.



Capstone Activity: Incident

Purpose: Illustrate how hectic an incident can get

Time: 10 minutes




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Capstone Activity: Incident

Purpose: Illustrate how hectic an incident can get


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Engaging Your Campus




Engaging Your Campus Objectives

- Discuss methods for helping to obtain campus support.





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The purpose of this topic is to give you suggestions to enable you to engage the campus community in the essential elements of emergency planning.



Methods for Helping Obtain Campus Support

- Newsletters and websites
- Letters
- Charter letter from the president
- Posters and flyers
- Statistics for parents

Distribute samples.

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Some items that will help you engage your campus faculty, staff, students, parents, and community—like letters, charter letter from the president, posters that advertise plans, the ability to provide good statistics for parents.

. Other ideas include:

- **Newsletter and Website Copy:** Use copy for your own website communications or share it with business and community groups to include in their newsletters.
- **Poster/Flyer:** Use the poster and flyer to provide information about local events or include inspirational messages. Distribute posters/flyers around campus or display them in high-traffic areas.
- **Fact Sheet:** Learn more about Emergency Planning with this handy fact sheet.

Websites that may have helpful information include:

FEMA Competitive Training Grant Program:

<http://www.fema.gov/emergency/ctgp/index.shtm>

FEMA Training Sites: <http://www.fema.gov/prepared/train.shtm>

Lessons Learned Information System: <https://www.llis.dhs.gov/index.do>

IAEM (International Association of Emergency Managers) Disaster Resistant University
List Serve: <http://www.iaem.com/committees/college/>

ICS Pocket Guide and other Disaster Preparedness Guides: www.quickseries.com